Chapter — Concina, Theologia Christiana III
Chapter XVI — Fr. Diego de la Fuente Hurtado upholds that purely mental restrictions are licit for an honorable cause, even after Innocent XI condemned these restrictions. Fr. Carlo Antonio Casnedi teaches that purely mental restrictions are not condemned
I. No one, among the Probabilists, was permitted to read so openly upholding purely mental restrictions condemned by the Church, as Fr. Diego de la Fuente Hurtado. Fr. Carlo Antonio Casnedi, on the contrary, does not defend purely mental restrictions as licit, but teaches another paradox — namely, that they are not condemned by the Church... .
II. Lest some of the Probabilists cry out with the customary childish charge, I propose in the very title of this chapter, for discussion, the reason adduced from Fr. Diego de la Fuente Hurtado himself, in his Reformed Theology, dissert. 15, ch. 5, n. 16: "PURELY MENTAL RESTRICTION" is thus defined by him: "one speech can be constructed, though the words composing it are false, without any addition, both internal and external, in the manner of a whole speech uttered by the speaker." Nor does this author fear to allege Sts. Gregory and Thomas in patronage of so great an error.
III. After the alleged authority of St. Gregory, he proceeds thus, n. 42: "Whence I dispute thus, a priori. A merely false signification of words does not suffice for the intention of deceiving, as is clear from its received definition: for its manifestation carries a signification, unless it is intended, that truth be concealed, and another perceived by those who are ignorant of it. Everyone who lies does so with the intention of deceiving. Why does the speaker use a false signification of words, unless it is so that the questioner may not attain the truth? Therefore..." etc. In our case, the speaker knows the truth, and knows the questioner's intention, even if in this matter men are accustomed to it. No one in the world, however, if he conceals what causes harm, is thereby a liar. The speaker, in this case, does not utter a false signification with the intention of deceiving; for if he did this, he would sin as those who lie without any urgent cause do. But this is true, except in those cases where he cannot manifest without prejudice to himself. Therefore he really does not lie before God with the intention of deceiving; for if he did this, he would not utter it, but only with the intention of expressing some conception of his own concealed from the questioner, so that truth... Therefore the intention of deceiving in these cases is not present, so that the questioner cannot attain the truth. Therefore the concealment of the truth, by means of a false signification of words, by which the speaker deceives and deludes him, who afterward directs this deception toward the concealment of truth. The end of every lie is concealment; the deceived questioner is deceived.
IV. Fr. Hurtado explains his doctrine in the same place, n. 43: "It is explained. One who, compelled by just necessity, says with mental restriction that he did not do what he really did, does not utter these words with the intention of denying the deed in itself, absolutely, nor with the intention of affirming that he has, within his mind, an absolute judgment negating the deed, or of persuading another that he has it; but only with the intention of concealing the truth of the deed, by denying it, not in whatever manner, but with an added restriction, which verifies the negation of it. He does not, therefore, really speak, as is necessary for a lie, with the intention of deceiving." For that voice, "I did not do it," so far as it is concerned in itself, is indifferent to denying with an addition, and without it: for otherwise one who did on another day what he speaks of, and therefore truly says, "I did not do it yesterday," could be judged a liar immediately upon this utterance, unless it is established that it was uttered without any addition. But this is not established precisely from the utterance itself, nor would he be further suspected, whether he adds anything else, by which his words are restricted, and thus verified. Then, it is not established either from the fact that the addition is hidden: for what is hidden to others is not hidden to the speaker, and this suffices for him to be able to intend to speak in this sense, and not in another. Therefore, whether the verifying restriction is public, or utterly hidden, the intention of deceiving will always be absent.
V. He warns you that he speaks of a restriction utterly hidden mentally. For although it is utterly hidden to the hearers, it is not hidden, nonetheless, to the speaker. Is this not, Father, a lie hidden to the speaker himself? Nor is there any objection you can raise. He who manifestly denies that he did what he did, retains it in mind, but does not deny it precisely with respect to that which he had expressed by voice and words. But he had not, in this way, expressed anything except the deed absolutely, not the external deed. He denies, therefore, the deed absolutely, which is, without doubt, false. For although he adds in his mind that word "yesterday," this does not restrict the speech uttered; since it is not a part, or modification, or complement of it. For that "yesterday" subsists entirely within the mind. Therefore it cannot restrict the external speech.
VI. To this he responds, in these words, n. 45: "These things persuade; but do not fully convince... because sacraments too are placed in the genus of a sensible sign; nonetheless they are composed, adequately, of sensible and insensible things, as the Eucharist, from visible species, and the body of Christ, which can be perceived by no sense there... Then, further, the Mass is not one thing by mere aggregation, like stones in a heap, but a certain whole, artfully composed... and yet it consists not only of words intelligibly uttered, but of speeches partly vocal, uttered aloud, partly mental, and partly SAID SECRETLY."
VII. I myself would be mad, if I refuted these things. I have transcribed them, so that it may be plain to all what the human mind can devise, so as to elude the most manifest oracles of the Church. But, so that it may evidently appear that this Theologian's doctrine is condemned by the Church, recall to your eyes the condemned proposition 26: "If someone, whether alone, or in the presence of others, whether questioned, or of his own accord, whether for the sake of recreation, or for any other purpose, swears that he did not do something which he really did, understanding within himself some other thing which he did not do, or some other way than that in which he did it, or whatever else true is added, he does not really lie, nor is he a perjurer."
VIII. What does Fr. de la Fuente Hurtado say to this? He responds, ch. 8, n. 71: "The Pontiff's aim was not to condemn opinions received of old, by the common reckoning of Doctors, after diligent examination, as probable, and safe in practice." What signifies "received of old by the common reckoning of Doctors"? In no author, except Fr. Sánchez, is the adduced condemned proposition repeated. I ask, whether the Pontiffs condemned propositions which European Theologians, or Japanese, Chinese, Persian, Egyptian Theologians, taught. The Jansenists too cry out, indeed even more evidently than Fr. Sánchez, that the Church did not condemn the propositions which Jansenius taught. And yet no severe critic, by force of reasoning, denies that the condemned propositions concerning mental restrictions are found in Fr. Sánchez, and other Casuists, condemned by Alexander VII and Innocent XI, as the five propositions condemned by Innocent X are found in Jansenius. Fr. de la Fuente Hurtado, then, gives the Jansenists occasion to imitate him in eluding the pontifical decrees.
IX. To dispatch the matter briefly, Fr. de la Fuente not only teaches that lies (for purely mental restrictions, by Fr. Viva's own showing, are rotten lies) are licit; but he openly asserts that these purely mental restrictions are taught by St. Augustine, by St. Thomas, by St. Gregory. Read him, in the place cited, ch. 12, n. 47, p. 306. The defenders of lies taught that these were licit for protecting life, chastity, for avoiding another's death; Fr. de la Fuente Hurtado teaches, dissert. 16, ch. 2, n. 11, that it suffices for swearing honestly, without sin, that necessity be present, which suffices, and is required, for having explored the truth. What cause, then, suffices for swearing, suffices for lying. If you wish more, read him yourself, and you will find worse things.
X. Fr. Carlo Antonio Casnedi (Vol. V, disp. 9, sect. 4) asks whether PURE restriction is condemned by Innocent XI. He answers, however, n. 79, in these words: "Celebrated among other ways of not lying, and at the same time of not speaking the truth, is PURE restriction, denying absolutely by words, and at the same time limiting, by a mental addition, that same vocal negation. Theologians of great name have stood for the licit use of PURE restriction, among whom Fr. Suárez, Fr. Sánchez, Fr. Lessius, Fr. Dicastillo, Fr. Moya, Fr. Raynaud." After a few words, he adds this, n. 80 and following.
XI. "It is worth the trouble now to show that this opinion of the Doctors concerning PURE mental restriction does not coincide with the condemned proposition 26. For, of its liberty, or non-liberty, I shall speak next. I say, then, that this opinion concerning PURE mental restriction was not condemned by Innocent XI. Thus expressly Fr. de la Fuente, who solidly proves that it is not condemned; indeed he wishes it to be still today licit, whenever grave necessity presses — which second part, however, I do not approve.... I show my conclusion, then, first. Because the Pope condemns, concerning perjury and lying, a restriction limited by clauses added in proposition 26 condemned. But none of the Doctors whom I have cited, and can cite, if attentively read, and many others whom I have not cited, admit a restriction with the said clauses added, contained in proposition 26. Therefore neither do I admit it as condemned. Therefore the opinion concerning PURE restriction, free from all the circumstances added in proposition 26 condemned, is not condemned." "I show it, second: because with equal right it could be said that the sensible restriction is condemned, and PURE restriction is called (as he says, n. 91) 'the safer condition of Doctors,' or 'transcribed witnesses in the source,' yet not the opinions which readers are assumed to use... Wretched, indeed, conclusions, from a superficial reading, or transcribed elsewhere, not understood in themselves.... not pure, but restriction they not only do not teach, but detest."
XII. This I have wished to transcribe, so as to stop the mouths of the Jansenists. They cry out that in Fr. Thomas Sánchez both condemned propositions, 26 and 27, are more evidently found than the five condemned propositions are found in Jansenius. And if the authority of the Church (which nonetheless prevails over every moment of reason) is set aside, and the matter is decided by the mere criticism of human reasoning, it is certain that the two cited propositions, with all their clauses, not one removed, are found more luminously to be true in Fr. Thomas Sánchez than the five are found in Jansenius. In both they really exist. That five are found in Jansenius, the Church has declared. That both condemned propositions are found in Sánchez, as they lie, the eyes themselves determine. Nor does anything precede, or follow, in Fr. Sánchez, which tempers the error and laxity of the propositions. Let the Jansenists know, then, that it is a hallucination in broad daylight for Fr. Casnedi, and Fr. de la Fuente, who are ready to deny that the sun shines. Wherefore we confess that the Church condemned the propositions which were excerpted from the books of the Casuists, not those which no one taught. Let Fr. Carlo Antonio Casnedi say that we are superficial readers. I say, meanwhile, that this practical zeal of his generates the greatest scandal, and gives the Jansenists a most seductive occasion, and instills in all the rest a most confident belief that the authors of the condemned propositions are the most famous Doctors. All this I grant to Fr. Casnedi. I wished, nonetheless, to read Fr. Sánchez yet another hundred times, after this. And I found the fact, as before, most evident. Wherefore Fr. Casnedi imposes on his readers, and evidently abuses public faith, when he denies that both condemned propositions are found in Fr. Sánchez. Let Fr. Casnedi find one other author who taught the aforesaid propositions more clearly, and more publicly, than Fr. Thomas Sánchez taught them, before the Church condemned these propositions. He will not find even one. Let the Casuists know, then, that the Church condemned these propositions. For, by these Probabilists' own judgment, they are not found in the authors from whom they are said to have been excerpted. Nowhere, then, do they exist.
XIII. Behold, Christian reader, the calamity of our times. Propositions full of laxity and scandal are forged. If they are not condemned by the Church, the Probabilists cry out: this is not a proscribed opinion; the most famous authors teach it; therefore it is probable. If the Church condemns it, they raise their voice: what? The Church does not condemn the propositions which the most famous Doctors uphold. These things seem incredible. But, though Fr. Casnedi does not defend this use of purely mental restriction, Fr. de la Fuente nonetheless defends this same use as licit; and thus, in the proposition of Fr. Sánchez, lies, licit perjuries, are upheld, by the mere circuiting of words, by which they say lies are not lies, mental restriction not mental restriction. But the matter of fact is manifest. From this it follows that many of the faithful are led, by doctrines proscribed by the Church, to believe that perjury is not perjury. Even in Sánchez it is said that one who uses mental restriction does not lie, does not perjure himself. But the Pontiff, condemning this proposition, declared that in it a lie, and perjury, are found. By what fabrications do they elude these two propositions, obscure them by the same, and reduce others to nothing, so as to render the doctrine once defended immune from all censures! More things would need to be said, which I only warn beforehand, so that you may guard yourself against authors of this kind.