Chapter XX — Some objections, drawn both from reason, and from examples, and from the doctrine of the Saints — especially St. Raymond, and from the work of Annibaldus, commonly ascribed to St. Thomas — are resolved

I. I will propose here only a few objections; since, in the following Dissertation, in which we shall handle all the cases which the authors of mental restrictions are accustomed to propose, we shall also explain very many difficulties that can occur. Here I shall only touch upon a few, which regard universal principles, and which are customarily objected against what we have taught in the preceding chapters.

II. You will object, first: Purely mental restrictions were therefore condemned, because their authors defended them as licit not only for sole, and precise, necessity, but also for utility. Whoever, then, employs them only in the case of extreme and grave necessity, will not be subject to the pontifical censures. Response: Purely mental restrictions are prohibited by the Church, as true, and rotten, lies. Lies, even in a case of extreme necessity, are forbidden, as all teach. Therefore purely mental restrictions are forbidden too. Utility, or necessity, does not constitute a locution true, or false, or lying; but it makes it either commendable, or execrable.

III. You will object, second: Unless we admit mental restrictions to be licit in grave necessity, some precepts of God, and of others, become impossible. For the immense necessity of guarding the seal compels one, on one hand, to violate it; on the other, that a tyrant compel one to violate the seal. What, then, must be done? If it is said that one or the other must be done — namely, either to lie, or to reveal the seal — it is already conceded that some precept of God is impossible; which is a heresy condemned by the Church. There remains, then, a way of escaping the transgression of both precepts, which can be no other than the way of mental restrictions — whether this restriction is made by the use of words signifying nothing, or by the use of twofold knowledge, communicable and incommunicable. These are the arguments of Frs. de la Fuente Hurtado, Casnedi, and others.

IV. It is answered that this objection is sheer, pure sophism. What a Confessor ought to answer a tyrant, we shall explain below. Now we say, briefly, that no precept of God is ever impossible to observe; just as no precept, whether natural or divine, ever bids us guard the seal by some illicit means, such as a lie, or mental restriction; but the precept only binds us to its concealment, either by silence, or by an honest repulse of an unjust questioner, even if life were to be exchanged for death. But, because the adversaries prefer life to truth, they therefore do not know how to reconcile the observance of both precepts: which Augustine reproaches to the authors of lying (Book On Lying, ch. 20): "If anyone were to propose to himself the loving of truth in such a way, not only that which is in contemplating, but also in truly enunciating what is true in its own kind, that it should not be otherwise uttered by the bodily mouth than as it is conceived and beheld in the mind, so that he should prefer the truthful beauty of faith not only to gold, and silver, and gems, and pleasant estates, but to the whole of temporal life, and every good of the body — I do not know whether anyone would be said to err by this judgment. And, if he rightly preferred this to all such things, and reckoned it of more worth, he ought also rightly to preserve, and aid, with his own diligence and benevolence, even the temporal affairs of other men, whom he loves." Augustine has here many things pertaining to our own purpose, which I omit for brevity's sake. This only I add, with the same Augustine: that, if, after man has employed all licit and honest means by which he might guard a secret, it should happen that truth be manifested in whatever way without the fault of that man himself, then the precept of the seal would in no way be violated, to whose concealment no one is bound except by licit means. For lies are not to be told, so that seals may be concealed. Nor does the necessity of concealing the seal remove the fact that what is absolutely a lie, in such an event, is a lie, whatever the adversaries may say. Finally, with Augustine, we add that such events can occur, in which, all diligence having been employed for the concealment of truth, nothing else remains but recourse to divine providence. Let the whole ch. 17 of the Book Against Lying be read, where, after he shows that the woman of Jericho ought to have answered, "I know where they are, but I fear God, I do not betray them," he has recourse to the refuge of divine providence. "And where," he says, "do we place the will, and power, of God? Could he not, perchance, have kept her from lying to her fellow-citizens, and yet have kept the men of God safe from every ruin?"

V. You will object, third: This objection is already resolved above. For man is free to disclose his conceptions inadequately, and separately, one rather than another; but he ought to use words which really, distinctly, refer to one conception rather than another. If he uses words that universally deny all conceptions, he cannot then conceal one conception rather than another — as, if you say, "I did not eat meat," these words universally deny the eating of any flesh whatsoever. You cannot, then, without a lie, retain in mind the conception of human flesh, when you have eaten flesh, whether of beef or of veal, etc., since the aforesaid words are not restricted to denying the eating of flesh, whether human or animal.

VI. You will object, fourth: St. Raymond of Peñafort, in his Summa, Bk. I, tit. 10, on lying, and adultery, proposes to himself this case: it is customarily doubted what is to be done by one from whom someone is sought for execution, whom he himself knows to be hiding in his own house, or even in another place. He seems perplexed. If he manifests him, he fears the crime of causing his loss, and homicide, to which he will seem to have given cause, by showing the person; he fears too the sin of those who will kill him, and thus he will die more gravely in soul — which he also fears for the one hiding, if perhaps he is in mortal sin, and dies impenitent. If, however, he does not manifest him, he dreads the lie itself, for which he seems able to apply no remedy.

VII. Response: That St. Raymond was somewhat disturbed by those sins which Augustine calls compensatory, appears manifestly from this text. He opens three ways, indeed, of concealing the innocent man sought for death, and of avoiding a lie. I believe, he says, saving a better judgment, that such a one ought first to keep silent. If, however, silence itself would betray the one hiding, then let him use an equivocal word, such as, "He is not here" — that is, in this process. But he confesses that this is not sufficient in another matter, or let him respond with some equivocal word, as, for instance, that he transfers himself elsewhere, as if asking about someone, to elude the malice of a false questioner, or something similar. The use of equivocal words is licit, for the cause of extreme necessity, even St. Raymond himself confesses. These equivocal words, however, ought to have a double sense, according to common understanding, just as the word "here" has, in the Latin tongue. Those, then, who speak another idiom, must employ a word which similarly enjoys a double signification in common estimation. Finally, at the last, Raymond concludes: or say simply that he must deny, and assert that he is not there. If, however, his own conscience dictates to him that he ought to speak thus, then he will not speak against conscience, that is, he will not go against his own mind; indeed he will follow it, and in no way will he sin; nor does he contradict, in these words, Augustine — since here he will not lie, because he will not go against his mind.

This last response of Raymond's is not absolute, but hypothetical. For he says that, this hypothesis admitted, in which someone judges himself obliged to deny that a man sought for execution is present in his own house, then he will not sin. Why? Because, if the dictate of his own conscience represents to him, and commands him, that in such an event falsehood, or a lie, must be told for saving the man's life, and soul at the same time, he sins in no way, because he follows the rule of his own conscience. In such circumstances, indeed, Raymond seems to concede that invincible ignorance of the malice of such a lie can be given in some man. For although there is no innocent ignorance of a lie absolutely taken, nonetheless, when a lie is told in such most grave circumstances, so as to save a man's life, it is entangled together with his soul, and life at once; it is not so evident that no one can invincibly reckon such a lie licit. Those last words of Raymond's must be weighed: "he will not lie here, that is, he will not go against his mind." Raymond here takes "mind" for conscience, as John of Freiburg also notes, in his commentaries on this passage. When, then, it is said, "To lie is to go against the mind," in a matter to which you do not wish another to be led, if "mind" is taken for the knowledge, or notion, existing in the mind, this is contrary to knowledge, and a formal lie is opposed to it. For the rest, if conscience judges that a lie must be told for a man's life, then that lie will not be against the mind, taken for conscience, although against the mind, taken for the knowledge, or notion, which is found in the mind. But that lie is against the mind, taken both for knowledge and for conscience, which is uttered not with the intent of concealing truth, but out of a lust for deceiving, says Augustine (Book On Lying, ch. 14): "The fourth, which is the lust of lying, and deceiving, which is pure lying... The sixth kind, which harms no one, and profits someone, as if someone, knowing where the money of another is that is to be unjustly taken, lies to whoever asks about it, so as not to know it. The seventh, which harms no one, and profits someone, as if someone, unwilling to betray a man sought for death, lies, not to the just and innocent man, but to the guilty one — since it is not to be despaired of anyone's correction, nor is the access of repenting to be closed to anyone." Of these two kinds, which are wont to have great weight with good, and truthful, men and women, we have treated sufficiently, so that, in undertaking inconveniences, both brave, and faithful men, so bear them strongly, that these kinds too are avoided by the brave and faithful. Augustine, then, established that one ought never to lie, either for a man's temporal, or eternal, salvation. Raymond, however, asserts that, if a man is found so weak that his conscience persuades him, in this most difficult controversy, that it is licit to utter a lie, then he will not sin, nor will he lie out of a lust for deceiving, nor will he go against the mind, that is, conscience. This is Raymond's genuine mind.

VIII. You will object, fourth: Annibaldus (Bk. III, Sentences, dist. 12, art. 4, ad 2): "It must be said that he (Christ) could utter a lying speech materially, not, however, significatively; and therefore he could not be a liar." So that this response may be understood, the objection must be recalled. If I shall say that I know him not, etc. (John 8). But this he could say. Therefore he could be a liar. It is now clearly gathered that Annibaldus teaches nothing else than that Christ could narrate the lying speech of the Jews, or utter a lie materially, not significatively, but assertively; in the manner in which we, with the Psalmist, sing: "The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God" — which words are indeed uttered by us materially, or historically. This will emerge more clearly, if the whole Gospel text, which the Author indicates in his objection, is transcribed. "And if I shall say that I know him not, I shall be like to you, a liar. But I know him, and do keep his word." Does not it hence most evidently appear... that Christ uttered the aforesaid words, "If I shall say," etc., only historically, or materially? It is, moreover, an altogether different thing to use words to express one's own conceptions materially, that is, stripped of all signification — which cannot be done without a lie. In the first case, he who utters those words does not use them so as to put forth his own conceptions, but so as to narrate the sentiments of another. But whoever uses words so as to communicate his own secrets to others, if he does not use them as signs representing internal senses, as their own nature would employ them, already perverts the order of nature, as we have proved in its own place.

END OF THE THIRD VOLUME