Title — Decretals of Gregory IX

Title I: On Judgments

English · Latin · Both

1.

Chapter I

Latin source headnote: A contumacious person can be excommunicated for failing to appear or to answer; he ought not, however, to be deprived of a benefice. This is what it says. Abbas Siculus.

From the African Council.

Concerning Quodvultdeus, Bishop of Centuria, whom, when his adversary had petitioned that he be brought before our council, and when he had been asked whether he wished to proceed against him before the bishops, he first promised this, but on the following day answered that this did not please him, and departed. It pleased all the bishops that no one should communicate with that Quodvultdeus until, satisfaction having first been made, he has been absolved. For no one can rightly be considered to have his bishopric taken from him before the conclusion of his case.

2.

Chapter II

Latin source headnote: Laymen ought not to handle ecclesiastical affairs, but they are disposed of by the judgment of prelates. This is what it says. Abbas Siculus.

From the synod of Pope Eugene.

We decree also that laymen are not to presume to handle ecclesiastical affairs. But bishops, abbots, archbishops, and other prelates of churches are not to dispose of ecclesiastical affairs, especially those known to be spiritual, by the judgment of [any] laymen, nor because of their prohibition are they to cease exercising ecclesiastical justice.

3.

Chapter III

Latin source headnote: A cause concerning the right of patronage belongs to the judgment of the Church. This it says specifically and literally.

Alexander III, to the illustrious King of England.

In proportion as divine grace [and highest providence have adorned you with the privilege of greater grace,] so much the more ought you to love religious men with greater charity, and more readily to maintain and foster them in their rights. A cause concerning the right of patronage, however, is so joined and connected with spiritual causes that it can be decided only by ecclesiastical judgment and terminated solely before an ecclesiastical judge.

4.

Chapter IV

Latin source headnote: A cleric convicted of or confessing a crime before a secular judge is not punished by his bishop on that account; but one convicted or confessing before him is punished with the due penalty, unless he dispenses with him, which he can do in adultery and lesser offenses; one deposed, however, is not immediately handed over to the secular court. This is what it says from the beginning to the end. Abbas Siculus. § 1. This section is summarized above at the beginning of the chapter; nevertheless, because it has separate and notable matter, state it otherwise: in adultery and lesser offenses a bishop can dispense with clerics after penance has been completed; but one deposed for his excesses is not indiscriminately handed over to the secular court. This is what it says. Abbas Siculus.

The same, to the Archbishop of Salerno.

But if clerics have been convicted of or have confessed a crime before a secular judge, they are not on that account to be condemned in any way by their own bishop. For just as a sentence rendered by one who is not their judge does not hold, so neither does a confession made before him. But if they have confessed their crimes in court before the bishop, or have been convicted by lawful proof, provided that the crimes are such that they ought to be suspended or deposed on account of them, they are not undeservedly to be suspended from their orders or perpetually removed from the ministry of the altar.

§ 2. Concerning adulteries, however, and other crimes that are lesser, a bishop can dispense with his clerics after penance has been completed, so that they may serve in their orders; but he ought not to hand over to a secular judge anyone deposed for his excesses, since he has discharged his own office and ought not crush that person with a double contrition. [Moreover, if a cleric, etc. (cf. c. 1, On Clerics Fighting in a Duel, V.14.)]

5.

Chapter V

Latin source headnote: A vassal is to be sued before the lord of the fief, even if the lord of the fief is an ecclesiastical person, provided that the claimant can obtain his justice there; otherwise the ordinary of the place can be approached. And according to this it is a notable case. Abbas Siculus.

The same.

Furthermore, because sometimes, as we have learned, a sentence of excommunication or interdict is promulgated, on the occasion of those possessions, against those who are known to hold possessions in fief from your church, we most strictly prohibit this as long as they are prepared to exhibit justice concerning these matters in your presence. But if this has been presumed by anyone with rash daring, let it be lawful for you to revoke that sentence with the remedy of appeal removed. Therefore, let it be lawful for no person to violate this charter of our grant, etc.

6.

Chapter VI

Latin source headnote: A party is not compelled to express the name of the action in the complaint; nevertheless, he ought to set forth the fact so clearly that the right of action may be gathered from it. This is what it says according to its meaning. Abbas Siculus.

The same, to the Bishop of Exeter and the Chapter of London.

Our beloved sons the prior and clerics of Guisborough transmitted to us a very grave and difficult complaint against the Archbishop of York, legate of the Apostolic See. [And below: (cf. c. 1, On Appeals, II.28.)] Take more attentive care not to inquire as subtly as many are accustomed to do what kind of action is being brought, but see to it that you investigate simply and plainly the fact itself and the truth of the matter according to the form of the canons and the institutions of the holy Fathers.

7.

Chapter VII

Latin source headnote: An excommunicated person cannot stand in judgment except as a defendant.

The same, to the Bishop of Padua.

We understood from your letters that, when the daughter of a certain nobleman, your parishioner, had contracted marriage with a certain man, and it was afterward discovered that this same man was held bound by the bond of excommunication for the killing of the Bishop of Vicenza of good memory, she raised a question in your presence. Hence, because you petitioned us whether an excommunicated person can stand in judgment, we answer that he can be sued and ought to answer in judgment through another, lest he appear to obtain an advantage from his own malice if by it he should be secure from their proceedings against him.

8.

Chapter VIII

Latin source headnote: A cleric ought to be sued concerning every crime before an ecclesiastical judge, and a contrary custom is not valid.

Lucius III, to the Archbishop of Esztergom.

Clerics, especially in criminal matters, can in no case be condemned by anyone other than an ecclesiastical judge, even if royal custom holds that thieves are to be judged by secular judges. Since the emperor says that even their laws do not disdain to imitate the sacred canons, in which it is generally handed down that a cleric ought to be sued concerning every crime before an ecclesiastical judge, prejudice ought not to be generated against the canons in this respect by any custom.

9.

Chapter IX

Latin source headnote: A judge ought by virtue of his office to provide that the due solemnities are observed in judgments; when these are omitted, the judgment is rendered ineffectual. This is what it says. Abbas Siculus.

Clement III.

Hear the cause that is pending between the brothers of the monastery of Durham and the monks of Saint Albans concerning the church of Cantinz., and terminate it with appeal removed. Among other things, provide this especially: that the brothers of the monastery of Durham enter into the business with the authority and participation of their bishop, lest, if the brothers of Saint Albans prevail, that bishop, presenting himself as abbot of the monastery, be able to revive the settled suit.

10.

Chapter X

Latin source headnote: An incorrigible deposed cleric is to be excommunicated and thereafter anathematized. And if he does not thus return to soundness, he is to be restrained by the secular judge. This is what it says. Abbas Siculus.

Celestine III.

Since not by man—(And below:) It was therefore asked of us on your behalf whether it is lawful for a king or any secular person to judge clerics of whatever order when they have been detected in theft, homicide, perjury, or any crimes whatsoever. We answer your consultation in this way: if a cleric constituted in any order has been lawfully detected and convicted in theft, homicide, perjury, or another mortal crime, he is to be deposed by an ecclesiastical judge. If, after being deposed, he is incorrigible, he ought to be excommunicated, and thereafter, as his contumacy increases, struck with the sword of anathema. But afterward, if, descending into the depth of evils, he treats this with contempt, since the Church has nothing further that it can do, lest he be capable of causing the destruction of many more, he is to be restrained by the secular power in such a way that exile is assigned to him or another lawful penalty is inflicted.

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11.

Chapter XI

Latin source headnote: By a rescript obtained against a violent possessor, one who knowingly succeeds to the wrongful condition is sued. This is what it says according to the common interpretation, which pleases me. Panormitanus.

The same.

Because V., who was said to have violently occupied the church of the cleric P., is dead, as we have learned, and R. afterward entered it, we command that, according to the form of the earlier letters, the business between R. and P. be terminated under the same judges, with reason as intermediary, just as it would have been between the same P. and the aforesaid V. if he were living.

12.

Chapter XII

Latin source headnote: The Pope alone, and not an inferior judge, takes cognizance of doubts concerning privileges of the Apostolic See.

Innocent III, to the Abbots of Saint Sergius and Saint George.

When they had come—(And below:) For since a cause concerning privileges of the Apostolic See is pending, we do not wish judgment concerning them to be given by others.

13.

Chapter XIII

Latin source headnote: An ecclesiastical judge can proceed by way of evangelical or judicial denunciation against any sinner, even a layman, especially by reason of perjury or a broken peace.

The same, to the prelates established throughout France.

He who knows all things, who is the searcher of hearts and knower of secrets, knows that we love our most illustrious son in Christ, Philip, the illustrious King of the French, from a pure heart, a good conscience, and unfeigned faith, and that we earnestly aspire to his honor, advancement, and increase, considering the exaltation of the kingdom of the French to be the exaltation of the Apostolic See, since this kingdom, blessed by God, has always remained in its devotion and, as we believe, will at no time depart from its devotion; for, although assaults are sometimes made from here and there by evil angels, nevertheless we, who are not ignorant of Satan's devices, shall endeavor to avoid his stratagems, believing that the same king will not permit himself to be seduced by his deceits. Therefore, let no one think that we intend to disturb or diminish the jurisdiction or power of the illustrious King of the French, since he neither wishes nor ought even to impede our jurisdiction and power, and since we do not suffice to fulfill our own jurisdiction, why would we wish to usurp another's?

But since the Lord says in the Gospel: “If your brother sins against you, go and correct him between you and him alone. If he hears you, you will have gained your brother; but if he does not hear you, take with you yet one or two, so that every word may stand in the mouth of two or three witnesses. But if he does not hear them, tell the Church; and if he does not hear the Church, let him be to you as a gentile and a publican”; and since the King of England, as he asserts, is prepared sufficiently to show that the King of the French sins against him, that he himself proceeded concerning him in correction according to the evangelical rule, and that at last, because he made no progress in any way, he told the Church: how can we, who have been called by the heavenly disposition to the governance of the universal Church, fail to hearken to the divine mandate, so that we should not proceed according to its form, unless perhaps he should show before us or our legate a sufficient reason to the contrary?

For we do not intend to judge concerning the fief, judgment of which belongs to him—unless perhaps something has been taken away from the common law by a special privilege or a contrary custom—but to decide concerning sin, the censure of which belongs to us without doubt, and which we can and ought to exercise against anyone. Therefore the royal dignity ought not to consider it injurious to itself if it submits itself to apostolic judgment concerning this matter, since the illustrious Emperor Valentinian is read to have said to the suffragans of the church of Milan: “Take care to establish upon the pontifical seat such a man to whom even we, who govern the empire, may sincerely submit our heads, and whose admonitions, when we transgress as men, we may necessarily receive as the medicines of one who heals.”

Nor should we omit that most humble provision which the Emperor Theodosius established and Charlemagne renewed, from whose lineage the same king is known to have descended: namely, “Whoever has a suit, whether he is claimant or defendant, whether at the beginning of the suit or after courses of time have elapsed, whether when the business is being argued or when sentence has already begun to be delivered, if he chooses the judgment of the bishop of the sacrosanct see, immediately and without any hesitation—even if the other party objects—let the matter be directed, with the statement of the litigants, to the judgment of the bishops.”

For since we rely not upon a human constitution but rather upon divine law, because our power is not from man but from God, no one of sound mind is ignorant that it belongs to our office to correct every Christian concerning any mortal sin whatsoever and, if he treats correction with contempt, to coerce him through ecclesiastical severity. That we ought and are able to correct is plain from both pages of the Testament, since the Lord cries through the Prophet: “Cry out, do not cease; exalt your voice like a trumpet, and announce their crimes to my people”; and he adds in the same place: “Unless you announce his impiety to the impious man, he will die in the iniquity which he has committed, but I will require his blood from your hand.” The Apostle also admonishes us to correct the unruly, and elsewhere the same says: “Reprove, entreat, rebuke in all patience and doctrine.” That we also can and ought to coerce is plain from what the Lord says to the Prophet, who was from the priests of Anathoth: “Behold, I have established you over nations and kingdoms, that you may uproot and destroy, scatter, build, and plant.” It is certain, however, that every mortal sin is to be uprooted, destroyed, and scattered. Moreover, when the Lord handed the keys of the kingdom of heaven to blessed Peter, he said to him: “Whatever you bind upon earth will be bound also in heaven, and whatever you loose upon earth will be loosed also in heaven.” But no one doubts that everyone sinning mortally is bound before God. Therefore, so that Peter may imitate the divine judgment, he ought to bind on earth those who are known to be bound in heaven.

But perhaps it will be said that one must act in one way with kings and in another with others. Yet we know it is written in the divine law: “You shall judge the great as the small, and with you there shall be no acceptance of persons,” which blessed James testifies intervenes if you say to the one clothed in splendid apparel, “You sit well here,” but to the poor man, “You stand there,” or, “Sit beneath my footstool.” Although we can proceed in this manner concerning any criminal sin, so that we may call the sinner back from vice to virtue and from error to truth, especially nevertheless when the sin is against peace, which is the bond of charity, [concerning which Christ specially commanded the Apostles: “Into whatever house you enter, first say: ‘Peace to this house’; and if a son of peace is there, your peace will rest upon him. But whoever will not receive you or hear your words, go outside and shake the dust from your feet as testimony against them.” For what is it for the Apostles to go outside from such persons except to deny them apostolic communion? What is it to shake the dust from their feet except to exercise ecclesiastical severity? For this is that dust which, when Moses scattered ashes from the furnace, became a plague of ulcers throughout all the land of Egypt. How grave a sentence of severity those who do not receive messengers of peace or hear their words are to suffer at the final judgment, Truth himself consequently shows, setting it forth not simply but with a certain affirmation: “Amen I say to you, it will be more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah on the day of judgment than for that city”; understanding by the city its citizens, from whom he did not except kings themselves. Moreover, since according to lawful enactments another may use against a person whatever rule of law that person has established against another, and the wise man declares, “Submit to the law which you yourself have enacted,” and since the same King of the French, against Richard of illustrious memory, formerly King of the English—who, that we may speak with due respect for the same king, was not of a worse condition, since we say this not to his confusion but for our excuse—used our office and benefit in war, how will he not admit against himself on another's behalf what he admitted for himself against that king?] Surely there ought not to be with us weight and weight, measure and measure, each of which is abominable before God?

Finally, since treaties of peace were reformed between those kings and confirmed on each side by an oath personally sworn, but were not observed until the appointed time, surely we shall be able to take cognizance of the sanctity of the oath—which without doubt belongs to the judgment of the Church—so that the broken treaties of peace may be restored? Therefore, lest we appear to foster such discord by dissimulation, to dissemble the destruction of religious places, and to neglect the slaughter of the Christian people, we have given in command to our beloved son the Abbot of Casamari, the aforesaid legate, that, unless the king himself either restores a solid peace with the aforesaid king, or enters into suitable truces, or at least humbly permits the same abbot and our venerable brother the Archbishop of Bourges summarily to take cognizance whether the complaint that the King of the English brings against him before the Church is just, or whether the exception that he caused to be expressed against him to us through his letters is lawful, the abbot is not to omit proceeding according to the form given to him by us.

Therefore, through apostolic writings we command all of you, and strictly enjoin you by virtue of obedience, that, after the same abbot has executed the apostolic mandate concerning this matter, you humbly receive his sentence—or rather, more truly, ours—observe it yourselves, and cause it to be observed by others, secure in the knowledge that, if you act otherwise, we shall punish your disobedience. [Given at the Lateran, ... ..., in the seventh year of our pontificate, 1204.]

Textual note: The Latin Library transcription represents the two blank elements in the dating clause with corrupt high-byte characters. The Friedberg-derived reference text prints ellipsis points in both places; these omissions are preserved above.

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14.

Chapter XIV

Latin source headnote: A principal party ought to set forth the fact in judgment personally, not through an advocate, unless that party is without discretion.

The same, to the Bishop of Ely.

The pastoral office—(And below: cf. c. 28, On the Office of a Delegated Judge, I.29.) We establish, moreover, that the principal parties are to set forth the fact not through advocates but personally, unless perhaps they are so lacking in discretion that, with the judge's permission, their deficiency is supplied through others. [But since, etc. Given at Rome, at Saint Peter's, on the fourteenth day before the Kalends of January, 1204.]

15.

Chapter XV

Latin source headnote: If the action and the claim are inept, or the claim alone, the defendant ought to be absolved from the pending judgment; nevertheless, the claimant will be heard again if he proceeds suitably. This is what it says according to its meaning.

The same, to the nobleman Matthew de Riparia.

Having examined the cause pending between you and the knights of Campania concerning the church of Saint Angelo de Casaperota, having heard the proceedings, confessions, and attestations, and having investigated the instruments and allegations, we perceived clearly that the arbitral award which T., the vice-lord of Sabina, was said to have promulgated concerning that business had been pronounced contrary to the form of law and of the submission to arbitration. Hence, notwithstanding the confirmation of Pope Celestine, our predecessor of happy memory, who had confirmed it as providently rendered and received by each party, we decreed it null and void.

We recognized, however, the action which you brought against the aforesaid knights concerning the right of patronage of that church to be incongruous and inept, because, although you introduced witnesses to prove that, when the aforesaid vice-lord A. received that church as though sequestered, you possessed the right of patronage of that church, you could neither bring a vindication of the thing nor petition for its restitution. Hence we pronounced that your claim in this respect did not hold, absolving the same knights from it, yet in such a way that, if you wish to bring a congruous and suitable action, they shall nevertheless be bound to answer you. [Therefore let no one, etc. Given at the Lateran, on the ninth day before the Kalends of April, in the tenth year of our pontificate, 1207.]

Textual note: The Latin source prints proiecto in the sentence explaining why neither vindication nor restitution was available. The word is syntactically difficult and may stand for profecto; because it does not alter the stated legal consequence, it has not been represented by an additional English adverb.

16.

Chapter XVI

Latin source headnote: The preceptors of the Temple can sue and defend on behalf of their houses; neither their religious state nor the fact that their origin is unknown stands in their way.

The same, to the Master and Brothers of the militia of the Temple established in Italy.

Since you are appointed to the service of Jesus Christ, who, since he is just, loves justice, and whose countenance beholds equity, we are bound by paternal solicitude to guard against your losses, lest, because you apply yourselves to works of piety, you suffer injury in your justice. We have clearly learned that certain judges, both secular and ecclesiastical, in Italy do not admit the preceptors whom you have in your houses to pursue their justice in causes, as though it were not lawful for those who have resolved to adhere to peaceful pursuits to undertake the care of contentious business. They allege for their exclusion that the origin of those men is not known to them, although, from whatever places they have come, called by divine grace, provided they execute the office of their order laudably, knowledge of their nation is required superfluously. Therefore, by apostolic authority we prohibit anyone from excluding those preceptors from suing or answering in the prosecution of causes on an occasion of this kind. [Therefore let no one, etc. Given at Rome, at Saint Peter's, on the fourth day before the Ides of April, in the ninth year of our pontificate, 1206.]

Textual note: The Latin Library and Friedberg-derived texts print the apparent typographical form decrecreverunt; the translation follows the evident sense of decreverunt, “have resolved.”

17.

Chapter XVII

Latin source headnote: Prelates ought to do justice to laymen concerning clerics, notwithstanding a frustratory appeal; clerics nevertheless ought not to be drawn by laymen to a secular forum, even when their prelates are negligent.

The same, to the Bishop of Vercelli and the Abbot of Toleto.

In what manner and when—(And below: cf. c. 17, On Accusations and Denunciations, V.1.) You are to command the prelates on our behalf to cause full justice to be exhibited to laymen complaining against clerics, notwithstanding frustratory appeals which clerics frequently interpose to their grievance, lest, through a failure of justice, clerics be drawn by laymen to a secular judgment, which we prohibit altogether; and you are to strive by every means that this not occur. Moreover, we wish your solicitude to remain vigilant against the deceits of heretics, admonishing and beseeching you in the Lord that you apply yourselves prudently and effectively to uprooting from the Lord's field the tares of heretical depravity. [Given on the fourth day before the Kalends of February, 1206.]

18.

Chapter XVIII

Latin source headnote: A judge who, as a private person, has an almost similar cause to the one he has as judge is removed from judging. This is what it says.

The same.

We remember having committed to you, sons T. and G., and the Archdeacon of Paris the cause pending between our beloved son the Abbot and Convent of Vendôme on one side and the Archdeacon of Chartres on the other concerning certain procurations. But the said abbot and convent, unwilling to answer the other party unless they first consulted us in accordance with the privileges of the Roman Pontiff granted to their monastery, sent our beloved son W., a monk of that monastery, to the Apostolic See for this reason, petitioning nevertheless that we deign to substitute you, son dean, in place of the aforesaid Archdeacon of Paris for the decision of that business. But because, since an almost similar cause concerns that same archdeacon, he would appear excessively favorable to the other party, substituting you, son dean, in place of that archdeacon, through apostolic writings we command your discretion that, notwithstanding the earlier letters obtained before the monk's arrival, you proceed in the cause, reason leading the way.

19.

Chapter XIX

Latin source headnote: If judges take cognizance of the principal matter and preliminary exceptions at the same time, or receive witnesses concerning the principal matter before issue has been joined, appeal is lawfully taken from them.

Honorius III, to the Archdeacon of Reims and the Dean of Brim in the diocese of Cologne.

A petition presented to us by our beloved son R., elect of Verdun, declared that, when the proctors of himself and of H. the archdeacon and certain canons of Verdun, his adversaries, had formerly approached our hearing concerning the fact of his election, we, having heard the petition of the opposing party and the things proposed by it, directed our letters under a certain form to our venerable brother the Bishop of Paris and his co-judges, containing among other things that, after summoning those who were to be summoned, they should inquire into the truth concerning the matters proposed and other things touching the business, compelling the witnesses who happened to be named to give testimony according to the customary form, and fixing for the parties a suitable term on which they were to present themselves before us, personally or through suitable proctors, to receive a just sentence.

Therefore, after the parties had been cited, no proceeding occurred on the first day. And when ten persons from the opposing party appeared at the second term and were asked in court whether they would oppose the elect, seven of them being unwilling to answer, the remaining three offered themselves to act. But when the same elect objected by way of exception that some of those who were proceeding against him were involved in conspiracy and others in excommunication, offering to prove this, the aforesaid judges ruled interlocutorily that they would inquire simultaneously into these matters and the principal business, concerning which it appeared to the same judges that inquiry should be made. They refused, as though they were not judges but investigators, to admit the proofs of the same elect concerning his said exceptions; instead, perverting the order of law, they intended to inquire personally and simultaneously into the aforesaid exceptions and the principal business, and they proceeded even to the reception of witnesses although issue had not yet been joined concerning that business. For this reason the aforesaid elect appealed to our hearing, humbly petitioning that, since the letters obtained for those judges import not an inquiry but a commission, as appears from their contents, we deign to revoke as void what was done by them after his appeal and to commit the cause to another.

Therefore, because the business was delegated not by way of inquiry but of commission, through apostolic writings we command your discretion that, meeting in a suitable place convenient for the parties, if it is established that appeal was taken on account of the said grievances or any of them, after revoking as void whatever you find attempted after such an appeal, you proceed in the cause itself according to the contents of the earlier letters, with appeal removed, reason leading the way, without the loss of delay.

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20.

Chapter XX

Latin source headnote: Notwithstanding the passage of three years, a delegate can proceed in a cause committed to him.

The same, to Master Tancred, Canon of Bologna.

Our venerable brother the Archbishop of Ravenna proposed before us that, although the decision of the cause pending between him on one side and the community of Cervia on the other concerning jurisdiction over the city of Cervia and certain other articles had been prolonged for three years through their subterfuges and cavils, and at last, after joinder of issue and various commissions, we commanded you to remit it to us sufficiently instructed, the said people of Cervia, asserting that the pendency of the judgment had expired through the passage of three years, refused to answer under your examination. Therefore, unwilling that the decision of the same cause be prolonged any further, by authority of the present writings we command that, notwithstanding an exception of this kind, you proceed in that business, with appeal removed and reason leading the way, according to the form handed to you. [Given at the Lateran, on the tenth day before the Kalends of May, in the eighth year of our pontificate, 1224.]

21.

Chapter XXI

Latin source headnote: A claimant who prevails in a possessory action before the judge of the thing is not bound to answer before that judge concerning ownership if he belongs entirely to another forum. This is what it says, and it is a notable case.

The same, to the Bishop and Masters T. and B. of Prato, residing at Bologna.

The Abbot and Convent of Saint Mary of Florence formerly signified to us that the Florentine podestà promulgated a definitive sentence in their favor against the community of the castle of Signa concerning possession, or quasi-possession, of the right of electing a rector there, which they said belonged to them. But afterward, when that community was unwilling to receive the nobleman B. Vinci-Werra, whom they had elected rector of the aforesaid castle, the aforesaid podestà, although frequently requested, not only took no care to put his sentence into execution and compel the community itself to receive the said nobleman as rector, but did not even permit that community to be constrained to this by the faithful men of their monastery; rather, the podestà improperly compelled the aforesaid abbot and convent to answer the aforesaid community in a secular judgment concerning ownership, or quasi-ownership, of the said right.

Hence, through our letters we enjoined upon you that, if it was so, through ecclesiastical censures you were to compel that community to admit as rector the person elected by the same monks; afterward you were to hear what the parties considered should be proposed concerning ownership, or quasi-ownership, of the said right, and decide the cause as would be just, notwithstanding any statute contrary to ecclesiastical liberty, or the fact that the aforesaid abbot and convent were compelled to join issue concerning this matter in a secular judgment. Recently, however, we learned from the report of the abbot and convent that, when knowledge of the letters obtained from us concerning this matter had reached that community, its syndic, after exhibiting before the judge of the podestà the oath against calumny, caused the abbot to be cited to undergo a similar oath before him, so that by this the same abbot would be understood to have renounced the apostolic letters by the act itself, or, if he refused to do this, would be held as convicted. And when you had cited the aforesaid community to your presence frequently and peremptorily, its syndic declaring that he wished to propose dilatory exceptions, you established a term on which he was to do this or answer concerning the principal business.

But the other party, by way of exception, proposed among other things that it was not then bound by law to answer before you because the time was one of judicial vacation on account of the vintage. The syndic of the monastery answered that this was proposed maliciously so that, with the cause prolonged, the term of the elect's governance might elapse uselessly. This appeared from the fact that the abbot was prohibited by a messenger of the podestà from suing the same community in judgment outside the Florentine district. For this reason the aforementioned abbot and convent humbly petitioned that we deign to oppose malices of this kind. Therefore we command your discretion that, absolving as a precaution, with the obstacle of appeal removed, both the same syndic and the monks of that monastery whose testimony he wished to use, if it should happen that excommunication is objected against them to impede the progress of the cause, lest under such a pretext they be capable of being excluded from suing or testifying, notwithstanding this, you proceed in the business, according to the form of the mandate received, reason leading the way, imposing the due end upon the cause without the loss of delay, so fulfilling the apostolic precept that we ought not to impute to you the difficulty which is known to threaten the said monastery on account of delay. [Given at Rieti, on the second day before the Kalends of November, in the tenth year of our pontificate, 1225.]