Article II. On The Division Of Conscience

Conscience is customarily divided in many ways:

304. 1. By reason of the act: into antecedent and consequent. Antecedent conscience judges concerning an act to be done; but consequent conscience judges concerning an act already perpetrated. Consequent conscience either approves the act perpetrated, and then causes spiritual joy and satisfaction;²¹ or it reproves this act, and then causes sorrow, which is customarily called remorse or the worm of conscience.²² Now we shall not speak of consequent conscience, but only of antecedent conscience, which is the subjective rule of acts to be posited, which it either a) commands, or b) prohibits, or c) counsels, or d) permits.

2. By reason of conformity with the eternal law: into true and erroneous. True or right conscience²³ is that which from true principles dictates that some particular act is licit or illicit. Erroneous or false conscience is that which from false principles, nevertheless reputed true, dictates that something is licit or illicit which in reality is not such. - Since ignorance is the cause of erroneous conscience, in moral theology we speak in almost the same way about erroneous conscience as about ignorance. And therefore we also distinguish conscience that is vincibly and invincibly erroneous, conscience that is culpably and inculpably erroneous.

Erroneous conscience is customarily subdivided into scrupulous, perplexed, lax, cauterized, Pharisaic. Speech will return below concerning each of these. Meanwhile let it be noted briefly: Scrupulous conscience is that which from futile and altogether contemptible reasons judges or fears that some action is evil which in reality is not such. - Perplexed conscience is that which apprehends sin on both sides, whether the action is omitted or committed. - Lax conscience is called that which from a slighter reason judges either that no sin at all is present, or that there is not as much sin as in reality there is. The higher, that is, worse, degree of that lax conscience is cauterized conscience (cauterizata, abgestumpftes Gewissen), which from a long-standing habit of sinning makes little of all or of certain grave sins. - Pharisaic conscience is that which makes little of great sins, but on the contrary makes much of certain matters of lesser moment according to that word of the Gospel: "straining out a gnat, but swallowing a camel."²⁴

3. By reason of assent: into certain, probable, and doubtful. Certain conscience is that which without prudent fear of erring firmly judges some act to be good or evil and therefore to be done or omitted. - Probable conscience is that which dictates some act to be probably licit or illicit, but with fear of the opposite part. Probable conscience therefore coincides with opinion. - Doubtful conscience accepted in the strict sense is the suspension of the intellect assenting to neither part of a contradiction.²⁵ Modern authors are not accustomed to distinguish between doubtful and probable conscience, but take each indifferently for a dictate of practical reason with fear of erring.

Note. Doubtful conscience, if doubt is taken for the suspension of any judgment, is in reality a contradiction in the adjective. For conscience is a dictate or judgment; but doubt is a suspension or negation of judgment. Therefore it would be much better if now no one spoke of doubtful conscience, but only of a moral doubt to be solved.

4. By reason of the obligation which it manifests: into commanding, prohibiting, permitting, and counseling, according as it commands, prohibits, permits, or counsels an act to be done.

²¹ St. Augustine beautifully says: "The joy of a good conscience is paradise" (De Genesi ad lit. l. 12, c. 34 [Migne, Patr. lat. 34, 482]). And (Pseudo-) St. Bernard says: "Nothing is more pleasant, nothing sweeter, nothing safer, nothing richer than a good conscience. Let the body press, let the world drag, let the devil terrify, and it will be secure" (De interiore domo c. 11 [Migne, Patr. lat. 184, 517]).

²² The punishments of an evil conscience are vividly described not only by the Holy Fathers, for example, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Augustine (see Migne, Patr. lat. 220, 351 sqq.), but also by several profane poets, for example, Horace, Juvenal, Goethe (Faust); cf. above n. 152.

²³ Certain authors subtly distinguish true conscience, which agrees with objective truth, from right conscience, which agrees with right appetite and therefore includes even invincibly erroneous conscience; but such a distinction is rather superfluous and today is customarily abandoned. Cf. Billuart, De conscientia a. 1.

²⁴ Matt. 23, 24.

²⁵ Cf. Billuart, De consc. n. 1.

305. Scholion. On the difference between certain and true conscience. From what has been said it is clear that certain conscience differs from true conscience; for the former excludes fear of erring, but by no means always corresponds to objective truth. Thus, for example, Jacob consummated marriage with Leah, having a certain conscience that Leah was his true wife; yet this was objectively false. - The latter brings with it, besides certitude, also objective truth; for example, if someone judges that lying is never licit and therefore refuses to tell a lie.

After it has been said concerning the notion and division of conscience, it is now necessary to treat the individual parts one by one, namely: 1. concerning true and erroneous conscience; 2. concerning lax conscience; 3. concerning perplexed and scrupulous conscience; 4. concerning certain and doubtful conscience; 5. concerning probable conscience, where the diverse moral systems will be treated.