Chapter IX — The doctrine of more recent writers concerning purely mental restrictions is false, and was rightly condemned by the Church

I. Thus far we have played the part of the Historian; now, however, we must demonstrate clearly and distinctly what is to be disapproved from what we have described. But before I establish anything, in this most difficult question, of what seems to me more probable, let us first assail those things which are certainly false to us, or appear so; then let us set forth our own views. We begin, then, from a refutation of purely mental restrictions.

II. A purely mental restriction, as has been said, is then present, when the words, considered absolutely, and all circumstances inspected, constitute an external speech of the speaker false; but in the mind of the speaker something is understood which would make it true, no external sign, however, being given by which the hearer could detect what he restricts in his civil mind. As if someone should say, "Peter is dead," understanding within...

III. All Catholic Doctors, after the proposition was condemned by Innocent XI, condemn the use of mental restrictions; although, before the aforesaid condemnation, Casuists commonly, and even some distinguished Theologians, upheld the same as licit. By these considerations, however, it is established that purely mental restrictions are lies. And first, by the authority of St. Augustine (Book On Lying, ch. 17), it is laid down that in no way is a false thing to be uttered to him before whom it is spoken, since it is his own mind that is to be considered, and the falsity is not shown merely by the movement of the tongue, but by the very intention of deceiving him to whom the truth is denied. For it is said of false testimony that even a true thing may be uttered with the mouth of the body, provided the mind of him who is addressed be truly regarded. Since, when it is said to God, only then in the heart is truth to be embraced. When, however, it is said to a man, then only in some way can it be contended that a false thing must be uttered to him before whom it is spoken, since man is a mere observer of the outward act. Augustine, then, condemns a restriction of this kind, when we address men, and wishes... that the corporal mouth not lurk within the recesses of the heart and mind, but that truth be manifested.

IV. To this authority is added a clear reason. A wholly internal, mental restriction, such as we have described, is a true lie — since a lie is nothing other than an oral speech unconformed to the mind of the speaker. But speech uttered under a mental restriction is altogether unconformed to the mind of the speaker. It is, then, a lie. The minor proposition is proved. Words used under a mental restriction do not, either absolutely, or the circumstances inspected, externally betray the internal conception of the speaker himself — which is clear from the examples which the patrons of such restrictions use. When, with Tamburini, you say, "I swear by God that I have not slept this night," understanding "clothed," the proposition absolutely put, "I have not slept," before the mental restriction, is false. Therefore it will also be false after the mental restriction. For here the mental restriction changes neither the word, nor the thing signified by the word; or the proposition, "I have not slept," is the same, both before and after the mental restriction. Therefore, if before the restriction it was false that you did not sleep, it will also be false after that same restriction. That this restriction can neither change the word, nor the thing signified by the significant words, is manifest. This is confirmed by another example, which they are accustomed to use. One who says, "I have not eaten meat," absolutely, understanding human flesh, denies, by force of that exterior proposition, universally, every eating of any flesh whatsoever. But the speaker's internal conception is not a universal negation of the eating of any flesh whatsoever, but is restricted to the exclusion of human flesh alone. The external speech, then, is unconformed to the mind of the speaker, and consequently a lie.

V. Finally, this is confirmed by the fact that the same absurdities, the same inconveniences, follow from a purely mental restriction as follow from a lie itself. St. Augustine observes two very great and extreme evils to proceed from lying, of which the first especially undermines the very foundation of faith. For if a lie were ever lawful, then God, and the Prophets, and the Evangelists could have handed down a doctrine involved in lies, and no reason at all could be assigned why it would be lawful for men to lie in extreme necessity, and not so for God, and the Prophets. Wherefore the ancient patrons of lying, since in the sacred Scriptures Patriarchs and Prophets are found sometimes to have lied without fault, therefore taught that it is lawful for men too to lie in extreme necessity. That this same inconvenience arises entirely from a purely mental restriction, the matter is clear. For, once it is admitted that a speech, cloaked by a mental restriction, is licit, nothing prevents the same from being consigned in writing. On this reasoning we could suspect that many things are found in Sacred Scripture, true only according to a sense unknown to us, but false according to the sense which the words present. Everywhere room for doubt would occur, and the certainty of our faith would perish, and its foundations totter. The other, and chief, inconvenience which a lie brings is the destruction of human society, just as a certain writer of ours forbids the fabric of words to be feared and suspected, lest all religious and divine speech waver, by its own nature. And this is entirely the case, according to a mental restriction — for the whole utility of words consists in the mutual communication of internal conceptions. But words are instituted to manifest conceptions of the internal mind. Wherefore, on the hypothesis that a lie were ever lawful, human commerce would collapse, faith among men would altogether perish, since there would always be reason for doubt whether the speaker used a lie, or spoke the truth; so too, the licit use of mental restrictions being admitted, human society would be broken off: since it would be lawful for anyone to affirm, and to swear, whatever he wished, however false according to the sense which the words present; especially since, according to the teaching of Tamburini, and others, which we exhibited above, ch. 6, n. 16, although the words in no way admit such a restriction, it is nonetheless permitted to another to understand, from his own mere will, that he did not sleep, understanding, that he did not eat. See the whole assertion in the place cited. No one, then, from this kind of restriction, any more than from a lie, escapes the ruin of commerce, and of the reciprocal society of humankind. But of this more below.

VI. You will object, first: An equivocal locution is licit, because it contains a true sense, though so obscure that the hearer cannot easily detect it: and it is therefore permitted, so that a deception, whereby truth is concealed which, if manifested, would produce a great evil, may be avoided. But a purely mental restriction also has a true sense in the mind of the speaker, though obscure with respect to the hearer, just as an external equivocal locution does. Therefore a purely mental restriction will be free of lying. Response: There is a disparity. The words of an equivocal, or amphibological, locution really betray a sense, either absolutely, or from the circumstances, intelligible by the hearer, if he attends to it. A purely mental restriction, however, encloses the sense within the mind of the speaker, which the hearer can perceive neither by force of the words, nor by any external sign.

VII. You will object, second: No one is bound to manifest adequately the conceptions of his own mind; but each can manifest one conception, and conceal another. Wherefore external words are conformed to the mind of the speaker, who restricts them according to his internal sense. Response: It is indeed true that no one is bound to utter all his internal conceptions; but he can reveal one, and conceal another. Whenever, however, he wishes to disclose some internal conception of his, it is necessary that he use words which really manifest and express that conception of his. For example: one who externally utters this proposition, "I have not eaten meat," and in his mind understands human flesh, brings forth these words, "I have not eaten meat," to manifest some internal conception. But this internal conception which they signify is nothing other, by Hercules, than a universal negation of any flesh, whether of man, or of animal. But that conception, universal, denying the eating of any flesh, whether of man or of animal, and denying no one kind more than another, is not in the mind of the speaker. Therefore the words are unconformed to his own mind. For the conception in the mind of the speaker is restricted to human flesh; and the external words in no way express human flesh more than that of an animal. Therefore the external words are unconformed to the internal conception. Therefore the speech is a lie.

VIII. You will object, third: It is false that our faith is weakened by mental restrictions, since it rests on divine revelations; for God testifies that he speaks sincerely, in such a way that he can discern true from false speech without any danger of error. Response: It is granted that, the licit use of mental restriction being admitted, the objections which are opposed, excluding certitude and the Church's own authority, are false — since we can doubt whether God has used mental restrictions in the manifestation of his own law, room for doubt also remains as to whether, in reflexive revelations, by which he attests that he speaks true things openly and sincerely, he employs the aforesaid restrictions — which the adversaries cannot deny, since they teach that one who has once lawfully used an equivocation in direct speech can also use the same in reflexive responses, even to infinity. For example: a defendant, who, the order of law not being observed, being questioned by a judge, can answer that he does not know the crime, understanding, "so as to reveal it," can also, if the judge presses, so that he speak without ambiguity, equivocation, or mental restriction, answer, and swear that he speaks without any equivocation, restricting... the negation only to that mind, which is not lawful for me to use — of which he affirms himself candidly using, and, as Fr. Castropalao expressly teaches, whose doctrine I described in Diss. 1, ch. 4. Which doctrine, once admitted, it is evident that the foundations of our religion totter, and human society entirely perishes.

IX. They object, fourth, several testimonies of Sacred Scripture, by which they attempt to defend the aforesaid mental restrictions. But such texts we shall bring under examination below, together, and sincerely — since those too abuse them who defend what they call external amphibologies, without any distinction; and those same testimonies the patrons of lying used to oppose. Wherefore we shall bring all of them, individually, under examination below.