Section III. On Fear in Particular

I. Notion. Fear is here understood as any motion whatever of the irascible appetite following upon the apprehension of a present or future evil.

II. Division. Fear is divided:

1. By reason of intensity, into grave and light, according as the motion is grave or light.

2. By reason of influence on the act, into antecedent and concomitant, according as the act is placed from it or only with it. A traveler from fear hands over money to one lying in ambush; with fear he passes through unsafe places.

III. Influence on the free. Fear generally does not remove the free character of a work placed from fear; nevertheless, if one acts from fear alone, it causes the involuntary in a qualified sense, or lessens the voluntary. The reason for the former is that fear generally does not wholly disturb judgment. The reason for the latter is that what proceeds from fear alone is done with some repugnance and therefore is chosen by the will with lesser affection (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 6, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, V, XXI).

Note. To what extent fear of harm excuses from observing a positive law will be explained elsewhere. For that is not to be sought from the passion of fear, but from the gravity of the evil which threatens, and which, from the reasonable will of the legislator, one generally is not bound to undergo.

IV. Practical question. Having set forth the influence of the passions on liberty, we add a sufficiently practical question: namely, whether there is an obligation of positively resisting the passions, or whether it suffices to behave negatively, that is, not to consent. Concerning this, note:

1. Temptation to sin ordinarily proceeds thus:

a) In the imagination there occurs the image of a delectable thing, which is followed by a motion of the sensitive appetite, or a sense of delight. This motion in itself is indifferent.

b) The intellect adverts to the motion, first as delectable, then as moving toward an evil act.

c) The will either positively consents, whether to the evil act or only to the sense of delight; or positively resists the motion; or behaves negatively toward the motion. Positive resistance can be made directly or indirectly: directly, for instance, by attacking the motion either through a contrary act or through an act of simple displeasure; indirectly, for example, by praying, thinking about other things, performing an external work, etc.

2. The question regards all passions, that is, all motions of the sensitive appetite which tend toward an illicit object. Now one who behaves negatively toward sensual motions:

a) Generally sins by not resisting. The reason is that generally there is danger of consenting. Namely, when the soul according to the sensitive part has been moved toward an illicit object, the will easily freely embraces that same object unless the disordered motion is positively resisted.

b) Sins gravely if the sensitive appetite is borne toward an object gravely evil, and, unless it is resisted, the danger of consenting is grave. Otherwise he sins only lightly. Now the danger of consenting is especially grave when the matter concerns a venereal and vehement motion, as will be said more fully in the treatise on chastity (St. Alphonsus, V, 6-9; Homo Apostolicus, tract III, nn. 41, 42, 44). Besides, note that indirect resistance is often practically to be preferred to direct resistance, especially if the motions of the sensitive appetite toward illicit things are lighter, more frequent, or longer-lasting.