Article II: On Fear

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 6.

71. Fear or dread is a passion of the irascible sensitive appetite by which we flee a future sensible evil difficult to avoid. Here it is taken for every movement by which we flee from evil, whether it is a movement of passion or of will; and it is usually defined: a trembling of the mind (that is, unrest and disturbance) on account of an imminent or future evil or danger. It differs from coercion, because the latter physically acts upon the powers of man and is from an extrinsic principle; but the cause which provokes fear is a moral cause which influences by way of a known object, namely, by proposing danger. Hence fear is from an intrinsic principle with knowledge.

72. Fear is divided:

1. By reason of cause, it is either taken up, if it comes from a natural cause, whether intrinsic, such as sickness or weakness of mind, or extrinsic, such as shipwreck, fire, or an encounter with beasts; or inflicted, if it comes from an external free cause, God, the devil, or man. This, by reason of mode, is just when the one causing fear has a right to cause fear and causes it in a legitimate mode, for example a father or judge by due punishments; or unjust when he does not have the right to cause fear or causes it in an illegitimate mode, whether it is done to extort something, for example a contract or vow, or for another end, for example revenge.

2. By reason of intensity, fear is grave when the evil which is feared is great and certainly or probably imminent; and light when a light evil is feared, or a grave one but not probably imminent.

The former is absolutely grave, when the evil considered in itself from its nature is great, e.g., death, grave wounding or mutilation, harsh prison, exile, rape, notable infamy, loss of status or of a great part of goods: this is accustomed to fall upon a constant man and a man of strong spirit; or relatively grave, when the evil is grave only with respect to the person fearing, with attention to his age, sex, condition, character, etc.: this does not fall upon a constant man, but upon a fainthearted one who easily fears; thus a fearful person, a boy, a woman, an old man greatly fears things which a man does not dread.

Reverential fear toward superiors, e.g., of children toward parents, wife toward husband, ward toward guardian, religious toward prelate, cleric toward bishop, per se is judged and generally is light, unless grave threats, blows, or most urgent prayers are added, because then vexation can be reputed hard and grave, or long-lasting indignation can be feared.

3. By reason of the work, fear is antecedent or impelling, while someone acts from fear, when it is the motive of operating, for example if a traveler gives money to a robber from fear of death; and concomitant, or repelling or drawing back, while someone acts not from fear but with fear, when it is not the motive of the work, although it accompanies it, indeed rather would be a motive of not operating, for example if a robber steals with fear of prison, or a merchant with fear boards the high sea.

73. Principles. I. That which is done with fear is perfectly voluntary and free: for then there is present a strong and deliberate will which overcomes and conquers fear.

II. That which is done from fear is regularly mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary, because it is done partly from inclination, partly against the inclination of the will. It is voluntary simply, because the will, all things considered, wills and places it; but involuntary in a certain respect, because it wills and places it with some repugnance, for it would not will it considered according to itself and apart from certain circumstances.

This is clear from the example of a merchant who from fear of shipwreck throws merchandise into the sea. In this case four things concur: 1) love of the lesser good, namely, the merchandise; 2) love of the greater good, namely, life, whose loss is feared; 3) efficacious consent to the loss of the lesser good (the merchandise) for conserving the greater (namely, life); 4) nevertheless an inefficacious love for the lesser good perseveres, from which arises an inefficacious displeasure at its loss. Now the consent is conformable to the second inclination and therefore simply voluntary, but it is against the first, which in some way perseveres, and according to this it is in some way involuntary; whence it is mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary.

We said regularly, because a) sometimes it is not involuntary in a certain respect, if fear also excludes affection toward the lesser opposed good; and then what is done from fear is purely voluntary, not mixed with the involuntary. For other reasons besides fear of the evil to be avoided can be added, on account of which the action becomes lovable in itself, and fear itself can be a motive which demands that an inefficacious affection toward the opposite be excluded. This is clear concerning a sinner who sorrows for sins because of fear of hell, but nevertheless does not retain affection toward sins (Council of Trent, session 14, chapter 4), and similarly a noble man fleeing theft from fear of infamy does not necessarily say: if there were no infamy, I would steal; b) by accident it is not voluntary simply, if the fear is so vehement and so disturbs reason that it totally removes its deliberation and use, and then it removes the voluntary properly so called and the free.

74. Corollaries. - From the aforesaid things it is easily understood:

1. That fear per se and regularly does not excuse from the whole sin, because it leaves the voluntary simply, which suffices for sin; nevertheless it diminishes insofar as the work is involuntary in a certain respect and therefore less voluntary and free (fear excuses from so much but not from the whole; cf. can. 2205, § 3), yet it does not so diminish that it makes a mortal sin venial, because generally it leaves sufficient deliberation for mortal sin.

2. That fear by accident excuses from mortal sin if it removes perfect deliberation, indeed from every sin if it removes all deliberation.

3. That grave fear, because it does not remove the free voluntary, per se from the nature of things does not invalidate human acts (can. 103, § 2), except perhaps sometimes for those acts which from their nature require a more perfect free act (vow, gratuitous donation, marriage).

75. Observations. - 1. Light fear in the external forum is never judged an efficacious cause of action.

2. Grave fear never excuses from an intrinsically evil work which is prohibited by natural law as being evil in itself; it often excuses from the observance of a positive law, or from those things which are evil only because prohibited (can. 2205, § 2 and 3).