Kinds of conscience

THE voice of conscience is the authoritative guide of man’s moral conduct. Not that the individual conscience is independent of all authority; if the individual conscience is right, it proclaims the duty of submitting to all properly constituted authority, and especially to the supreme and absolute authority of God. It is, as theologians are fond of saying, the herald or ambassador of God to each individual, making known to him and applying the eternal law of God to the conduct of life.

Although the term is also used with other meanings, here conscience signifies a dictate of the practical reason deciding that a particular action is right or wrong. The process by which we arrive at this judgement of the practical reason may be put in the form of a syllogism. The major premise will be some general law of conduct, the minor will be its application to the particular case, the conclusion will be the judgement, which is nothing else but conscience. Thus when a precept has been given by one who is in lawful possession of authority, the dictate of conscience is implicitly arrived at somewhat as follows: I must obey all who command me with lawful authority. A.B. commands me with lawful authority. Therefore I must obey him is the conclusion and the dictate of conscience.

Conscience is said to be certain, dubious, or probable, as the motive on which it is grounded is morally certain, doubtful, or only probable.

A right conscience is in accordance with the eternal law of morality; an erroneous conscience gives a false instead of a true judgement. If the mistake could and ought to have been avoided by the agent who has a false conscience, the conclusion is vincibly erroneous; otherwise it is invincibly erroneous.

A strict conscience is one which is apt to decide that there is an obligation when none exists, or a greater obligation than there really is; a lax conscience, on the contrary, is apt to deny an existing obligation or to make it less than it is in fact; a scrupulous conscience without sufficient reason apprehends sin where there is none.

A dictate of conscience which precedes the action, judging it to be right or wrong, is said to be antecedent; that which follows an action, approving it as rightly done, or condemning it as wrong and disturbing the inward peace of the soul, is consequent,

If I have this imperfect moral certainty that my action is right, I am justified in acting, and if with such certainty my conscience tells me that I am bound to act, I must do so, even though my conscience be erroneous. For my action is morally good if my will be good. My will is good when it tends to a good object as represented by my intellect, not as it is in itself. But if my will follows my conscience and determines on what it prescribes, my will then tends to a good object as represented by my intellect and is a good will. So that even though my conscience be erroneous, I am justified in following it, and I am bound to follow it when it prescribes any action to be performed.¹ This is true whenever I have a certain conscience—that is, when I have no doubt or suspicion about the honesty of my action, even though my conscience be erroneous. If I were the wilful cause of my conscience being in error by not taking means to inform it correctly, then any objectively wrong action that I perform is voluntary in the cause, and so far imputable to me, but here and now I must follow my conscience.

I am said to be bound by my conscience because it compels me to follow it under pain of doing wrong, committing sin, and being exposed to the pangs of remorse. It binds me also in the name of God, whose will it makes known to me, It speaks, therefore, with the authority of God, it sternly bids me follow his behests, and it reproves me with the authority of a superior if I neglect to follow its promptings. As representing the will of God its authority is greater, as St Thomas teaches,² than that of any merely earthly superior. .4. The question as to whether in any particular case a person acted with an erroneous conscience is a question of fact, which only he and God can decide. Still, following approved theologians, we may make use of certain presumptions drawn from the nature of things and from experience. It may be admitted that ignorant and dull people may have an invincibly erroneous conscience concerning the malice of merely internal sins committed in thought only; but we should except efficacious desires to do what is known to be wrong. A person can scarcely know that the external action is morally wrong and be ignorant of the malice of an effective desire to commit such an action.

Again, the first principles of morality, which are certain general axioms of conduct, such as, Do to others as you would be done by, can scarcely fail to be known by anyone who has the use of reason. Even the secondary principles of the moral law, or the precepts of the Decalogue, are usually known by those who have attained the use of reason among civilized men; if in any case there is ignorance of them, it is vincible ignorance, and so more or less culpable. Theologians readily admit the possibility of an invincibly erroneous conscience concerning the application of the general principles of morality to concrete cases. The theological disputes which they chronicle are proof of the fact. 1 St Thomas, 1-2, q. 94, aa. 4, 6.

¹ St Thomas, 1-2, q. 19, a. 5.

² De Verit., q. 17, a. 5.

With regard, however, to such laws as it is within the competence of the State to make, conscience obliges us to pay loyal obedience to those which urge and apply the law of nature. Near relatives are bound to support the indigent poor because it is their natural duty, and also because the State commands it; and, similarly, crime must be avoided because it is wrong, "and because the State forbids it. Where the law of nature is indeterminate and vague, but where the positive law has stepped in to define rights for the common good, conscience must also submit to the civil law. Unless we admit this, we shall have to say that in such matters there is no certain and definite rule for conscience to follow; rights and obligations will be left in uncertainty, to the serious disturbance of men’s consciences and the public inconvenience. Laws, therefore, which govern prescription, the rights of inventors and authors, the distribution of the property of intestates, the property rights of married women, the capacity of minors, and contracts, will have binding force in both the external and internal forum.¹

¹ D’Annibale, 1, n. 206.

Conscience can be taken both physically and morally. Conscience taken physically, or physiological conscience, is the cognitive faculty of returning to one's own acts. Conscience taken morally, or moral conscience, imports a judgment about the morality of our acts; and it is twofold, antecedent and consequent, according as it regards an act, or respectively an omission, to be placed or already placed. Antecedent conscience commands, forbids, or permits an act to be placed. Consequent conscience approves or reproves an act already placed, and consequently causes joy or remorse (St. Thomas, De verit., q. 17, a. 1). But it is clear that the morality of an action does not depend on consequent conscience, which follows the act, but on antecedent conscience alone; in other words, this latter, not the former, is the rule of morality. Hence our discussion concerns antecedent conscience alone.

I. Notion. Conscience, moral and antecedent, is a dictate of the practical intellect by which someone judges that a particular action is commanded, prohibited, or free for him (St. Alphonsus, I, 2; cf. St. Thomas, I, q. 79, a. 13; De veritate, q. 17, a. 2). It is said:

1. A dictate, because conscience is an act, not a faculty or a habit.

2. Of the practical intellect, that is, of the intellect insofar as it directs to operation what it apprehends. This belongs to the practical intellect, which "knows truth as the speculative intellect does, but orders the known truth to work" (St. Thomas, I, q. 79, a. 11, ad 2).

3. A particular action; for conscience is not a judgment about the morality of an act considered in general and in the abstract, but about the morality of an act viewed in particular and in the concrete (St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 17, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, I, 2).

4. For him, namely, conscience judges about the morality of an act insofar as it belongs to the one judging himself, or insofar as it must be placed or omitted by the one judging himself, or can be placed or omitted at will.

5. Commanded, etc. That is, moral conscience does not judge about the utility or pleasantness of an act, but about its morality, that is, about the moral necessity or moral liberty of placing or omitting the act.

Corollary I. Conscience is the conclusion of a syllogism, at least a virtual one. The major proposition states some law. The minor proposition compares some act with the law; for example: Theft is illicit. But the taking of this thing would be theft. Therefore the taking of this thing is illicit for me.

Corollary II. Conscience differs from synderesis, from moral science, from casuistic science, from prudence, and from the last practical judgment.¹ Synderesis (Greek synteresis, that is, preservation) is the natural habit preserving the first and general practical principles, for example: good is to be done, evil is to be fled. Moral science is an acquired habit which concerns general conclusions deduced from first principles; for example: to each person his own must be left; but theft takes away from one's neighbor what is his; therefore theft must be rejected. Casuistic science is an acquired habit which applies the conclusions of moral science to particular cases considered in the abstract. But conscience applies general conclusions to particular cases, and to these as considered in the concrete, insofar as here and now they are to be brought into practice. Prudence is a habit which directs the intellect in deducing and applying conclusions. But conscience is the very act itself of applying conclusions to particular cases considered in the concrete. Finally, the last practical judgment dictates only that something is to be done or omitted; but it does not speak about the morality of the action or omission.

¹ Judgments formed in order to operation are distinguished into speculative, speculative-practical, and practical-practical. Speculative judgments regard the truth which founds the morality of a consequent act, for example the existence of some fact, as: Today is Sunday; or the value of an act, as: A sacrament administered in this way is invalid; etc. Speculative-practical judgments regard the morality of an act, but only in common, as: Mass is to be heard on Sunday. Practical-practical judgments concern the morality of an act in particular and constitute conscience properly so called, as: Today Mass is to be heard by me.

II. Division. Conscience is divided:

1. By reason of its relation to truth, into true or right¹ and false or erroneous, according as the morality which is predicated of a particular action is really present in the action or is not present in it (St. Alphonsus, I, 3).

An erroneous conscience is called vincibly or invincibly erroneous, according as the error can or cannot be driven out by moral diligence.

2. By reason of the morality which is judged to be present in the act, into commanding, prohibiting, and permitting conscience, according as something is judged to be commanded, prohibited, or free.

3. By reason of the state of the mind, into certain, opinionative, and doubtful conscience. Certain conscience is that by which someone judges firmly, that is, without prudent fear concerning the opposite, about the morality of a particular action. It is distinguished into two: directly and indirectly certain. The former rests on motives which show the objective morality of the action. The latter arises from a general, reflex, and certain principle, which is applied to an act about whose objective morality there is only doubt or opinion.² Opinionative conscience is that by which someone judges weakly, that is, with prudent fear concerning the opposite, about the morality of a particular action. Doubtful conscience is one which hesitates uncertainly concerning the morality of a particular action and suspends assent (p. 205; St. Alphonsus, I, 20).

A perplexed conscience is had when someone apprehends sin on both sides, and can neither form a safe conscience for himself nor abstain from choosing one side, as if someone judges, and persists in that opinion, that he sins whether by hearing Mass he leaves a sick person alone, or by remaining with the sick person he neglects Mass (St. Alphonsus, I, 10).

¹ Others call that conscience right which is prudently formed, whether it is true or false.

² Indirectly certain conscience is usually called probable conscience (St. Alphonsus, I, 40).

III. Directive force of conscience. 1. Certain conscience, whether true or false, or erroneous,¹ is the rule of morality; or it brings it about that an action has, with respect to the one judging it, that morality which is judged to be present in it. In other words, one who firmly judges that a particular action must be placed by him, or omitted by him, or is free for him, is in reality either bound to place it or omit it, or is free. For certain conscience involves a firm judgment about the ordinance of God the Best and Greatest concerning a particular action. But the mode or manner of acting must be conformed to such a judgment, whether it is true or false. For neglect of the aforesaid conformity would involve neglect of the divine ordinance itself (St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 17, a. 4, c. and ad 3; I, q. 79, a. 13; I-II, q. 19, a. 5; cf. St. Alphonsus, I, 5).

2. Certain conscience enjoys the force described above not from itself, but from the power of divine law. The reason is that the power of obliging, or of morally binding, cannot belong except to a superior. But a man's conscience is not superior to the man himself. "Conscience," says St. Bonaventure, "is like God's herald and messenger; and what it says, it does not command from itself, but commands as if from God, as a herald does when he publishes the edict of the king"² (cf. St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 17, a. 3).

3. Uncertain conscience, that is, opinionative or doubtful conscience, of itself lacks directive force, because direction necessarily takes place toward one thing, and therefore must proceed from a conscience which itself is determined to one thing. But uncertain conscience is not determined to one thing, but is disposed about different things. What must be done by one who is uncertain will be explained in n. 221.

Corollary I. One who acts against a certain conscience commanding or forbidding, whether true or false, commits as much and such a sin as he apprehends in the act. "A human act is judged virtuous or vicious according to the good apprehended toward which the will is borne, and not according to the material object of the act" (St. Thomas, Quodl. 3, art. 27).

Corollary II. One who apprehends the malice of an act, but thinks nothing, not even confusedly, about grave or light malice, sins only lightly. Nevertheless, commonly there is present, and therefore it is presumed that there is had, sufficient advertence and consent, though confused, to grave malice: first, if the matter is manifestly grave; second, if there is question of a man little concerned about the quantity of sin.

Corollary III. One who from an erroneous conscience judges that he sins, whether by not fulfilling a precept which he physically cannot fulfill, or by suffering an evil, for example rape, which he cannot prevent, does not sin. For there is physical impotence, and therefore the voluntary is lacking.

Corollary IV. One who apprehends sin on both sides should, if he can, form a safe conscience for himself by seeking the truth and by prudently solving the doubt, should it perhaps persist, with the help of a reflex principle. If he can neither form a certain conscience for himself nor abstain from choosing, let him choose what appears the lesser evil.³ If each appears equal, let him choose at will. If nevertheless he judges that he sins, he is still free from sin, because liberty is lacking and no one sins necessarily.

If he chooses what appears graver, he indeed sins, but only in proportion to the apprehended excess; since as regards the total malice he is not free, but he freely embraces the excess.

¹ Others add: provided it is invincibly erroneous. But certain conscience is necessarily here and now invincibly erroneous; for such a conscience supposes that here and now not even a suspicion of error is suggested. Hence such a conscience, if it commands or prohibits something, obliges, even if a vincibly erroneous conscience preceded it; if it permits something, it renders that thing licit here and now to the one so judging, although the erring person perhaps was not without fault led to such a conscience and therefore sinned before.

² In II Sent., dist. 39, a. 1, q. 3.

³ Of itself, that is, other things being equal, the transgression of a natural precept is to be guarded against more than that of a positive precept; of a divine precept more than of a human one; of a negative precept more than of an affirmative one.

Proposition. For acting licitly, certainty strictly so called concerning the honesty of the action to be placed here and now is required. This is clear, first, from Sacred Scripture. "But he who discerns, if he eats, is condemned, because it is not from faith. But everything that is not from faith is sin" (Rom. 14:23). Here St. Paul treats the controversy about the eating of foods which the Mosaic law prohibited. Moreover, the Apostle teaches that he sins who eats the aforesaid foods while discerning, Greek diakrinomenos, which in the context means: struggling with himself, doubting, hesitating,¹ whether the eating is licit. But according to the Apostle the reason is that every action placed without a firm persuasion concerning the honesty of the action is sinful. "It is said," says St. Alphonsus, "from faith, namely, from a certain dictate of conscience, so that a man is persuaded in his conscience that by acting he acts rightly" (I, 55). This interpretation is deduced from the context of the discourse (vv. 2, 14, 22), and even today is commonly admitted.² There is added, second, an argument taken from reason. Beyond doubt, he sins who wills and chooses an action, whether it is good or evil, whether it offends God or does not offend God. But one acts thus who wills and chooses an action about which he doubts whether here and now it is licit. Hence St. Augustine: "To do that which is uncertain whether it is a sin is a certain sin."³ St. Alphonsus asserts the same repeatedly (I, 22, 24; likewise I, 81 and Homo Apostolicus I, 65, where he teaches that not even a most probable opinion of itself and ultimately suffices).

Corollary I. Authors commonly teach that broad certainty suffices for acting licitly. But this is said less accurately; for broad certainty still admits prudent fear, or broad doubt. But it is not licit to place an action as long as one still prudently fears that it is formal sin, or a true offense against God. Moreover, this fear or broad doubt is easily excluded through some general reflex principle, for example: It is licit to follow an opinion certain in the broad sense; which principle others also call concomitant.

Corollary II. It suffices that someone in good faith be certain of the liceity of an action, even if the foundation on which the certainty rests is less solid. Nor is it required that someone reflexively judge that he is certain.

Corollary III. One who acts with a practical doubt concerning the honesty of an action commits as much and such a sin as that about which he doubts; for he perpetrates as much and such a sin as the danger to which he exposes himself (St. Alphonsus, I, 22). If only the notion of sin is apprehended, there is had a sin of unnamed species; concerning this, however, observe these words of St. Thomas: "When reason apprehends something as evil, it always apprehends it under some notion of evil; for instance because it is contrary to a divine precept, or because it is scandal, or on account of something of this kind; and then such an evil will is reduced to such a species of malice" (I-II, q. 19, a. 5, ad 3). "Yet it must be noted for practice, what many are ignorant of, that it is gravely illicit to act with a practical doubt about grave sin."⁴

¹ The source's Greek form is badly OCR'd; the intended term is diakrinomenos.

² That by "faith" supernatural faith is not understood, but a dictate of conscience, is clear from Lateran IV (c. 41); and that a certain dictate is understood is taught by Estius, Beelen, Cornely, Reithmayer, Bisping, and other interpreters commonly.

³ Bk. I, De Baptismo, c. 5.

⁴ Cf. Marc, n. 37; Vindiciae Alphonsianae, I, p. 504; Aertnys-Damen, I, n. 64.

We speak about him who lacks the conscience required for acting licitly, that is, about him who is not certain of the honesty of the action to be placed. Moreover:

I. One who is not certain of the honesty of some action, unless he wishes to abstain from it, is held before all else to inquire into the truth, that is, to investigate what the morality of the action is; in other words, what the ordinance of the eternal law concerning it is. And indeed one who neglects the aforesaid inquiry holds the divine ordinance itself cheap, since he rashly exposes himself to the danger of violating it. Hence St. Thomas: "But in doubtful and uncertain matters, reason does not give judgment without a preceding inquiry; and therefore inquiry of reason before judgment about things to be chosen is necessary; and this inquiry is called counsel" (I-II, q. 14, a. 1). And St. Alphonsus: "For acting licitly in doubtful matters we must inquire into the truth" (I, 54).

II. Concerning the manner of inquiring into the truth, hold these things:

1. The arguments, intrinsic and extrinsic, or authorities, of each opinion mutually opposed to the other, must be investigated and compared. For in doubts one part must be chosen before the other. But "choice imports a certain preceding comparison" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 13, a. 1).

2. The inquiry must be made with moral diligence proportionate both to the person inquiring and to the gravity of the matter of which there is question, and to the time that can be spent on the inquiry. The less learned should try to reach the truth by consulting the more learned, for example a pastor or confessor; the more learned, by their own inquiry. "It will be enough," says Benedict XIV in the encyclical De Praeparatione ad Annum Universalis Iubilaei (26 Jun. 1749), "to have admonished confessors that in a doubtful matter they not rely on their own opinion; but before they decide the cause, they should consult very many books, especially those whose doctrine is more solid; and then they should descend to that opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms. Nor indeed did we teach anything else in our encyclical on usuries." Besides this, greater diligence is needed if there is question of a matter of great importance, say of notable restitution, than if the discussion concerns a small matter.

If someone, after the truth has been inquired into, continues to doubt, or is not certain of the honesty of the action, it is disputed to what extent one who thus doubts theoretically can come to practical certainty and place the action. Moreover, the diverse responses to this question constitute the diverse moral systems, about which we must now speak. But it is clear that this controversy is of the greatest importance: since a moral system governs the whole of moral doctrine and opens the way for solving for practice the innumerable doubts that occur in it. About to speak of this very grave matter, we shall set forth first the notion of a moral system, the state of the controversial question, and the diverse systems; then the proof of the system which seems true to us. Finally we shall add some points concerning certain sayings akin to the moral system, concerning the importance of the controversy between equiprobabilists and probabilists, and concerning the use of the moral system.

I. He has a strict conscience who habitually, from a slighter reason, judges that something is a sin or a grave sin which involves no malice or only slight malice. One who labors under a strict conscience should strive to submit his mind to the judgment of wiser and more prudent persons, especially with regard to the direction of others.¹ "It is indeed wrong to relax the observance of divine laws more than is permitted; but it is no less an evil to render the divine yoke harder for others than is fitting" (St. Alphonsus, I, 82).

¹ Cf. Sweens, Theol. Mor. fund., n. 739.

Hence, Moral Theology differs from various related sciences or habits. Thus: (a) it differs from Ethics, which is the science of human conduct as directed by reason to man’s natural end, for Moral Theology uses faith as well as reason, and is concerned with man’s supernatural end; (b) it differs from faith, since it includes not only principles revealed by God, but also conclusions derived from them; (c) it differs from synderesis, or the habit that perceives the natural principles of morality that are self-evident to the mind, for Moral Theology deals also with supernatural truths and with truths that are not self-evident; (d) it differs from conscience, which draws conclusions for individual cases, since Moral Theology is concerned with general conclusions.

(Summa Theologica, I, q. 79, aa. 11-13.)

Definition.—Conscience is an act of judgment on the part of the practical reason deciding by inference from general principles the moral goodness or malice of a particular act.

(a) It is an act, and as such it differs from moral knowledge and intellectual virtues, which are not transitory but enduring. Moral understanding (synderesis), by which everyone naturally perceives the truth of general and self-evident principles of morality; moral science, by which the theologian or ethician knows the body of conclusions drawn from moral principles; prudence, by which the virtuous man is able to make right applications of moral rules to individual cases—all these are permanent states and are preparatory to the act of conscience, in which one makes use of one’s knowledge to judge of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an action in the concrete, as attended by all its circumstances.

(b) Conscience is an act of judgment, and thus it differs from the other acts employed by prudence—from counsel about the right means or ways of action, and from command as to their use. Counsel inquires what is the right thing to do, conscience gives the dictate or decision, the moral command moves to action.

(c) Conscience is in the reason—that is, it is a subjective guide, and thus it differs from law, which is objective.

(d) Conscience is in the practical reason. Unlike other judgments, which are speculative and deal not with action or only with theoretical aspects of action (e.g., the judgment that God is perfect, that the active faculties are distinct from the soul, etc.), conscience is concerned with action from the view-point of its moral exercise.

(e) Conscience is the inference from general principles, and thus it differs from moral understanding (synderesis). This latter is a habit by which everyone who is mentally developed is able to perceive without argument that certain more general propositions of morality must be true, such as the axioms of the natural law (see above, 319 sqq.); conscience draws conclusions from those axioms.

(f) Conscience judges concerning the morality of an act. Here lies the difference between consciousness and conscience; consciousness is a psychological faculty whose function is to perceive one’s own states and acts; conscience is a moral judgment concerning the lawfulness or unlawfulness of those states or acts. Thus, consciousness testifies that one is considering the performance of a certain act, conscience judges the morality, and permits or forbids; or consciousness testifies that a certain thing was done or not done in the past, conscience declares the morality—condemning, excusing, or approving what took place.

(g) Conscience judges concerning a particular act—that is, it considers an act that is to be done here and now (or was done), with all the attendant circumstances. Conscience, thus, differs from moral science, which, though it systematizes the body of conclusions drawn from the natural and positive laws, is not able to make the applications for the innumerable cases that arise. Even works containing moral cases, which give solutions for concrete instances, do not take the place of conscience in such instances, for it is still the individual who judges about those solutions or about their applicability to his particular circumstances.

Division.-Conscience is variously divided. (a) According as the act judged is in the future or in the past, conscience is antecedent or consequent. The antecedent conscience is a monitor which decides that a future act will be lawful or unlawful; the consequent conscience is a judge which causes peace or remorse for what has been done in the past. (b) According to the kind of direction or decision it gives, antecedent conscience is commanding, forbidding, permitting or counselling; while consequent conscience is excusing, approving, or condemning (Rom., ii. 15).

According as it agrees or disagrees with the external divine or human law, conscience is true or false. (a) A true conscience judges that to be good and commanded which is really good and commanded. Example: According to law, one may use money of which one has the disposal. A sum of money before Balbus is really at his disposal. Hence, his conscience is true if it decides that he may use this money.

(b) A false conscience judges the lawful to be unlawful, or vice versa: “The hour cometh that whosoever killeth you will think that he doth a service to God” (John, xvi. 2). Example: Balbus would have a false conscience, if he decided that he had no right to use the money before him. This would happen if he was mistaken about the general principle, or about the fact that the money was at his disposal, or if he drew a wrong inference from the premises.

According to its qualities and suitability as a guide of conduct, conscience may be viewed either with reference to the will or to the intellect. (a) With reference to the will, conscience is either good (right) or bad (wrong), according as it does or does not proceed from a well-meaning intention and a right disposition towards one’s end and duties. Example: If the Balbus mentioned above decided that the money was at his disposal because he wished to know the truth and had investigated to the best of his ability, his conscience would be good. But, if he decided this without sufficient investigation and only because he was prejudiced in his own favor, his conscience would be bad.

(b) With reference to the intellect, conscience is either certain or uncertain, according as the mind assents to its judgment without or with fear of error. Examples: If Balbus decides that he has the right to use the money, and is so firmly convinced that his judgment is true that he has no fears or doubts, his conscience is certain. But, if there remain solid difficulties or objections against his judgment which he cannot satisfactorily answer so that he assents to his view only with the fear that he may be wrong, his conscience is uncertain.

Obligation of Conscience.—Man is bound to be guided by conscience, both negatively and positively—that is, he must neither disobey when it forbids, nor refuse to obey when it commands.

(a) It obliges by reason of divine command, since it acts as the voice or witness of God making known and promulgating. to us the moral law. Hence “all that is not from conscience is sin” (Rom, xiv. 23).

(b) Conscience obliges from the nature of things, for, since the will is a blind faculty, it must be guided by the judgment, of the intellect, and must follow the inner light given it about the law. Apart from revelation, there is no other way of learning what God wishes one to do here and now.

The authority of conscience is not, however, unlimited.

(a) Conscience is not independent of external law and authority. It is not autonomous morality of the reason or will, nor private inspiration or interpretation; for its function is not to establish law or pass judgment on it, but to apply the law as expounded by the Church to a present case. Hence, conscience must aim to be true—that is, to agree with and express the objective law.

(b) Conscience is not independent of the righteousness of the will. It is not a speculative judgment, whose value depends solely on agreement between the mind and the facts, as is the case with a conclusion of pure science. It is a practical judgment, which has to guide all man’s conduct, and thus its value depends on the relation of the means it selects to the end towards which the means should be directed. Hence, conscience must be good—that is, a judgment dictated by a will well disposed towards the true end of life.

(c) Conscience is not independent of the certainty of the intellect. It is a judgment formed, not by sentiment, emotion, or one’s own wishes, but by evidence and firm conviction; for its office is to guide man reliably in the most important of affairs. Hence, conscience must be certain—that is, a judgment to which the intellect yields its unhesitating assent.

In order, therefore, that conscience may be the proper rule and moderator of man’s moral life, it must have the following qualities:

(a) It must be good, and practically true—that is, in agreement with the Last End of man and, as far as the efforts of the individual can attain to such agreement, with the objective law—for the standard of moral good is not each one’s wish or opinion, but God as the Last End and the external natural and positive law as means to that End.

(b) It must be certain—that is, without fear that one is wrong; at least, it must have that degree of certainty which is possible in moral matters. For to act with the fear that one is committing sin, is to be willing to do what may be sin, and is thus consent to sin.

A conscience that has not the requisite conditions is not a safe guide, and hence it cannot be followed.

(a) An erroneous conscience may not be followed, if the error is vincible and there is danger of sin; neither may one act against it if there be danger of sin. To follow such a conscience would be to do what is wrong and to act in bad faith (i.e., to have a bad and erroneous conscience); not to follow it, would be to act against one’s judgment, wrongly formed though it was, and to do insincerely what is right (i.e., to have a bad, though true conscience). Example: A person who has made up his mind that dishonesty is necessary in his business, but who realizes that his reasons are not convincing, sins against sincerity if he follows his opinion; he sins against conviction, if he does not follow his opinion. But his predicament is due to his own sophistry or bad will, and the escape from it requires only that he be honest enough with himself to inquire about the matter.

(b) A doubtful conscience may not be followed, if the doubt is such that one is not reasonably sure that a certain act is lawful. Example: If a man does not know whether a certain remedy will be helpful or seriously harmful to another, his conscience is doubtful as to the lawfulness of administering the remedy, and it may not be followed. If in spite of this he makes use of the remedy, he is guilty of the harm he foresaw, even though it does not happen.

Results of Conscience.—The results of following an erroneous conscience are as follows:

(a) He who follows an erroneous conscience, commanding or forbidding or permitting, is not guilty of sin if his ignorance is invincible. Example: A child who thinks he is obliged to lie because he has been told to do this, is excused from sin on account of his ignorance.

(b) He who follows an erroneous conscience, commanding or permitting evil, is guilty if his ignorance is vincible. Example: A grown person who has persuaded himself that deception is lawful, obligatory or advisable, or that truthfulness is forbidden, but who ought to know better, is not excused by the conscience he has formed (see above, 97 sqq.).

The results of disobeying an erroneous conscience are as follows:

(a) He who disobeys an invincibly erroneous conscience, is guilty. Example: The child who refuses to tell a lie when he thinks he ought to do so because it has been commanded, is guilty of disobedience.

(b) He who disobeys a vincibly erroneous conscience, is also guilty. Example: Caius promises to tell a lie to help another party. The doubt occurs whether or not this is lawful, and he takes no pains to settle it correctly, but decides offhand that a promise must be kept. When the time comes, Caius becomes alarmed and does not keep his promise, lest he get into trouble. He is guilty.

The kinds of sin committed in consequence of an erroneous conscience are as follows:

(a) Sin committed by following a vincibly erroneous conscience is of the same gravity and species as the act for which the conscience is responsible, but the ignorance is an extenuating circumstance. Example: He who blinds his conscience so that it decides in favor of grave calumny, is guilty of mortal sin against justice; but he is less guilty than if he had sinned without any permission from conscience.

(b) Sin committed by disobeying an invincibly erroneous conscience is of the gravity and species apprehended by the conscience. Example: A person who tells a small lie, thinking it a mortal sin against charity, is guilty of the malice he understands to be in his act.

(c) Sin committed by disobeying a vincibly erroneous conscience is of the species that was perceived. Example: Caius who did not live up to his promise of telling a lie, after he had decided that to keep his word was the right thing to do, was guilty of a breach of promise. As to the gravity of sin against a vincibly erroneous conscience, it is always the same as that apprehended by the conscience, unless what is seriously wrong is culpably mistaken for what is only slightly wrong. Examples: If Caius, just referred to, thought that his desertion of his friend inflicted a grave injury, he was guilty of grave sin. A person who persuades himself by vain reasonings that complete intoxication does not differ in gravity from incipient intoxication, is nevertheless guilty of the greater malice, if he puts himself in the former state; for his wrong opinion cannot change the fact, and his culpable ignorance cannot excuse him.

(Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 19, aa. 5, 6.)

As was explained in the previous article, conscience is not a proper guide unless it is good. In this article we shall speak of the good conscience and of its opposite the various kinds of bad conscience.

Definition.—The distinction of good and bad conscience is applied both to consequent and antecedent conscience (see 576).

(a) The consequent conscience is good, and one is said to have a good conscience, if it testifies that past acts were rightly performed, that past sins were forgiven, that one is in the friendship of God, etc.; “The end of the commandment is charity from a good conscience” (I Tim., i. 5); “War a good warfare, having faith and a good conscience” (ibid., 19). The consequent conscience is bad if it testifies in a contrary way: “Let us draw near with a true heart, having our hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience” (Heb., x. 22).

(b) The antecedent conscience, with which we are now concerned, judges about the morality of an act to be performed here and now, or in the future. It is called good, if it is made by one who is in good faith—that is, one who sincerely loves goodness and who decides according to the truth as far as he is able to see it. It is called bad, if it is the judgment of one who is in bad faith—that is, one who is in error through his own fault, or who arrives at the truth by reasonings that are not honest or not understood by him. Example: Speaking of those who, though fearing that idol meats were forbidden, yet ate of them because they saw others do this, St. Paul says: “There is not knowledge in everyone. For some until this present, with conscience of the idol, eat as a thing sacrificed to an idol, and their conscience being weak is defiled” (I Cor., viii. 7).

Divisions.—By training and care a good conscience is developed and becomes better. (a) A vigilant conscience is one that asserts itself promptly and strongly under all circumstances. (b) A tender conscience is one that inclines to a careful observance of all the Commandments and to a purification of the inner workings of the soul. A possessor of this kind of conscience is called conscientious. (c) A timorous conscience moves one through filial fear to shun even the slightest sins and imperfections, and to use all prudent efforts to avoid occasions and dangers of sin. The possessor of this kind of conscience is called God-fearing.

A bad conscience that is in vincible error is divided according to its effects into the scrupulous and the lax conscience. (a) The lax conscience errs on the side of liberty. It is moved by trivial reasons to judge the unlawful to be lawful, the gravely sinful to be only slightly evil, that which is commanded to be only counselled, and so on.

(b) The scrupulous conscience errs on the side of obligation. It is moved by trivial reasons to judge that there is sin in something lawful, grave sin in something venially wrong, and obligation in something that is only counselled; it sees inhability or defect where these do not exist, and so on.

The scrupulous Conscience.—This is a species of erroneous judgment that sees sin where there is no sin, or grave sin where there is only light sin, and whose reasons are trivial or absurd. (a) It differs, therefore, from a strict or tender conscience, which, while it does not exaggerate sin, judges that one should try to avoid even slight sin and imperfection. This is the golden mean between a lax and a scrupulous conscience. Persons with this sort of conscience are sometimes called scrupulous or singular, because they are more exact than the majority. More accurately they are to be called conscientious or God-fearing.

(b) The scrupulous conscience differs also from scrupulosity, which is a state of mind in which one whose judgment is not erroneous, is nevertheless tormented by fears or doubts about his moral condition.

The rules given above (588 sqq.) for the erroneous conscience apply also to the scrupulous conscience. (a) He who follows a scrupulous conscience does not sin by this, even though he is vincibly in error; for there is no danger of sin in doing more than is required. Example: Caius is too lazy to make inquiries about his religious duties, but he has the exaggerated notion that grace at meals obliges under pain of grave sin. He does not sin by following his conscience, for grace at meals is recommended to all. (b) He who disobeys a scrupulous conscience commits the sin his conscience apprehends. Example: If Caius omits grace, he is guilty of grave sin.

Special Dangers of a scrupulous Conscience.—(a) As to himself, the scrupulous person suffers from his conscience; it makes him guilty of sin where there should be no sin, and by its exaggerated strictness it often drives him to the other extreme of laxity. (b) As to others, the scrupulous person is an annoyance and a detriment; he tries to impose his conscience on them, or at least he makes virtue appear forbidding.

The Perplexed Conscience.—Like to the scrupulous conscience is the perplexed conscience, which judges that in a particular instance one cannot escape sin, whether one acts or does not act. Example: Titus fears that, if he goes to church, he will sin by endangering his health, which is feeble; that, if he does not go to church, he will sin by disobeying the law. This seems to have been the conscience of Herod, who thought he was confronted with the alternative of perjury or murder when the head of John the Baptist was asked of him (Matt, xiv. 9).

St. Alphonsus gives the following directions to assist one who is perplexed in conscience:

(a) If without serious inconvenience decision can be delayed, reliable advice should be obtained (e.g., from the confessor).

(b) If decision cannot be delayed, the alternative that seems the lesser evil should be chosen. Example: The natural law requires that Titus should not expose his life to danger unnecessarily. The positive law of the Church requires that he go to Mass on Sunday. It is a less evil to omit what is required by the law of the Church than to omit what is required by the law of God. Hence, Titus should decide that he is not obliged in his circumstances to go to church.

(c) If decision cannot be delayed and the party cannot decide where the lesser evil lies, he is free to choose either; for he is not bound to the impossible.

Scrupulosity.—Like to the scrupulous conscience is the state of scrupulosity, which manifests itself in moral matters especially as a vain fear or anxiety concerning the presence or magnitude of sin in one’s act. A psychopathic state, scrupulosity is usually listed as a form of psychasthenia which is characterized by weakness of soul, inability to cope with problems, and a lack of psychic energy. Clinically examined, the psychasthenic presents the following characteristics: (1) physically, he is listless and always tired; (2) intellectually, his tiredness makes it impossible for him to concentrate for long periods of time; (c) psychologically, he is an introvert concerned with himself as the center of his interests and activities.

The more common manifestations of the psychasthenic’s difficulties include: self-diffidence, uncertainty, hesitation, obsessions and scruples. A species of psychasthenia, scrupulosity may be described as an inordinate preoccupation with the moral and religious order, a special type of worry directed toward the morality of actions.

(a) scrupulosity must be distinguished, however, from the scrupulous conscience, inasmuch as scrupulosity is not a judgment, but a fear that accompanies one’s judgment. Example: A scrupulous person knows very well that it is not a sin to omit grace, nor a grave sin to pray with some voluntary distraction; but he worries over these things as if they were sins, or grave sins.

(b) scrupulosity must be distinguished from the tender conscience, inasmuch as scrupulosity is an exaggerated and harmful solicitude. A person of tender conscience is careful even in smaller duties, but in a quiet and recollected way, whereas the scrupulous person is all excitement and distraction.

(c) scrupulosity must be distinguished from the anxious or doubtful or guilty conscience, inasmuch as scrupulosity is a baseless fear or phobia. Examples: A person who has practised injustice for many years, has good reason to be perturbed in conscience when he reflects that restitution or reparation is a prerequisite to pardon; but a mother who did all she could to train her children well, is scrupulous, if she is constantly reproaching herself that she should have done better. A person who makes a contract while fearing that it may be unlawful, because good authorities hold its unlawfulness, acts with a doubtful conscience; but if he fears that the contract is unlawful, in spite of the fact that others regard it as lawful and that his only reason for doubt is that they may be wrong, he is scrupulous. The Egyptians at the time of the plagues could reasonably forecast grievous chastisements on account of their wickedness (Wis., xvii. 10); but a good person who worries constantly over the possibility of being damned must be scrupulous.

Scruples may be divided in various ways, but the simplest division seems to be by virtue of object, extension and duration. By reason of object, scruples may center on only one or, at most, a few moral activities, e.g., duties of charity, or sins against chastity, or they may embrace the whole moral life of the individual. By reason of extension, some scruples are limited to interior actions, others extend to external manifestations. By reason of duration, scruples may be classified as intermittent, or temporary, and quasi-permanent which is characteristic of the constitutionally scrupulous person whose physical and psychical disposition incline him to scrupulosity.

The signs or external manifestations of scrupulosity have been variously divided, but a simplified division into intellectual, or cognitive, affective, or volitional, and compulsive suffices for our present purpose.

(a) Intellectual: habitual abulia, i.e., an inability to decide, coupled with and interacting with constant doubt.

(b) Affective: closely allied to the intellectual state is the feeling of insufficiency which extends to actions, to the individual’s own personality, to his desire for higher goals, to his abilities, etc. This fosters and strengthens the inability to decide. Inordinate fears, anxieties and sadness contribute to the genesis and growth of the sense of inadequacy.

(c) Compulsive: numerous compulsion factors are present in more serious cases of scrupulosity, e.g., obsessions, phobias, and compulsions properly so called, which concern external actions or rituals.

Obsessions include irresistible, persistent and irrational ideas accompanied by feelings of tension and fear. These ideas which plague the individual are “discordant,” that is, out of harmony with his habitual attitude, and “impulsive,” tending to reduce themselves spontaneously to action. The scrupulous person is frightened and flustered by the thought of doing a thing for which he has a positive abhorrence and by his inability to get the thought out of his mind.

Phobias refer to habitual, irrational fears of a definite entity associated with a high degree of anxiety and unwarranted by objective reality. They are very intense fears, completely out of proportion to their causes or objects.

Finally, compulsions strictly so called may be defined as irresistible, unreasonable urges to perform actions to free the individual from an obsessing idea. Tension and anxiety are associated if the act or external ritual is not performed.

For the confessor, the recognition of a scrupulous person is not too difficult. The penitent’s own difficulties present the first and most obvious sign, e.g., irrational doubts about consent to temptation, as to the gravity of a sin, etc., and undue concern about circumstances. Concomitant signs confirming the judgment that a person is scrupulous include:

(a) Obstinacy of judgment; Although the scrupulous person seeks advice, frequently from many confessors, he tends to follow his own judgment. He is inclined to think that the confessor has not understood him, that he has not given a complete picture of his state of soul, etc.

(b) Inconstancy in acting owing to inability to judge rightly and the consequent frequent changes of judgment for light reasons.

(c) Irrelevant accusations of multiple circumstances that tend to lose the sin in the maze of circumstances.

(d) External motions by which the individual tries to do away with the fear, sin, or other difficulty.

Causes of a scrupulous Conscience.—Although the signs of scrupulosity are easily recognizable, the causes are not clearly defined, and authors are not entirely agreed in this matter. A listing of probable causes would include internal causes:

(a) physical—the physical causes are virtually unknown. Most authors admit a constitutional disposition to scrupulosity, just as there is one to its quasi-genus, psychasthenia. Reductively this might involve disorders in the vago-sympathetic nervous system and the neuro-endocrine system. (b) psychical—the cause is attributed to too low a psychic tension. The inability to cope with obsessions and the attacks of phobias serve to exhaust the individual; (c) moral—perhaps a suspicious and melancholy character, a disposition that is overly impressionable and changeable, or a self-opinionated nature, overconfident of its own ability.

The external causes of scrupulosity are: (a) the devil, who excites vain fears in order to diminish devotion, to discourage the use of prayer and of the Sacraments, to drive to tepidity and despair; (b) the neighbor, who teaches scrupulosity by his words or example; association with persons who are scrupulous; the reading of spiritual books of a rigoristic character; assistance by persons of a timid character at terrifying sermons on the divine justice; overly protective and overly rigorous education.

Though God cannot be the cause of scrupulosity in the same way as the evil spirits (who use it for man’s destruction), nor in the same way as human agencies (which are unable to bring good out of the evil they cause), He does in exceptional cases directly permit even saintly persons to be vexed by scrupulosity that they may thereby satisfy for sin, or exercise themselves in humility and patience, or shake off spiritual torpor.

Scrupulosity that is supernatural in origin is much rarer than that which has a natural source, and it can be usually recognized by certain signs, like the following; (a) when it cannot be accounted for by natural causes, and is generally short in duration; (b) if it is from the evil spirits, it leaves the soul shaken or dismayed, if from God, it is followed by light and peace.

Dangers of scrupulosity.—The evil results of indulged scrupulosity are as follows: (a) temporal evils—the constant fears and worries of the scrupulous affect the brain and nerves, break down the bodily vigor, and lead to neurasthenia, hysteria, insanity or monomania; (b) spiritual evils—time is wasted in useless regrets and anxieties, prayer becomes a torture, confidence in God decreases, and, seeing they do not find consolation in virtue, the scrupulous often end in vice and despair.

Rules to be observed by the scrupulous.—(a) They must not yield to their scruples. As was said above, scrupulosity is not a conscience, but only the counterfeit appearance of a conscience; not a help to the soul, but a grave drawback and danger. Hence, the scrupulous must learn to despise their foolish fears and imaginations. (b) They must follow blindly the commands of a prudent spiritual director. To attempt to make decisions for themselves is a harrowing experience for scrupulous persons, and one fraught with great peril. They must protect themselves, therefore, by following the decisions made for them by one who will guide them aright. Gradually, as their condition improves, however, they must learn to take the initiative and thus prepare themselves to act as responsible persons capable of forming a correct judgment.

Qualities required for a successful direction of the scrupulous are:

(a) Knowledge. The spiritual physician must be able to distinguish scrupulosity from spiritual diseases or conditions that are similar, lest he prescribe what is not suitable for the case. Example: A person of tender conscience should continue in that state, a person of scrupulous conscience needs instruction that he may put aside his erroneous views; a scrupulous person stands in need of special guidance. He must also recognize that scrupulosity is a mental illness that at times requires the expert treatment of a psychiatrist. Knowing his own limitations and the need of expert therapy, he should not hesitate to send the penitent to a competent doctor.

(b) Prudence. Some persons pretend scrupulosity in order to get a name for holiness, or to make a good impression; needless to say, they must be dealt with cautiously, as they often prove very unscrupulous. With a person who is really scrupulous, the spiritual director must carefully obtain all the knowledge necessary to ascertain the true state of soul, prudently bring the individual to recognize that he is a sick person, help to restore his confidence in himself, in his confessor, in God, etc.

(c) Patience. The scrupulous are almost as troublesome to their directors as they are to themselves; but they are heavily burdened and are unable to help themselves. The law of charity applies. They have the same right to charitable treatment as others who are physically suffering and needy.

(d) Firmness. Disobedience will defeat every effort of a director to help a scrupulous person. On this point, therefore, there must be no leniency: the rules laid down must be insisted on, the reasons should not be given, and no argument or discussion should be allowed. The director should speak with certainty and authority; he should be brief, and, if he must repeat, he will do well to use the same words.

(e) Good judgment. After deciding that a person is scrupulous, the director must discover what is the particular form of scrupulosity in the case, and must apply remedies that are suitable.

Rules Concerning Persons Scrupulous about Past Confessions.—(a) For the first time the confessor may permit a general confession of the past life, if the scrupulous penitent has fears about previous confessions and has not already made such a general confession. Let the individual relate his whole story at once, with all its details and complications. This might perhaps take more than one confession to complete, but the full recital is necessary if the scrupulous person is to have confidence in his director’s knowledge of his exact state of soul. (b) After this general confession, no mention of past confession must be permitted, unless the scrupulous person is ready to swear without hesitation that he is sure that a sin certainly grave was committed by him and never rightly confessed.

Rules Concerning Persons scrupulous about Present Confessions.—(a) Before confession, the penitent must be content with a certain brief space of time appointed by the confessor for making his examination of conscience and act of contrition. A longer time spent in these preparations is useful to other penitents, but harmful to the scrupulous.

(b) During confession only those sins need be mentioned which are seen from a brief examen to be both certain and grave, and only those circumstances whose declaration is absolutely necessary. If the scrupulous penitent begins to speak of doubtful sins or irrelevant details, the confessor must forbid him to go on; for though confessions must be complete, whenever possible, doubts and details must not be permitted in the case of such scrupulous persons (see Vol. II).

(c) After confession, if the confessor judges that there is not sufficient matter for absolution, he must not yield to the penitent’s fears, but must assure him that he does not need absolution and that he may go to the Sacraments Without it.

Rules Concerning Persons scrupulous about the Performance of Duties.—(a) The scrupulous person should be instructed that positive laws, divine as well as human, do not oblige in case of moral impossibility (i.e., when their observance is too burdensome); that the matter about which he has scruples has become too difficult for him, and hence that he is not obliged to it as others are.

(b) The scrupulous person should be commanded to leave undone what his vain fear calls on him to do; and, if this does not suffice, he should be told that he is not bound by the duty which causes him such anxiety. Example: Titus is scrupulous about the performance of obligatory prayers, so much so that he is not satisfied until he has repeated them several times, lest some syllable may have been omitted or hurried over, or the intention or attention may have been lost sight of at some part of the prayer, or the devotional posture may not have been observed throughout. If Titus cannot learn to say these prayers without making senseless repetitions, he should be told that the obligation has ceased until such time as he is able to fulfill it without torture to himself or others.

Rules Concerning Persons Scrupulous about the Commission Of Sin.—(a) The scrupulous person should be told that he is scrupulous, that his scrupulosity is not a conscience that he is obliged to follow, but a vain fear which he is obliged to struggle against by observing the directions given him.

(b) He should be directed not to deliberate long before acting, but to do what seems right to him at first; not to conclude after acting that he has committed sin, unless this appears certain and evident. Since the scrupulous are over-careful, the presumption is in their favor, and they can act and judge prudently by disregarding their fears and doubts. If by deciding offhand they sometimes sin or fail to recognize sin in a past act, this will come from invincible ignorance, and they will be excused from responsibility.

Remedies for Scruples That Are Mental in Origin.—(a) Those who suffer from fixed ideas, phobias, and delusions, should not be reproved harshly and told that their fears are insane, but should be treated with kindness and firmness. In ministering to these troubled minds, the best course seems to be kind assurance that they have nothing to fear, along with insistence that they imitate the example of the generality of good people, avoid singular practices of piety, discuss their anxieties only with their director, and give themselves to some occupation that will distract their attention from their manias.

(b) Those whose minds are over-active and given to doubts and objections must avoid introspection and the study of moral problems that are too difficult for them; they must take a proper amount of suitable recreation, think and plan how they may help others who are in need, and avoid idleness.

Signs of a Good Conscience.—(a) Extraordinary holiness is not necessary before one may consider one’s conscience good, for there are degrees of goodness. If, therefore, a person’s external life is directed by the duties of his state, and his internal life, as far as he can judge, is free from serious guilt and guided by love of God and hatred of sin, he may safely regard his will as good. If sometimes he sins venially, this is not because he lacks a good conscience, but because he does not always follow it.

(b) Extraordinary diligence in studying one’s duties is not necessary before one may regard one’s conscience as good, for otherwise a heavier burden would be imposed than we can suppose God to intend. A person who is using all the means for obtaining religious instruction that are used by others in his position and who are conscientious, may safely regard himself as free from voluntary error. If sometimes he judges wrongly, the mistake will be involuntary and not due to a bad conscience. Of course, one whose conscience is not in vincible error may sin even mortally, not because his conscience is bad, but because he does not follow it.

(Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 57, a. 5; II-II, q. 47, a. 9.)

As was said above, only that conscience is a safe guide which is not only good—that is, in agreement, as far as one’s efforts can secure this, with the external law—but also certain. A certain conscience is one which, without any prudent fear of erring, judges that a particular act is obligatory or unlawful, and hence here and now to be done or omitted.

Kinds of Certitude.—Judgments may be certain in a greater or less degree.

(a) They are metaphysically certain, when error is absolutely impossible, the opposite of what is held by the mind being a contradiction in terms which omnipotence itself could not make true. Example: The judgments that the same, identical act cannot be both good and bad, that good is to be done and evil to be avoided, that God is to be honored, are metaphysically certain, since they result immediately from the very concepts of being, of goodness, and of God.

(b) Judgments are physically certain, when error is impossible according to the laws of nature, the opposite of what is held by the mind being unrealizable except through intervention of another cause. Example: The judgments that he who takes poison will destroy life, that he who applies fire to a house will destroy property, are physically certain. because natural agencies, like poison and fire, act infallibly when applied to suitable matters and under suitable conditions and left to their course, unless they are overruled by superior power.

(c) Judgments are morally certain, when error is impossible according to what is customary among mankind, the opposite of what is held by the mind being so unlikely that it would be imprudent to be moved by it. Examples: One is morally certain that what a reputedly truthful and competent person relates to one is true. A person is morally certain that a conclusion he has drawn about his duty in a particular instance is correct, if he believes that he has overlooked no means of reaching the truth. Testimony and inference, since they come from free and fallible agencies, may lead into error; but, when they appear to have the requisite qualities indicative of truth, they are for the most part reliable and in practical life have to be considered as such.

An Uncertain Conscience.—Uncertainty of conscience can be understood in two senses.

(a) Conscience is uncertain in a more strict sense, if the verdict of the moral judgment on a question of lawfulness or unlawfulness is that no decision can be given either way, either because there are no reasons of importance on either side (negative doubt), or because the opposing reasons balance so perfectly that it is impossible to choose between them (positive doubt). Examples: Titus, wishing to do some drawing on Sundays, asks himself whether drawing is servile work. Not knowing the definition of “servile,” he can only reply to his doubt that he has no reasons either for affirmation or for negation. Caius reads moral authors on the same question, and the pros and cons seem to him so equally strong that he cannot pronounce for either side.

(b) Conscience is uncertain in a less strict sense, if the verdict of the moral judgment on a question of lawfulness or unlawfulness is that the mind inclines to one side more than the other, but cannot decide in its favor (suspicion), or that it decides for one side, while perceiving that the arguments for the contrary are not to be despised (opinion). Example: Titus decides to spend a good part of Sunday taking photographs. Caius argues that this is unlawful; Sempronius, that it is lawful. Titus thinks the arguments of both are strong, but is better pleased with those of Sempronius. If he feels he cannot act on either opinion, his state of mind is what we called suspicion; if he feels that the opinion of Sempronius has prevailed, his state of mind is one of opinion.

From what was said above concerning the certitude requisite for conscience (see 641 sqq.), it follows that: (a) when the state of mind is positive or negative doubt, one is not allowed to act; for a person who is ignorant of what he should do, or who is fluctuating between opposites, runs the risk of sin and its consequences, if he acts blindly; (b) when the state of mind is suspicion, one is not allowed to act, for conscience must be more than conjecture or inclination; (e) when the state of mind is opinion, one is or is not allowed to act, according as the opinion has or has not the qualities required for certitude that is moral and practical (as explained above in 643 sqq.).

10. Therefore conscience is divided: 1. Into right and erroneous conscience. Right conscience is that which dictates what is true; erroneous conscience is that which dictates as true what is false. Erroneous conscience is either vincibly or invincibly such, according as the error morally could and should have been avoided, or morally could not have been avoided. 2. Into certain, probable, doubtful, strict, lax, scrupulous conscience, according as it is founded on a certain, probable, doubtful, stricter, laxer, or wholly vain motive. Conscience that is only subjectively certain, that is, which is thought to be such, and therefore with certainty taken more broadly, and likewise probable and doubtful conscience, can be objectively right or erroneous. Scrupulous, strict, and lax conscience are referred to erroneous conscience. For without sufficient reason, the scrupulous conscience fears sin where there is no sin; the lax conscience bends judgment in favor of liberty, either to avoiding the law simply, or to lessening its obligation; but the strict conscience affirms either an obligation which is not present, or a graver obligation than is really present.

How manyfold is the acceptance of conscience? - Conscience can be taken in two ways, physically and morally. Conscience physically considered pertains to Psychology and to Logic, according as it is considered either precisely insofar as it is a cognitive faculty of returning upon its own acts, or precisely insofar as it is an instrument of attaining truth. But conscience taken morally belongs both to Moral Theology and to Moral Philosophy. Therefore here the discussion will be only of conscience morally considered. We shall speak first of the intrinsic nature of this moral conscience, then of its various divisions.

What are the divisions of moral conscience? - If in that syllogism which must be formed in order that conscience may be had, the major proposition, or law, always stood with evident certainty, and the minor proposition, or that this or that action is contained in the law, also always stood with evident certainty, there would be only one conscience, certain and right conscience. But since both the law and the application of the law often must be gathered by the force of difficult reasoning, hence there are various species of conscience.

Therefore it is divided: 1. Into right and erroneous conscience. Right conscience is that which dictates what is true; erroneous, that which dictates as true what is false. Erroneous conscience is either vincibly or invincibly such, according as the error morally could and ought to have been avoided, or morally could not have been avoided. 2. Into certain, probable, doubtful, strict, lax, and scrupulous conscience, according as it is founded on a certain, probable, doubtful, stricter, laxer, or altogether empty motive. Conscience only subjectively certain, namely one which is thought to be such, and therefore with certainty taken more broadly, as also probable and doubtful conscience, can be objectively right or erroneous. But scrupulous, strict, and lax are brought back to erroneous conscience. For without sufficient reason, the scrupulous conscience fears sin where there is no sin; the lax bends judgment in favor of liberty, either to avoid the law simply, or to lessen its obligation; but the strict affirms either an obligation which is not present, or one more grave than actually exists. Suarez t. 3. d. 12. s. 2;

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 3, a. 6 ad 2, Quodl. 3. a. 26.

What is certain conscience; and what is its directive force? - Certain conscience properly is that conscience which rests upon a certain motive; and consequently judges concerning the honorableness or shamefulness of the action to be done without fear of erring. Less properly, however, it is that which judges simply without any fear of erring concerning the honorableness or shamefulness of an action. This latter is only subjectively certain; the former is also objectively certain. It can likewise be certain strictly and broadly, or morally. Strictly certain excludes every doubt, both prudent and imprudent. Broadly or morally certain excludes only every prudent doubt. Its directive force is declared by the following propositions.

It is lawful to act according to a certain conscience which is nevertheless invincibly erroneous. - Proof. He who acts in this way wills, as much as is in him, a good action, and consents only to a good action. But it is right to will this action. Therefore. The major is proved, for nothing is willed unless first known. Therefore, while an invincibly erroneous conscience stands, he who acts according to it wills, as much as is in him, a good action, and consents only to a good action. - L. 1. 1. n. 5; Elbel 126.

What is probable conscience; and what is its directive force? - "Probable conscience is that by which someone, relying on some probable opinion, forms for himself a practical dictate of reason from certain reflex, or concomitant, principles for acting licitly." L. 1. 1. n. 40. Thus, for example, Titius, a confessor, relying on a probable opinion, judges that he probably has jurisdiction. Then, however, he says, and this is the reflex principle: But while jurisdiction is truly probable, the Church certainly supplies it. Therefore, he concludes, and this is the practical dictate of conscience: I can validly and licitly absolve in this case; and he absolves. Its directive force is declared by the following propositions.

What is doubtful conscience? - Doubt is a suspension of assent concerning an apprehended object; not only as regards the specification of the act, but also as regards the very exercise of the act, namely because a sufficient reason is not had for either part. Therefore doubtful conscience is that which remains suspended concerning the honorableness of an action, inclining to neither part. This conscience, since it does not involve judgment, is not conscience properly, but rather a defect of conscience; for conscience is judgment, not suspension of judgment. Nevertheless this suspension of judgment is called conscience, insofar as with this suspension of judgment we often in fact act. Doubt of this kind can be joined with a reflex judgment about the insufficiency of the motive or reason for assenting, and then a judgment of this kind is more properly called doubtful conscience. - L. 1. 1. n. 20; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5.

Note: He who sinned from an erroneous conscience is not bound in confession to explain that circumstance of erroneous conscience, because it does not change the species; since every sin is against conscience, and does not depend on the objective truth of the thing except insofar as that is judged through conscience and proposed to the will. Except the case of censure and reservation: since then the erroneous conscience must be explained so that the exemption from censure and reservation may be established. Except also the case in which otherwise the sin would not be understood, for example, if someone by omitting Mass on a weekday believes that he sins gravely.

What must someone do if, placed between two precepts, he remains doubtful which one he ought to choose, for example, if the precept of hearing Mass urges, and he ought to assist someone gravely sick? - This conscience is usually called perplexed. Someone, when such a case occurs, must sufficiently, as much as is in him, inquire into the truth so that he may put aside the doubt. When the truth has been sufficiently inquired into, and the doubt remains, he can and must choose that which seems to him the lesser evil; and, if each seems equally grave, he can choose either. This is true even if someone culpably cast himself into that perplexity, provided that he is sorry for the past fault. The reason is that there is no obligation to impossibilities, and therefore then the lesser obligation ceases; or, if they are or seem equal, or because of ignorance someone does not know how to discern which is lesser, either ceases; and even if someone thinks that by acting so he sins, he does not really sin from defect of liberty. - Suarez d. 12. s. 5; Lessius on q. 19. d. 19. a. 6. d. 9; L. 1. 1. n. 10; Elbel 141.

What is scrupulous conscience? - A scruple is an empty apprehension, and from this arising fear and anxiety, that sin is somewhere where it is not; or that there is grave sin where there is only light sin. Therefore scrupulous conscience is that conscience which from some vain cause doubts about the honorableness of some action, and therefore fears sin. Fear of this kind can very well stand with a determinate judgment concerning the honorableness of the thing; for it rests only on a light and empty motive. But if that fear is with a determinate judgment that something is sin which in reality is not, this judgment, insofar as it proceeds from an empty motive and afflicts and anxiously troubles the soul, can certainly be called a scruple, or scrupulous conscience, speaking broadly; but properly it is vincibly erroneous conscience. Likewise there can be a scruple with true practical doubt whether this is sin or not, from an empty motive, suspecting perhaps that it is sin, without any determinate judgment that it is or is not sin.

And thus again it is a scruple or scrupulous conscience broadly so called, but properly it is doubtful conscience. Ferraris Supplem. v. Scrupulus. Scrupulous conscience differs from tender conscience; for the latter is a conscience recognizing, fearing, and fleeing both grave and light sins, and even simple imperfections, as much as with divine grace it can, strives to avoid.

37. • DEFINITION. Right conscience is that which represents the object as it is in itself; otherwise it must be called erroneous; and indeed it is called invincibly or vincibly erroneous according as the ignorance or error is inculpable or culpable.

Principles. - I. A right conscience commanding must always be followed, because conscience is the proximate rule of the will, derived from the first and highest rule of all human actions. - St. Lig., no. 3.

II. An invincibly erroneous conscience commanding must likewise be followed in every case; because it is altogether to be equated subjectively with right conscience, and because, according to the Apostle, Everything which is not from faith (or according to conscience) is sin. - St. Lig., no. 5.

III. An invincibly erroneous conscience permitting exempts from every sin, because there can be no sin where no malice is apprehended. - St. Lig., ibid.

IV. It is not licit to follow a vincibly erroneous conscience permitting or commanding, because, since by hypothesis the error is vincible, whoever acts with such a conscience errs voluntarily. Nor is it licit to act against it when commanding, because one so acting does that which he judges to be prohibited, and therefore sins. Therefore before action that conscience must be laid aside through inquiry into the truth ¹. - St. Lig., no. 4.

¹ These things hold concerning him who here and now in some way adverts to or suspects the necessity of inquiring before he acts. But it can also happen, as Croix warns (book 1, no. 42), that an error indeed was once culpable, which nevertheless at present someone no longer adverts to, for example, if a confessor once did not sufficiently cultivate theology, or from negligence interrupted its study for too long. And concerning this it is most truly said with St. Thomas (On Truth, q. 17, art. 8, objection 8), that he is never excused from sin, whether he acts according to conscience or against it. And the reason is clear, because that old sin is always present, namely culpable ignorance of those things which one is held to know. Nor is this guilt incurred while someone is now about to act; but it is the fault of diligence once omitted, and independent of the present action; therefore its gravity must be taken not from the action now to be posited, but from the common principles concerning sins of ignorance. And from here the true reason also is clear why in the case he who acts against conscience is more guilty than he who acts according to it. For the latter has only the aforesaid guilt of ignorance. But the former, besides this, adds another present guilt of an action posited against conscience. But if someone has retracted the fault of ignorance by suitable penance and by adding diligence, as is fitting, it is clear that he is to be equated with one who labors under invincible ignorance.

38. You Will Resolve. - 1. He who thinks that it is a fast when it is not, on account of erroneous conscience sins against the precept if he does not fast.

2. If someone lies in order to free his neighbor from danger of life, inculpably thinking that from charity he is held to this, he does a good act; and if he does not lie, he sins against charity.

3. He who with some doubt thinks that he must lie or steal in order to assist his neighbor cannot follow such a conscience nor act against it; but he ought, if he can, to inquire, lay it aside, and afterward act; for such an error is vincible.

YOU WILL ASK. By what signs can the Confessor know that error is vincible in the penitent?

I answer. Let him ask 1. whether he adverted to some indecency in this act? 2. whether his conscience dictated to him that at least the Confessor, or another prudent man, should be asked? 3. whether he neglected the occasion of asking from shame ² or fear? If the penitent responds affirmatively to one or the other of these, he can be considered to be in culpable error; otherwise, if he denies all. - See Cases, no. 37.

² Nevertheless certain persons, as experience teaches, are sometimes prevented by shame from asking even about those things which have no guilt.

The usefulness of this title is very great for the direction of souls or the pastoral ministry.

— I. What a right conscience is. We call that conscience right which habitually pronounces truly concerning the honesty or dishonesty of an action, according to those dictates persuades or dissuades the action, and praises or censures actions done according to their merit.

This is conscience fully right, for producing which the intellect concurs with the will. For practical-practical judgments are commanded by the will.

Conscience must be called right in a diminished way when only its speculative-practical judgments are accustomed to agree with truth, so that practical persuasions and consequent affections disagree with speculative views.

II. What tender conscience is. The perfection of a right conscience is its tenderness. For that conscience is called tender or timorous which perceives even slight reasons of honesty or dishonesty, antecedently persuades or dissuades, and consequently approves or reprehends.

— Estimation. A right conscience must be held in the greatest esteem. For formally, as much as truth must be esteemed, so much praise must be attributed to it; and besides, by its judgments already and then by its goads, it is a source of moral goodness.

But as tender, it has an increased price from the quality of subtle wit, and from many good acts which would not affect a less sensitive moral balance. And it adorns man with a certain grace and flowering beauty. Finally that good conscience, whose companion is charity (1 Tim. 1, 5), at the same time strengthens the soul by an ineffable force, pacifies it by an ineffable quiet, and gladdens it by an ineffable sweetness. For, as if the forerunner of the eternal Judge, it foretells those unshaken sentences, avengers of injuries, which compensate present iniquities so that the just man may continue to walk firmly in his ways; and it seems to begin the eternal largess of undisturbed peace and happiness.

— Conditions and acquisition of a right and tender conscience. A right and tender conscience supposes a good quality both of intellect and of will: of intellect, which is suited for perceiving and weighing true reasons; of will, which dares and wills to command according to things perceived. The gifts of each faculty are partly innate, but partly can be acquired by free exercise. To this end the study of truth and sincerity greatly contributes, both exterior and also interior; a use of words alien from every excess; cleanness of heart immune from less ordered affections; preparation of a firm will; flight from every sin from a filial spirit. For delicate services are unknown by servants and hirelings, as such, but are proper to sons.

These pursuits must be fostered not only in ourselves but especially also in those whose care we have: for the most joyful fruit of prudent discipline and instruction is a good conscience. And in this supernatural order, we shall be helped very much by prayer: "Create a clean heart in me, O God, and renew a right spirit within my bowels" Ps. 50, 12.

— The precarious conscience right in a diminished way. Scarcely ever will the imperfect or diminished rectitude of conscience be preserved. For every less good action, just as it has its root in some error of the intellect, so also tends to vitiate or obscure the intellect itself.

Nor does the appetite long tolerate opposition between our actions and moral judgments. Wherefore it will try to apply the intellect to considering and estimating those reasons which lessen or excuse sins for the sinner: i.e., little by little it will pervert the intellect.

15. Definition. True conscience is that which dictates the truth of the thing. It rightly concludes from true principles that something is lawful or unlawful, which in reality is such. Erroneous conscience is that which dictates the false as true, whether it assumes for itself a false principle, or deduces false conclusions from a true principle (I, 3).

True conscience, strictly speaking, is not the same as right conscience, although it is sometimes used promiscuously; for true is said according to what is, but right according to what is apprehended. Namely, TRUE is that which in reality is such in itself; RIGHT is that which is done according to the rules of prudence, in other words, that which truly and really is conformed to right appetite, as St. Thomas says (Eth., VI, 1. 2). Hence right conscience can be predicated, although per accidens, even of him who labors under invincibly erroneous conscience, as will be said below. Cf. Beaudouin, q. 1, § 1.

16. Division. Erroneous conscience is either invincibly or vincibly erroneous.

1. Invincibly erroneous conscience is that whose error morally cannot be overcome or laid aside; because, a) either the thought or doubt of error in no way, not even confusedly, comes into the mind of the one acting, while he places the action or its cause; or because, b) although doubt of error has come into the mind, nevertheless, with moral diligence applied for attaining the truth, the error cannot be driven away.

2. Vincibly erroneous conscience is called that whose error man does not lay aside through neglect. Therefore he operates with vincibly erroneous conscience who a) either already notices the error in some way, or b) at least

doubts about the error, and at the same time notices the obligation of overcoming it, and nevertheless does not inquire into the truth.

But diligence in inquiring into the truth is not required to be the greatest; ordinary and common diligence suffices, such as prudent men of the same condition are accustomed to apply in like circumstances.

Note. Those things which later in the various treatises, on Laws, on Sins, on Censures, etc., will come to be said concerning ignorance will explain the present matter more perfectly. See n. 22.

17. Principles. I. We are always bound to obey a true conscience, whether prescribing or prohibiting. This is clear from the words of the Apostle (Rom. 14:23): But all that is not from faith (that is, from the dictate of conscience) is sin. And from Innocent III (c. Litteras, de restit. spol.): "Whatever is done against conscience builds toward gehenna." The reason is that true conscience is the right application of the law, and a manifestation of the divine will, to which it is always unlawful to resist.

St. Bonaventure very beautifully expresses this office of conscience, saying: "Conscience is like the herald of God and His messenger; and what it says, it does not command from itself, but commands as though from God, as a herald when he publishes the edict of the king" (L. 2 Sentent., dist. 39, a. 1, q. 3).

18. II. We can obey a true conscience permitting or counseling, but we are not bound. For 1. it belongs to a permitting conscience truly and absolutely to dictate that some action is neither prescribed nor prohibited, therefore; 2. but it belongs to a counseling conscience to declare that something is better and of counsel. But this is the nature of counsel, that it indeed brings in the merit of reward in the one carrying it out, but no guilt of fault and penalty in the one omitting it. Hence that saying: "He who passes over counsel does not sin, provided contempt is absent" (St. Thomas, de Verit., q. 17, a. 3 and 4).

19. Nevertheless it must be noted that what the law in general only counsels or permits can in the particular case be prescribed or prohibited by conscience, namely when there are peculiar circumstances which, in a special case and for a determined person, clearly manifest the obliging will of God; as will be clear from the things to be said concerning vocation to the clerical or religious state (cf. n. 1916, q. 3 and n. 2141).

20. The principal means by which the treasure of a true and right conscience is acquired are these: 1. knowledge of the law of the Lord, in which each one can progress by continual study, by reading good books, by consulting the doctors of the Church, and especially by questioning and humbly listening to the Church herself, who is the supreme mistress of consciences. 2. Mortification of vices. This mortification is absolutely necessary, because the practical judgment of reason, on account of the evil inclination of the will, often turns away from the truth. 3. Prayer, or assiduous conversation with the Divine Teacher, who speaks within without the noise of words, and raises up to Himself a docile mind in a point of time so that it grasps more reasons of eternal truth than if it had studied in the schools for ten years (Imit. Chr., l. 3, c. 43).

21. III. It is right to follow an invincibly erroneous conscience permitting; one must follow it when it prescribes or prohibits. The reason for both is that "a human act is judged virtuous or vicious according to the apprehended good, toward which the will is borne of itself, and not according to the material object of the act" (St. Thomas, quodl. 3, a. 27; St. Alphonsus, I, 5).

The first is also clear: 1. From the words of the Lord (John 15:22): If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin. 2. From the saying of St. Augustine (de Lib. arb., l. 3, c. 19, n. 53): "That which you unwillingly do not know is not imputed to you as fault." 3. From the second proposition condemned by Alexander VIII: "Although there be invincible ignorance of the natural law, this does not excuse the one acting from formal sin." So Baius and Jansenius (cf. Viva, on this proposition).

The second is proved: 1. From the doctrine of the Apostle (Rom. 14:22), saying that one who eats meats which he judges it unlawful to eat, as having been sacrificed to idols, truly sins, because he acts against faith, that is, conscience.

2. From reason: the will is borne toward the object not according as it is in itself, but according as it is proposed by reason. Hence St. Thomas says (1.2, q. 19, a. 5): "When erring reason proposes something as a precept of God, then it is the same thing to contemn the dictate of reason and the precept of God."¹ Hence he who acts against an invincibly erroneous conscience (if it obliges) commits sin of the same species as if he acted against a true conscience.

It is useful to note that one acting with invincibly erroneous conscience not only does not sin, but also more probably acquires merit for himself. "The reason is that, in order to call some act good, at least inadequately, it suffices that it be directed by the dictate of reason and prudence. Therefore, since the one acting acts prudently, without doubt he ought to merit on account of the good end by which he is led in acting, namely the end of the glory of God or of charity toward neighbor, etc.; just as, on the contrary, he would demerit who does a good work, but apprehended as evil, on account of the evil end by which he carries out that work" (I, 6). So the doctors very commonly with St. Bernard, "who teaches that a subject obeying a prelate from a right intention acts meritoriously, although materially he errs against the law" (de Praec. et disp., c. 14, n. 21). Cf. I, 7 and 173, 174.

22. IV. No one can follow a vincibly erroneous conscience permitting, nor contemn one prescribing or prohibiting; but each one is bound to lay it aside. For 1. By operating according to a permitting conscience of this kind, a man sins, because he does what in reality is evil in itself; nor does ignorance excuse him from fault, since, as vincible, it makes his act voluntary in its cause (cf. n. 288). Thus a judge who already notices that he does not sufficiently know a case debated in court cannot cast his vote for either side; but he is bound to acquire for himself a more perfect knowledge of the matter, so that he may thus be able to render a just sentence; otherwise he would rashly commit himself to the danger of erring, and accordingly would stain himself with sin. 2. By operating against an obliging conscience of this kind, he likewise sins, because he chooses what he judges to be evil. Thus, he who erroneously judges that he must lie or steal in order to help his neighbor, and at the same time notices the obligation of further inquiring into the truth, cannot follow such a conscience, nor act against it (I, 4).

Yet in order that one sin by acting against erroneous conscience, his action must be free. Hence the ignorant man does not sin, even if he believes himself to sin, when, being unable, he omits to hear Mass on a feast day; when he suffers involuntary distractions in prayer, or nocturnal pollutions in sleep.

Note. That the confessor may more easily judge whether the conscience of a penitent was vincibly or invincibly erroneous, let him ask him: a) whether he truly doubted concerning the lawfulness of the act, b) whether he attended to the obligation of searching into the matter further? If he answers affirmatively, we have one laboring under a vincibly erroneous conscience. Nevertheless the responses of a scrupulous person must be weighed according to the things soon to be said. Cf. n. 319, 337.

23. To vincibly erroneous conscience can be reduced: 1. lax conscience, which loosens obligations too much; 2. scrupulous conscience, which increases them too much; 3. perplexed conscience, which apprehends sin in both terms of a contradiction.

We shall treat of each only briefly here, because practical rules will be set forth at length below in the treatise on Penance.

29. Notion. A perplexed conscience is that by which someone, placed between two precepts, believes that he sins whichever part he chooses. He labors under this conscience who, for example, assisting a sick person, thinks that he will sin equally, whether, on a feast day, he omits Mass, or whether he departs from the infirm person.

Rules to be observed by the perplexed (I, 10; H. Ap., I, 7):

I. If the perplexed person can defer the action without grave harm, he is held to defer it until he has consulted the wise (for example a confessor); because each one must avoid that by which he thinks God is offended.

II. If (as usually happens) he cannot defer the action, he is held to choose that which seems to him the lesser evil, avoiding rather the transgression of natural law than of human or positive divine law; for the law of an inferior order must yield to the law of a superior order.

III. If he cannot discern the lesser evil, whichever part he chooses, he does not sin; because there is lacking in him the liberty necessary for formal sin, and because he himself is in invincible ignorance (cf. n. 216).

Conscience is customarily divided in many ways:

304. 1. By reason of the act: into antecedent and consequent. Antecedent conscience judges concerning an act to be done; but consequent conscience judges concerning an act already perpetrated. Consequent conscience either approves the act perpetrated, and then causes spiritual joy and satisfaction;²¹ or it reproves this act, and then causes sorrow, which is customarily called remorse or the worm of conscience.²² Now we shall not speak of consequent conscience, but only of antecedent conscience, which is the subjective rule of acts to be posited, which it either a) commands, or b) prohibits, or c) counsels, or d) permits.

2. By reason of conformity with the eternal law: into true and erroneous. True or right conscience²³ is that which from true principles dictates that some particular act is licit or illicit. Erroneous or false conscience is that which from false principles, nevertheless reputed true, dictates that something is licit or illicit which in reality is not such. - Since ignorance is the cause of erroneous conscience, in moral theology we speak in almost the same way about erroneous conscience as about ignorance. And therefore we also distinguish conscience that is vincibly and invincibly erroneous, conscience that is culpably and inculpably erroneous.

Erroneous conscience is customarily subdivided into scrupulous, perplexed, lax, cauterized, Pharisaic. Speech will return below concerning each of these. Meanwhile let it be noted briefly: Scrupulous conscience is that which from futile and altogether contemptible reasons judges or fears that some action is evil which in reality is not such. - Perplexed conscience is that which apprehends sin on both sides, whether the action is omitted or committed. - Lax conscience is called that which from a slighter reason judges either that no sin at all is present, or that there is not as much sin as in reality there is. The higher, that is, worse, degree of that lax conscience is cauterized conscience (cauterizata, abgestumpftes Gewissen), which from a long-standing habit of sinning makes little of all or of certain grave sins. - Pharisaic conscience is that which makes little of great sins, but on the contrary makes much of certain matters of lesser moment according to that word of the Gospel: "straining out a gnat, but swallowing a camel."²⁴

3. By reason of assent: into certain, probable, and doubtful. Certain conscience is that which without prudent fear of erring firmly judges some act to be good or evil and therefore to be done or omitted. - Probable conscience is that which dictates some act to be probably licit or illicit, but with fear of the opposite part. Probable conscience therefore coincides with opinion. - Doubtful conscience accepted in the strict sense is the suspension of the intellect assenting to neither part of a contradiction.²⁵ Modern authors are not accustomed to distinguish between doubtful and probable conscience, but take each indifferently for a dictate of practical reason with fear of erring.

Note. Doubtful conscience, if doubt is taken for the suspension of any judgment, is in reality a contradiction in the adjective. For conscience is a dictate or judgment; but doubt is a suspension or negation of judgment. Therefore it would be much better if now no one spoke of doubtful conscience, but only of a moral doubt to be solved.

4. By reason of the obligation which it manifests: into commanding, prohibiting, permitting, and counseling, according as it commands, prohibits, permits, or counsels an act to be done.

²¹ St. Augustine beautifully says: "The joy of a good conscience is paradise" (De Genesi ad lit. l. 12, c. 34 [Migne, Patr. lat. 34, 482]). And (Pseudo-) St. Bernard says: "Nothing is more pleasant, nothing sweeter, nothing safer, nothing richer than a good conscience. Let the body press, let the world drag, let the devil terrify, and it will be secure" (De interiore domo c. 11 [Migne, Patr. lat. 184, 517]).

²² The punishments of an evil conscience are vividly described not only by the Holy Fathers, for example, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Augustine (see Migne, Patr. lat. 220, 351 sqq.), but also by several profane poets, for example, Horace, Juvenal, Goethe (Faust); cf. above n. 152.

²³ Certain authors subtly distinguish true conscience, which agrees with objective truth, from right conscience, which agrees with right appetite and therefore includes even invincibly erroneous conscience; but such a distinction is rather superfluous and today is customarily abandoned. Cf. Billuart, De conscientia a. 1.

²⁴ Matt. 23, 24.

²⁵ Cf. Billuart, De consc. n. 1.

305. Scholion. On the difference between certain and true conscience. From what has been said it is clear that certain conscience differs from true conscience; for the former excludes fear of erring, but by no means always corresponds to objective truth. Thus, for example, Jacob consummated marriage with Leah, having a certain conscience that Leah was his true wife; yet this was objectively false. - The latter brings with it, besides certitude, also objective truth; for example, if someone judges that lying is never licit and therefore refuses to tell a lie.

After it has been said concerning the notion and division of conscience, it is now necessary to treat the individual parts one by one, namely: 1. concerning true and erroneous conscience; 2. concerning lax conscience; 3. concerning perplexed and scrupulous conscience; 4. concerning certain and doubtful conscience; 5. concerning probable conscience, where the diverse moral systems will be treated.

⁵⁰

⁵⁰ In the German language it is called: Das verwirrte Gewissen.

317. Notion. Perplexed conscience is that which fears sin on both sides, whether it does the act or omits it. For example, some fearful person, on whom the care of some sick person lies, thinks that he commits sin if on a feast day he does not assist at Mass; but on the other side he fears lest he gravely injure charity if he leaves the sick person alone at home and assists at Mass; or another example, which can happen rather often: a confessor fears to absolve a penitent, either because he is doubtfully disposed, or because he probably committed a reserved sin; but on the other side he fears lest the penitent, dismissed without absolution, will now neglect receiving the sacraments. - Therefore a man with a perplexed conscience is like a navigator between Scylla and Charybdis.

318. Rules to be observed. 1. If he who labors under a perplexed conscience can suspend the action and meanwhile consult wise men or books, he is certainly bound to this. The reason is that according to the first principle brought above concerning true conscience to be sought, each person is bound to apply serious solicitude toward having a right conscience and toward acting according to laws truly existing.

2. If the perplexed person is able neither to consult wise men or books nor to defer the action, as is accustomed to happen in the example brought above concerning the confessor, then he ought to choose that which seems less evil to him, having before his eyes that the stronger law prevails over the lesser law. Thus divine law prevails over human law.

3. If the perplexed person neither can consult wise men or books nor is able to discern which law in such a conflict is stronger, he is able freely to choose either part; for no one is bound to the impossible and no one necessarily sins. Nevertheless, if this perplexity has arisen from preceding fault, as for example if a confessor is not able to solve rightly some practical case because he previously neglected the study of moral Theology, then all those things hold which were said above concerning vincible and culpable ignorance.⁵¹

4. If perplexed conscience is at the same time joined with scrupulous conscience, as often happens, then the rules soon to be given concerning the scrupulous are to be applied.

⁵¹ Cf. n. 46.

33. Definition. - True conscience is that which from true principles rightly concludes that something is lawful or unlawful, which truly is such; as if someone from this true principle: it is not lawful to obey parents commanding sin, should infer: therefore it is unlawful for me to perpetrate this theft which they command me. - True conscience, strictly speaking, is not the same as right conscience, although sometimes they are used promiscuously; for true is said according to what is, but right according to what is apprehended. Namely, true is that which really in itself is such; but right is that which is done according to the rules of prudence. Hence right conscience can be predicated even of him who labors under an invincibly false conscience; for he acts prudently, since he acts from an intimate and insuperable persuasion. You have an example in him who, from invincible error, thinks that it is not a fast day when it truly is. His conscience is not indeed true, but nevertheless is right.

34. - False (or erroneous) conscience is that which dictates as true and lawful that which nevertheless in itself is false and unlawful.

A twofold false conscience is distinguished: invincible and vincible. Invincible is that which morally cannot be overcome, since no thought or doubt of error, not even in the confused, comes into the mind of the one acting while he places the action or its cause. But vincible is that which the one acting can and ought to overcome, because a) he has already noticed the error, or at least doubts about it, and b) at the same time notices the obligation of overcoming it; nevertheless c) he neglects to overcome it. Thus conscience is invincibly erroneous in him who, not even confusedly noticing that it is a fast day, eats meat; but vincibly erroneous in the same person if, suspecting that it is a fast day, he notices the obligation of inquiring about the matter, and nevertheless neglects to inquire.

35. Principles. - I. True conscience, commanding, must always be followed. For conscience is the herald of law, or of God, in the case truly commanding; therefore he who refuses to obey true conscience refuses to obey God Himself.

II. Invincibly erroneous conscience, whether commanding or prohibiting, must likewise be followed in every case. It is proved: a) From Sacred Scripture: Everything that is not from faith (according to the dictate of conscience) is sin.¹

b) From reason. For the object of the will is good and evil, not in whatever way, but formally insofar as it is in the apprehension of the intellect; whence, when the intellect apprehends something as a moral good that is necessary and commanded, although in reality it is not good nor commanded, indeed is evil and prohibited, the will, by rejecting it, consents to a transgression of law. Again, if the intellect apprehends something and proposes it to the will as morally evil and prohibited, although in reality it is not evil nor prohibited, indeed is good or permitted and even commanded, the will, by embracing it, consents to an evil and prohibited object, and therefore sins. Thus he who thinks that there is a fast when there is not, on account of erroneous conscience sins against the precept if he does not fast.

III. Invincibly erroneous conscience permitting exempts from every sin, because there can be no sin where no malice is apprehended. Thus he does not sin who lies in order to free his neighbor from danger of life, invincibly thinking that this is lawful for him in the case.

IV. It is not permitted to follow a vincibly erroneous conscience, whether permitting or commanding, because, since by hypothesis the error is vincible, whoever acts with such a conscience errs voluntarily. Nor is it permitted to act against it when it is commanding or prohibiting, because by acting thus he does that which he judges prohibited, and therefore sins.

Therefore before the action that conscience must be laid aside through inquiry into the truth. Thus he who with some doubt thinks that he must lie or steal in order to assist his neighbor cannot follow such a conscience nor act against it; but he must, if he can, inquire, lay it aside, and afterwards act; for such error is vincible.

Nevertheless, one acting against a vincibly erroneous conscience does not incur penalties latae sententiae against transgressors of that law against which by error he thinks that he is acting; because penalties are inflicted on transgressors of the law truly, not putatively. Thus, for example, he who strikes a layman, thinking him to be a cleric, does not incur excommunication.

36. Practical admonitions. A) A confessor will be able more easily to judge that the conscience of his penitent was invincibly erroneous:

1° If the thing ignored is not concerning the first moral principles, or concerning conclusions proximately connected with them; for these are inscribed by nature itself in the hearts of all. Hence, if someone admits that in his past life he perpetrated openly dishonorable things, but did not have them as sins, do not easily believe him, unless the matter is of a sin committed by a child or an uneducated person, or with some circumstance apparently making it honorable, and not prolonged for a longer time.

2° If it is not concerning the obligations of one's own state; for this ignorance is ordinarily culpable in its cause. Hence St. Thomas teaches that a judge who errs in passing sentence is not excused on the ground that he is ignorant of laws which, by reason of his office, he was bound to have learned.¹ - But by length of time vincible ignorance can become invincible. For just as it happens that you forget those things which you once learned, so a fortiori it happens that the memory of your ignorance entirely slips away from you; in which case, indeed, new errors and errors of good faith will not be culpable in themselves, but in the cause, or as effects of culpable ignorance, so long as the cause itself has not been retracted, at least indirectly, through penance.

3° If the penitent is sufficiently diligent and accurate in fulfilling those things which are wont to be performed by others of the same condition; or, if noticing that through ignorance he has violated a precept, he grieves and is saddened; for through these things his good faith is rightly presumed.

B) Erroneous conscience can in no way bind unless the matter is placed in the free choice of man. Hence they do not sin who unwillingly are agitated either by obscene imaginations, or by blasphemous and heretical thoughts, although they falsely believe that they are either giving consent to these things, or even by error judge it a great fault to be touched by thoughts so horrible.

C) Great prudence is required in the theologian, preacher, confessor, instructor of boys, nurses, parents, in a word in all those who must direct others, lest by exaggerating erroneous conscience they induce it in them. Yet do not understand this in such a way as if, when preaching, it were not permitted to you with more vehement speech to censure certain things which, although they are not in themselves mortal, are exceedingly dangerous. See St. Alph. L. III. n. 55. § cum ego munus, etc.

37. - Perplexed conscience is called that by which someone thinks that he sins whichever of two incompatible precepts he neglects. Such would be the conscience, for example, in him who, assisting a sick person, thinks that he would sin both if he should leave the sick person in order to be present at Mass, and if, conversely, he should omit Mass in order to remain at home in the care of the sick person.

He who labors under a perplexed conscience, if he can suspend the action without grave harm, is bound to suspend it until he has consulted experts; for each person must avoid that by which he thinks God is offended. But if he cannot suspend his action, as ordinarily happens, he is bound to choose the lesser evil; for the will cannot tend into that which appears the greater evil, because thus it would freely choose this excess of malice. But if he cannot discern which is the lesser evil, then whichever part he chooses, he does not sin; because he is indeed free physically by reason of the act, but he is not free morally by reason of sin; for there can be no sin in that which in no way can be guarded against.

St. Thomas, I, q. 79, a. 13; De Veritate, q. 17, a. 1, 2, 3; II Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 4.

199. Notions. - Conscience (syneidesis), from the word conscire, that is, to know together, is etymologically as it were knowledge with another, and therefore sometimes signifies knowledge had with others or the common knowledge of several persons (Cicero, Or. 1 in Catil., 1; Tacitus, Agr. 2); more commonly, however, it signifies the knowledge of one person kept within himself but considered and applied to something else, whence properly it imports an order of knowledge to something, and is an act by which we apply knowledge to a particular fact.

This can be done in two ways:

1. by applying knowledge to considering that something is or has been, and this is merely psychological conscience, by which we know that we are doing something, or recognize that we have done or have not done something: this is said to testify and includes intimate sense and memory (Gen. XLIII, 22; Rom. IX, 1; Eccl. VII, 23; II Cor. IV, 2; V, 11);

2. it can also be done by applying knowledge to considering whether something is done or has been done rightly or not, and this is moral conscience, which is a judgment concerning good and evil acts and the application of moral knowledge to our human works. This again is twofold; for moral knowledge can be applied:

a) to examining something which has been done and to judging whether it has been done well or not, and this is consequent conscience, which is said to excuse, or to accuse or gnaw (Heb. IX, 14; Rom. II, 15; Tit. I, 15; II Tim. I, 3; II Cor. I, 12; Is. LXVI, 24 and Mk. IX, 48 [the original misprints IX, 40]: namely, the worm of conscience does not die);

b) to directing something which can still be done, and judging that it is good and to be done, or evil and not to be done, and this is antecedent conscience, which is said to instigate, induce, bind, urge, or impede (Rom. XIII, 5). This is a judgment concerning the morality of an act in the individual, to be placed here and now, and the application of moral knowledge to a determined act. And it is moral conscience in the strict sense, because it alone is the rule of human acts, and concerning it we speak in the present treatise.

Improperly, however, conscience is taken either a) for its object, or the thing known together, that is, for that which is in our conscience (I Tim. I, 5), as when someone says: I will tell you my conscience; to examine conscience, or that it is stained or cleansed; or b) for its causes: both for the habit by which we are rendered capable of judging good and evil, and for the habitual disposition by which we are inclined to judge in such or such a way concerning the honesty of an action; and for knowledge of the law or universal judgment concerning the morality of acts in general without applying it to a determined act; and thus we say that a child at seven years has conscience of good and evil.

200. Antecedent conscience is a judgment.

But not every antecedent judgment is conscience. For there is had:

1. a merely speculative judgment concerning the truth alone of a thing, without respect to operation, for example, whether Peter possesses money;

2. a speculative-practical judgment, that is, speculative concerning practice, concerning the morality of our acts in general and in the abstract, insofar as they are considered according to themselves and without order to a subject here and now active. In other words, it is a judgment concerning objective and material honesty, which is twofold; for man:

a) either makes altogether universal moral judgments by which he assents to the first practical principles, for example, good is to be done, evil is to be avoided; injury is to be done to no one; what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another; the Supreme Good is to be loved, etc.; in these the intellect does not err, because it naturally possesses for perceiving and enunciating them the habit, or facility, which is called synderesis;

1. It is called synderesis (synteresis = conservation, namely, of the first moral principles), which therefore is called the spark of conscience and a little fire derived from the divine light.

b) or he makes less universal judgments, by which he assents to general conclusions deduced immediately or mediately from the first principles, for example, theft is to be avoided, fornication is illicit, etc.; in these the intellect can sometimes err, although it can acquire for them the habit which is called moral science;

3. a practical-practical judgment concerning the morality of an act in the particular and in the concrete, to be placed here and now by the acting subject, by which we apply the first universal principles or moral science to a particular case in particular conclusions, for example: now to take this sum from Peter without his knowledge and without reason is theft to be avoided. This is the particular judgment of conscience, which is immediately ordered to operation and is concerned with subjective and formal honesty, and is proximately practical in relation to the universal judgments of synderesis and moral science, which are remotely practical; hence by some it is called the last practical judgment, namely, not simply, but among those three judgments which concern honesty;

4. the ultimately practical judgment, or the discretive judgment of election, not concerning morality but concerning the fittingness of the act, namely, concerning that which here and now is to be chosen and is fitting to do, whether it is good or evil: this follows conscience, by which it ought to be directed, but often is contrary to it, for example, I will seize Peter's money, although conscience dictates that it is prohibited.

201. Conscience is defined: the dictate or judgment of the practical intellect affirming that an act in the particular is licit or illicit, and therefore is to be placed (or can be placed) or is to be omitted by us. In this definition there is indicated:

1. the genus to which conscience pertains, namely, dictate or judgment, and thus it is distinguished from reason, which is a power; from synderesis, which is the habit of the first practical principles by which we are capable of having conscience; from moral science, which is acquired habitual knowledge concerning the morality of acts in general; from prudence, which is the virtue inclining one rightly to estimate all the circumstances of the concrete act, and rightly to judge concerning its morality, or to have a right conscience, and to command what it dictates: for conscience is not a habit but an act, and therefore it is easily reformed and laid aside; but if it is said to remain, this must not be understood as though it remains in itself, but in its causes, which are reason and synderesis, or even the other things mentioned above;

2. the subject in which it resides: a) the intellect: for judgment is not in the will, but precedes it so that it may will the good and flee the evil; but if conscience is called good or bad, it is not such formally in itself (as though it were the subject of goodness), but regulatively and from the effect, insofar as it directs good or evil works;

b) the practical intellect: for it does not stop in the contemplation of truth but directs toward executing a work, and thus it is distinguished from merely speculative judgments and from psychological conscience;

3. the specific object: a) affirming an act in the particular, that is, in the concrete, regarded with its end and circumstances, as it can be placed here and now; and thus it is distinguished from the speculative-practical judgments of moral science;

b) that it is licit or illicit, and thus it differs from other practical judgments which treat of utility, fittingness, facility, etc., among others from the last practical judgment;

c) and therefore that it is here and now to be placed or omitted: for it judges concerning an act to be placed, not concerning an act already placed, and thus it is distinguished from consequent conscience;

d) by us: for conscience regards only one's own acts and not those of others (Rom. XIV, 4; I Cor. IV, 4, 5).

202. Conscience is the conclusion of a practical ratiocination; whose major is from synderesis, for example, evil must be fled; the minor from reason: now to have intercourse with such a married woman is evil; conscience infers the conclusion: therefore for me, here and now, intercourse with her is illicit.

1. More recent authors are accustomed to say that the major of the syllogism from which conscience arises is a principle of right, understanding also a principle deduced from the first and most universal principles of morals; indeed, some even say that the major is always a principle, not indeed of synderesis, but of moral science, and that the minor only enunciates the fact to which the principle is applied. On the contrary, St. Thomas manifestly and constantly teaches that the major is the most universal principle of synderesis in which error cannot exist; but if conscience is called the application of science to a particular case, this must be understood of the minor of the syllogism, which is affirmed by reason, and to the enunciation of which both moral science and the right estimation of particular circumstances concur. Cf. Q. D. De Veritate 17, a. 2; and in II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 4.

But just as in speculative ratiocinations there can be a false conclusion, so also in conscience, either a) on the part of the form, because it is badly deduced from true principles which are not rightly applied, for example: God must be obeyed; but God commands that one in need must be aided; therefore here and now I must aid such a neighbor; or b) on the part of the matter, because it is deduced from a false principle, for example: what is not prohibited is not evil; but intercourse with such an unmarried woman is not prohibited; therefore it is not evil. For although falsity cannot be present in the major, because synderesis does not err concerning first principles, nevertheless reason can err in the minor concerning particular principles.

1. Yet not every conscience can be false, because falsity cannot always be present in the minor; namely, when there is question of immediate conclusions which are assumed directly from the first principles, and in the minor there is only a particular enunciation of that which is contained universally in the major. Thus: Injury is to be done to no man; Peter is a man; therefore injury is not to be done to Peter. Or: The Supreme Good is to be loved; therefore God is to be loved by me. Let St. Thomas be heard, De Ver. q. 17, a. 2: "Nevertheless it must be known that in some things conscience can never err, namely, when that particular act to which conscience is applied has of itself a universal judgment in synderesis. For just as in speculative matters it does not happen that one errs about particular conclusions which are assumed directly under universal principles in the same terms, as in this: This whole is greater than its part, no one is deceived, just as neither in this: Every whole is greater than its part; so in this: God is not to be loved by me, or some evil is to be done, no one can err; because in both judgments, both of speculative things and of operable things, the major is per se known, as existing in a universal principle, and the minor also, by which the same is predicated particularly, as when it is said: Every whole is greater than its part, this is a certain whole, therefore greater than its part."

203. Principle. Conscience is the proximate and subjective rule of human acts, obligating not per se and by force of itself, but by force of the divine precept, because it applies the objective and remote rule, or law, to the particular case in order to the operation of the subject. Thus, if the precept of an emperor did not reach the citizens except by means of a legate, the precept of the legate would not obligate except because it promulgated the precept of the emperor (q. 19, a. 5, ad 2; II Sent., d. 39, q. 3, a. 3, ad 3). Hence conscience is an intimation and as it were promulgation of the law with respect to the act to be placed here and now.

St. Bonaventure says, II Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 3: "Conscience is like God's herald and messenger; and what it says, it does not command from itself, but commands as from God, just as a herald, when he publishes the edict of a king; and hence it is that conscience has the force of binding." - St. Thomas uses another comparison, Q. D. De Ver. 17, a. 3, namely, of a physical bond, by which we are not bound except through contact or application to the body; whence the moral bond or law does not bind except through the application of the law, which happens through knowledge of the precept and conscience: "The command of someone governing stands in relation to binding in voluntary matters according to that mode of binding which can occur to the will (namely, the necessity of moral obligation), as bodily action stands in relation to binding bodily things by the necessity of coercion. But the bodily action of an agent never induces necessity in another thing except through the contact of the action itself with the thing upon which it acts. Whence neither is someone bound by the command of some king or lord unless the command reaches the one to whom it is commanded. But it reaches him through knowledge. Whence no one is bound by any precept except by means of knowledge of that precept... Just as in bodily things a bodily agent does not act except through contact, so in spiritual things a precept does not bind except through knowledge. And therefore, just as it is the same power by which touch acts and by which the power of the agent acts, since touch does not act except from the power of the agent, and the power of the agent not except by means of touch; so it is the same power by which the precept binds and by which conscience binds, since the precept does not bind except through the power of knowledge, nor knowledge except through the power of the precept. Whence, since conscience is nothing other than the application of knowledge to an act, it is established that conscience is said to bind by force of the divine precept."

From this it follows that conscience obligates more than the precept of a human superior: "Conscience does not bind except by force of the divine precept... Whence, since the divine precept obligates against the precept of a prelate, and obligates more than the precept of a prelate, the bond of conscience will be greater than the bond of the precept of a prelate, and conscience will bind, though the precept of the prelate stands to the contrary" (ibid., a. 5).

But just as law, so conscience, by reason of the mode by which it binds or of obligation, is obligating (or prescribing), whether negatively prohibiting or positively commanding; and non-obligating (or non-prescribing), which is permitting and counseling.

204. Observation. - Antecedent conscience alone, because it alone influences the act, is the rule of the act, but not consequent conscience, which supposes the act. Hence to the uninstructed, who think the contrary, it should be said that concerning the goodness or malice of a past act one must judge not according to the knowledge which they now have, but according to that which they had before the act.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 3, 5, 6; De Veritate, q. 17, a. 2, 3, 4; II Sent., d. 39, q. 3, a. 3; Quodlibet III, 26, 27.

206. Notions. - Conscience must be right. Now by reason of the object, or of conformity with the law, conscience is distinguished as twofold: true and erroneous, according as it dictates the truth of the thing or falsity. True conscience, namely, is that which from true principles dictates that something in particular is licit or illicit which really is such, namely, which is truly good or evil. Erroneous conscience is that which from false principles, nevertheless reputed true, dictates that something in particular is licit or illicit which really is not such, for example, that what in itself is good or indifferent is evil, or that what in itself is evil is good. It is erroneously vincible if it can be conquered by moral diligence, but voluntarily is not conquered, whether directly by design, or indirectly from negligence; invincibly, if it cannot be conquered by moral diligence, either because someone has in no way, not even confusedly, thought about the truth to be inquired into, or because, sincerely inquiring into the truth, he has not arrived at it. But if conscience errs from an error which before was vincible, but now is invincible, although the preceding error was a sin and so much graver as the greater evils foreseen as to follow from it were greater, nevertheless the actual judgment of conscience itself is truly invincible.

Now it is asked whether both consciences, true and erroneous, are a rule of acting and in some way sufficiently right. To solve this question, many have distinguished negative conformity and positive conformity with conscience, saying that every conscience always obligates lest we act against it, but that not every conscience, namely erroneous conscience, always obligates us to act according to it: negatively, namely, it is licit to act against no conscience, but it is not always required that we act positively according to it. But that distinction is generally useless: for one who does not act according to a conscience commanding and prohibiting, but does not do what it commands or does not avoid what it prohibits, by that very fact also acts against conscience, because he does what it prohibits or omits what it commands. Hence by equal reason, in the mode of one response, we shall answer both at the same time.

207. Principle I. True conscience is per se the rule of acting, so that if it is commanding or prohibiting, we are bound to conform ourselves to it both negatively, by not acting against it, and positively, by acting according to it.

It is said: a) per se, that is, from its nature, because it faithfully exhibits the law as it is in itself, whence it binds absolutely and in every event, and therefore an act conformed to it is per se good;

b) if it is commanding or prohibiting: for if it counsels or permits, to act against it is not illicit, because we are not bound to do or omit what is commanded or prohibited by no law; for conscience counseling binds us not to contemn it, not that we fulfill it. But we can always act according to a true conscience; indeed we also have the right so to act.

Right conscience, which some prefer to call true, is that which represents the object as it is in itself; otherwise it must be called erroneous, and indeed it is called invincibly or vincibly erroneous, according as ignorance or error is inculpable or culpable.

Right conscience, if it commands, must always be followed, because conscience is the proximate rule of the will, derived from the first and supreme rule of all human actions; but if it permits, it altogether exempts from every sin, because there can be no sin there where it is known that no objective malice is present. But erroneous conscience, if it is such vincibly, must not be followed, whether it commands or permits, because vincible error is considered voluntary, and is imputable as demerit; but if it is invincibly erroneous, then the same must be said of it as of right conscience, because subjectively it is compared to it. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 3 and 5.

You Will Resolve. 1st. He who thinks it is a fast when it is not, because of erroneous conscience sins against the precept which he supposes, if he does not fast.

2nd. If someone lies in order to free his neighbor from danger of life, thinking inculpably that from charity he is bound to this, he performs a good act; and if he does not lie, he sins against charity.

3rd. He who, with some doubt, thinks that he must lie or steal in order to aid his neighbor, cannot follow such a conscience, nor act against it; but he must, if he can, inquire, lay it aside, and afterwards act; for such error is vincible.

4th. He who acts from a vincibly erroneous conscience is never immune from sin. For his very ignorance is voluntary and culpable; and this is always present, whether he acts according to conscience or against conscience, and it was committed when he omitted due diligence for knowing the things necessary to be known. Such a man, if when about to act he does not advert here and now to his error and acts against conscience, is stained with a twofold guilt, the former sin in its cause and the present actual fault contracted when he violates the dictate of conscience; but if the same man acts according to conscience here and now, as is evident, he does not sin, because he does not advert to his error, but nevertheless the former guilt of sin in its cause remains. But if when about to act he adverts in some way to his ignorance, he is surely bound to inquire and to obtain due knowledge. Moreover, if he retracts the fault of that ignorance by true penitence and applies a sufficient effort to driving away the ignorance, even if perhaps it remains, it will no longer be held culpable. Cf. Baller., Op. Mor., vol. 1, tr. 2, n. 32 sqq.

Question. By what signs can the confessor know that error is vincible in a penitent?

Response. Let him ask, 1st, whether he adverted to some indecency in this act; 2nd, whether his conscience dictated to him that at least the confessor or another prudent man should be asked; 3rd, whether from shame or fear he neglected an occasion of asking. If the penitent answers affirmatively to one or another of these, he can be judged to be living in culpable error; otherwise, if he denies all of them. And generally, if there is question of first principles and obligations of state, vincible ignorance ought to be presumed; but invincible ignorance if the penitent is diligent in those things which the pious are accustomed to observe, or grieves when he adverts to the error, which grief is rather a sign that no present fault is present, not that there was none past in the cause. Cf. Baller. tr. 11, n. 43.

I say 1° : Conscience, quasi cum alio scientia [knowledge-with-another], or the conjunction and application of knowledge to some particular fact ¹ , can be defined: « The judgment or dictate of the practical intellect dictating from common principles that something in particular here and now is to be shunned as evil, or done as good; » or, as commonly said, « dictating concerning the goodness or malice of those things which are to be done by us here and now. » Conscience therefore is the conclusion of the practical syllogism. Thus, e.g., synderesis says: « Evil is to be shunned. » Reason subsumes: « Yet adultery is evil. » And conscience concludes in the particular: « Therefore adultery is to be shunned by me here and now. » ¹ Ia p., q. 79, a. 13, c.; hic q. 19, a. 5, c.; q. 17 de Veritate, a. 1, c.

The definition is explained. It is called judgment or dictate, because conscience is an act, not a power or habit; for a power cannot be laid aside, and a habit is hard to move, but conscience can be laid aside and easily changed. It is called judgment or dictate of the intellect, because conscience pertains to the intellect, not to the will, as appears from the very etymology of the name; for conscience, as I said, is cum alio scientia. It is called judgment of the practical intellect, because the intellect, as while occupied by moral science with general conclusions concerning the goodness or malice of human actions, is called speculative-practical; so while occupied through conscience with particular conclusions concerning the goodness or malice of this act to be placed or shunned here and now, is called practice-practical.

It is called judgment, not imperium, which is expressed in words of the imperative mood: « Do this; » because an imperium of this kind supposes conscience, and is often disconformable to it, as when conscience dictates that something be shunned as evil, and man, reason commanding and conscience remorseful, does it.

It is called dictating something in particular to be done or shunned ² ; because although conscience be also of past things by testifying, approving, reproving, remorsing — of which Apostle, II Cor., I, 12 : This is our glory, the testimony of our conscience; and Isa., LXVI, 24, concerning the conscience of the damned: Their worm shall not die — therefore conscience in all its breadth ought to have been defined, « dictating something to be, to be about to be, or to have been done or shunned. » Because however we treat here of conscience as rule of things to be done, therefore we define under the limitation placed. ² Ia p., q. 79, a. 13, c.; q. 17 de Veritate, a. 1, c.

[ Conscience differs from Synderesis, which is not a practice-practical judgment concerning things to be done here and now, but « the habitus of operable principles, » which habitus also pertains to the intellect. The Angelic Doctor thus determines the nature of synderesis, Ia p., q. 79, a. 12, c. : « Synderesis is not a power, but a habitus: although certain ones placed synderesis as a certain power higher than reason, others indeed said it is reason itself, not as it is reason, but as nature. For the evidence of this it must be considered that man's ratiocination, since it is a certain motion, proceeds from the understanding of certain things, namely naturally known without investigation of reason, as from a certain immobile principle, and terminates at understanding also, inasmuch as we judge through principles per se naturally known concerning the things found out by ratiocinating. But it stands established that, as speculative reason ratiocinates about speculative things, so practical reason ratiocinates about operable things. There must therefore be naturally indited in us, as principles of speculative things, so also principles of operables. But first, the principles of speculative things naturally indited in us do not pertain to any special power, but to a certain special habitus, which is called the understanding of principles, as appears in VI Ethic., c. 6. Whence also the principles of operables naturally indited in us pertain not to a special power, but to a special natural habitus, which we call synderesis. Whence synderesis is said 'to instigate toward good and murmur about evil,' inasmuch as we proceed through first principles to find out, and judge what is found. It appears therefore that synderesis is not a power, but a natural habitus. »

Synderesis therefore is habitus, but conscience act.

Through synderesis the intellect possesses general principles whose light we can judge of the morality of actions, and conscience is an act of the intellect commanded by the will whereby we apply moral principles to judging of the morality of our actions in the singular.

Sometimes however synderesis is named conscience, but improperly, because habitus is taken for the act of which it is principle. Which our Doctor marks ibidem, a. 13, c. : « Properly speaking, conscience names an act. But since habitus is the principle of act, sometimes the name of conscience is attributed to the first natural habitus, namely synderesis, as Jerome, in glossa Ezech. I, calls synderesis conscience, and Basil, natural judgment, and Damascene says that it is the light of our intellect. For it is customary that causes and effects be mutually named. » ]

I say 2° : Conscience is divided commonly into true and false or erroneous, uncertain and probable or opinionative, and doubtful; into perplexed, scrupulous and lax; because reason judges in just so many ways from common principles of the licitness or illicitness of a particular action, as will appear from the enumeration and explanation of each.

True conscience is that which from true principles dictates something in particular to be licit or illicit which is really such.

False or erroneous conscience is that which from false principles, nevertheless reputed true, dictates something to be licit or illicit which is not really such. And it is twofold, vincibly and invincibly erroneous, like ignorance itself.

Certain conscience is that which formally and in itself, and in all the principles from which it is immediately formed, is such as to exclude every reasonable fear of the opposite.

Probable or opinionative conscience is that which from merely probable principles dictates something to be licit or illicit, with fear of the opposite part.

Doubtful conscience is the suspension of the intellect assenting to neither part of a contradiction, either because of contrary reasons equally probable, and it is called doubtful positively; or because it has no reasons pro or contra, and is called doubtful negatively. It would better be called un-knowing or ignorant. For one asking whether the sands of the sea are equal, one would better answer: « I know not, » than: « I doubt; » because if asked further why I doubt, I should have nothing to answer. Conscience doubtful in either way does not seem conscience properly and strictly so called, because it is not a definite judgment, such as conscience ought to be.

[ Perplexed conscience is that whereby someone, constituted amid two precepts, believes he sins whichever part he choose. E.g., if one could by perjury save the life or liberty of the accused in court, and were distressed on the one side by the precept of religion not to perjure himself, and on the other, led by error, by the precept of charity toward his neighbor, nor could resolve the difficulty. ]

Scrupulous conscience is that which from futile and utterly contemptible reasons judges or fears lest an action be evil. I say: « Judges or fears, » because if it truly from these light and vain reasons judge the action evil, it is truly conscience; but if it only fear lest it be evil against the judgment it has of its goodness, it is not properly conscience, but rather the shadow or likeness of conscience. The first is called scruples formed, the second scruples agitated. Against the former it is not lawful to act, well against the latter, as I shall say below.

Lax or loose conscience is that which from very slight and contemptible moments judges that not evil which is really evil, or a light evil which is grave, when either can easily be detected. To this approaches the pharisaical conscience, which makes great things small and small things great, straining out the gnat and swallowing the camel, Matth., XXIII, 24. These two consciences, scrupulous and lax, differ in this, as appears, from the probable, that the probable rests upon weighty moments, not these; whence they belong to the erroneous.

I say 1° : If there be question of conscience erring vincibly, it seems beyond doubt that the confessor is bound to admonish his penitent : 1° Because, as physician, he ought to guard against his formal sins, from which he is not excused by a conscience erring vincibly. 2° Because such a penitent is in an evil state and incapable of absolution. The same must be said of those who ask whether this be sin or not; because by the very fact that they ask, they seem to doubt, and not to have invincible ignorance, and moreover the confessor is not only judge of the penitent, but is doctor, whose office it is to instruct, especially those who beg to be instructed. And I esteem both parts of the conclusion true, even though no hope of amendment appear; because the same reasons urge, and besides no inconvenience follows from admonition; for equally does the penitent sin formally whether admonished or not, since his vincible ignorance will not excuse him from formal sin.

You will ask by what signs the confessor can know that the error was vincible in the penitent.

I answer. Let him interrogate : 1° whether he adverted to any indecency in this act; 2° whether his own conscience dictated to him that he ought at least to consult a confessor, or another prudent man; 3° whether out of shame or fear he neglected the occasion of asking. If the penitent answer affirmatively to one or other of these, he can be held to be laboring under inculpable error; otherwise if he deny all. Gury, de Conscientia, n. 38.

I say 2° : If there be question of a conscience erring invincibly, a distinction is needed. Either there is hope of amendment, and no danger of graver inconvenience from admonition, or there is no hope of amendment, or there is danger of a graver inconvenience than the material sin of the penitent. If there be hope of amendment, and no danger of a graver inconvenience than the material sin of the penitent, the confessor is bound to admonish him; because, as doctor, he is bound, where no inconvenience is feared, to instruct his penitent, and to guard against sins in him, even material ones. But if there be no hope of amendment, or only a very slight one, or if there be, yet graver inconveniences are justly feared than the material sin of the penitent, as a rule the confessor neither is bound nor can admonish. The reason of the first part, because, hope of amendment set aside, the gravest inconvenience follows, namely that this penitent will sin formally, whereas before he sinned only materially, and that being admonished he is damned, who not admonished might have been saved. It is better therefore to leave him in good faith : whence Aug., hom. 41, among the 50,^{1 1} This homily was relegated to the appendix in the Benedictine edition.

si quis, dist. 7 de Poenit. : « If I knew that I did not profit you, I would not admonish you, I would not terrify you. » The reason of the second part is, that of several evils the less is to be chosen.

I said, « as a rule, » because certain cases are excepted.

Excepted is 1° if the penitent be invincibly ignorant of what is necessary with necessity of means for salvation, as that God is triune, incarnate, that sorrow for sins is necessary together with the sacrament for obtaining remission of sins, and the like. For whether there be hope of amendment or not, the confessor ought on these points to admonish and instruct his penitent, partly because otherwise the penitent is not capable of absolution, partly because even if he do not admonish him, he will no more be saved on account of ignorance of these things. It is better therefore to place him in that state in which he can be saved, if he wish, and from which it is likely that hope of amendment will not be excluded throughout the whole course of life.

2° Excepted is the case where the invincible ignorance of the penitent verges toward scandal of many or damage to the common good ; as if a priest ministering the sacraments were invalidly ordained, if the nullity of some marriage were notorious, etc. The penitent must be admonished, whether there be hope of amendment or not, because the good of many, especially the common good, prevails over the good of any particular person.

Certain authors add, and not badly, even if the ignorance of the penitent verge toward grave damage to some particular person ; because it seems to belong to charity and equity that I rather guard against the damage of an unwilling innocent¹ than the damage of him who is supposed to incur it by his own will and malice. ¹ This homily was relegated to the appendix in the Benedictine edition; note on the citation of Aug., hom. 41, among the 50 (p. 93).

Here a distinction must be made : namely whether grave damage, to be borne by a particular person from such an error, casts into peril the salvation of his soul or only temporal goods. If the former, the one erring invincibly seems bound to be admonished, because, if perchance he acquiesce not in the admonition, at least the peril of salvation will be removed from the other, and the lost good will be compensated by a good of the same nature and weight. If the errant one, unwilling to obey, perish, he will perish by his own fault, and it cannot be said that his soul should be preferred to another's soul. In the latter case, since the good of a superior order is to be preferred to the good of an inferior order, we hold that the errant one, probably not going to obey the admonition, is to be left in good faith. If it be objected that the consent of him who would suffer damage of this kind ought not be presumed, we answer that he is not reasonably unwilling, because the order of charity requires that provision be made for the eternal salvation of the neighbor at temporal loss, even grave. Moreover, the confessor, concerning whom here chiefly there is question, is bound ex officio to provide for the spiritual good of the penitent, not indeed for the temporal good of another, and since he cannot avert these two evils simultaneously, he ought choose the less, or rather permit it.

3° Excepted by certain more recent authors, and well, is the case where the ignorance concerns the natural law, as regards secondary principles, v. g., pollution, venereal delectation, etc. Because although invincible ignorance of these things can exist for a time (which nevertheless many deny), this ignorance cannot long endure, and easily and shortly becomes vincible, on account of the suspicion of malice which an act evil and dishonest of itself carries with it. Whence if the penitent be not admonished, when the occasion arises he will reckon this suspicion as ill-founded because of the silence of confessors, and will easily contemn it, and thus he will persevere in sin already formally, from a conscience erring vincibly ; but if he be admonished, there is hope that he will sin with greater remorse, will open his wicked habit to confessors, receive salutary remedies from them, and finally come to himself.

You will say against the second part of the second conclusion : A penitent in whom there is no hope of amendment, if admonished, ought not be held sufficiently disposed for absolution. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the antecedent. For that one be held sufficiently disposed, it suffices that he detest sin above every evil in its kind, nor is it necessary that he descend to singulars; otherwise, human frailty attended to, few would be true penitents : « Contrite, says St. Thomas, Quodlibet 1, a. 9, he is bound in general to will to suffer whatsoever punishment rather than sin...; but to descend in particular to this punishment or that he is not bound. Nay more, anyone would act foolishly who should solicit himself or another concerning punishments of this particular kind... And therefore to descend in such matters to singulars is to lead man into temptation and furnish occasion of sinning. » He teaches the same in Suppl., q. 3, a. 1.

From what has been said you will gather : 1° that if the confessor discover that the marriage of the penitent is null, which however the penitent himself believes invincibly valid, if he prudently judge that the penitent once admonished would not depart from the putative wife, or that if he depart, grave inconveniences and scandals would follow, namely hatreds and long-lasting quarrels, incontinence, defamation or desertion of an honest family or of children, and the like, he ought be silent and leave the penitent in good faith. But if there be question of contracting marriage, attention must be given to the irreverence toward the sacrament, and to the evils naturally apt to follow from an invalid marriage if the penitent be not admonished; and these must be weighed against the inconveniences foreseen to follow if he be admonished, and what seems less must be chosen, admonishing or keeping silence. As a rule, while future act is concerned, the thing still remaining intact, lesser evils follow if he be admonished than if he be not; whence as a rule in this case the penitent must be admonished. From these cases resolve others similar.

You will gather 2° that the confessor is bound to admonish a penitent whom he sees laboring under an erroneous conscience against himself, namely judging to be sin what is not, or mortal what is only venial. V. g., a layman thinks himself bound under mortal sin to be present at Vespers on Sundays and feasts, or that he cannot drink for refreshment on a fast day ; a religious or nun believes herself bound under mortal sin by regular silence or fasting; a wife reckons many mortalities in the use of matrimony which are only venial : in these, I say, and like cases, the confessor ought to admonish the penitent; because, as was said, as doctor he ought to instruct him, and as physician to guard against his formal sins, especially since there follows no inconvenience outweighing the inconvenience which follows if he be not admonished. For that thence the penitent perhaps sin venially more easily and frequently is far less inconvenient than if he sin mortally once only from an erroneous conscience.

I. Question I. What is conscience? Answer. It is the dictate of our reason, concluding from the general principles of synderesis what, here and now, all circumstances considered, is to be embraced as good, and to be shunned as evil. It is called a dictate, or judgment, of the practical intellect, not of the speculative: because it does not halt in contemplation, but directs to the execution of the work. It differs from synderesis in this, that synderesis consists in those first dictates implanted, as it were, by nature, by which we judge: good is to be done, evil to be shunned; what thou wouldst not have done to thyself, do not to another; and other like principles of this kind. Wherefore conscience is not a habit, nor a power, but an act — not of the will, as Durandus contends, but of the practical intellect, as has been said.

II. Question II. Of how many kinds is conscience? Answer. One is antecedent, which directs the operation; the other consequent, which rejoices over a good work, and is distressed over an evil one. Again, one commands, another counsels: the former prescribes the operation by way of precept, the latter by way of counsel. Furthermore, on the part of the object it is divided into true — that is, right and good — and into false — that is, evil and not right. On the part of the assent it is distributed into certain, probable, doubting, scrupulous, and erroneous.

III. Question III. Does he sin who does not follow a right conscience? Answer. Conscience is called right by relation to a right rule. The rule of operation is twofold: one remote, which is the eternal law; the other proximate, which is the reason of the practical intellect. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, art. 5 — to whom the theologians commonly subscribe — teaches that he sins who resists a conscience proposing something as commanded under precept. This is perspicuously established from holy Scripture: All that is not of faith (that is, of conscience) is sin: Romans 14. If conscience proposes anything as prohibited under mortal sin, he sins mortally who resists it; the sin will be venial, if what conscience proposes as venial is venial. It is disputed whether he sins mortally who resists a conscience proposing something as sin without determining the gravity of the sin. Dismissing petty distinctions, I say that he sins gravely who acts against such a conscience. The reason is evident. He who with deliberate mind exposes himself to a manifest danger of sinning mortally, sins mortally, as Scripture itself testifies: He that loveth danger shall perish in it. To this danger he exposes himself who acts against the aforesaid conscience; since in that malice proposed absolutely there is contained equally a grave malice and a light one. Therefore, unless the gravity or lightness of the malice be first ascertained with due diligence, there is a grave danger of offending mortally.

IV. Question IV. Is a man bound to follow his own conscience, whether right or erring? Answer. All affirm it. For the same reason which proves the duty of following a right conscience proves also that no one can act against an erring conscience. For an erring conscience, just as much as a right conscience, proposes what is to be done as commanded by the divine Law. Both prescribe that the divine Law must be obeyed. On this matter read St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, art. 5, ad 2. In an erroneous conscience a twofold judgment must be distinguished: one by which it is judged that something is prohibited by God which is not prohibited; the other by which it is judged that the divine Law must be obeyed. The first is false; the second is true.

V. Question V. Does he sin who does not act according to a vincibly erroneous conscience? Answer. Conscience can be erroneous in two ways. 1. Invincibly, when the error, all diligence having been applied, cannot be overcome; and in this case the conscience is without fault. 2. Vincibly, when the error, diligence being applied, can be overcome. Both these consciences oblige, with this difference: that the vincible conscience can and ought to be laid aside, whereas the invincible cannot be laid aside. Now these two things — namely, the duty of laying aside a vincibly erroneous conscience, and the obligation of following it — are by no means repugnant to one another, because they flow from diverse principles. The first arises from the principle of applying the diligence necessary for finding the truth and expelling the error; the second — namely, the duty of following the erroneous conscience — arises from the dictate of that very conscience, whereby the obligation of obeying the divine Law is proposed. Read St. Thomas, question 17 On Truth, article 4.

VI. Question VI. How should he conduct himself who, from an erroneous conscience, judges both extremes of a contradiction to be sin? Answer. If the erroneous conscience be vincible, it must be laid aside. Unless you lay it aside, you sin, whether you follow it or contradict it, as St. Thomas teaches, question 17 On Truth, article 4, ad 8: Just as in syllogistic matters, one absurdity being granted, others necessarily follow; so in moral matters, one absurdity being posited, others follow of necessity. Thus, supposing that a man seeks vainglory, whether for the sake of vainglory he does what he is bound to do, or omits it, he will always sin; and yet he is not perplexed, because he can dismiss his evil intention. And similarly, supposing an error of reason or of conscience which proceeds from an ignorance that does not excuse, it is necessary that evil in the will should follow; and yet the man is not perplexed, because he can withdraw from the error, since the ignorance is vincible and voluntary.

VII. What if the erroneous conscience be invincible, and judge both parts of a contradiction to be sin? This hypothesis I count scarcely probable. But granting it, no sin is committed, because there is no sin without liberty; invincible ignorance takes away liberty; therefore, the supposition being made that the conscience is invincibly erroneous, it cannot be said that the man sins, whichever part he follows. The Adversaries object that even in this hypothesis the man is free to omit or to perform his act. He is free with physical liberty, but not with moral liberty. But for sin, since it is in the genus of morals, moral liberty is necessary — which all Catholics, against Jansenius, confess to be taken away by invincible ignorance. A pastor assisting his flock on a feast day invincibly reckons that he sins if he omits Mass, and that he likewise sins if he abandons his flock to the incursions of wolves. This man is not morally free; therefore, whichever extreme he chooses, he will not sin. Though he is physically free to choose either of these two extremes, he is nevertheless not morally free: because he is not free to avoid acting against conscience, since in each extreme he apprehends sin.

VIII. Authors are wont to dispute whether it is graver to act against a vincibly erroneous conscience, or to follow it. But no certain rule can be assigned. Sometimes it is graver to follow it; sometimes it is less grave to act against it. Absolutely speaking, however, it is graver to act against it: since he who acts against it sins knowingly; he who follows it sins from ignorance; and ignorance, even though vincible, diminishes the malice of the sin. He who, shut up in prison, has the erroneous conscience that he sins mortally unless he hear Mass, according to the common opinion does not sin, for want of liberty: since that erroneous dictate is not the cause of the omission.

IX. Question VII. How is an erroneous conscience to be laid aside, and what diligence is to be applied? Answer. If the erroneous conscience has been formed rashly and imprudently, then it can be laid aside at will; and it suffices to advert to the falsity of the erroneous judgment, and to lay it aside by forming a contrary judgment upon the honesty of the operation. If, on the contrary, the conscience has been formed from a probable reason, then a contrary and more probable reason is necessary, to conquer the prior false persuasion. Ordinary diligence — not extraordinary — is necessary for laying aside a vincibly erring conscience. The former uses the accustomed means, namely study, counsel, prayers, pious works, by which the necessary light is implored of God. The latter applies extraordinary means: for instance, after taking the counsel of the Doctors of his own city, a man proceeds to other provinces to consult more learned men. The diligence to be applied must be gathered from the magnitude and diversity of the affairs. In unusual affairs, and those of extreme and highest moment, an unusual, exact, and utmost diligence must likewise be applied; on the contrary, in ordinary affairs there suffices the ordinary diligence which prudent and diligent upright men are wont to use. The extremes to be avoided are negligence and extraordinary diligence — for this latter fills the soul with scruples, anxiety, and disturbance. The omission of that ordinary and exact diligence which upright and vigilant men are wont to apply is, in affairs of grave moment, a grave sin.

X. Question VIII. From what indications can it be gathered that an erring conscience is vincible, or invincible? Answer. You can prudently presume the ignorance to be invincible: 1. If the thing ignored be of human, or of positive, law. 2. If the matter be most difficult even among the Learned themselves. 3. If no scruple, doubt, or any confused notion whatever has preceded. 4. If the man, on perceiving that he was deceived and violated the Law from ignorance, grieves and is saddened. 5. If the man be upright, and of an entire and well-ordered conscience. 6. If he has not been prejudiced by a false system and a depraved manner of opining. From these and similar circumstances and signs the Confessor can gather that the ignorance or inadvertence was invincible. The contrary holds if the matter be of the natural law; if some doubt has preceded; if the man be accustomed to offend, and be of a conscience entangled in crimes; if he be facile in adopting opinions which favor liberty and the appetites. For the rest, this ascertainment is difficult: therefore God must be prayed to with the Prophet David: Remember not my ignorances.

96. My conscience, with regard to any particular act may be correct or erroneous; its judgment may be certain or doubtful; the doubt may be concerning a law or a fact. A doubtful judgment is called an opinion; the reasons in favor of an opinion constitute its probability. In matters pertaining to conscience, we can seldom have the strictest certitude, such namely as excludes all possibility of error. However, moral certitude, which excludes a prudent doubt (Log. 79, etc.) is sufficient to safeguard moral rectitude. Hence, a certain dictate of conscience means a practical judgment free from a prudent doubt in regard to error. Moreover, it may happen that two honest men act in diametrically opposite ways about the same matter, and each may be morally certain that he is right. If I make a mistake through no fault of my own, my judgment is erroneous though it may be morally certain. In such a case I am said to be invincibly ignorant of the truth. If, however, the error is due to my own fault, my ignorance is vincible.