Chapter VI — A historical narration of the doctrine which several more recent writers devised for concealing truth. Purely mental restrictions, not-purely-mental restrictions, equivocations, amphibologies, and material locutions are reviewed

I. After Augustine attacked lies as professedly wicked in his own Books, and censured the census of all Fathers and Doctors of every age, both the Fathers after Augustine, and all Catholic theologians, condemn lies as sin, and, in whatever event of Christian profession, they are detested. It is superfluous, I judge, to weave this together, since no one now doubts that all Doctors have acceded to Augustine, so as to reject lies, however useful, as illicit remedies for concealing truth. But, since the concealment of truth is most frequently necessary, both for guarding secrets, and for protecting innocence, chastity, and bodily life, and other domestic goods — Doctors have therefore all exercised the powers of their genius, so as to provide suitable remedies for this necessity. Augustine, with his nearly divine genius, left us no other means, by which we might guard the truth hidden in our mind, necessary for attaining this end, except these: silence, and "I will neither betray, nor will I lie." The Fathers who followed devised nothing else. St. Thomas, as in other matters, so in this one, adopted the Augustinian teaching. Writers closer to our own time — St. Raymond, St. Antoninus, Cajetan, Sylvester, Sotus, Navarrus, Angles, and others — introduced the use of equivocal words, though only of those which by their own nature have a double external sense; which use, however, some had already indicated before them. At length, as the sixteenth century was drawing to a close, and the seventeenth beginning, when moral theology began to be treated more sharply and broadly in the schools and academies, the invention of mental restrictions, within a short interval of time, so prevailed, that not only Casuists who filled the front benches, but even Theologians, defended these same mental restrictions as licit for guarding truth. So that readers may have an exquisite knowledge of the doctrine which such theologians handed down, I will here transcribe it, expressed in the very words of the authors themselves. For, just as I set before the eyes, in compendium, Augustine's teaching against lying, so that the controversy of that time might be known, so it is fitting that we should likewise bring forth the sentiments of these theologians too. Among the more recent theologians who treated this controversy most broadly, and at the same time most laxly, are Sánchez, and Tamburini. Let me touch briefly, then, on the synopsis of their teaching.

II. Sánchez (Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 6, n. 15): "Words may be used without lying, although by their own signification they are not ambiguous, nor admit a true sense either of themselves, or from the surrounding circumstances, but nonetheless yield a true sense from something retained in the mind of the speaker, whatever that may be — as" (here begins the proposition condemned by Innocent XI) "if someone, whether alone, or in the presence of others, whether questioned, or of his own accord, whether for the sake of recreation, or for any other purpose, swears that he did not do something which he really did, understanding within himself some other thing which he did not do, or some other day" (Sánchez has "another day": and this is the true reading, since an error has crept into the condemned proposition) "or whatever else true is added, he does not really lie, nor is he a perjurer." (Thus far the condemned proposition.) "But," Sánchez continues, "he only does not state the determinate truth which the hearers conceive, and which the words in themselves signify, but another, disparate truth." He lists several patrons of his own opinion, namely Navarrus, Valentia, Salón, Toledo, Manuel, Filiarco, Suárez, Leonardo. He proves his opinion, moreover, by the authority of Christ the Lord, who, in John 7, said: "I go not up to this festival day"; and yet" (says Sánchez) "he went up immediately afterward: which speech was nonetheless true, manifestly, from an added retained mental clause — namely, 'I will not go up,' with the sense which those words did not themselves make." He proffers many other arguments, drawn both from Scripture and from reason, which I omit, so as to proceed to describe the other rules of his teaching.

III. In the same chapter, n. 19, he has this: "The cause, moreover, of using these amphibologies is, whenever it is necessary, or useful, for the safety of body, of honor, of protecting family property, or for any other act of virtue, such that the concealment of the truth is then judged expedient, and worthy of pursuit." This is proposition 27 condemned by Innocent XI. He adds, moreover, n. 12, near the end, that the cause of using these amphibologies can also be jest, or recreation. But, he says, if there were fault, it would only be venial, if it were manifest.

IV. The same, n. 34: "A witness can use the aforesaid equivocations, even if otherwise legitimately summoned, whenever he is bound, for some cause, to bear testimony, as, for instance, because notable harm would follow to himself, etc."

V. The same, n. 25, writes this: "When the assessed price of some thing is unjust, if one selling for more, or defrauding in weight and measure, so that he satisfies himself for the injustice of the price, and gives corresponding goods for the price given — can this man, questioned by a judge, if he is not bound, that excusing cause standing, to say he did not see, did not hear, understanding that he is not obligated to answer, so that he must say he does not know whether he sold for more, or fell short in weight and measure, deny this, and assert that he sold at the taxed price, and delivered the full weight and measure, understanding this: 'insofar as one who sells for more, or falls short in weight and measure, is held to make it up.' For without any defect he has done both. And so he truly says that he delivered in full, namely, insofar as he was bound, that price having been received, nor did he exceed by his wrongdoing. And for this it suffices that the opinion be probable, that that tax does not oblige." Not only are mental restrictions, or lies, taught here; but the very governance of the commonwealth is entirely subverted. For it is manifestly about the state, if subjects can despise the sanctions of the Principate, and substitute for them, at their own arbitrary whim, whatever probable opinion they judge more just.

VI. The same, n. 21, writes this: "Fifth, it is deduced that, when someone needs to hide his goods, for his own sustenance, lest he be forced by his creditors to beg — he can lawfully have such goods hidden" (and the same is quite obviously true of the commonwealth) "and, asked by a judge whether he has any such hidden goods, can knowingly swear that he has none, so long as it satisfies him — understanding within himself: 'I do not have hidden goods which I am bound to disclose to the judge.'" The discourse here is not of extreme, or grave, necessity. For he holds that a debtor can retain the creditor's goods, so as not to be forced to beg, and, moreover, can swear that he has not retained them. What could be more effective for introducing every kind of fraud, and for evading the payment of debts?

VII. The same, n. 21: "Sixth, it is deduced that, whenever someone is free from the obligation of any debt whatsoever, he can, being asked by a judge about it, deny it, understanding within himself: 'so that I am bound' — since he answers according to the judge's due intent. For which reason Covarrubias, Cepola, and Azor most excellently teach that one who has paid back money received on loan can, being asked by a judge about the loan, swear that he did not receive it, understanding: 'so that he is bound to pay it.' Suárez, Paraldus teach the same. And the same must be said, if for any other cause he is freed from paying back the loan. And I believe the same, if he is then not bound to pay, because the term to which the loan was given has not yet been fulfilled, or the debtor is excused from paying then on account of poverty."

VIII. The same, n. 16: "Ninth, it is deduced that a creditor, by virtue of a public instrument, exacting a debt before a judge, commonly 'executing for the debt,' can affirm under oath that the sum contained in that instrument is owed him, exactly as it is owed by right — even if part of that debt has been paid to him — if an equal amount of money, as much as has been paid, is owed him by some other way, of which nothing..." concerns the other creditor's prejudice."*

IX. The same, n. 39: "Tenth, it is deduced that, if by injury a sworn promise of giving some money is extorted, it is lawful for the swearer to use this equivocation: 'I swear to you' — understanding, 'that I will pay you money' — with the word 'you' understood ambiguously, such that the sense is: 'I swear to you that I will pay money, whether to you, or to another' — since that speech admits both senses."

X. The same: "But is it lawful then to swear, retaining in mind this condition: 'I swear that I will give, if I am indebted to you by no oath'? Some deny it, on the grounds that these words do not admit this amphibology in the common sense of men — Cajetan, Aragón, Sotus. But, holding to our own opinion, given in number fifteen, it must be said that this is lawful. For it matters not that the words do not admit this amphibology, provided the intent, and necessity, compel their use." Moreover, in the fifteenth number cited, he teaches: "Why, then, would it be a lie to use words not ambiguous in themselves, if from a retained mental condition they produce a true sense? ... This is most useful for concealing many things which need to be concealed, and could not be concealed without a lie, unless this method were certain. For words ambiguous in themselves are not everywhere to be found."

XI. The same, n. 39: "Eleventh, it is deduced that one compelled to accept some woman in betrothal, whom he is not bound to marry, can swear that he will accept her, understanding within himself: 'if I am bound,' or 'if it should afterward please me.'"

XII. The same, n. 41: "Thirteenth, an adulteress, asked by her husband whether she has committed adultery, can swear that she has not broken the marriage. Likewise she can swear that she did not do it, understanding within herself: 'so that I would reveal it to you.'"

XIII. The same, n. 43: "Fifteenth, it is deduced that, when someone from whom a loan of money is sought, which he really has, can affirm under oath that he does not have it, understanding within himself: 'so as to be bound to lend it,' when he is not bound to lend it. So Navarrus, Filiarco, Sayr... But Córdoba, López, Henríquez hold the contrary. But I believe the former opinion to be truer, as to this — that he is not thereby a perjurer: because in his own sense he speaks truly, since the sense is: 'I do not have it so that I would wish to lend it to you.' Wherefore, for the truth of this oath, it matters not at all whether he is bound to lend or not. And so it is not necessary to add that limitation which the aforesaid Doctors add, 'when he is not bound to lend.'"

XIV. The same, n. 44: "Lastly, it is deduced that a penitent, rashly asked whether he has confessed this or that sin, can swear that he has not confessed it, understanding: 'so that he is bound to explain it to you.'"

XV. So that a fuller knowledge of more recent theology may be had, it is worth adding a few things from Tamburini, who, above the others, tempered the rules of the ancient doctrine, and accommodated them to human weakness. In Bk. II of his exposition of the Decalogue, ch. 2, §2, n. 1, he teaches this: "The question is, whether it is lawful for the swearer to take words in another sense than that which they present. For example: I swear by God that I have not slept this night, understanding, clothed; that I do not have money, understanding, which I would wish to bestow on you; that my wife, or husband, has not broken the laws of marriage, understanding manifestly; that a hundred is not owed by me to you, understanding, so that I cannot compensate it against the other hundred which you owe me, etc. Response: it is lawful, as the same authors teach" (namely Lessius, Castropalao, Rebello, Bonacina) "and it is taught elsewhere, prescinding, however, from the harm which I would unjustly cause by this deceitful oath — even if I am not asked to swear, but offer to do so of my own accord."

XVI. The same, ibid., n. 4: "When the words in no way admit such an equivocation, or restriction of mind, is it lawful to understand something else, from one's own mere will? For example: I swear that I have not slept, understanding that I have not slept together. By this manner of speaking, I only, in a material fashion, say that I did not sleep — this signifying only affirmatively." Response: Sánchez denies that it is lawful, because it is not within anyone's discretion to impose a signification on words. But this reasoning cannot draw me away from the probability that it is lawful.

XVII. Martín Bonacina copied out almost all the propositions which we have reported from Sánchez, and taught the laxity more clearly still. I will transcribe one or two here. In disp. 4, q. 1, punct. 5, n. 5, he has this: "Fifth, one who has a just cause of concealing some goods, lest they be seized by creditors, which are necessary to him for the sustenance of life, without which he would be forced to beg — can deny that he has concealed them, understanding those which he could not conceal, or which he is not bound to disclose. Witnesses who knowingly conceal him could answer the same, both because this response is not contrary to the intention of the questioner, but rather conforms to his mind, and because there is a just cause of using this restriction, or amphibology."

XVIII. The same Bonacina, ibid.: "Sixth, an adulteress, asked by her husband whether she has committed adultery, can answer negatively, understanding, 'so that she is bound to reveal it to him.'"

XIX. The same Bonacina, ibid., n. 8: "From this it is gathered that sellers, who, since they could obtain a just price by no other way from the buyer, swear that a thing so priced cost them so much, in another sense than that the buyer shares — not only are not, precisely by reason of the oath, held to anything, as is clear from the first question; but they do not even seem to sin mortally, if they inflict no notable harm on the party, nor intend by this means to deceive, or to obtain something beyond the just, or to extort a rigorous price, at which the buyer would not have wished to buy."