Chapter VII — The Supreme Pontiff Innocent XI condemned the principles of the aforesaid propositions. Later theologians devised new inventions, by which to conceal truth. A synopsis of the various doctrines, and of the various principles, of these theologians is woven together

I. Before I proceed further, it is fitting to declare this: that the propositions which I described in the preceding chapter, from Sánchez, Tamburini, and Bonacina, were not the offspring only of these theologians; indeed, as may be gathered from Lumbier, in Cárdenas, dissert. 19, on the condemned propositions, ch. 1, n. 5, more than fifty Doctors are found to have upheld this same opinion condemned concerning mental restrictions, so that I might content myself with saying, lest I be too prolix — not only Casuists and Summists, but even distinguished Theologians of nearly every order and standing, taught the same, as one may gather from their Books. Suárez, Valentia, Castropalao, Diana, Vincenzo Ferre, Candido, Leander, Moya, Trullench, Conrado, Hurtado, Filiarco, Filliucci, Dicastillo; and, consequently, the recounted propositions all proceed, as from a fountain, from the condemned doctrine of mental restrictions.

This I especially wish to say, both lest ill-will attach to the three aforesaid authors alone, and so that the historical narration may be more exact. But as for what Gabriel Daniel asserts, in his Colloquies of Cleander and Eudoxus, near the end of his dissertation on mental restrictions — namely, that the recounted propositions, and others, which Innocent XI condemned, he condemned just as they lie, that is, as their words sound, and not as they are in the Books of the Authors from which they were excerpted — this is altogether the same as what the Jansenists say concerning the five propositions: that he condemns them as they lie, but that these propositions, condemned in that sense, are not to be found in Jansenius, and, falsely and contumaciously, they contend this.

II. The doctrine of mental restrictions, condemned by the most holy Pontiff Innocent XI, in the year 1679, then, men bent their minds toward finding other remedies for the concealment of truth. For the use of mental restrictions had so far prevailed, that already, from the time when the censure of the Roman Church came forth against the aforesaid doctrine, the faithful were disturbed, some were tormented with scruples and doubts, confessors approached theologians, seeking counsel over secrets to be guarded; theologians, reduced to a loss, did not know which way to turn. No other refuge for evading a lie, and for concealing a secret, was known, except mental restrictions; these having been condemned, minds despaired of guarding a secret. Augustine's teaching, and that of the other Fathers, which bids us neither betray the truth, nor lie, but guard it either by silence, or, by the virtue of fortitude, with open brow, seemed to them too harsh, and exceeding the yoke of human strength. Besides which, several theologians of that time, neglecting the study of the Fathers, and human reasoning, held their own authority of little account, and held the Theologians and Casuists, and Summists, of their own age, as the rule of morals.

III. Hence they began to soften the condemned doctrine of mental restrictions with various interpretations, and to purge it from censure with various distinctions. First of all, indeed, they distinguished a twofold kind of mental restriction: one, of purely mental restriction; the other, of restriction not purely mental. The former, they affirmed, was condemned by the Pontiff; the latter, licit. This distinction, moreover, was itself the occasion of disagreement among them. For that locution which seems to one a wholly internal, and purely mental, restriction, seems to another an external, and not purely mental, restriction. For example: if, having several sums of money, you are asked by Peter to lend him some of it, and you respond that you do not have money to give him — this locution, say the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 1, punct. 8, n. 106), is not to be called amphibological, but is to be called a mental restriction — joining mentally to it, "in excess of what I need myself." Other theologians, however, wish this same locution to be called not an internal, but an external, or not-purely-mental, restriction, when the borrower is not accustomed to repay the loan, prolongs the payment beyond the fixed time, and the lender suffers loss; for then, they say, from the exterior circumstance, the aforesaid restriction is not purely mental, but external, and therefore licit — of which more in its own place.

IV. Besides mental restrictions, new theologians devised other remedies as well, by which they might conceal, at least from men of dull perception, the truth. These are amphibological, and equivocal, words. These, likewise, are of a twofold kind. Some, according to common understanding, have a double sense, and acceptance, both of which they equally betray — as appears in this saying: "I say that you, the Aeacid, can conquer the Romans," which locution admits a double sense: namely, that the Aeacid can conquer the Romans (and here, in the aforesaid arrangement of words, this seems the obvious sense), or that the Romans can conquer the Aeacid. Others likewise have a double sense: one common, and proper; the other less proper — as if you should say, "Sebastian is a good man," which, in common acceptance, signifies that he is endowed with virtue, but, in a less proper sense, signifies that he is simple, or of dull mind. By these equivocal and amphibological locutions, more recent theologians commonly hand down, truth can be concealed, a just cause pressing; nor do the ancients altogether dissent, as we shall explain below. Such amphibological locutions, however, are not undeservedly called not-wholly-mental restrictions, but constituted external by some external sign, or by a somewhat obscure, yet intelligible, word.

V. At length, not a few theologians, setting aside mental restrictions of both kinds, and amphibological and equivocal locutions, entered upon another path. For they learned by experience that ambiguous words are not always at hand in every circumstance, and are not frequently sufficient for concealing truth; nor are all men equally endowed with perspicacity and acumen, so as to be able, especially in sudden events, to arrange words by such artifice as to constitute an amphibological sense. Hence they devised another manner of concealing secrets. They say, first, that some truths are communicable, others incommunicable; and that it is to be gathered from the circumstances whether words are to be taken with respect to communicable, or incommunicable, knowledge. As, when a Confessor is asked whether he knows anything of a penitent's sin, and he himself answers that he knows nothing, it is denoted from the circumstances that he knows nothing by communicable, or extra-sacramental, knowledge; and when he is asked by a tyrant whether he knows anything as a Confessor, likewise, they say, he can answer that he knows nothing — since even in this circumstance the words appear to be uttered with reference to extra-sacramental knowledge, with respect to which he really knows nothing. Those, however, who proceed by this path have not altogether renounced mental restrictions; but they admit a restriction of mind, made intelligible by an external circumstance. They differ only in this: that they do not wish some word to be necessarily required in the speech itself, which retains the obscure sense which the speaker holds in mind, and reveals and conceals it; but they wish only the obscure, and internal, sense to be gathered from the circumstance either of time, or of the speaker.

VI. At the very last, other theologians entirely removed from the midst mental restrictions, both internal and external, both amphibologies, and equivocations, for the reasons indicated — namely, that ambiguous words do not always occur, or are not sufficient, whenever we address sharp-witted men, or that simple folk are not capable of constructing an amphibological and equivocal speech. Wherefore they forged an invention more effective, they say, than all those recounted, for concealing truth. They teach, then, that we can use words materially, or, as they say, in our own power, so as to utter words materially, without their signifying anything, whenever truth must be concealed for a just cause. Wherefore Peter, asked whether he committed a crime, or knows it to have been perpetrated by someone, can, absolutely, and without any equivocation of words, respond, "I did not do it," "I do not know anyone to have done it" — even though he did do it, or knows by whom it was done: because such words, "I do not know," "I did not do it," signify nothing, just as if they had been uttered by a parrot. Tamburini (Bk. II, on the Decalogue, ch. 2, §2, n. 6) opposes to himself the authority of Cardinal Pallavicino, in these words: "But in this way you speak against the pact which was tacitly entered into among men in the constitution of language, that words be uttered significatively, and not only materially. Read Sforza Pallavicino in his Theology, Bk. II, disp. 2, n. 15." I respond: such a pact was too speculatively devised by that most ingenious man. I add: granted that there was an agreement, that by those sounds men could open their own conceptions — yet I contend there was never a pact that they could never, whenever they wished, utter those sounds materially. Certainly, thus do infants utter them, when they begin to learn foreign languages; thus do typesetters, when they set type, and writers and printers, when they write or print words of another language. Why not, when it profits a man to do so? That words can be used materially, or as signifying nothing, in human and serious speech, for concealing truth, Caramuel also taught, in his Haplotes, art. 1, concl. 1, n. 14, p. 15, in Cárdenas, dissert. 19, ch. 4, n. 51; which opinion, however, he himself does not approve, since he saw it was not approved by the Roman Censors.

VII. Other more recent writers hand down this doctrine of words, or sounds, signifying nothing, more clearly. Fr. Claude La Croix (Bk. VI, part 2, ch. 3, dub. 2, n. 158, at the end) attributes this opinion to Tanner, and Stoz, in these words: "Tanner and Stoz suggested another method: that a Confessor, if he cannot otherwise guard the seal, should use words purely materially, as sounds not signifying, wishing to signify nothing by them. The reason, moreover, why words in these circumstances are not significative, is this: that the significative force of words is the will of those who instituted them for signifying this or that. Now those instituting them neither willed, nor could will, that such words should be significative in the case where the seal would be revealed through them: for to will this would be impious, and neither God's, nor the commonwealth's, approval can accede to it — which, however, ought to accede, for there to be an obligation of using words as they were instituted. Therefore words, in these circumstances, are not significative. But as for the fact that the questioner takes them as significative, and is deceived — let him blame himself, for he questions unjustly." Fr. La Croix neither approves nor disapproves this manner of speaking; but, according to the custom of other Doctors, gathers various opinions, so that readers may select whichever pleases them.

VIII. Of his own, however, he offers a rule to all those bound by a seal, by which they might more easily know how to guard it. He says, then, n. 1587: "When a Confessor is thus unjustly asked about a matter closed by the seal, and cannot otherwise conceal it than by lying, it is not necessary that he seek out, of the many ways of answering without a lie, that which is more consonant with the reasons already related; but it suffices, simply saying that he knows nothing, that he not have the intention of lying, and wish to respond in that sense in which, according to the mind of the Church and the Doctors, he can thus speak with truth: for it is certain that there must be here some licit way of saving the seal, nor does any more fitting one occur than one of these. And what has been said of a Confessor holds for every other person bound to a seal." But for these, and similar most grave cases, it would be a mortal sin to lie; it is licit to use such words.

IX. This doctrine, whose use Fr. La Croix concedes as licit only for the guarding of the seal, and for similar most grave cases, to protect either life, or chastity, which are called the most grave cases — Fr. Carlo Ambrogio Cattaneo extended to cases not only grave, but to the avoidance of any notable inconvenience whatsoever. The cases to which he extends this described doctrine I will transcribe here, rendered from the vernacular tongue into Latin. He says, then, Vol. I, Lecture 44: "To your shop, for example, comes a wicked debtor, whom you cannot at all subject to the laws of justice; he asks whether you have such-and-such cloth. This question, the circumstances being inspected, betrays this sense: 'Would you have such cloth to sell me?' You respond..." : "and it must be understood that I do not have that which I do not have to sell to a wicked debtor; you can freely say: I do not have it." He proposes another case in these words: "Another comes, who does not possess a hand's-breadth of land, and asks whether you have a hundred scudi. You abound in many. You respond: I do not have them. Is this not a lie? Not at all. From the circumstances, this response is true. For the question signifies: do you have a hundred scudi to lend? But you, to one who could repay only at great risk, and would not have the solid means to repay, are not bound to lend."

X. With these, and other similar cases resolved, and various examples adduced, he expounds this doctrine at greater length than the aforesaid Fr. La Croix indicates; and he beforehand warns his readers that this doctrine of his is sufficient to overturn all difficulties. He says, then, that ambiguous and equivocal words of double meaning are not always at hand, especially in sudden events. What, he says, if an assassin, having entered your courtyard, about to kill your father, asks whether he is at home? Are you, as if bewitched, bound to strain your mind to search out ambiguous words, or to fit an equivocal locution; or to bring under scrutiny whether the restriction is purely mental, or not; or to recite a formula of words committed to memory from some book, as described, when you may thus escape free from this snare? In these, and similar cases, no other way is open, nor does the word "I do not know" suffice; you must hurl back into the face of the impudent questioner a round and bold "no" — since this conforms to the mind of all men whatsoever: for men are masters of words. They by no means instituted them to the harm of the commonwealth, and in favor of thieves and assassins. Not to say more: whatever lacks signification, by the consent of the whole human commonwealth, which established that, in similar events, words signify nothing — in just the manner in which a coin, its value having been removed by the Prince's command, becomes worthless. When, then, you hear that an officious lie cannot licitly be told, neither to save an entire city from a fire, nor for the same end to steal one solidus, or one silk thread — you must know, however, that just as, in such an event, theft would not be theft (since this has been so agreed among men for the public good), by the same reasoning a lie would not be a lie: since the human commonwealth possesses dominion no less over words than over things.* Thus far Cattaneo, who confirms his doctrine with other examples.