Chapter XV — The causes are further explained why very many more recent writers really teach purely mental restrictions, and consequently lies. The explanation by which Fr. La Croix interprets the condemned propositions is rejected. His judgment concerning Fr. Cárdenas is approved, and extended to other authors

I. The second cause why very many more recent writers unwillingly fall into the error of purely mental restriction, and consequently into lies, arises from this: that they pervert the order of things, preferring vile things to precious ones, and corporal to spiritual ones. They strive to couple these two together, even at the cost of truth: the guardianship of natural secrets, of sacramental confession, and of other hidden truths, which charity, prudence, justice, and fidelity bid be concealed; and the preservation of one's own body, which they wish to keep intact and unharmed. They think that both the rights of human life, and the concealment of truth, remain unimpaired by these means. But if one or the other must perish, let truth perish, and life be preserved. If a husband, dagger drawn, attacks his adulterous wife, so that, an oath having been given, she confess the adultery committed, let her deny that she committed adultery, and confirm the denial by oath, so as to preserve her life. Augustine most excellently explains this cause (Book Against Lying, ch. 18): "What of the fact that lovers of this life do not hesitate to prefer it to truth, so that man may not die — or rather, so that man, who is one day to die, may die a little later — they wish us not only to lie, but even to perjure ourselves, so that, forsooth, the vain safety of man may not pass a little sooner, and we take the name of our God in vain? And there are, among them, learned men, who even fix rules, and set limits, of when one ought, and when one ought not, to perjure oneself."

II. Moreover, so as to preserve both of these, they thrust upon us a paradox, most crafty of all. For they object that some precepts are impossible to fulfill, unless we say that the use of restriction is licit. For the precept of guarding the seal presses: it is not lawful to keep silent, since silence itself would betray the truth. It is necessary, then, to speak. It must be said, then, either that the precept of guarding the seal is impossible; or that words, in such an event, lose their own signification; or that, with reference to incommunicable knowledge, words contain some true, not manifestable, sense. Not to multiply words: it is necessary that some way of concealing truth be licit. This paradox is founded on a perversion of the order of things — since the theologians of this doctrine postpone precious things to vile ones, and are unwilling to protect the seal by the shedding of blood, as the Fathers teach after Augustine, but say that it is a most grave yoke, exceeding human weakness — that of a mere fallacy of words.

III. This very paradox, by which the order of things is disturbed, Augustine proposes to himself, and refutes it, Book Against Lying, ch. 18: "In this men err, that they subject precious things to viler ones. For when you have granted that some evil is to be admitted, lest another, graver one, be admitted; each one measures the evil not by the rule of truth, but by his own desire and custom, and reckons that graver which he himself shrinks from more, not that which is truly more to be fled. This whole vice is born from a perversity of love. For since there are two lives of ours: one everlasting, which is divinely promised; the other temporal, in which we now are — when anyone begins to love this temporal life more than that everlasting one, on account of this, which he loves, he thinks all things are to be done; nor does he reckon any sins graver than those which take away from this life, or which unjustly, or illicitly, take away from it some advantage, or which take it away by death." By many arguments Augustine utterly refutes this aforesaid paradox, and adduces to himself the example of the woman of Jericho, who lied, so as to guard both her own life, and that of her guests. But Augustine shows that, if that woman had preserved truth, where there was no deceit, in passing over to the city of God, she ought to have kept the guests, and truth, faithful to the Israelites. Could she not have said to those asking: I know where they are; I fear God; I do not betray them? He could have said this, if it were already certain, by mercy, that... What of it, you will say, if, having heard this, they had killed her, and searched the house? Yet even if she had been killed by her own fellow-citizens, for a work of mercy she would have ended that life by a death precious in the sight of the Lord, and her kindness toward them would not have been in vain.

IV. St. Augustine dispels the objected sophism with no trouble: he decrees that the seal must be guarded, and wishes blood to be shed, rather than either lying, or betraying the innocent. Turn over all the books of more recent Probabilists on this argument, and you will scarcely find one teaching that death must be undergone, blood shed, so as to avoid the danger of an officious lie, except in the matter of justice, and of religion. Those things which, Augustine says, can harm this mortal life, they exceedingly dread: they make life itself too precious. From which principle it follows that they object, as impossible, only those precepts which sometimes cannot be observed with peril to life: of which more below.

V. The third cause of deception is that they conflate the unique and peculiar case of the Confessor with other cases. For, as soon as they institute discourse concerning equivocations, and mental restrictions, they oppose the case of the Confessor, or of a Prince's Secretary. The guardianship of the natural, and sacramental, seal is a matter of natural, divine, and human right. The debt of preserving this seal takes precedence over any other debt toward anyone else. Hence men of the Christian profession, otherwise most easily credulous, and, without any distinction, read in books that the material use of words, or communicable and incommunicable knowledge, is licit for guarding a seal, as if with some weight, this leans, with pressing force, indeed into error... into error, that it is licit for all men indiscriminately to use, for concealing truth, the very speech-formulas which they read, in books, are used for guarding the seal of the Confessor. By this cause, then, the human mind, persuaded by that example of the Confessor's seal, with the greatest preoccupation, falls into this error: that it judges to be licit whatever the same authors, with more ample power, and just examination, except for that seal.

VI. I could adduce many, indeed innumerable, documents, by which to fortify this cause which I have indicated. I will report one or two. In common with other Theologians, Fr. Gabriel Daniel, in his book on mental restriction, part 1, n. 1, has this: "Whatever is said of a Confessor, other authors likewise transfer, whether about grave secrets, or about a judge, so that he might not question without authority, and legitimate power." By this same reasoning, other authors grant, and privilege, unlearned men, ignorant of the artifice of amphibologies, according to the laws of the case, to be judged in cases pertaining to morals. They establish, for those unversed in these matters, that one of the many methods, sufficiently indicated, of these which Theologians have devised for concealing truth, is enough for concealing truth. Thus Filliucci (tract. 25, ch. 11, n. 78): "For unlearned men, who do not know how to conceive an amphibology in particular, it suffices that they have the intention of affirming, or denying, in a sense which really contains truth, for which it is necessary that they at least know, in a universal way, that they can deny in some true sense." You see? At length, the true sense is discovered, not only of concealing, but even of denying, the truth. Fr. Viva, Castropalao, and more recent writers commonly teach the same. Below, however, we shall show that the case of the Confessor is absolutely peculiar. Many things, moreover, concerning the Confessor himself, which cannot be purged of a lie, they teach. They wrongly infer, from the Confessor's parity, that all men can use twofold, communicable and incommunicable, knowledge.

VII. The last cause, finally, why more recent writers are deceived in this question, arises from the falsest interpretation, by which they interpret the condemned propositions — which vain interpretation draws its origin from the first cause, which we explained in the preceding chapter. They are unwilling, as we have seen, that these propositions be condemned as they are in the authors, in whose books they lie; and therefore they have devised some extraordinary sense, and uphold that they were condemned in this. They say, then, that propositions 26 and 27 are condemned in this sense: namely, that if someone uses purely mental restrictions for any end whatsoever, without any distinction, or for any necessity, or utility whatsoever. Thus Fr. La Croix (Bk. III, part 1, ch. 2, dub. 4, §1, n. 284): "Since," he says, "proposition 27, condemned, says that a sufficient cause for using these amphibologies is 'whenever,' this word 'whenever' sufficiently signifies that, by these prohibited amphibologies, are understood those purely mental restrictions of which the immediately preceding proposition 26 spoke; and it adds that this damns their use for whatever necessity, or utility." By these last words, this author indicates that we ought not to use these amphibologies for any necessity, or utility, whether grave or light — that is, in clearer words, that it is forbidden to use those restrictions upon any occasion whatsoever, and outside the case of extreme, most grave necessity. And, although the words in which Fr. La Croix expresses his interpretation are somewhat obscure, nonetheless that this is his genuine sense is gathered from his doctrine, which establishes that grave causes make it so that a restriction is not purely mental, and, on the contrary, that light causes render an amphibology purely mental. This is already demonstrated, §5, n. 309, where he says: "When the causes are not very grave for so restricting, if the restriction is made... it will be purely mental." Read what he teaches in the same place, §3, n. 305, and what he writes, Bk. VI, ch. 5, n. 1687: "Outside these, and similar most grave cases, it would be a lie thus to use words." Consult what I have said, ch. 10.

VIII. This interpretation, handed down by Fr. La Croix in a few, and somewhat obscure, words, other authors teach more openly. Many being omitted, I will describe the interpretation which the Author of an Allegatio, published not long ago against the often-praised Fr. Orsi, gave in his defense of Fr. Cattaneo. He writes thus, §37: "He greatly errs who thinks that all ambiguous locutions, equivocations, and restrictions have generally been condemned, as scandalous things, because such things are named in propositions 26, 27, and 28, by the holy memory of Innocent XI. To this thought Fr. Orsi seems, in several places, to accede — since, this posited, he ought to reckon condemned even his own equivocations of the second kind, which are not excepted by privilege. But the scandal of these propositions consists in this: that they grant such things as licit, as it is commonly said, in every respect — that is, for any end, under the title of any utility whatsoever, even on the occasion when truth is sought with all justice — as anyone can gather from the natural and obvious sense of these same propositions, even without great study, from those Theologians who have examined them most diligently." Which I have thus rendered in Latin: "He is greatly mistaken who thinks that all ambiguous locutions, equivocations, and restrictions, since these are named in propositions 26, 27, 28, by the holy memory of Innocent XI, are to be reckoned as condemned as though scandalous." Fr. Orsi seems to accede to this opinion, without reconsidering that, this admitted, he ought to reckon condemned even his own equivocations of the second kind, which are not excepted by privilege. Wherefore the scandal of these propositions pertains to this: that it advises the most frequent, and constant, use of them — namely, for any end, and for the utility of anyone whatsoever, and even in the very case in which truth is justly sought — as each one can gather from the native, and obvious, sense of these same propositions. Nor did the most accurate examination of the Theologians who subjected these propositions to examination collect anything else for this purpose.

IX. Several things here are worth noting. First, that these authors are unwilling for the condemned propositions to be condemned as they are in the authors from whom they were abstracted; and from this impotent affection toward the authors of these propositions have proceeded so many absurd fabrications. I ask that it not be tiresome to weigh seriously what the cited Anonymous author, from Fr. La Croix, and others, comments.

X. So that it may clearly appear how ruinous his interpretation is, we must attend to what the Pontiff really condemned in the aforesaid propositions. That the Pontiff condemned mental restrictions in the recounted propositions, as lies, and confirmed by oath, is most evidently gathered from proposition 26 itself, in which it is said that one who uses mental restriction really does not lie, nor is a perjurer. Here the assertion condemned is this. It is certain, then, that its opposite is most true — namely, that one who uses purely mental amphibology really does lie, and is a perjurer. This is so evident, that even Fr. Viva himself, in his commentaries on these same propositions, affirms it in express words: that the use of purely mental restriction is, by this thesis, really to be declared a lie, and an oath added to it, in whatever manner, and for any end whatsoever, perjury. Fr. Cárdenas teaches the same, in express words (dissert. 19, ch. 3, n. 28): "From the censure of proposition 26, it clearly stands that these mental restrictions are condemned by the Pontiff, no less than a lie is unlawfully done in any case; indeed it is declared that in that case an oath added to it is a perjury." The same is proved from those words, "He does not lie, nor is a perjurer": for the assertion of these words is condemned as scandalous. And consequently the contradictory proposition must be asserted by the Master of the Roman Chair — namely, that one who uses this mental restriction, and swears under it, lies, and is a perjurer.

XI. From this principle alone it is most evidently established that this Anonymous Author, defender of Fr. Cattaneo, does not concede that lies are ever licit — although he himself really teaches this. For he teaches that only the constant use ("in every respect") of the condemned restrictions, or amphibologies, is forbidden. But these amphibologies are condemned as lies. Therefore this Author teaches that only the constant use of lies, for any end and utility whatsoever, is condemned; but not the rare use, urgent grave cause pressing. Therefore he teaches that lies are sometimes licit. This inference follows necessarily from his doctrine, and is so evident, and manifest, that it can be evaded by no subterfuge whatsoever. See into what snares they entangle themselves, so as to defend the sayings of all their authors! And what we cannot sufficiently marvel at is that this Anonymous allegator dares to delude the entire human race, when he says that the scandal of the said propositions consists only in this: that they grant such things as licit, in every respect, that is, for any end, under the title of any utility whatsoever. This interpretation, as I have said, is most openly false. For this is the condemned proposition, in which the causes for using amphibologies are assigned. "The cause of using these amphibologies is whenever it is necessary, or useful, for the safety of the body, honor, protecting family property, or for any other act of virtue, such that the concealment of truth is then judged expedient, and worthy of pursuit." These causes — namely, the preservation of bodily safety, the defense of honor, and of family goods, the exercise of virtue, etc. — are, in everyone's estimation, most grave causes. With what face, then, is it said that these restrictions were condemned for any end, and any utility whatsoever, if in the proposition itself only grave, and most grave, causes are recounted! Did Fr. Sánchez (whose proposition this is) approve the use of restrictions for light causes, or for any causes whatsoever? The daily use, too, in familiar speech (in every respect), all the authors of mental restrictions, with the same Fr. Sánchez, condemned — as can be established from their perusal. Only for grave causes, which Fr. Sánchez recounts, did they teach mental restrictions to be licit. All this is manifest. What more? If, according to the common opinion of the Doctors, and the obvious sense of the propositions, the Church declared that purely mental restrictions are lies, and proscribed them as lies, can it be said that it was forbidden to use lies continuously, and for any end and utility whatsoever, but not so in extreme events, and for grave causes?

XII. Fr. La Croix, who among more recent Collectors of moral Casuistry does not hold the last place, although he most often reports the diverse opinions on both sides, in this matter sincerely confesses that many things need much limitation, which grave authors, not only those before, but even those who wrote after the condemned propositions, hold. He warns readers that Fr. Cárdenas, who at length interpreted the aforesaid propositions, is to be read cautiously among the rest — though he does not himself render his own judgment, but leaves the choice of opinions to the readers' discretion. Here are Fr. La Croix's own words (Bk. III, part 1, ch. 2, dub. 4, §3, n. 296): "According to what has been said, many things which are found everywhere in grave authors, which Fr. Moya reserves — Vol. II, disp. 1, q. 6, to Fr. Cárdenas (dissert. 19, on the condemned proposition 26, ch. 6) — must now, after the condemnation of the recounted propositions, be used with much limitation, since some things are put there which deservedly need to be limited." To this judgment I subscribe, and I add that very many more recent writers, among whom Fr. Viva, are to be read most cautiously in their commentaries on the condemned propositions. I likewise warn that Fr. Patritius Sporer must be read cautiously, who, contrary to the pious and sincere warning of Fr. La Croix, proposes to readers Fr. Cárdenas as master and interpreter of the condemned propositions. Here are Sporer's own words (tract. 3, on the Decalogue, ch. 1, sect. 3, resol. 1, n. 108, p. 116): "Other cases, difficult in practice, look to the famous Fr. Juan de Cárdenas, of the Society of Jesus, in his Theological Crisis, Cologne 1692, dissert. 19, ch. 6, which explains the said propositions fully, quite liberally." Fr. La Croix warns that Cárdenas is to be read cautiously; Fr. Sporer advises him to be taken up as a famous master. He calls his liberality in this matter "laxity," which he boasts of following, in the place cited, n. 100: "Nonetheless," he says, "in a matter most practical, and most necessary for Confessors to know, saving reverence for the Holy See, I dare to say what Juan de Cárdenas dares, in his Theological Crisis, dissert. 19, and other modern Doctors, explaining the aforesaid propositions, as they lie, too laxly." And, what is worse, Sporer gathers what he writes not only from Cárdenas, and others who lived after Innocent XI, but from Fr. Sánchez, Tamburini, and others, who taught the condemned restrictions before the said Pontiff. Not only Fr. Sporer, but even very many more recent writers, proceed by the same path, and use entirely the same principles as the authors before Innocent XI used. They say that they reject the proscribed propositions, as they sound, as they lie; but really they teach the same, only the words being varied. Wherefore I again advise, in this matter, that very many more recent writers, and especially those who adhere to a probability lesser in the sight of a greater probability, be read cautiously — so that lies may be shown to be lies, and perjuries avoided. For it is evidently established, from what has been said thus far, that this pertains to it: that we show that the opinions of many more recent writers are not innocent lies, which the ancients called lies, which really are such — as we shall say even from Caramuel himself in the following chapter. This, nevertheless, is fitting for us to hold, as it becomes us to think: that they most innocently erred, just as those innocently erred who taught purely mental restrictions.