First Question: On Moral Conscience According to Itself in Psychological Being

St. Thomas, I, q. 79, a. 13; De Veritate, q. 17, a. 1, 2, 3; II Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 4.

199. Notions. - Conscience (syneidesis), from the word conscire, that is, to know together, is etymologically as it were knowledge with another, and therefore sometimes signifies knowledge had with others or the common knowledge of several persons (Cicero, Or. 1 in Catil., 1; Tacitus, Agr. 2); more commonly, however, it signifies the knowledge of one person kept within himself but considered and applied to something else, whence properly it imports an order of knowledge to something, and is an act by which we apply knowledge to a particular fact.

This can be done in two ways:

1. by applying knowledge to considering that something is or has been, and this is merely psychological conscience, by which we know that we are doing something, or recognize that we have done or have not done something: this is said to testify and includes intimate sense and memory (Gen. XLIII, 22; Rom. IX, 1; Eccl. VII, 23; II Cor. IV, 2; V, 11);

2. it can also be done by applying knowledge to considering whether something is done or has been done rightly or not, and this is moral conscience, which is a judgment concerning good and evil acts and the application of moral knowledge to our human works. This again is twofold; for moral knowledge can be applied:

a) to examining something which has been done and to judging whether it has been done well or not, and this is consequent conscience, which is said to excuse, or to accuse or gnaw (Heb. IX, 14; Rom. II, 15; Tit. I, 15; II Tim. I, 3; II Cor. I, 12; Is. LXVI, 24 and Mk. IX, 48 [the original misprints IX, 40]: namely, the worm of conscience does not die);

b) to directing something which can still be done, and judging that it is good and to be done, or evil and not to be done, and this is antecedent conscience, which is said to instigate, induce, bind, urge, or impede (Rom. XIII, 5). This is a judgment concerning the morality of an act in the individual, to be placed here and now, and the application of moral knowledge to a determined act. And it is moral conscience in the strict sense, because it alone is the rule of human acts, and concerning it we speak in the present treatise.

Improperly, however, conscience is taken either a) for its object, or the thing known together, that is, for that which is in our conscience (I Tim. I, 5), as when someone says: I will tell you my conscience; to examine conscience, or that it is stained or cleansed; or b) for its causes: both for the habit by which we are rendered capable of judging good and evil, and for the habitual disposition by which we are inclined to judge in such or such a way concerning the honesty of an action; and for knowledge of the law or universal judgment concerning the morality of acts in general without applying it to a determined act; and thus we say that a child at seven years has conscience of good and evil.

200. Antecedent conscience is a judgment.

But not every antecedent judgment is conscience. For there is had:

1. a merely speculative judgment concerning the truth alone of a thing, without respect to operation, for example, whether Peter possesses money;

2. a speculative-practical judgment, that is, speculative concerning practice, concerning the morality of our acts in general and in the abstract, insofar as they are considered according to themselves and without order to a subject here and now active. In other words, it is a judgment concerning objective and material honesty, which is twofold; for man:

a) either makes altogether universal moral judgments by which he assents to the first practical principles, for example, good is to be done, evil is to be avoided; injury is to be done to no one; what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another; the Supreme Good is to be loved, etc.; in these the intellect does not err, because it naturally possesses for perceiving and enunciating them the habit, or facility, which is called synderesis;

1. It is called synderesis (synteresis = conservation, namely, of the first moral principles), which therefore is called the spark of conscience and a little fire derived from the divine light.

b) or he makes less universal judgments, by which he assents to general conclusions deduced immediately or mediately from the first principles, for example, theft is to be avoided, fornication is illicit, etc.; in these the intellect can sometimes err, although it can acquire for them the habit which is called moral science;

3. a practical-practical judgment concerning the morality of an act in the particular and in the concrete, to be placed here and now by the acting subject, by which we apply the first universal principles or moral science to a particular case in particular conclusions, for example: now to take this sum from Peter without his knowledge and without reason is theft to be avoided. This is the particular judgment of conscience, which is immediately ordered to operation and is concerned with subjective and formal honesty, and is proximately practical in relation to the universal judgments of synderesis and moral science, which are remotely practical; hence by some it is called the last practical judgment, namely, not simply, but among those three judgments which concern honesty;

4. the ultimately practical judgment, or the discretive judgment of election, not concerning morality but concerning the fittingness of the act, namely, concerning that which here and now is to be chosen and is fitting to do, whether it is good or evil: this follows conscience, by which it ought to be directed, but often is contrary to it, for example, I will seize Peter's money, although conscience dictates that it is prohibited.

201. Conscience is defined: the dictate or judgment of the practical intellect affirming that an act in the particular is licit or illicit, and therefore is to be placed (or can be placed) or is to be omitted by us. In this definition there is indicated:

1. the genus to which conscience pertains, namely, dictate or judgment, and thus it is distinguished from reason, which is a power; from synderesis, which is the habit of the first practical principles by which we are capable of having conscience; from moral science, which is acquired habitual knowledge concerning the morality of acts in general; from prudence, which is the virtue inclining one rightly to estimate all the circumstances of the concrete act, and rightly to judge concerning its morality, or to have a right conscience, and to command what it dictates: for conscience is not a habit but an act, and therefore it is easily reformed and laid aside; but if it is said to remain, this must not be understood as though it remains in itself, but in its causes, which are reason and synderesis, or even the other things mentioned above;

2. the subject in which it resides: a) the intellect: for judgment is not in the will, but precedes it so that it may will the good and flee the evil; but if conscience is called good or bad, it is not such formally in itself (as though it were the subject of goodness), but regulatively and from the effect, insofar as it directs good or evil works;

b) the practical intellect: for it does not stop in the contemplation of truth but directs toward executing a work, and thus it is distinguished from merely speculative judgments and from psychological conscience;

3. the specific object: a) affirming an act in the particular, that is, in the concrete, regarded with its end and circumstances, as it can be placed here and now; and thus it is distinguished from the speculative-practical judgments of moral science;

b) that it is licit or illicit, and thus it differs from other practical judgments which treat of utility, fittingness, facility, etc., among others from the last practical judgment;

c) and therefore that it is here and now to be placed or omitted: for it judges concerning an act to be placed, not concerning an act already placed, and thus it is distinguished from consequent conscience;

d) by us: for conscience regards only one's own acts and not those of others (Rom. XIV, 4; I Cor. IV, 4, 5).

202. Conscience is the conclusion of a practical ratiocination; whose major is from synderesis, for example, evil must be fled; the minor from reason: now to have intercourse with such a married woman is evil; conscience infers the conclusion: therefore for me, here and now, intercourse with her is illicit.

1. More recent authors are accustomed to say that the major of the syllogism from which conscience arises is a principle of right, understanding also a principle deduced from the first and most universal principles of morals; indeed, some even say that the major is always a principle, not indeed of synderesis, but of moral science, and that the minor only enunciates the fact to which the principle is applied. On the contrary, St. Thomas manifestly and constantly teaches that the major is the most universal principle of synderesis in which error cannot exist; but if conscience is called the application of science to a particular case, this must be understood of the minor of the syllogism, which is affirmed by reason, and to the enunciation of which both moral science and the right estimation of particular circumstances concur. Cf. Q. D. De Veritate 17, a. 2; and in II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 4.

But just as in speculative ratiocinations there can be a false conclusion, so also in conscience, either a) on the part of the form, because it is badly deduced from true principles which are not rightly applied, for example: God must be obeyed; but God commands that one in need must be aided; therefore here and now I must aid such a neighbor; or b) on the part of the matter, because it is deduced from a false principle, for example: what is not prohibited is not evil; but intercourse with such an unmarried woman is not prohibited; therefore it is not evil. For although falsity cannot be present in the major, because synderesis does not err concerning first principles, nevertheless reason can err in the minor concerning particular principles.

1. Yet not every conscience can be false, because falsity cannot always be present in the minor; namely, when there is question of immediate conclusions which are assumed directly from the first principles, and in the minor there is only a particular enunciation of that which is contained universally in the major. Thus: Injury is to be done to no man; Peter is a man; therefore injury is not to be done to Peter. Or: The Supreme Good is to be loved; therefore God is to be loved by me. Let St. Thomas be heard, De Ver. q. 17, a. 2: "Nevertheless it must be known that in some things conscience can never err, namely, when that particular act to which conscience is applied has of itself a universal judgment in synderesis. For just as in speculative matters it does not happen that one errs about particular conclusions which are assumed directly under universal principles in the same terms, as in this: This whole is greater than its part, no one is deceived, just as neither in this: Every whole is greater than its part; so in this: God is not to be loved by me, or some evil is to be done, no one can err; because in both judgments, both of speculative things and of operable things, the major is per se known, as existing in a universal principle, and the minor also, by which the same is predicated particularly, as when it is said: Every whole is greater than its part, this is a certain whole, therefore greater than its part."

203. Principle. Conscience is the proximate and subjective rule of human acts, obligating not per se and by force of itself, but by force of the divine precept, because it applies the objective and remote rule, or law, to the particular case in order to the operation of the subject. Thus, if the precept of an emperor did not reach the citizens except by means of a legate, the precept of the legate would not obligate except because it promulgated the precept of the emperor (q. 19, a. 5, ad 2; II Sent., d. 39, q. 3, a. 3, ad 3). Hence conscience is an intimation and as it were promulgation of the law with respect to the act to be placed here and now.

St. Bonaventure says, II Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 3: "Conscience is like God's herald and messenger; and what it says, it does not command from itself, but commands as from God, just as a herald, when he publishes the edict of a king; and hence it is that conscience has the force of binding." - St. Thomas uses another comparison, Q. D. De Ver. 17, a. 3, namely, of a physical bond, by which we are not bound except through contact or application to the body; whence the moral bond or law does not bind except through the application of the law, which happens through knowledge of the precept and conscience: "The command of someone governing stands in relation to binding in voluntary matters according to that mode of binding which can occur to the will (namely, the necessity of moral obligation), as bodily action stands in relation to binding bodily things by the necessity of coercion. But the bodily action of an agent never induces necessity in another thing except through the contact of the action itself with the thing upon which it acts. Whence neither is someone bound by the command of some king or lord unless the command reaches the one to whom it is commanded. But it reaches him through knowledge. Whence no one is bound by any precept except by means of knowledge of that precept... Just as in bodily things a bodily agent does not act except through contact, so in spiritual things a precept does not bind except through knowledge. And therefore, just as it is the same power by which touch acts and by which the power of the agent acts, since touch does not act except from the power of the agent, and the power of the agent not except by means of touch; so it is the same power by which the precept binds and by which conscience binds, since the precept does not bind except through the power of knowledge, nor knowledge except through the power of the precept. Whence, since conscience is nothing other than the application of knowledge to an act, it is established that conscience is said to bind by force of the divine precept."

From this it follows that conscience obligates more than the precept of a human superior: "Conscience does not bind except by force of the divine precept... Whence, since the divine precept obligates against the precept of a prelate, and obligates more than the precept of a prelate, the bond of conscience will be greater than the bond of the precept of a prelate, and conscience will bind, though the precept of the prelate stands to the contrary" (ibid., a. 5).

But just as law, so conscience, by reason of the mode by which it binds or of obligation, is obligating (or prescribing), whether negatively prohibiting or positively commanding; and non-obligating (or non-prescribing), which is permitting and counseling.

204. Observation. - Antecedent conscience alone, because it alone influences the act, is the rule of the act, but not consequent conscience, which supposes the act. Hence to the uninstructed, who think the contrary, it should be said that concerning the goodness or malice of a past act one must judge not according to the knowledge which they now have, but according to that which they had before the act.