Acts done through fear

The actions which are done out of fear are simply voluntary, but they are usually also involuntary under a certain respect.

There is no question here of actions which are done in fear or with fear, as when I walk with fear and trembling along a lonely road by night. We are concerned with the effect which fear has on human actions done in consequence of fear; and unless it deprives the agent of the use of reason, which in rare cases may happen, the action remains voluntary, because it is done freely and deliberately to avoid the threatened danger. In such circumstances, as we saw above, the action is said to be simply voluntary; but it is also involuntary under a certain respect, for, unless the danger threatened, the action would not be done. An exception must be made with regard to attrition elicited from fear of hell, which, if it is to be efficacious, must be simply voluntary and in no respect involuntary,¹ for otherwise it would not help to justify the sinner in the sacrament of Penance.² We can easily see how this is possible with regard to sin. For other actions done through fear have some evil or loss annexed to them, on which account they are involuntary under some respect; while aversion from sin is wholly good and reasonable, and so there is no reason why repentance for sin from fear of hell should not be simply voluntary and in no respect involuntary.”

¹ St.Alphonsus, 6, n. 442.

² Trent, sess. 14, c. 4.

Inasmuch as bad actions done through fear are simply voluntary, it would follow that they are imputable to the agent, so that fear does not excuse him from sin. And this is true of such actions as are intrinsically bad and against the natural law. The Church has always considered those to be apostates who through fear of death or persecution deny their faith, though less culpable than those who renounce it without excuse (Can. 2205).

However, with regard to positive precepts, grave fear ordinarily excuses transgressors of them from sin. The reason is, because the legislator is not presumed to desire that his laws should bind when their observance would entail such grave consequences to his subjects. Divines, relying on what we read in Holy Scripture, teach this doctrine concerning the positive law of God, and it will be all the more true of positive human legislation.¹ But if non-observance of a law or a command of a superior would cause great damage to the common good, then the law or command must be obeyed, even with loss of life; for private advantage must yield to the requirements of the common weal. And so a soldier must stick to his post in war, even at the risk of life.

¹ St Thomas, 3, q. 40, a. 4, ad 3; 1-2, q. 100, a. 8, ad 4; Suarez, De Leg. 3, c. 30, n. 6; Can. 2205, sec. 2.

III. Influence on the free. Fear generally does not remove the free character of a work placed from fear; nevertheless, if one acts from fear alone, it causes the involuntary in a qualified sense, or lessens the voluntary. The reason for the former is that fear generally does not wholly disturb judgment. The reason for the latter is that what proceeds from fear alone is done with some repugnance and therefore is chosen by the will with lesser affection (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 6, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, V, XXI).

Note. To what extent fear of harm excuses from observing a positive law will be explained elsewhere. For that is not to be sought from the passion of fear, but from the gravity of the evil which threatens, and which, from the reasonable will of the legislator, one generally is not bound to undergo.

The acts of one who is under fear are of various kinds.

(a) Acts are done with fear, when the fear is concomitant—i.e., when it is not willed and does not cause the act, but is merely its occasion or would rather prevent it. Examples: Julius is ordered under pain of death to drink a glass of wine, a thing he was intending to do and which he would have done even without any threats. Balbus walks along a lonely road, because he must get home, but he trembles at the thought of robbers. Caius, a highwayman, at the point of the revolver, forces Balbus to hand over his purse, but he fears that the police may arrive before he has secured the money. Titus, a business man, makes a trip by air, because he must reach another city without delay, but he has some apprehensions about his safety. All these men act, not because of, but apart from or in spite of their fears.

(b) Acts are done through fear, when fear causes an act that would not otherwise be performed. The fear may be antecedent (i.e., unwilled) or consequent (i.e., willed). Examples: Balbus, in the case mentioned above, surrendered his purse because of involuntary fear which was caused by the revolver of the robber. Claudius makes an act of sorrow for sin because of voluntary fear which he produces by thinking of the punishment of hell.

The effects of fear, which do not take away the use of reason, on the voluntariness of acts are as follows.

(a) Acts done with fear are not made really involuntary on account of the fear that accompanies them, for they are done for their own sake, not out of fear or as a consequence of fear. They may be called relatively involuntary in the sense that, by reason of fear, they are comparatively unpleasant, unless one enjoys the thrill of danger. Examples: Balbus, Caius and Titus, in the cases mentioned above, acted with perfect willingness. Whether they enjoyed their experiences or not, depends on their attitudes towards adventure and excitement.

(b) Acts done through fear are voluntary simply and absolutely, for the act done under the impulse of fear is what the agent considers here and now as most desirable. Examples: Balbus’ surrender of his purse and Claudius’ act of contrition are just what these two men wish to do as best suited to the circumstances.

(c) Acts done through fear are involuntary in a certain respect, if the agent can retain his inclination towards the opposite of the act and still avoid what he fears; otherwise, they are in no way involuntary. Examples: Balbus retains his liking for the money taken from him by force, and hence the surrender of it to the highwayman, although voluntary, if all things are considered, is not voluntary, if only the money itself is considered. Claudius, on the contrary, retains no liking for his sins, for he knows that, if he does, he will defeat the purpose of his act of sorrow, which is to escape the pains of hell; hence, his contrition, although the result of fear, is in no respect involuntary.

Does grave fear excuse from fault? - Either the discussion is of those things which are not intrinsically and of themselves evil, or of those things which are from their nature intrinsically evil, as would be, for example, apostasy from faith, blasphemy against God. If the first, ordinarily speaking, grave fear excuses from all fault, because any positive law is not accustomed to oblige with a grave proportionate inconvenience, as is common. Ordinarily speaking, because if someone by grave fear were compelled to the violation of some positive law, which would yield to common harm, or to contempt of legitimate power, or of religion, with grave public scandal, then grave fear would not excuse from fault of transgression. For in the first, the common good must be preferred to private good; but in the second and third, there would already be question of a thing intrinsically evil from its own nature. Nevertheless in this second and third case, if the one suffering, when he violates the law, publicly protests that he does not act thus in contempt of the law or of religion, but only to decline the violence, in the presence of which he declares that law and religion no longer oblige, then, if public scandal ceases, and the aforesaid contempt ceases - which, practically speaking, seems altogether difficult - he would be excused from fault.

If the second, it is certain that fear, however grave, provided it is not such as to take away the use of reason, never excuses from all fault. For those things, since they include intrinsic and essential malice, if they are done voluntarily, can never lack fault. An example is in that Christian who, struck by fear of punishments or even of death, would deny the faith of Christ. Nevertheless it diminishes fault, since it diminishes the voluntary. But, ordinarily speaking, grave fear still leaves such cognition of the things which are done that it suffices for mortal sin. L. 1. 1. n. 175; l. 5. n. 21; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 125. a. 4; Elbel 43-52; Del Vecchio, vol. 1, n. 144.

You will resolve: Grave fear, for example of death, etc., often excuses not only from a positive precept, whether divine or human, even ecclesiastical, but sometimes also from an affirmative natural precept. And thus someone is not bound with danger to life to receive baptism, to confess integrally, to receive communion, to preserve a deposit, to fulfill a vow, or to aid a neighbor in extreme necessity of life. On the contrary, to avoid death a priest cannot violate the sacramental seal. Viva, Opusc. de Act. hum., q. 4, a. 4; Lessius, q. 6, a. 6; L. 1. 1. n. 175.

Do ignorance, fear, and grave inconvenience excuse from invalidation? - R. To the first: Negatively, because subjective ignorance, whether of fact or of law, does not supply the objective defect of the act; and thus there is no marriage, when there stands, e.g., the diriment impediment of consanguinity, whether it is contracted in good faith or in bad faith. - But if the invalidating law is penal, then, if ignorance excuses from guilt, it also excuses from the penalty of invalidation. But if guilt is admitted, yet the penalty of invalidation is unknown, then more probably this is not incurred, because invalidation is an extraordinary and exorbitant penalty, from which ignorance excuses. Schmalz., l. 5, t. 37, n. 105; Sanch., de Matr., l. 9, d. 32, n. 17. More commonly, however, they affirm that it is incurred, because since such ignorance does not excuse from sin against the law, neither consequently does it excuse from the penalty, although this is unknown. Suarez, l. 5, c. 22; Ithur., Cas. 53, n. 24. Nor indeed does ignorance excuse in any way if the invalidation was established principally to preclude evils which otherwise would flow into the commonwealth, but the penalty only accessorily, for coercing the person. And indeed the proper reason of an invalidating law is common utility.

R. To the second and third: There are not lacking those who affirm it, because positive law ought to yield to the natural law of charity, and because in the case there is a certain legitimate epikeia. But it seems one must answer with the common opinion: Negatively; because grave fear, and even gravest inconvenience, neither render the person capable, nor restore to acts the force taken away by law. But since laws of this sort primarily and directly tend to preserving the public good, no place is given to epikeia on account of merely private harm. And thus a marriage between blood relatives and relatives by affinity will be void, even to avoid death, even in the article of death. Private harm, I say; for if a common harm is present, since then the law would become harmful to society, invalidation ceases. L. 191; l. 3, n. 112; l. 6, n. 1029; de Privil., n. 57; Diana, t. 2, tr. 6, r. 62, 73; Sanch., de Matr., l. 3, d. 17, n. 3; Ithur., Cas. 53, n. 18; M. E., vol. 20, p. 177, 474.

Does a promissory oath extorted by grave and unjust fear oblige? - The first probable opinion affirms. For the general rule is that any oath is to be kept when it can be done without sin, lest God be brought in as witness of the false. The second opinion, also sufficiently probable, denies, because an oath follows the nature of the act to which it is added. But that promise by natural law is void, or at least rescindable by the very one who suffered fear, according as the promise is gratuitous or onerous, on account of the grave injury which it contains, which is not to be confirmed and continued by oath. Whence even the patrons of the first opinion warn that he who suffered fear can ask relaxation of the oath, so that he may be excused from the obligation of paying; but if he has already paid, he can seek in judgment what he gave, or secretly compensate himself. L. 174; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7 ad 3; q. 98, a. 3 ad 1; Ithur., Cas. 15, nn. 11, 18; Struggl 23, 29.

Is a vow made through fear valid? - R. Negatively, if the fear is grave, unjust, inflicted from without in order to extort the vow. The reason is that that cannot be acceptable to God which is violently extorted from someone through injury, since the law of nature demands that right be restored entirely. And this indeed proves that vows of this sort are invalid by natural law. It is clear, moreover, from canon law as to solemn vows of religion, and probably also as to other vows. C. Perlatum 1, de His quae, etc.; L. 197.

Unjust; for if the fear is just, the vow is valid, since there is no true coercion in that which one ought to do, nor is the one vowing reasonably unwilling. Inflicted in order to extort the vow; for otherwise the vow is valid, for example, if someone, fearing death which robbers threaten, made a vow to God that he might be delivered. Grave; whether a vow emitted from light unjust fear is invalid, "Busembaum here affirms with Suarez and Filliucci. Likewise Navarrus and many others cited by Sanchez, Decal., l. 4, c. 3, n. 24. The reason, as they say, is that fear therefore annuls a vow because it takes away full liberty of consent; therefore light fear also will annul it, when it takes away the same liberty and is the cause that the vow is made. And Sanchez calls this opinion probable. But the opposite opinion is more probable, which Sanchez holds, n. 24, with Soto, Valentia, Sa, Azor, etc., and the Salmanticenses, ibid., n. 161, who call it common, and prove it from C. Perlatum, de His quae vi, etc. The reason is that light fear, which can easily be cast off, is not judged to be the cause of so grave a thing as a vow, just as we shall likewise say concerning contracts, n. 718." L. 197.

R. Affirmatively, if the fear arises from within or from a necessary cause, unless it takes away the use of reason from the one vowing; the reason is that vows of this sort are simply voluntary.

Does grave fear invalidate a contract, or at least render it rescindable? - R. Negatively, if there is question of fear from within, or from a necessary or natural cause; or of fear indeed from without, but justly induced. The reason is that fear does not simply take away voluntariness, unless it is so grave that it disturbs reason. Nor indeed does such fear inflict any injury on the contracting party.

If there is question of grave fear from without, and unjustly induced, and not for extorting consent, it is disputed, but a distinction seems to have to be made. "For if it was induced by the other contracting party... the contract is voidable, because he who unjustly induces fear is bound to remove all disadvantages which arise from the injury, among which is the obligation arising from such a contract. Thus more probably Lugo.

But if fear is induced by an irrelevant third party, and the contract is used as a means for declining the imminent evil, then an onerous contract holds irrevocably... for neither of the contracting parties inflicted injury; but the third party inflicting fear cannot take away the obligation by consenting to rescission of the contract, because the contract was not made with him; although he is bound to induce rescission, so that he may avert injury from the innocent person, if this one wishes... And who would say that a contract can be rescinded if, from fear of your enemy plotting against you, you bought a sword to defend yourself?... Lugo excepts 1. the contract of marriage, which he thinks to be invalid if entered upon from such fear. He excepts 2. probably with Palau, gratuitous contracts, because thus better provision is made for the innocent person, and the other cannot complain, because he is deprived only of gain, remaining in the state in which he was before; and just as he would not wish to be obligated in such a state, so neither ought he wish to oblige the other." Reuter 127. S. Th. Quodl. 5. a. 17. Cf. V. 2. n. 1022. If there is question of grave fear from without, unjustly induced for extorting consent by someone other than the fellow contracting party, it is again disputed. The first probable opinion teaches that the contract "cannot be rescinded by natural law, because since neither party has inflicted injury, there is no reason from the nature of the thing why it could be rescinded at the will of one rather than preserved at the will of the other." Reuter 126. C. A. 875 favors this opinion. The second probable opinion holds the opposite, "because by reason of the injury, even if inflicted by a third party, the thing remains obligated to the prior owner, and consequently passes to anyone with that burden; but it is not fitting that someone through another's injury should lose every right in his own thing. Billuart, etc." Gur. 782.

Both Roman Law, Reuter l. c., and Italian Law 1111, French Law 1111, and Spanish Law 1268 are consonant with this latter opinion. Cod. Lusit. 666: the contract is null. If fear from without is unjustly induced for extorting consent by the other of the contracting parties, whether the contract thus entered upon is invalid by the fact itself is disputed. There is a threefold probable opinion. The first affirms. The reason is that if a contract of this kind were naturally valid, justice would arise from injustice, since from a contract extorted by injury there would arise an obligation, which is an act of justice. The second holds that gratuitous contracts are invalid, but not onerous ones. The reason is that for gratuitous contracts, unlike other contracts, an altogether free will is required; for it is a beneficence. But the third, more probable and very common opinion teaches that such a contract is indeed rescindable, but not invalid, neither by natural nor by positive law. Not by natural law, because fear does not simply take away voluntariness. Not by positive law, whether Roman, by which judges are commanded to rescind such contracts, therefore per se the law has them as valid; or French, as is openly had in art. 1117; or Italian 1111, 1113; or Spanish 1267, 1268; or Austrian 870, 874, 875; or German 123; L. 715, 716. - Cod. Lusit. 666: the contract is null.

Does grave fear excuse from censure? R. Affirmatively, unless nevertheless observance of the law is necessary for preserving the public good, or violation of it yields to contempt of faith, or of law, or of ecclesiastical power. The reason for the response is that one who commits a delict from fear sins rather from weakness of nature than from contumacy. The reason for the exception is that in the aforesaid cases the obligation even of human law does not cease.

10. “It is one thing to operate with fear, but another from fear; for the first says concomitance. Whence what is done thus, although it is absolutely voluntary, nevertheless that voluntary does not arise from fear, but rather is opposed to and conquers that fear, which is a sign of a great will; as when Christ the Lord was going forth to death, fearing it, he embraced it with the highest will, which did not arise from fear of the Father and of men, and therefore conquered natural fear. But to be done from fear signifies that fear itself induces one to willing or doing something, and then fear is the cause of such voluntary, in the way in which among the acts of the will intention is the cause of election, and election of use; and love of good is the cause of hatred of the opposite evil. For in this way in the present matter, when someone fears death he decrees and intends to flee it; and by force of this decree he chooses this means, for example to cast merchandise into the sea, and use or execution follows upon this election. Therefore from first to last fear was the cause stirring and applying the will to that efficacious act by which it commanded that exterior action.” Suarez D. 3. S. 1.

11. Moreover, those things which are done from fear are more voluntary than involuntary: for they are voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect. For each thing is such simply according as it is in act. But this act, according as it is exercised here and now, is simply willed; because although such an action considered per se is not lovable simply, nevertheless here and now it is proposed as absolutely to be chosen, as a fitting means for avoiding a greater evil. Therefore under that account it is here and now simply voluntary. For judgment concerning the voluntary must be borne with the thing considered in particular with all circumstances, and not through abstraction or precision of the intellect. “But that what is done through fear is taken as existing outside this case, according as it is repugnant to the will, this is only according to reason alone, and therefore it is involuntary in a certain respect, that is, according as it is considered as existing outside this case.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. Therefore that which is done through fear without condition is voluntary, that is, according as it is actually done; but it is involuntary under a condition, that is, if such fear were not impending.” St. Thomas, ibid. ad 3. “And because acts are in particulars, therefore it is simply voluntary, but involuntary in a certain respect.” St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 47. a. 1.; Suarez D. 3. S. 1. 2.

12. From what has been said the difference is clear between those things which are done from force and those which are done from fear. “Those things which are done through fear and through force differ not only according to present and future, but also according to this, that in that which is done through force the will does not consent, but is wholly against the motion of the will. But that which is done through fear becomes voluntary for this reason, that the motion of the will is borne into it, although not on account of itself, but on account of another thing, namely for repelling the evil which is feared. For it suffices for the account of the voluntary that it be on account of another voluntary thing. For voluntary is not only what we will on account of itself, but also what we will on account of another thing, as on account of an end. Therefore it is clear that in that which is done through force the interior will does nothing. But in that which is done through fear the will does something.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. ad 1.

13. Likewise the difference is clear between fear and concupiscence in relation to the voluntary. “In him who does something through fear there remains a repugnance of the will toward that which is done, according as it is considered in itself. But in him who does something through concupiscence, as is the incontinent man, the prior will does not remain, which was repudiating that which is desired concupiscently; but it is changed to willing that which before it repudiated. And therefore what is done through fear is in some way involuntary, but what is done through concupiscence is in no way involuntary. For the incontinent man of concupiscence acts against that which he previously proposed, but not against that which he now wills. But the fearful man acts against that which even now he wills according to itself.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 7. ad 2.

14. From the preceding doctrine it follows that a contract per se is valid, if someone has been coerced to contracting by grave fear, but nevertheless justly. Whence he who has contracted betrothals from fear of excommunication can be compelled to matrimony, and the contract is valid. C. Ex litteris 10, On Betrothals. He who has violated a virgin is compelled to endow or marry her. He who promised something lest he be accused of a committed crime is bound to give it. The reason is that fear does not render a contract simply involuntary. For he who contracts with grave fear, all things considered absolutely, wills and consents. But since the fear was struck justly, there is no injury. Wherefore the contract cannot be invalid either on account of defect of consent or on account of inflicted injury. — Nor indeed is a contract invalid of itself, if someone has been coerced to contract by grave fear but unjustly, although it can be rescinded at the judgment of him who suffered the fear. For consent is not lacking, since consent is altogether the same, whether the fear is just or unjust. But a contract cannot be rendered invalid from injury. For the immediate cause of the contract is consent, not injury. But because he who unjustly struck fear inflicted injury upon another, he is bound to restore him to the prior state, and the other has a right of exacting this restitution, which can be done only by rescission of the contract.

15. Now those things which are done from fear are involuntary in a certain respect, when the thing is evil in itself, but good only in the present circumstances, as is clear in the example adduced of the casting of merchandise by a merchant, which in itself is evil to him, but is good to him in the present circumstance of shipwreck. But if the thing is good in itself, so that it is such even by abstracting from the present circumstances, then he who operates from fear can be borne by a perfect inclination of the will into that thing, so that the voluntary simply is had, without at the same time having the involuntary in a certain respect. And thus he who from supernatural fear of Gehenna wills to abstain from sin has the voluntary simply without an admixture of the involuntary, because observance of the divine law is simply good in itself, even by abstracting from that circumstance of fear of the divine judgments. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 6. n. 442. Objection II. Moreover, “he who wills to preserve the precept from fear of hell, if he understands the force of that motive, cannot have a simple contrary affection: I would transgress the precept if there were no penalty, for through this very affection he would sin and would incur liability to the penalty, and consequently would act against his own motive. If therefore he is truly and efficaciously moved by that motive, and understands its force and the quality of his acts, it cannot happen that such an affection is with that motive.” Suarez D. 3. S. 2.

17. Whether grave fear excuses from fault? — Either the discussion is of those things which are not intrinsically and per se evil, or of those things which from their nature are intrinsically evil, as would be, for example, apostasy from the faith, blasphemy against God. If the first, ordinarily speaking, grave fear excuses from all fault, because any positive law is not accustomed to oblige with grave proportionate inconvenience, as is common. It is said ordinarily speaking, because if someone by grave fear were compelled to the violation of some positive law which would yield to common harm, or to contempt of legitimate power, or of religion, with grave public scandal, then grave fear would not excuse from the fault of transgression; for in the first case the common good must be preferred to private good; but in the second the matter would now be concerning a thing intrinsically evil from its nature. But in this second case if the one suffering, when he violates the law, should protest publicly that he does not thus act in contempt of the law, but only to avoid violence, with which existing, he declares that the law no longer obliges, then, if public scandal ceases and the aforesaid contempt ceases, which, practically speaking, seems altogether difficult, he would be excused from fault. — If the second, it is certain that fear, however grave, provided that it is not such as to take away the use of reason, never excuses from all fault: for since those things include intrinsic and essential malice, if they are done voluntarily, they can never lack fault. An example is in that Christian who, struck by fear of punishments or even of death, would deny the faith of Christ. Nevertheless it diminishes fault, since it diminishes the voluntary. Yet, ordinarily speaking, grave fear still leaves such cognition of the things which are done as suffices for mortal sin. Busembaum apud St. Alphonsus, l. 1. n. 175.; Elbel 43-52.

18. Principles. - I. An act posited from fear, however grave, is simply and absolutely voluntary and free. The reason is that through fear cognition on the part of the intellect is not taken away, unless the mind is utterly disturbed, nor election on the part of the will, which always enjoys the faculty of determining itself to the opposite. - St. Lig., no. 21. - Hence those have always been held as apostates who, conquered by fear of torments, denied the Faith.

II. Those things which are done from fear, even if they are simply voluntary, nevertheless regularly ¹ are also involuntary in a certain respect: whence also the gravity of fault is lessened. The reason is that when someone is impelled to act by fear alone, he so acts that, fear being absent, he would flee from acting; and therefore a work done from fear alone has joined with it a certain sadness and repugnance of the will, although inefficacious.

¹ It is said regularly; because sorrow for sins which is elicited from fear of divine vengeance excludes every account of true involuntary, or every deliberate affection toward sin.

III. If fear takes away the use of reason, the act, as is clear, can in no way be voluntary. But if it does not indeed take away the use of reason, but notably impedes it, the act will be imperfectly voluntary on account of imperfect cognition of the thing.

IV. Fear light in every respect, at least in the external forum ², is not considered an efficacious cause of acts. For it is presumed that fear of this sort could easily have been contemned, and thus that the man acted entirely of his own accord.

² It is said in the external forum; because it is a mere presumption, since otherwise even light fear can in reality be the cause of acting, so that the act is indeed simply voluntary, yet also involuntary in a certain respect; and although light fear cannot excuse from any grave obligation, nevertheless, if it is unjustly struck, it probably gives the right in the forum of conscience that one not be obliged to a contract entered into from such fear. - St. Alphonsus, book 3, no. 718.

71. Principle 3. a) Acts and contracts entered into from grave fear unjustly struck in order to extort consent are indeed valid of themselves; b) yet they can afterward be rescinded; c) indeed some contracts (or acts) entered into from fear are declared by positive law invalid of themselves. This principle has also been established by the Code of Canon Law, c. 103, § 2.

It is explained: a) Fear is not accustomed to take away the voluntary, as was said. But for the validity of an act or contract nothing else is required of itself than the voluntary consent of those contracting and a fit thing.⁶⁶

There are some authors, for example Billuart,⁶⁷ who think that those contracts whose object is only liberation from vexation or from unjust fear are invalid by natural law, because this liberation from vexation or from unjust fear is already owed from justice and therefore cannot be sold. But this reason does not seem to be sufficient, because otherwise all contracts entered from unjust fear would be invalid; yet this is not true. And truly he who enters some contract because of grave fear always wishes to free himself from unjust vexation. Hence he who gave a sum of money to a robber threatening death entered into a valid contract, but afterward can compel the robber to restitution.

b) He who enters a contract from grave fear unjustly struck has suffered a grave injury, from which he can free himself through rescission of the contract, as positive laws also rightly establish.⁶⁸ This matter will be treated more broadly below, II, n. 258.

c) Certain contracts or acts are invalidated by positive ecclesiastical law by the very fact that they are entered into under grave fear, for example, vows,⁶⁹ entrance or admission into the novitiate and religious profession,⁷⁰ marriage contracted from grave fear unjustly struck,⁷¹ a vote in an ecclesiastical election,⁷² absolution from censures and other ecclesiastical penalties,⁷³ renunciation of ecclesiastical offices.⁷⁴

⁶⁶ Billuart, De contractibus diss. 1, a. 4. St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 716) calls this opinion more probable and most common. But many teach the contrary, for example, Laymann (Theol. mor. l. 1, tract. 2, c. 6).

⁶⁷ L. c.

⁶⁸ Cf. Code of Canon Law, c. 1684.

⁶⁹ Ibid. c. 1307, § 3.

⁷⁰ Council of Trent, sess. 25, on regulars, c. 19; Code of Canon Law, c. 542, n. 1; c. 572, § 1, n. 4.

⁷¹ Code of Canon Law, c. 1087.

⁷² C. 3 in VI, I, 6; Code of Canon Law, c. 169.

⁷³ Code of Canon Law, c. 2238.

⁷⁴ Code of Canon Law, c. 185.

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 6.

71. Fear or dread is a passion of the irascible sensitive appetite by which we flee a future sensible evil difficult to avoid. Here it is taken for every movement by which we flee from evil, whether it is a movement of passion or of will; and it is usually defined: a trembling of the mind (that is, unrest and disturbance) on account of an imminent or future evil or danger. It differs from coercion, because the latter physically acts upon the powers of man and is from an extrinsic principle; but the cause which provokes fear is a moral cause which influences by way of a known object, namely, by proposing danger. Hence fear is from an intrinsic principle with knowledge.

72. Fear is divided:

1. By reason of cause, it is either taken up, if it comes from a natural cause, whether intrinsic, such as sickness or weakness of mind, or extrinsic, such as shipwreck, fire, or an encounter with beasts; or inflicted, if it comes from an external free cause, God, the devil, or man. This, by reason of mode, is just when the one causing fear has a right to cause fear and causes it in a legitimate mode, for example a father or judge by due punishments; or unjust when he does not have the right to cause fear or causes it in an illegitimate mode, whether it is done to extort something, for example a contract or vow, or for another end, for example revenge.

2. By reason of intensity, fear is grave when the evil which is feared is great and certainly or probably imminent; and light when a light evil is feared, or a grave one but not probably imminent.

The former is absolutely grave, when the evil considered in itself from its nature is great, e.g., death, grave wounding or mutilation, harsh prison, exile, rape, notable infamy, loss of status or of a great part of goods: this is accustomed to fall upon a constant man and a man of strong spirit; or relatively grave, when the evil is grave only with respect to the person fearing, with attention to his age, sex, condition, character, etc.: this does not fall upon a constant man, but upon a fainthearted one who easily fears; thus a fearful person, a boy, a woman, an old man greatly fears things which a man does not dread.

Reverential fear toward superiors, e.g., of children toward parents, wife toward husband, ward toward guardian, religious toward prelate, cleric toward bishop, per se is judged and generally is light, unless grave threats, blows, or most urgent prayers are added, because then vexation can be reputed hard and grave, or long-lasting indignation can be feared.

3. By reason of the work, fear is antecedent or impelling, while someone acts from fear, when it is the motive of operating, for example if a traveler gives money to a robber from fear of death; and concomitant, or repelling or drawing back, while someone acts not from fear but with fear, when it is not the motive of the work, although it accompanies it, indeed rather would be a motive of not operating, for example if a robber steals with fear of prison, or a merchant with fear boards the high sea.

73. Principles. I. That which is done with fear is perfectly voluntary and free: for then there is present a strong and deliberate will which overcomes and conquers fear.

II. That which is done from fear is regularly mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary, because it is done partly from inclination, partly against the inclination of the will. It is voluntary simply, because the will, all things considered, wills and places it; but involuntary in a certain respect, because it wills and places it with some repugnance, for it would not will it considered according to itself and apart from certain circumstances.

This is clear from the example of a merchant who from fear of shipwreck throws merchandise into the sea. In this case four things concur: 1) love of the lesser good, namely, the merchandise; 2) love of the greater good, namely, life, whose loss is feared; 3) efficacious consent to the loss of the lesser good (the merchandise) for conserving the greater (namely, life); 4) nevertheless an inefficacious love for the lesser good perseveres, from which arises an inefficacious displeasure at its loss. Now the consent is conformable to the second inclination and therefore simply voluntary, but it is against the first, which in some way perseveres, and according to this it is in some way involuntary; whence it is mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary.

We said regularly, because a) sometimes it is not involuntary in a certain respect, if fear also excludes affection toward the lesser opposed good; and then what is done from fear is purely voluntary, not mixed with the involuntary. For other reasons besides fear of the evil to be avoided can be added, on account of which the action becomes lovable in itself, and fear itself can be a motive which demands that an inefficacious affection toward the opposite be excluded. This is clear concerning a sinner who sorrows for sins because of fear of hell, but nevertheless does not retain affection toward sins (Council of Trent, session 14, chapter 4), and similarly a noble man fleeing theft from fear of infamy does not necessarily say: if there were no infamy, I would steal; b) by accident it is not voluntary simply, if the fear is so vehement and so disturbs reason that it totally removes its deliberation and use, and then it removes the voluntary properly so called and the free.

74. Corollaries. - From the aforesaid things it is easily understood:

1. That fear per se and regularly does not excuse from the whole sin, because it leaves the voluntary simply, which suffices for sin; nevertheless it diminishes insofar as the work is involuntary in a certain respect and therefore less voluntary and free (fear excuses from so much but not from the whole; cf. can. 2205, § 3), yet it does not so diminish that it makes a mortal sin venial, because generally it leaves sufficient deliberation for mortal sin.

2. That fear by accident excuses from mortal sin if it removes perfect deliberation, indeed from every sin if it removes all deliberation.

3. That grave fear, because it does not remove the free voluntary, per se from the nature of things does not invalidate human acts (can. 103, § 2), except perhaps sometimes for those acts which from their nature require a more perfect free act (vow, gratuitous donation, marriage).

75. Observations. - 1. Light fear in the external forum is never judged an efficacious cause of action.

2. Grave fear never excuses from an intrinsically evil work which is prohibited by natural law as being evil in itself; it often excuses from the observance of a positive law, or from those things which are evil only because prohibited (can. 2205, § 2 and 3).

Fear is a trembling of the mind on account of some present or future danger to oneself or to those closely joined to oneself; but it is commonly divided thus:

1st. Grave or slight fear, according as the evil feared is either grave, such as death, mutilation, hard imprisonment, notable detriment to reputation, a great loss of goods, etc.; or slight or mediocre inconvenience, such as the loss of a thing of slight moment, a small detriment to reputation; or even something grave, but from a slight cause, or which can easily be averted, etc.

But grave fear is such absolutely or relatively. Fear is called absolutely grave when evils truly grave in themselves are feared; but relatively grave when evils, though slight in themselves, are nevertheless grave respectively to certain persons. Thus children, women, and old men are wont to be affected by greater fear in the same danger than men of mature age.

2nd. Fear from within or from without, according as it proceeds from an intrinsic cause, for example, from sickness, from infirmity of mind, etc.; or from an extrinsic cause, either free, namely from man, or necessary or natural, as from the elements, contagion, etc.

3rd. Fear justly or unjustly impressed, according as it is brought in either from a just cause, for example, from deserved punishments, or from an unjust cause, that is, is impressed through injury. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 20.

Reverential fear must also be added, which is had when someone fears lest he have offended his parents, or other superiors. It is referred to just or unjust fear according as its cause is just or unjust. But it can be grave, if there is a prudent fear lest those who impress the fear be offended for a long time or gravely.

An act posited from fear, however grave, is voluntary simply, although regularly it is also involuntary in a certain respect. The reason for the first is that what, being known as the lesser evil here and now, is efficaciously assumed as a means for avoiding another evil, is called voluntary simply. Hence they have always been held as apostates who, conquered by fear of torments, denied the faith. The reason for the second is that what is done from fear alone is repugnant to the will, and apart from this case would not be done. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 6, art. 6. - St. Alphonsus, n. 21.

I said, 1st, from fear or from fear alone, because acts posited with fear, or from fear but not as from a total or moving cause, are voluntary without any admixture of the involuntary.

I said, 2nd, however grave, but always excepted is the case in which the fear is so great that the use of reason is wholly removed. But if the fear should be slight under every respect, and at the same time the total cause of the action, in the external forum indeed it is not reckoned, because it is presumed not to have had influence; but in the internal forum that action will be less sinful according to the quantity of influence, or of the involuntary, which it causes.

I said, 3rd, regularly, because then an action is involuntary in a certain respect from fear when in itself it is hateful to the will, although relatively, and appears here and now desirable as a means for avoiding the evil which is feared. But this happens regularly, yet not necessarily and always. For he who, for example, flees sin in order to avoid hell, or from fear of hell, does not for that reason have flight from sin as hateful in itself; otherwise by the force of such a disposition he would always sin and become worse, which it is wicked to assert. Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 8.

You Will Resolve. 1st. Fear proceeding from within or from natural causes does not prevent an act elicited under its influence from being able to be valid: thus a vow emitted from fear of death in the midst of shipwreck, or in grave sickness, is valid. But if a vow from fear impressed by an extrinsic and free cause is not valid, the reason is not taken from the absence of the voluntary, but from the presence of injury.

2nd. Fear, even grave fear, does not of itself excuse from mortal sin whenever the violation falls into contempt of religion; but it excuses when there is question of a prohibiting human law, or even a positive divine law, not because the voluntary ceases, but because the legislator is judged not to will to press the obligation with so great an inconvenience. But natural laws which prohibit acts intrinsically bad continue to oblige, and so do laws which regard the common good of the whole republic; nor in these does fear excuse.

3rd. § 2. Acts posited from grave and unjustly impressed fear, or from deceit, are valid unless something else is provided by law; but they can be rescinded, according to the norm of can. 1684-1689, by the sentence of a judge, either at the petition of the injured party or ex officio (Can. 103).

Fear is defined in law: « Trembling of mind from the cause of future and imminent danger, » that is, disquietude and disturbance. One fear is grave, another light. Grave fear is one kind absolutely grave, namely whereby a grave and imminent evil is feared, as death, exile, hard imprisonment, etc.; this is called such as befalls a man of constancy, that is, whereby men otherwise of constancy are commonly moved, although at times they ought not to be moved; for no one ought to be moved by any fear whatever, e. g., to perjury. Another fear is respectively grave, whereby although a man of constancy would not be moved, yet a timid person would be moved, as a child, a woman, an old man.

Fear is light when a light evil is feared, or indeed a grave one, but not imminent; as if, under a serene sky, or with frost pinching, you should fear lightning. To absolutely grave fear is reduced reverential fear, whereby one fears superiors gravely incensed and threatening. But if threats and grave indignation are absent, it can be called light, unless perhaps respectively as regards daughters of the family, who have a timid disposition.

I say 1°: Things done out of fear are mixed of the voluntary and the involuntary¹. ¹ Here q. 6, a. 4, c.

It is proved of the conclusion. Things done out of fear, considered in themselves, are not voluntary; nay, thus they are involuntary; but they are made voluntary and willed out of fear, namely in order to avoid the evil that is feared. This whole matter is clear in the common example. The merchant, considering his goods in themselves, setting aside the peril of shipwreck, would not wish to cast them overboard; but a tempest having arisen and the peril of death being imminent, he wills to cast them overboard. Therefore.

I say 2°: Things done out of fear are voluntary simply, and involuntary secundum quid². ² Ibid.

It is proved. That which is voluntary here and now, all circumstances weighed, and involuntary only considered in itself and prescinded from here and now, or from the individuating circumstances, is voluntary simply and involuntary secundum quid. But what is done out of fear is voluntary here and now, all circumstances attended to, and involuntary only considered in itself and prescinded from the circumstances. Therefore. — The min. is clear in the casting of goods into the sea out of fear of shipwreck.

It is confirmed. What is done out of fear is willed absolutely and efficaciously, and not-willed inefficaciously and conditionately only: so the merchant, the tempest pressing in, wills absolutely and efficaciously to cast overboard his goods, which he would not will to cast overboard were the tempest absent. But what is willed absolutely and efficaciously, and not-willed inefficaciously and conditionately only, is voluntary simply and involuntary secundum quid. Therefore.

From what has been said you will gather, 1° that contracts entered into out of grave fear are valid by natural law. Some, however, are invalidated by positive law: concerning which when we treat of contracts.

You will gather 2° that grave fear does not excuse from the whole sin in those things which are intrinsically and immutably evil, or, as is said, forbidden because evil, because they remain voluntary simply. Hence he who out of fear of death denies the faith, commits perjury, fornicates, etc., sins mortally. It does excuse, however, from so much of the sin, and the more so the graver the fear, because it diminishes the voluntary.

But in those things which are not intrinsically evil, but evil because forbidden, grave fear regularly excuses from the whole, not because they are not voluntary simply, but because positive laws, whether divine or human, by the intention of their legislators do not oblige regularly with so great a loss. Whence works of this kind, which are evil only by reason of the law, the obligation of the law ceasing, cease to be evil. Hence he who out of fear of death or of grave infamy, or of another grave evil, did not fast in Lent, or did not hear Mass on a feast day, etc., would not sin.

I said, « regularly, » because sometimes positive laws, whether divine or human, oblige even with loss of life: 1° when that which the law commands is of such moment that in the judgment of prudent men it outweighs the life of a particular individual. It is clear in the soldier commanded not to abandon his post, or to break upon the enemy with evident peril of death. 2° When transgression of the law would redound to contempt of religion or of ecclesiastical authority, as happened to the Machabees, whom tyrants threatened with death unless they ate swine's flesh in contempt of the law; since it is better that the law, the faith, or religion be not despised than that the life of one private person be preserved. But of these specially when we treat of Laws.

VI. Likewise in the same place, article 5, reply 1, he subjoins: It must be said that in him who does something through fear there remains a repugnance of the will to that which is done, according as it is considered in itself. And therefore that which is done through fear is in a certain manner involuntary. … The timid man acts against that which even now in itself he wills.

This QUESTION is exceedingly weighty, and presupposes much, and hands down things necessary also for other Tracts, even that on marriage.

I ASSUME first, from the first part 2. Tract. 1. disp. 3. quaest. 5., that the Will, as regards elicited acts, cannot be coerced.

I ASSUME secondly, from the same disput. quaest. 8., that things done through fear are not involuntary. So holds also the Jurisconsult l. si mulier 21. §. si metu coactus, ff. de eo, quod metus causa. and l. cum proponas C. de hered. instit. and C. si privatus, ff. qui et a quibus. The reason is clear, because he can elicit, and not elicit, the act.

Fear IS a trepidation of mind from danger present or to come. So defines Ulpian the Jurisconsult, l. 1. ff. de eo quod metus causa. It is defined likewise by D. Bonav. 3. p. Centil. sect. 55. and in 4. at the place cited.

Fear is DIVIDED into Concussive, such as that which is inflicted by threats, and Impressive, which is called fear of Fact, as when deeds intervene, say blows, etc. So D. Bonav. loc. cit., on which Zasius Instit. de actione, §. quadrupli, num. 10. Bursatt. consil. 72. num. 11. vol. 1., where he reports others; Sanchez l. 3. de matrim. disput. 12 num. 8. Another fear they add, Compulsive from a powerful man, which is also called Violent; because the force that strikes fear is a man of great power: another fear, they say, is tacit, or of reverence, such as a daughter's toward her Father. The last they call fear of treachery, such as that of a sick man fearing to be treated treacherously by his physician.

Fear, then, is said of someone coerced conditionally, because setting fear aside the will would not will it; yet not absolutely, because he can still be unwilling, and therefore it is called conditional force.

BUT violent force, or absolute force, is that which is from without, not conferring force upon the sufferer ex 3. Eth. cap. 2., as if a Christian were dragged to a Mosque, and compelled by blows to offer incense to an Idol; which force D. Bonav. defines thus, loc. cit. Centil. and in 4. at the place cited, following the Jurisconsult, l. 2. ff. de eo quod metus causa: Vis est maioris rei impetus, qui repelli non potest, which assuredly lacks the voluntary altogether:

A CELEBRATED division of fear is that of D. Bonav. in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. in corpore, and loc. cit. Centil., and found in c. Considerationi, c. veniens, el. 2. de sponsal. cap. cum dilectus de his quae vi, et from the Jurisconsult, l. metu, l. 2. ff. de eo quod metus causa. Decio cap. final. de appell. c. causam matrimonii, num. 4. de off. deleg. Menochio de arbitrariis l. 2. Centur. 2. casu 135. n. 1. Flaminio de resignatione benef. l. 13. q. 1. n. 54. Abb. c. cum dilectus n. 3. D. Thoma in 4. dist. 29. quaest. un. art. 2. and elsewhere everywhere with the other Theologians and Summists.

Another is called fear falling upon a constant man, which is also called just fear, c. Finali de appell.; it is called probable by D. Bonav. loc. cit. and Goffredo de his, quae vi, num. 2. Angelo, at the word metus. Sylvest. quaest. 1. Sanchez loco cit. num. 19. It is called also grave fear by D. Bonav. and others, with the Jurisconsult, lege metum, l. 2 ff. de eo quod metus causa, where he says, it is not of a man of no account, since even the strong are shaken by it.

Another is called the fear of an inconstant man, and it is called light fear, in contrast to the preceding, because it marks out as inconstant, light, and vain the one who is shaken by it and led to act against his appetite.

Five conditions, however, S. Bonav., in the places adduced, whom the rest follow, assigns to fear, that it be of the first kind. The first is that the evil feared be grave, l. Metum, l. 1. de eo quod metus causa, there, Labeo says fear is to be taken, not any fear whatever, but of a greater evil.

From the last words they take occasion to say that this fear need not be great absolutely, but comparatively, so that it be greater than another, though light in itself. So Sylvest. v. metus, quaest. 1. Veracruz p. 1. speculi, art. 8. concl. 3. Carbon. de restit. quaest. 46. fundamento 3.

But D. Bonav. in 4. loc. cit. in corpore, and loc. cit. Censil. wills it to be grave in itself, say of death, infamy, or mutilation; whom follow Sotus 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 2. Sanchez num. 12. The reason is, D. Bonav. loc. cit., because contracts are rescinded by such fear, seeing it impedes consent, cap. Cum locum de sponsal.; but when the evil is light, though preferred before a graver evil, the liberty of consent in a strong man is not held to be impeded.

To those words I say that the comparative is there abusive, and signifies only what is positively great, as the Gloss explains there.

The second condition of fear falling upon a constant man is that the estimation of the grave evil be of one probably imminent, and not a light suspicion. So D. Bonav. in 4. loc. cit., and found l. Metum la 2. ff. de eo quod metus causa. For a constant man is not so lightly terrified; so also D. Thom. in 4. dist. 29. quaest. unica, art. 2. in corpore. Scotus there quaest. unica, §. de primo contradictio. Durandus there quaest. 2. Richard. art. 1. quaest. 1. Gabriel in 3. dist. 39. quaest. 1. art. 1. Sotus 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 2. Palacios there, disp 1. Ledesm. dub. 23. de matrimonio. And from the Jurisperiti, Torcremata 31. quaest. 2. in summa, num. 6. Sylvest. v. metus, quaest. 1. Tabiena v. impedimentum, impedimento 9. quaest. 1. Burlat. consil. 72. num. 30. vol. 1. Alphaeus in his collectaries, collect. 877. Sanchez num. 15. Hence Aristotle, 3. Eth. cap. 9., says, the brave man is fearless, because he does not fear lightly, but where right reason dictates that he must fear.

Hence I infer with D. Bonav. loc. cit. in resol. that there is not required a true and real infliction of the punishments, for then it would be called not fear but harm; but it is enough that there be a probable fear of a future or imminent infliction, Leg. nec timorem 7. ff. de eo quod metus causa and l. 15. tit. 2. p. 4., and the Gloss teaches, c. el. primo vero metuebant de electione. Bartolomaeus l. metum autem, at the beginning, num. 1. ff. de eo quod metus causa. Sylvest. v. metus, quaest. 1. Lopez on that l. 15. Cucus l. 5. instit. Maiorum, tit. 12. num. 157.

Some add that the fear ought to be present, not awaited, though the evil be only future. They gather this from l. metum autem 9. ff. de eo, quod metus causa. So expound many, as Sanchez num. 16. reports.

Others, however, think that a probable suspicion of fear suffices, and that this is enough for rescinding the act, Leg. novissime, ff. de falso tutore, there, that he was thus compelled by fear, or fearing, lest he be compelled. So Bartol. l. 2. lectura 2. C. quod metus causa. Baldus leg. interpositas at the end C. de Transact. Alex. cons. 99. n. 6. vol. 3. Parisius consil. 60. num. 15. vol. 3. Romanus l. 5. ob turpem, num. 10. C. de condonatione ob turpem causam. Hostiens. c. Cum dilectus de his, quae vi, on the words nec metum mortis, and there Anchar. num. 7. Rebuff. Tom. 2. consil. Gallicarum, tit. de rescissione contractuum, art. unico Glossa 2. 2. num. 6. Alex. Tartagnus among the matrimonial consilia of Tileti cons. 21. num. 5. Sylvest. v. metus Villalobos in communi opinione, litt. N. at the word metus, num. 70. Anton. Gabr. tom. 2. commun. l. 11. v. metus, fol. 107. Burgos de Paz cons. 25. num. 73. Padella l. cum proponas, la 1. num. 3. C. de transact. Decisio Pedemontana 170. num. 3. Ioan. Garzia de nobilitate, gloss. 17. num. 14. Mascard. de probat. concl. 1055. num. 26.

Yet that Law sounds differently to me: that the contract be rescinded of one who, compelled by fear, or fearing, would not be compelled, that is, by force against the thing, say if he were compelled to subscribe, l. nam timor violentiae inferendae vitiat electionem. So the Gloss C. bone, CL. 1., at the word metuebant de electione, which all follow there, Alex. cons. 98. vol. 3. Rebuff. Mascad. loc. cit.

Therefore I note that the Law does not say, or thinking probably, lest fear be struck into him, but fearing (it says) lest he be compelled, that is, by force.

The third condition required for grave fear is assigned by D. Bonav. loc. cit. in corpore; and it is that the one striking fear be able to command his threats to execution; for it is not for a brave general to be terrified by the threats of little rustics, as D. Bonav. notes, l. Famosi, ff. ad legem Iul. maiest., there, for the person also is to be considered: whether he could do it, Gloss. l. metum, v. iactationibus, C. de his, quae vi. Anchar. c. ad Audientiam, num. 2. de his, quae vi. Baldus l. metum q. C. de his quae vi, and there Alex. Salicetus num. 2. Sebastianus de medicis, de casibus fortuitis, quaest. 1. num. 67. Flaminius de resign. benef. l. 13. quaest. 1. n. 116. Cucus l. 1. Instit. Mai. tit. 12. num. 165. Rolandus consil. 83. num. 28. vol. 2. Angelus v. metus, Sotus l. 7. de Iustitia, quaest. 2. art. 1. ad 2. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 3. §. Pro explicatione, fol. 988. Carbo de restit. quaest. 46. fundamento 4., and all whom Sanchez num. 19. follows.

Note, however, that it is not to be taken as though he could in very fact fulfill the threats, but that the one fearing reasonably judge that he can fulfill them, even though in fact he truly cannot, for some reason unknown to the one fearing. Which D. Bonav. signified excellently, loc. cit., whom Richardus follows, there art. 1. quaest. 1., as Sanchez num. 19. reports. Wherefore the quality and power of the one striking fear and of the sufferer must be weighed, as if the former were a powerful man and the latter weaker, as Beroius cap. 1. n. 30. de off. deleg. Sotus, Arag. Carbo, and Sanchez loc. cit., and Henriquez l. 11. de matrim. cap. 9., after D. Bonav. loc. cit. Censil., teach well.

The fourth condition is D. Bonav. loc. cit. Censil., which he indicates in 4., that it be likely that the threatener will execute his threats; because he is wont to do so, and is not of those Worthies who fling out threats but do not execute them. It is established ex l. unica, C. Si quis Imperatori, there, let us weigh the sayings from the characters of men. And leg. Famosi, ff. ad Leg. Iul. maiest. and Leg. metum, C. de his, quae vi, there: Fear ought to be proved not by boasts or contentions alone, but by the atrocity of the deed. And so teaches Bartolus, Paulus, Alex. Baldus, Salicet. and Aretinus: Abbas indeed cap. 1. num. 3. de offic. deleg., and cap. causam matrimon. numer. 5. on the same title, and cap. Cum dilectus, numer. 8. Anchard. in the chapter ad Audientiam, num. 2. de his quae vi. Navo cap. consultatione, num. 12. de sponsal., and cap. finali, num. 17. de appel. Felinus cap. 1. de offic. deleg., there Decius, and cap. causam matrim. on the same title num. 21. Crottus leg. stipulatio hoc modo concepta, num. 67. ff. de verb. oblig. Vitalis de Cambaris tract. de clausulis; clausula non vi, tit. de metu uxoris, found in Tom. 18. tract. noviorum, Iacobinus leg. interpositas, num. 10. Cod. de transact. Couar. 4. decret. 2. part. cap. 3. §. 6. Tiberius Decianus consil. 18. num. 128. vol. 1. Bursatus consil. 72. num. 35. and 42. vol. 3. Flaminius lib. de resignatione, benef. lib. 15. quaest. 1. num. 174. Mascardus de probat. consil. 1055. num. 18. Antonius Gabriel. Tom. 2. com. lib. 11. v. metus, fol. 106.

From the Theologians, Henriquez lib. 11. de matrim. cap. 9., Lopez 2. part. Instruct. de matrim. cap. 40. fo. 1071., and Sanchez num. 20., who num. 21. adds that it is required that such a one be wont to execute the threatened evil in the same kind of evil as that threatened, on the doctrine of Baldus leg. finali at the end, ff. de haered. instit., where he says that conjecture is not drawn from unlike things; so Cynus, whom Alexander cites and follows, leg. metum, num. 2. Cod. de his, quae vi.

The last condition is that the one fearing be unable to meet the threatened evils otherwise than by vowing; for if he could meet them otherwise, it would not be the fear of a brave man, but of a little fellow, whose it is to dread evils he could easily escape. This condition, however, seems to me implicit in the second, whereby the evil is imminent, for then it is well-nigh irreparable.

Straightway Sanchez disputes whether one choosing a greater evil, say to deny Christ, in order to avoid a lesser, say death, can be called a constant man, and whether that fear of a lesser evil, though grave in itself, suffices to render external acts invalid, as involuntary, because it is fear falling upon a constant man, since it is grave according to the first condition of fear.

Very many assert that an evil, even if grave, does not suffice to strike fear into a constant man if it be chosen to avoid another greater evil, to say, he is not held to be a constant man if he chooses the greater evil, say fault, to avoid a lesser penalty, say death; the reason is, because such a one is moved not by rational but by irrational fear; but the constant man acts rationally.

And indeed D. Bonavent. holds this, at the place cited, toward the end, D. Thom. in 3. dist. 29. quaest. unica, art. 2. in corpore, Scotus quaest. unic. §. de prima contradictio, and §. hic dicitur, Durandus quaest. 1. Richardus art. 1. quaest. 1. ad Paludanum quaest. unica, art. 2. concl. 2. num. 13. Gabriel. in 3. dist. 39. quaest. 1. art. 1. and art. 3. concl. 8. Victoria sum. de matrim. num. 168. Sotus in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 2. Palacios in 4. dist. 29. dub. 1. fol. 655. Veracruz p. p. speculi, art. 8. and others, whom Sanchez reports, lib. 4. de matrim. disp. 2. num. 2., where he asserts that these Doctors, speaking of fear in reference to marriage and other contracts to be rescinded — namely that it be fear falling upon a constant man, sufficient to annul marriage — require that the lesser evil be chosen by the man, otherwise he was not constant but inconstant.

Others, however, explain that these Doctors will this condition of choosing the lesser evil to be required in order that fear excuse from fault, but not that it suffice for rescinding contracts; and in this sense D. Bonavent. spoke, in 3. dist. 29. art. 3. quaest. 2. ad 3., where he grants fear falling upon a constant man with regard to human contracts; yet with regard to things of universal justice he denies it, according to that of Matth. 10.: Fear not them that kill the body. Therefore such fear, on grounds urged before God, is not reckoned a sufficient cause to excuse man from the guilt of sin, or from the obligation of an oath, though it exempt him from human contracts, according to the Axiom of the Jurisperiti reported above.

In the place indeed adduced by Sanchez, in the fourth sent., at the end of the question cited, he says that fear falling upon a constant man is of those things only that are not contrary to our salvation, and thus no fear of penalty, with respect to committing sin, can fall upon a constant man; therefore he ought rationally to suffer death rather than sin; but marriage is not of things contrary to salvation, whence he infers that, with respect to it, the fear of a constant man can fall, which fear renders the act involuntary; whence it comes about that this condition, of one choosing the lesser evil in order to be a constant man, in our case does not come into play in a vow or oath, but only in things that carry fault in themselves, which, even though they carry only venial fault, are yet a greater evil than any penalty whatsoever, even of death, as D. Bonavent. teaches, in 3. dist. 38, whom others imitate after D. Augustine, reported in cap. ne quis 22. quaest. 2.

Which things being so, Sanchez does not rightly institute the second disputation lib. 4. de matrimonio: Whether the fear of a constant man necessarily requires that the lesser evil be chosen, that is, the penalty rather than the fault. He says that B. Bonaventure, D. Thomas, and others assert that such an evil ought to be preferred in reference to marriage; for since marriage is not compared, as an evil, with the fear, and consequently cannot be called a lesser evil than the evil certainly threatened by the threatener unless one enter marriage, I do not see on what ground Sanchez says that D. Bonaventure, D. Thomas, and others spoke in this sense, that by choosing marriage rather than death, or death rather than marriage, one is said to choose the greater or the lesser evil, and thence one is argued to be a constant or inconstant man. As D. Bonavent. subtly argues, at the place cited, and Sanchez himself, disp. 5. num. 16., where he says that the fear of just excommunication does not strike grave fear with regard to some contract, because one thing is not chosen as an evil before another, since both are goods.

This fear, then, is not only required for the rescission of marriage and other just contracts, as Soto asserts, in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 4., Nauar. summa lat. cap. 22. num. 51., and others whom Sanchez follows, num. 3.; neither can it even intervene.

Sanchez defines this well indeed, disp. 3.: this grave fear, which is called falling upon a constant man, is not equally to be assessed, but proportionally, so that what is light to a man may be grave to a woman or a child, cap. indignanti, 13. quaest. 6., as Tiraquel notes, lib. 1. connub. num. 71., the Gloss cap. cum locum de sponsal. v. metu, where Anton. num. 12. Abbas num. 6. Alexand. de Nevo, num. 23. and others.

Moreover, note that it is not required for grave fear, which deters a constant man, that the evil be feared for one's own person, but it is enough that it be feared in the persons of one's children, leg. isti quidem §. fine, ff. de eo, quod metus causa.

The same of other kindred, in cap. sciam cuncti de electione, in 6., which text Jason says is notable, leg. de pupillo, ff. si quis ipsi, num. 12. ff. de operis novi nuntiat. Felinus cap. Ecclesiae sanctae Mariae, n. 99., where fear inflicted upon the kindred of an elector in order to strike fear into the elector is held to have been struck into the elector himself.

The same of a bond of friendship closely joined, Sanchez teaches, num. 9.; because a friend is another self. Attend also to other things concerning grave evil, sufficient to strike fear into a constant man.

AND indeed, as to those evils that are not declared grave by law, that is to be defined by the judgment of a Judge, leg. 3. ff. ex quibus causis. The greater reason is, because all cases cannot be expressed; but this judgment is not required for those evils that are clearly grave by law. So Baldus, cap. 2. de his, quae ad finem; his reason is, because arbitria are given with respect to those things that cannot be comprehended under a rule, on account of human variety, as is noted on leg. non possunt, ff. de legibus. Sylvester notes the same, V. metus, quaest. 4.; it will be so judged, whether the estimation of the impending evil be in accordance with right reason.

AS TO evils certainly grave, D. Bonavent., at the place cited, in corpore, enumerates death, found in cap. cum dilectus, de his quae vi, and leg. nec timorem 7. ff. de eo quod metus causa. The reason is, because of all terrible things the greatest is death, by the testimony of Aristotle, 4. Eth. So also Sanchez, disp. 5. num. 4.

S. Bonavent. asserts the same of mutilation; for it is a kind of partial death, cap. si quis absciderit disp. 55., and it is found expressly in dicta leg 7. The same, of grave bodily torment, is found expressly in the said cap. cum dilectus, and the said leg. 7., to which grave blows are reduced. The same must be said of the fear of arms, leg. 3. at the beginning, in the verse qui armati, ff. de vi, et vi armata.

S. Bonavent. asserts the same of the fear of servitude. It is found in leg. ego puto, and leg. isti quidem, ff. de eo, quod metus causa. Say the same of the fear of captivity and of grave exile. Of the fear of prison, it is found in leg. nec timorem, and leg. qui in carcerem, ff. de eo, quod metus causa.