The marriage debt: what is owed and what is lawful

79. On situation. The natural and ordinary situation of the conjugal act is this, that it occur lying down, in such a way that the woman lies beneath and the man lies above: for this situation is most apt for the infusion of semen into the vessel of the woman. Any situation is unnatural which departs from the natural one, as if intercourse occurs sitting or standing, or in such a way that the man lies beneath and the woman lies above. Through an unnatural situation generation is indeed rendered more difficult, but not impossible, because the semen reaches the ovaries not by descent, but by attraction.¹

To choose a mode of coming together by which conception is actually rendered more difficult, from the intention of rendering conception more difficult, is a venial sin if it is done without a just cause: for since the generation of offspring is the primary end of marriage, to act thus without a just cause is against reason; nevertheless not gravely, because conception is not impeded.

1. An unnatural situation, whatever it may be, does not exceed venial sin, provided grave danger of pouring forth semen outside the vessel is excluded: for any situation by which intercourse can be had is apt for generation.

Therefore spouses must never be questioned concerning the situation which they employ in performing the conjugal act, since the matter is not necessary for confession; and if the penitents themselves ask about this matter for the sake of counsel, let the confessor respond only in general, that they complete the act duly and, as far as can be done, in the natural mode. But if penitents accuse themselves concerning an unnatural situation, let him ask whether generation could have followed from that intercourse, because it suffices for the confessor to know whether generation was altogether impeded.

2. If a change of the natural situation is done from a just cause, e.g. on account of danger of miscarriage or on account of difficulty of coming together in the natural mode, there is no sin, even if some part of the semen is scattered; indeed, if another mode of intercourse is impossible, even if a great part of the semen is lost: for on the one hand the scattering occurs accidentally, and on the other hand generation is not impeded, since a small part of semen suffices for it.²

¹ St. Alphonsus, n. 917; Capellmann, Medicina past.^9, p. 151.

² Capellmann, Medicina pastor., p. 151.

80. On place. 1. Natural shame and the law of charity, by which we must avoid scandal, require that the place be secret.

a. To have intercourse before others is a grave sin by reason of scandal.

b. Parents ought to take care lest children acquire knowledge of this matter and thus suffer scandal.

2. In a sacred place ecclesiastical law prohibits intercourse under grave sin, unless necessity presses: for through the effusion of human semen irreverence is inflicted on the sacred place, and if the effusion becomes notorious, the church is polluted.¹

¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 458; cf. De praeceptis^3, n. 178.

Let the words of St Paul serve us as a preface, who are about to treat this unseemly matter briefly: "Let the husband render the debt to his wife," says the Apostle, "and in like manner the wife also to the husband.

The woman hath not power of her own body, but the husband; and in like manner the husband also hath not power of his own body, but the wife. Defraud not one another, except perhaps by consent for a time, that you may give yourselves to prayer; and return together again, lest Satan tempt you for your incontinency." Accordingly the use of marriage is not only lawful, but the debt must be rendered in justice, under grave obligation, to the other party asking seriously and reasonably. Although this is most certain, causes are nevertheless admitted which excuse from this obligation, so that there is no obligation of rendering the debt when it cannot be rendered without danger of life or of grave illness, or when it is not reasonably asked — as by one insane or drunk — or when it is asked too often, as several times in the same night. Even to one half drunk it seems lawful to refuse the debt, especially because of the danger of grave defects, both bodily and moral, in the offspring that might be conceived, unless quarrels, discord and incontinence on the part of the one asking are thereby feared. It has been said that in these circumstances there is no obligation of rendering the debt; indeed it would of itself be unlawful to render it with proximate danger to life or health. Nevertheless, if the disease were long-lasting and not tending proximately to death, such as syphilis, the healthy party is permitted to render the debt with danger of infection, in order to avoid incontinence or to foster conjugal love.

A greater difficulty arises when, in the judgment of a physician, the offspring to be conceived would be death to the mother. Such cases, however, are not easily to be admitted; and indeed physicians pronounce judgment about danger to life the more readily because they see that women are angling for it. Unless, therefore, the case be altogether special, a confessor will safely give this counsel to a woman alleging such a judgment of a physician: that she study to please her husband, and commit herself to God with great confidence.

Since married persons are bound to render the debt to one another, it is clear that they are as a rule bound also to live together, except when necessity does not allow it, or when by mutual consent it is otherwise arranged without danger of incontinence and without scandal. To married persons who are old or weak, and who often perform the act only imperfectly, the use of marriage is not to be denied, provided there is some hope that they can duly complete the act.

¹ 1 Cor. vii-3-5.

What is lawful and what is not lawful for married persons is contained in the following general rule: what is useful for performing the conjugal act is lawful; what is against the generation of offspring, or tends to impede it, is gravely unlawful; what is not against the generation of offspring, although it be beside it, is at least not gravely unlawful.

It is lawful for a married person to excite himself to intercourse by immodest touches and looks, and, after the husband has withdrawn, it is lawful for the wife to excite herself by touches to complete venereal pleasure. Sodomitical intercourse, and intercourse begun but broken off with emission of seed outside the woman’s vessel, is gravely unlawful. If, however, it is established by experience that the spouses can break off intercourse once begun without proximate danger of pollution, this does not seem to be mortal if both consent. A fortiori other shameful touches and looks allowed by the spouses without proximate danger of pollution do not seem to be mortal sins, and they are excused from all sin if they are done for a just cause, as to foster conjugal affection.

Provided intercourse can be duly completed, no posture in performing it is gravely unlawful, and an unnatural posture is made honourable, so that it is not even venially unlawful, provided some just cause is present. By the old law approach to a wife was forbidden at the time of the menses and of purgation, and indeed a similar prohibition was in force in the ancient ecclesiastical law. It seems must be said that those laws were positive and no longer bind Christians. The opinions of the Doctors vary concerning the lawfulness of such approach. The reasons which many brought forward to show the unlawfulness of the act rested on fables; nevertheless physiological science confirms the opinion according to which, on account of the nervous state of the woman at the time of the menses and of purgation, a man must abstain at least under venial sin unless a just cause excuses him. The same seems to be said of the time of pregnancy; indeed, if intercourse involved proximate danger of abortion, one would then have to abstain under grave sin. Such danger, however, can scarcely be established, and hence the obligation of abstaining cannot be urged. The opinion of many seems probable, according to which immodest touches which a spouse performs upon himself in the absence of the other party are not mortal sins, provided there is no proximate danger of pollution. The married state itself, they say, makes such acts less unbecoming, so that what in the unmarried is grave is in the married only venial. Nor does morose delectation about intercourse had or to be had — excluding again proximate danger of pollution — seem to be forbidden to married persons under grave sin. Indeed a merely rational delectation about a lawful object,

such as intercourse is for married persons, would not be even venial; in practice, however, delectation about the conjugal act can scarcely be merely rational, inasmuch as it naturally excites the senses and the members. Hence morose delectation about intercourse had or to be had is as a rule forbidden, at least under venial sin, to married persons also. To have intercourse with one’s spouse with an adulterous mind, thinking of another person besides the spouse, is a grave sin by reason of the adulterous mind.

That conjugal intercourse is lawful in itself, or objectively, is clear both from Sacred Scripture (Gen. 1:28; 1 Cor. 7:3; Heb. 13:4) and from Canon Law (can. 1081, § 2 and 1111), and from the fact that it is a means ordained by God for propagating the human race. But in order that intercourse here and now be honorable or lawful, it is required: 1. that there be absent an impediment which forbids it; 2. that there be absent a harm to be feared which ought to be guarded against and therefore forbids intercourse; 3. that it be done from a right end; 4. in the due place and manner. I judge it more practical to discuss the absence of impediments and of harm in the last place.

I. The obligation of asking for the debt is absent in itself, because no one in itself is bound to use his own right. By accident there can be an obligation, and indeed of charity, for example if the partner seems to be in danger of incontinence, or if otherwise quarrels cannot be ended or averted (St. Alphonsus VI, 929).

II. The obligation of rendering the debt is circumscribed by these points:

1. Existence of the obligation. There exists an obligation of rendering the debt to one who reasonably and seriously asks for it. "Let the husband," says the Apostle, "render the debt to the wife; and likewise also the wife to the husband. The woman does not have power over her own body, but the man. Likewise also the man does not have power over his own body, but the woman."¹ Moreover, it is an obligation of justice, as is clear both from the fact that the Apostle speaks of the debt to be rendered, and repeats the obligation from the fact that spouses have power over the body of the partner; and from can. 1111; and from the nature of marriage, which is an onerous contract. Moreover, the obligation from the cited canon exists from the beginning of marriage, and therefore the so-called two-month privilege has been abrogated, that is, the privilege by which a spouse deliberating about entering a Religious Institute strictly so called could deny the debt for two months after contracting marriage. Finally, note that a spouse, in practice the husband, is bound to render the debt even if "the wife tacitly only demands it, for example if she shows some indication which signifies a tacit petition; because in women, on account of their innate modesty, such signs are held as a true petition" (St. Alphonsus VI, 928; St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 64, a. 2).

2. Gravity of the obligation. The obligation of rendering the debt is commonly grave, because there is question of an act or of a matter which is grave. Make exception: 1. when the partner asks less insistently, for example if he asks weakly, or, when asked to desist from the petition, easily consents; 2. if the debt is rarely denied to one who asks often, for example once in a month; for this, in view of the frequency, does not seem grave. Besides, a brief delay, for example from day to night, is easily excused from grave and even from light fault. Nevertheless if, in the excepted cases, the partner were cast into danger of incontinence by the denial, there would be a grave obligation of charity (St. Alphonsus VI, 940).

Corollary. They sin gravely: 1. wives who show great delay in rendering, or do not grant the debt unless coerced, or reproach the husband insultingly for his petitions; 2. husbands who, whether in order to avoid offspring or from love conceived toward others, never or almost never know the wife, although they ought to presume that the wives bear this with difficulty.

3. The causes excusing from the obligation are:

a. Cessation of the right of demanding the debt, namely by the spontaneous renunciation of the spouses. Renunciation can be made explicitly or implicitly, by both or by only one party. It is presumed to have been made implicitly if both spouses, by mutual consent, emit a vow of chastity; nevertheless, in itself it is not repugnant that those vowing retain the right to intercourse (St. Alphonsus II, 61 and VI, 944, 948).

b. Deprivation of the right of demanding the debt, namely through adultery, sodomy, unnatural lying together with a person of diverse sex, or bestiality; according to that saying: Let faith be broken with the one who breaks faith. But the innocent spouse is excused until that spouse has condoned the crime or committed a similar crime (St. Alphonsus VI, 945, 960, 966; St. Thomas, In IV Sent., dist. 35, q. unica, a. 1, corp.; Supplement, q. 62, a. 1; can. 1129, 1130).

c. Defect of reason in the one asking, as if intercourse is asked by one perfectly insane or wholly drunk. The reason is that a petition of this sort is not a human act. There is added the danger lest offspring be born defective in mind and body² (St. Alphonsus VI, 948). Nor is there an obligation of rendering the debt if one perfectly insane or wholly drunk is in danger of incontinence, because an act materially evil can be permitted on account of the harm to offspring to be feared. - To one semi-insane and semi-drunk, and likewise to an insane person who has a lucid interval, the debt is in itself to be rendered (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). Moreover, on account of the harm to be feared, it is generally and in itself to be advised that intercourse with a drunk or insane person be avoided.

d. A grave inconvenience to be feared either for the one asking, or for the one rendering, or for offspring already conceived. The reason is that in all debts great difficulty excuses from payment (St. Alphonsus VI, 950, 952; cf. St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 64, a. 1).

Many grave inconveniences, such as death, notably harmful infection, another disease, or a notable increase of this disease, not only excuse from rendering the debt, but also render the rendering unlawful, unless a grave cause, for example the danger of incontinence of oneself or of the partner, or a grave quarrel to be avoided, is present (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.); nevertheless a grave cause does not render intercourse lawful if death is proximately going to follow from it (n. 93).

Other inconveniences, such as very sharp pains either in intercourse or in childbirth, or immense fatigue, can indeed excuse from rendering the debt, but, as is clear, do not in themselves prohibit it.

Finally, if, for example, the husband has truly vexed the wife during the day and asks in the evening, the psychological difficulty itself seems to excuse the wife, unless the husband either explicitly or implicitly, for example by his manner of asking, has offered some satisfaction to her.

It was said: "A grave inconvenience to be feared for offspring already conceived excuses from intercourse." For the inconvenience of offspring to be conceived commonly does not excuse from rendering the debt, because it is always better for the offspring to be thus than not to be (St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 64, a. 1, ad 4; St. Alphonsus VI, 951). If, however, a woman has learned by experience that she gives birth to dead children, she is excused from rendering the debt if, according to the judgment of a physician, it is rightly feared that the death of the fetus in the uterus would expose the mother herself to grave danger (St. Alphonsus VI, 953).

Note. To grave inconvenience is also referred an immoderate petition, either absolutely, as if someone habitually is not accustomed to be content with one or another act of intercourse daily, or, for example, were to ask four times in a night; or relatively to weakness of body, for example on account of incipient phthisis or some other chronic infirmity (St. Alphonsus VI, 940).

¹ 1 Cor. 7:3-4.

² Capellmann-Bergmann, op. cit., p. 328; Von Olfers, op. cit., p. 69, judges that the danger is absent if intercourse is had with one who is drunk only actually, not habitually; yet others contradict him.

Question 1. Whether fear of more numerous offspring, for whom sufficient provision cannot be made, excuses from rendering the debt.

Response I. If the evil threatens through the fault of the husband, it seems that one must answer affirmatively, "because you are not compelled to render his right to another, if he refuses to render yours to you" (St. Alphonsus IV, 999). But in the proposed case the husband refuses to render to the wife the cooperation owed to the bodily education of offspring by force of marriage and of intercourse had. Therefore the wife is not bound to render his right to the husband until he has amended himself. The argument is confirmed, or is even proposed, by this reasoning: let faith be broken with the one who breaks faith. Now, since the education of offspring, together with their procreation, is the primary end of marriage (can. 1013, § 1), cooperation toward the bodily education of offspring, equally as cooperation toward their procreation, seems to pertain to the matrimonial fidelity owed to the wife; this fidelity, in the hypothesis laid down, is broken by the husband. Therefore.

Response II. If the evil threatens without fault of the husband, it is disputed. Some judge that the wife is excused, provided the danger of incontinence is absent. The reason alleged is that in all debts great inconvenience excuses from payment. Others deny this, because the inconvenience of which we speak is intrinsic to the conjugal debt. Moreover, because in practice the danger of incontinence will scarcely be absent, for there is question of continually denying the debt, otherwise the end of the denial would not be obtained, in practice the debt cannot be denied (St. Alphonsus VI, 941).

Question 2. Whether a spouse is excused from the debt if the partner forbids the offspring to be educated Catholic.

Response. It seems that one must answer affirmatively, because, as we said above, you are not compelled to render his right to another if he refuses to render yours to you. But in the case the partner stands in the way of the partner's right to educate the offspring Catholic. Therefore. And this holds whether the spouse has promised or has not promised Catholic education.

e. A sinful petition excuses as follows:

1. If the petition is sinful because an act is asked for in circumstances which render it unlawful, or because an unlawful thing is asked, for example sodomitic intercourse or intercourse to be performed before others, the partner is not only excused from rendering the debt, but is also forbidden to render it. The reason is that no one enjoys a right of asking for an unlawful thing. If, however, the malice of the act or unlawful thing is only venial, for example if without a just cause intercourse to be performed from behind is asked for, there is easily present a reason which renders the rendering lawful, though not obligatory (St. Alphonsus VI, 943, 946).

2. If the petition is sinful because the one asking is held by an impediment, for example by a vow, it is lawful to render the debt. The reason is that an impediment which holds one party does not deprive the other of the right of having intercourse. It is disputed whether in the case there is an obligation of rendering the debt. Now it seems that this must be affirmed, because intercourse in the case, although asked illicitly, is nevertheless asked lawfully, and therefore the petition must be satisfied, "just as if someone were to emit a vow not to exact from you the money owed, if he later asks, you are bound to render it, because through the vow the creditor did not lose his right" (St. Alphonsus VI, 944). Moreover, when "a spouse foresees that the other, impeded by a vow or another impediment, will ask illicitly, then it will be safer for the spouse himself to forestall it; and if the other has already asked, then he himself should also ask, saying: I wish you to render to me. But Sanchez rightly says that wives are rarely bound to this, because it would be a great burden to them, on account of the natural modesty of women, to be bound always to ask" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

3. If the petition is sinful on account of the manner of asking, for example if it is made for pleasure alone, intercourse ought to be granted, because it is asked lawfully, indeed also licitly if the one asking so wishes (St. Alphonsus VI, 946).

III. Consequences of the obligation set forth. From the obligation of rendering, indeed sometimes of asking, the debt, there follow:

a. The obligation of cohabiting.¹ Now it belongs to the husband, since he is the head of the conjugal society, to choose the domicile. Moreover, the obligation of cohabiting is essentially mutual. Hence one cannot be absent from the other for a rather long time without necessity or the consent of the partner. But the husband who must be absent for a long time is bound to take the wife with him, if she desires this and it can conveniently be done; and the wife must follow the husband if he requires this, unless, however, a grave reason excuses (St. Alphonsus VI, 939).

b. The obligation of using at least the same bedroom or chamber; that is, the right and obligation of using the same marriage bed or bed ought not to be urged, provided they spend the night in the same bedroom and can come together at will. Besides, the obligation seems to be satisfied if, as is in use in some families, wife and husband indeed have a distinct bed and room, but the room is adjoining, and free and easy access to the other's room and bed lies open to each, although this practice is very much to be dissuaded.²

c. The obligation not to render themselves impotent for the debt. A spouse who by unlawful means renders himself impotent for the conjugal debt sins mortally, because the law of justice obliging to the rendering of the debt also forbids that anyone by unlawful means render himself impotent. Hence a husband who, whether by frequent pollutions or by access to other women, renders himself impotent, or notably less apt, for paying the debt, beyond the sin of adulterous pollution or of adultery, seems to commit a new fault against the law of justice. Indeed a spouse could sin gravely who, by works in themselves lawful but indiscreet and by no means necessary, such as excessive mortifications, vigils, or labors, rendered himself notably less fit³ (St. Alphonsus VI, 942).

Note. Vasectomy (n. 87), oophorectomy (n. 86), and excision of the ovaries, admitted for the end that procreation of offspring be impeded, are gravely unlawful, both because they contain mutilation which is not necessary for the preservation of the whole, and because, done for that end, they are directly opposed to the good of the species; besides, if they are done without the consent of the partner, they are opposed to that partner's right.

¹ Cf. Gen. 2:24; c. 1, de coniug. lepros., IV, 8; can. 1128; Civil Code, arts. 161, 162.

² Cf. Gasparri, Tractatus Canonicus de Matrimonio, n. 1077.

³ Cf. Theologia Mechliniensis de Sponsalibus et Matrimonio, n. 43, q. 10.

The Obligation of Paying the Conjugal Debt.—(a) The duty is one of justice, since it arises from the contract of marriage, in which the parties freely and solemnly bind themselves to it as the subject-matter of their pact.

(b) The obligation is grave, since the marriage contract is one of the most momentous of human agreements, its direct end being the propagation of the race, while the denial of its essential right is productive of most serious evils, such as incontinence, scandals and the disruption of families. There is light matter, however, as when the request is not imperative, or the denial is infrequent and without danger of incontinence.

Absence of Obligation.—The obligation of paying the conjugal debt does not exist, however, when the right to make the request has been lost or when the request is unreasonable.

(a) Thus, the right to make the request is lost when one party has broken faith by committing adultery and has not been forgiven by the innocent party, and also when one party is incapable (e.g., on account of insanity or drunkenness) of asking in a rational manner.

(b) The request is unreasonable, first, when it is immoderate (e.g., when it cannot be granted without serious and unusual detriment to health, or without danger of death, or without likelihood of abortion or other great harm to a child conceived or to be conceived); secondly, when it is seductive (e.g., when it is an invitation to commit onanism).

Suspension of Obligation.—The obligation of granting and the right of requesting conjugal relations are suspended when the marriage is discovered to be null or uncertain.

(a) Thus, if the marriage is certainly null, abstinence is necessary until the marriage is made valid; otherwise the parties are guilty of fornication. But if nullity is due to a merely ecclesiastical impediment, the impediment probably ceases in cases of most grave inconvenience when the nullity is known to only one spouse and the dispensation cannot be obtained at once.

(b) If the marriage is only doubtfully null, abstinence is not necessary unless both parties have a serious doubt and no examination has yet been made. Light doubts should not be considered, nor doubts that have not been corroborated by investigation; while, if only one party doubts, he or she cannot refuse the debt lest injustice be done the other.

Is There an Obligation of Requesting Conjugal Intercourse?—(a) Per se, there is no obligation, since one may lawfully decide not to enjoy one’s right, and not to use what belongs to one. As man and wife were free to marry or not to marry, so are they free to agree either to consummate or not consummate marriage. It is even lawful for married people to contract together to abstain temporarily or permanently from marriage relations (e.g., for the sake of health, or of economy, or of mortification). By mutual consent one or both may make a vow of chastity, as was done by St. Joseph and the Blessed Virgin, or the husband may enter the priesthood and the wife become a nun.

(b) Per accidens, there is often an obligation of requesting intercourse, for experience shows that continual non-use of marriage often leads to incontinence or to loss of affection (see 2228).

137. We have spoken chiefly in the preceding chapters about sins outside the use of marriage; now we must speak about sins within the very use of marriage. Therefore first it must be said concerning the lawfulness of this use, with attention to its intrinsic nature and extrinsic circumstances, and then concerning the right with respect to it and the consequent obligation.

161. Prop. 2. The use of marriage is lawful if it is done from the end of rendering the conjugal debt to the other party. The reason is that the rendering of the conjugal debt, on account of the right of another and one's own debt, is a formal act of justice, and therefore positively honorable.

168. Prop. 8. Any spouse bound by a vow of chastity or impeded by affinity is forbidden under grave sin to ask for the debt; yet he can render it to the other spouse asking, indeed he is even bound, since the other party cannot be deprived of his or her right. But neither spouse can ask for or render the debt if either both are bound by a vow of chastity, or both have contracted affinity; for, because of the vow and the sin, each is prohibited. S. Th. Quodl. 3. q. 7. a. 18.; Quodl. 10. q. 5. a. 11.; G. v. 2. n. 909.; Cf. ibid. n. 780-783.; Laymann, l. 5. tr. 10. p. 3. c. 1. n. 10-12., and here n. 201. 204. 214. and following.

170. Can a spouse who is prohibited from asking by reason of vow or affinity ever lawfully exact the debt?

Resp. The doctors commonly affirm in the following cases: 1. If there is danger of incontinence in the other spouse; indeed they say that then he is bound to ask, because this obligation arises from the very institution of marriage. 2. If the other interpretatively exacts, namely when the woman is modest, and the man perceives her will concerning the rendering of the debt; for then it is rather to render than to ask. 3. It will not improbably be lawful for the impeded spouse to ask, if he himself is in danger of incontinence, and the impediment is one imposed by the Church, whose dispensation cannot be obtained shortly, and there is great danger in delay. The reason is that an ecclesiastical law does not oblige in so great a crisis. And this will be confirmed from the following question. L. 930.; Sporer 483.

189. Prop. 18. A spouse certainly conscious of a diriment impediment cannot ask for or render the debt, even if the partner is wholly ignorant of such an impediment.

Proof. "The doctors commonly assert that in such a case the woman cannot render the debt; and thus teaches Villalobos, Coninck, etc., whom Sanchez cites and follows, t. 1. de matr. l. 2. disp. 39. n. 6.; whence afterward he himself, n. 8., thus asserts. From these it is inferred, as most certain to be held, that a spouse conscious of the nullity of the marriage because of a diriment impediment, whether by divine or human law, can in no event render the debt to the ignorant husband, even if she undergoes danger of life. Thus he; and the reason is clear: because if the contrary were said, it would follow that fornication is sometimes lawful, namely because of danger to reputation or life; but to say this is erroneous, since fornication is intrinsically evil; therefore in such a case even with danger to life the debt is not to be rendered, because one who renders the debt in such a case certainly knows the marriage to be null; therefore he certainly knows that he is fornicating; therefore if it were lawful in such a case to render the debt, it would consequently be lawful to fornicate; and thus this opinion is determined in cap. Inquisitioni, de Senten. excommunicat." Diana, tr. vii. de matr. Res. 176. n. 1. Thus also Sporer, nn. 469, 472. Cf. G.-Dumas, Cas. v. 2. n. 772.

191. In doubt concerning the validity of marriage, can someone ask for and render the debt?

Resp. 1. If, after marriage has been contracted in good faith, someone falls into doubt concerning its validity, and the doubt is negative, as being an imprudent doubt, it is to be spurned, and therefore he can render and ask for the debt. But if the doubt is positive, and remains even after diligence has been applied, and it is such that there is indeed a probable reason for the invalidity of the marriage, but none for its validity, then there is a twofold opinion: 1. affirms that one is bound to render to the other, who contracted in good faith, but cannot ask; 2. asserts that he can both render and ask. This opinion is called sufficiently probable by St. Alphonsus, n. 905. The reason is that in doubt the condition of the possessor in good faith is better. For this good-faith possession prevails over any opposed probability, and produces moral certainty. Further, the same possession gives an acquired right to the thing possessed; whence no one is to be deprived of his certain possession until it is certainly established concerning the nullity of his right. Wherefore, as such a possessor in good faith can retain the thing, so he can use it. This holds a fortiori if, besides that legitimate possession, there is also a true probable reason for the validity of the marriage. It is said after diligence has been applied; for otherwise it is certain that while the doubt lasts he can indeed and is bound to render, but he cannot ask. The first reason is because, as was just said, no one is to be deprived of certain possession which is had in good faith until it is certainly established concerning the nullity of his right. The second reason is because before diligence has been applied the ignorance is still vincible, and unless it becomes invincible, one cannot act. L. 903, 904, 905.; Ithur. Cas. 33. n. 29.

2. If marriage has been contracted with doubtful faith concerning an impediment, it is certain that while the doubt lasts, before diligence is to be applied for laying aside the doubt, the doubting spouse cannot ask, but can and is bound to render to the other asking in good faith. The reason is the same as that which was given in the first Response. But whether the doubting one, after diligence has been applied, can also ask for the debt is disputed. The first and more common opinion denies. "But the second opinion, sufficiently probable, affirms... The reason is that, granted that the doubting person cannot lay aside the doubt from the title of possession, nevertheless he can lay it aside from other principles, namely first, because in doubt one must stand for the validity of the act, as is had in L. Quoties, ff. de Rebus dubiis. Secondly, because, since marriage is a favorable cause, in doubt one must stand for its validity, as Sanchez himself proves, l. 1. d. 18. n. 6., with Covarruvias, Lopez, and Menochius, because, just as in the external forum in doubt judgment must be made for the validity of marriage, according to the common opinion there from c. fin. de Sentent. et re judic., so also judgment must be made in the internal forum, which ought to conform to the external when the latter does not rest on a false presumption." L. 906, 903. Cf. here n. 153.

3. Although St. Alphonsus has as sufficiently probable the opinion asserting that in the case of a doubt after marriage has been contracted, and also in the case of a marriage contracted with doubtful faith, after diligence has been applied, the spouse can lawfully ask for and render the debt, nevertheless he excepts the case of doubt "concerning the death of the prior spouse, whether the nuptials were entered with good faith or with doubtful faith." For the holy Doctor says that in that case "the doubting spouse will never be able to ask, unless concerning the death of the prior spouse there is had certainty, or at least so great a presumption that it establishes moral certainty." But the holy Doctor adds this reason: "both because then the probable danger of injury to the prior spouse remains; and because in that case the prior marriage possesses, until it is established that it has been dissolved." But that reason by no means seems demonstrative: for the right of the prior spouse and the possession of the prior marriage, since it is not certainly established, for it is supposed probable that the spouse has died and the marriage has been dissolved, do not present a certain right and a certain possession against which it is not lawful to use probability. Indeed, on the contrary, the later marriage, certainly contracted in good faith and certainly existing, brings a certainly acquired right to its use; and no one can now be despoiled of this right, unless the opposite right is certainly established. And indeed several and grave theologians in reality admit this. These are the words of Struggl: "If each spouse entered nuptials in good faith and certain knowledge concerning the life of the prior spouse cannot be had, each can render and ask for the debt, because in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, and each is in possession of a marriage begun in good faith." And he admits the same also in favor of the party contracting in good faith, if the other party contracted in doubtful or bad faith: "If only one party entered the marriage in bad faith, or while the doubt stood, but the other in good faith, the former is bound to render the debt to the latter asking, but cannot ask, because only one party, and not the other, is in possession of the marriage," de Matr. n. 90. But after sufficient diligence has been applied, it plainly does not appear why the other party also, who contracted while doubting, if not by force of a possession begun in good faith, at least by force of other principles, could not claim for himself the right also of asking. For if the right of the prior spouse is not certain, nor the possession certain, because his death is probable, even here one can invoke for himself those principles: in doubt one must stand for the validity of the act; favors are to be amplified; a marriage certainly contracted and certainly existing ought, in doubt, to prevail over a doubtfully existing marriage, until the certainty of the latter is established and destroys the later one. Further, as Elbel, de Matr. n. 205, teaches, one who thus doubted, and applied every diligence possible to himself in this matter, but nevertheless did not attain certainty, but only a great probability and presumption, could contract marriage; and consequently could ask for the conjugal debt. And indeed the praised author asks "what sort of certainty concerning the death of the prior spouse is required for this, that the spouse may lawfully pass to second nuptials." He immediately responds: "moral certainty is required, at least in the external forum," l. c. n. 204. But soon he adds: "Yet it has been said that moral certainty is required at least in the external forum; for in the internal forum, so that a man or woman may lawfully pass to second nuptials, Sylvester, Rosella, St. Antoninus, Sporer, and Laymann hold that a likely and most probable presumption suffices. Indeed Father Kugler, although with us he holds that moral certainty is required at least regularly, nevertheless in a case where such cannot be had, very probably with several others he thinks that it is enough that there be great probability and presumption, or a greater probability of death than of life, for this, that the ecclesiastical Judge can permit passage to second nuptials." But Laymann has these words, lib. v. tract. X. p. 3. c. 3. n. 2: "The difficulty turns on this: whether, because of a likely presumption and probable cause for believing that the death of the husband has intervened, it may be conceded to the woman to pass to second nuptials? I respond, and say, 1. The opinion of Rosella, St. Antoninus, Sylvester, and Philiarus is very probable: that a woman in such a case would sin in nothing, if with such a very probable persuasion and presumption, and a most just cause for believing that the husband is dead, and therefore in good faith if no one opposed her, she were to pass to second nuptials. Wherefore the confessor in the forum of conscience could permit this to her, and the Judge in the external forum, if after the nuptials have been celebrated he understood the cause, ought neither punish the woman nor separate her from the second husband, until it were known that the prior husband was still living. And this is plainly taken from c. Cum per bellicam, c. 34. q. 1. But the reason is that in moral matters, in which for the most part certainty cannot be had altogether, a most probable opinion or presumption, although not altogether certain, ought to suffice for man for instituting his actions."

4. If the other spouse also is not certain, but each doubts, then before diligence has been applied neither can ask, and therefore neither can render the debt. But after diligence has been applied, sufficiently probably each can ask, and therefore also render. The reason: for this openly follows from what was said in the preceding responses. G. 790.

As to the proposed questions Genicot, Theol. Mor. vol. 2. n. 493. ed. 4., says: "If one contracted with probable doubt concerning the life of the prior spouse... if, after moral diligence has been applied, the probable doubt remains, some opine that he who began possession in bad faith must always abstain from asking for the debt, until it is morally established concerning the death of the other spouse... But the common and certainly probable opinion of Sanchez, the Salmanticenses, etc., holds that then a conscience can lawfully be formed by force of a probable opinion favoring the validity of the new marriage... If each contracted with probable doubt... if after diligence has been applied the doubt remains, it is disputed whether they can render and ask for the debt, by the same reason as was said above concerning one doubting party."

The following cases resolved by the Holy Office also bear upon the matter:

Certain women in Italy after the war in Africa fruitlessly awaited their husbands returning. Since no further information was had concerning them, although diligent inquiries had been made by the Italian Government, supposing them dead in the war, they asked that they could contract another marriage. The Holy Office rescribed: "Provided that the matter concerns men who certainly were present at the battle of Adua, and, after suitable investigations have been carried out, it cannot indubitably be known whether the husband in fact fell dead, with attention to the special circumstances occurring in the case set forth, and to the valid presumption of death, the Ordinary will be able to permit passage to other nuptials." His Eminence Cardinal Gennari notes that this Document is universal, and that it is one thing that passage to other nuptials can be permitted, another thing that the death of the husband is established. The first imports only great probability of the death of the spouse; the other, absolute certainty of it. Monit. Eccles. vol. 10. part. 2. p. 145.

"A woman, when she had fruitlessly awaited the return of her husband, after three years, thinking that he was already dead, in good faith joined herself in marriage to another man; and since it is now impossible to investigate whether the first husband is still living or in fact dead, it is asked whether she can be left in the use of the second marriage contracted until certainty is had concerning the life of the first husband? - Resp. They are to be left in good faith." Holy Office, 22 Mar. 1865.

"This too must furthermore be guarded against: that if perhaps it should happen that the prior spouse, whom they thought dead, is still among the living, then the second nuptials are altogether to be made void, and, the later spouse having been dismissed, each one is bound to return to the prior." S. C. de Prop. Fid. 1792.; Enchir. Morale ed. 4. n. 1032.

193. The use of marriage has the nature of a right and of a debt. For in the matrimonial contract spouses mutually hand over to each other the right to their own body, in order to its legitimate use through copulation of itself apt for generation.

194. Prop. 1. Neither spouse is bound, speaking of itself, to ask for the debt; although by accident one is sometimes bound, either from charity, e.g., to avert a danger of incontinence threatening the spouse, or from legal justice, because the public welfare is endangered unless offspring be born. L. n. 938. - The first reason is because anyone can yield his own right. The second reason is because in those circumstances the precept of charity toward one's neighbor and of legal justice presses.

195. Note. 1. By accident the man is sometimes bound to ask for the debt, namely if the wife tacitly exacts it; for instance, if she shows some indication by which she signifies a tacit petition; because in women, on account of innate modesty, such signs are held as a true petition. Wherefore the man rather renders than asks. Conversely, "a woman is not bound to render to the man unless he expressly asks; for since men are not ashamed to exact expressly, wives can well presume that men who do not expressly ask do not wish to oblige them to ask; indeed I judge that they cannot, because the husband cannot bind the woman to ask the debt with such great embarrassment on her part. Yet Sanchez rightly excepts, with St. Antoninus, Navarre, Sylvester, and Manuel, unless such embarrassment should sometimes rather be presumed to be on the part of the man than of the woman (which otherwise rarely happens); for instance, if she were of very great authority, or of a fierce condition, and the man very fainthearted and modest. Yet regularly (Sanchez well adds) the wife is not bound to ask, unless it is evident to her concerning this faintheartedness and shame of the husband." L. 298.

2. Hence "it is certain that ordinarily the wife is not bound to ask, because this is notably immodest for women. It is also certain that when the other spouse is in danger of incontinence, both husband and wife are bound to ask, in order to free the other from danger." But since more probably the spouse is then not bound to ask except from charity, "because where there is no express or tacit petition of the other spouse, there is no obligation of justice to render," "one is not bound to ask with great inconvenience; hence probably the wife is then excused from asking, if in this she would have to undergo great modest embarrassment." L. 229.

196. Prop. 2. The obligation of rendering the debt to a spouse seriously and insistently asking, speaking of itself and from its own genus, is grave.

Pre-note. 1. It is said seriously and insistently asking; for "they commonly agree that the wife does not sin by denying if the man asks kindly or remissly... Likewise, if the spouse asking, even insistently, yields to the prayers of the one denying, who denies with a just cause; otherwise he also would sin venially... unless the prayers were so importunate that the other seemed as if forced to yield; or unless there were danger of incontinence in the other; for then it would not be lawful, even by prayers, without grave cause, to turn him away." Speaking of itself; for by accident such obligation can cease, as will be clear from the following questions. From its own genus; for 1. "the wife does not seem to sin if she delays rendering for a short time, namely until night..., or if from night she delays until morning..., yet with danger of incontinence always excluded. But after copulation has been had in the day, she cannot deny at night." L. 940. - 2. "The one denying does not sin when the other asks immoderately, yet without danger of incontinence, and in this also all agree. Hence Laymann, etc., say that it is not mortal, after the third copulation has been had in the same night, to deny a fourth." L. 940. - 3. But whether it is grave to deny once or twice, see below n. 198.

The proof is because the conjugal debt is a debt from justice, and in a matter of great moment. Therefore if it is asked seriously and insistently, the obligation of itself and from its own genus is grave. Diana, tr. 6. de Matr. res. 178. n. 1.; I, 179. n. 1.; Sporer 506.; Laymann, l. 5. tr. 3. p. 3. c. 1. n. 1.

197. Corollaries. 1. The man or woman sins gravely if, against the will of the partner, he or she renders himself or herself impotent even by other lawful means, e.g., fasts, etc.; indeed, if otherwise one cannot render the debt, he lawfully does not observe the fasts of the Church. L. 942.; Billuart, diss. 4. art. 4. de matr. - 2. By reason of rendering the debt, spouses are bound to cohabit not only as to the house but also as to the bed, unless they are separated by consent, and then danger of incontinence and harm to education is absent. But the man can lawfully undertake some brief pilgrimage from a cause of devotion, or another honorable cause, even against the will of the wife; but not the wife, against the will of the husband. Indeed the man can also be absent for a long time, if this is fitting for the public good or for the family; thus commonly Sanchez, Castropalaus, Bossius, Laymann, etc. But Bossius says with Toletus and Sayrus that the man is then bound to lead the wife with him, if he conveniently can. But when the wife is bound to follow the husband, and when the husband is bound to lead her, see what was said concerning the fourth precept, t. 1. tr. VII. n. 13.; L. Homo Ap. tr. XVIII. n. 59. - But in that place the holy Doctor has these things: "The wife sins... if she unjustly refuses to follow the husband who changes domicile, even without sufficient cause, and even if he goes forth to distant parts, where he must remain for a rather long time; because if he had to return shortly, neither is the woman bound to go, nor the man to lead her, just as the man also is not bound if great expense were needed to lead her with him. Thus commonly. On the contrary, the woman is not bound to follow the man: 1. if such an agreement had been entered into in the betrothal, and no new and grave cause, not then noticed, had arisen; 2. if the man wished to lead her to an evil end; 3. if on the journey she would have to expose herself to grave danger of death, or of another grave harm; 4. if the man wished to go abroad. But whether the wife is bound to follow an exiled husband, some deny, but more probably they affirm...," tr. VII. 13.

198. Does a spouse who denies the debt once or twice sin gravely?

Resp. The first opinion says that even to deny once, or to delay the debt for one seriously and insistently asking, speaking of itself, is mortal, even when the danger of pollution is removed. The reason is that this seems matter sufficiently grave, both by reason of offspring, which can well be begotten from one copulation, and by reason of discord and danger of incontinence, which can follow from such denial. But the second opinion denies, provided danger of pollution is absent, because this in reality does not seem matter so grave as to constitute lethal fault. Several and grave theologians hold this opinion; whence concerning it St. Alphonsus, 940, says: "It does not seem improbable, since the gravity of matter depends on the estimation of men, and so many grave doctors judge this to be light matter; but they themselves say this on the supposition that danger of incontinence or great dissension is absent; otherwise, the procreation of offspring for that turn is very uncertain."

199. Is it a just cause for denying the debt, if more children are born than the spouses can support?

Resp. The first opinion denies: both because the procreation of offspring looks to the principal end of marriage, to which any inconvenience whatever must be postponed, for it is better that the offspring live poor than not exist at all; and because either the spouse would deny for a long time or sometimes. If for a long time, he would expose the other to danger of incontinence; if sometimes, he would deny in vain, for spouses by coiting more rarely conceive more easily. The second opinion affirms: both because the multiplicity of future offspring would yield to the harm of children already begotten, and because in all debts great difficulty excuses from payment. - Yet they commonly agree: 1. that there is an obligation of rendering if there is danger of incontinence in the other, which in fact will scarcely not be present if they lie in the same bed, and the other asks for the debt; 2. if matters were situated at that point that, because of the generation of new offspring, parents or offspring would have to be reduced to extreme poverty, then the conjugal debt could justly be denied; 3. if the wife denied the debt to a husband who consumed everything, and allowed her with the children to endure hunger and miseries, until he amended himself, she would not easily be accused of grave sin. L. 491.; Sporer n. 516.; Struggl n. 109.; Laymann, l. c. n. 16.

200. Is a spouse bound to render the debt to one insane or drunk?

Resp. "Navarre and others affirm, because a drunken spouse, or one made insane, still retains the dominion acquired over the body of the other; nor does insanity stand in the way of the procuring of offspring. But Busembaum, Laymann, Paul Laymann, Bonacina, Sanchez, and others very commonly and more probably deny... The reason is that although these retain dominion, nevertheless they are incapable of the use of dominion. Make exception, 1. if in them there is danger of wasting semen, because although they themselves sin, nevertheless an act materially evil is to be impeded. Make exception, 2. if someone were not universally insane, but only in one or another matter; or if he were only foolish, but not altogether deprived of mind; or if he asks while he has a lucid interval. But although there is no obligation of rendering to an insane or drunken spouse, nevertheless it is lawful to render to him, as the aforesaid authors commonly say, since the use of marriage is lawful of itself, and the offspring can be educated by the spouse of sound mind. Provided (it must be understood) that danger of scandal or abortion is absent. Hence Sanchez and Bossius well add that it is not lawful to coit with a furiously insane wife, unless by experience she is known to be sterile. He also would sin who joined spouses, both insane, to copulation, because he would be the cause that children would lack due education." L. 948.; Laymann, l. c. n. 9. It must be added that those conceived in drunkenness are very easily born prone to alienation of mind, to insanity and scrofula; and alcohol can infect even the ovule itself and the semen. To this is added that offspring can easily be born dull and deaf-mute. Wherefore a spouse is not bound to render to a drunken spouse. Antonelli, vol. 2. p. 205. n. 438.

201. Is it lawful to render to one asking illicitly with mortal sin?

Resp. If the fault is on the side of the act, for instance when the man wishes to exercise onanism or sodomy, or wishes to use marriage in a sacred or public place, or with evident danger of abortion, or with grave harm to health, if the man or woman, e.g., labors under an organic vice of the heart, in which case copulation could then cause sudden death, and this were established, cf. here nn. 184, 185, all agree that the spouse is not bound, nor able, to render without grave fault. The reason is that to render then is to cooperate in the sinful act itself. But no one can be obliged to sin. - If the fault is on the side of the one asking, for instance because he is bound by vow, asks for a depraved end, etc., there is controversy. The first opinion says not only that one can, but also is bound. The reason is that, although the spouse asks illicitly, nevertheless he does not ask unjustly, since he does not lose the right of asking because he exacts the debt with sin. But this kind of reason, as is clear, holds only for the case in which the spouse retains the right whole, as if he has made a vow of chastity; but by no means for the case in which he has lost this kind of right, as if he has committed incest. Cf. Laymann, l. c. n. 17., and here n. 214. The second opinion says neither is one bound, nor able. The reason is that if that conjugal act is illicit to the one asking, it is not lawful for the other spouse immediately to cooperate in that illicit act. The third opinion says that one can render but is not bound. One can; for the spouse rendering gives his work not to the sin of another, but to a lawful thing; for the sin of the other spouse is wholly subjective. One is not bound, speaking of itself; because a debtor is not bound to restore to the owner a thing which he is going to abuse gravely for sinning. "When the thing to be restored appears gravely harmful to him to whom restitution is to be made, or to another, it should not then be restored to him; because restitution is ordered to the utility of him to whom it is restored; for all things which are possessed fall under the notion of the useful." St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 62. a. 5. ad 1. - But Lugo apud St. Alphonsus says that, since this obligation is only of charity, the debtor is not obliged to deny if he cannot deny without grave inconvenience, which will altogether excuse from cooperation in the material of sin, which rather is a permitting of the sin which the other commits. But it is said speaking of itself; for if it would be an occasion of other sins also for the spouse, of indignation, dissension, etc., with grave inconvenience of the other spouse excluded, he is then bound by reason of charity to render the debt. Cf. here n. 125 and following. Furthermore this third opinion is deduced as a corollary from the two prior ones; for each of those opinions is probable both intrinsically and extrinsically. - "Yet Sanchez and others well observe that in that case the spouse is bound to warn the one asking, who is bound by vow, to desist from the petition, provided he can warn without fear of great dissension, or indignation, or incontinence of the other; which inconveniences Sanchez and Bossius say are present for the most part." L. 494.; Struggl n. 105. Cf. here n. 127.

202. Is the other bound to render to one asking with only venial fault?

Resp. If the fault is on the side of the act, one can indeed render when a just cause is present, since any just cause excuses here from venial sin; but one is by no means bound, because since the act is illicit of itself, the other does not have a right to it. "Indeed he is truly bound to render if the one asking would have a just cause on his side for asking even in that way, for instance if he asked copulation in an unnatural position because the wife is pregnant, or he himself is corpulent, or otherwise there would threaten danger of scandal...; or if he asks during the time of menstruation or puerperium with danger of incontinence, according to what was said n. 917 and 925 toward the end." St. Alphonsus, n. 946.; Lessius, de Iust. et Iur. c. 4. c. 3. d. 13. n. 89. - But if the fault is on the side of the one asking, one can again render; for he himself gives his work to a lawful thing, and almost always there is also an extrinsic cause excusing from cooperation, or rather making the permission honorable, lest he displease the spouse. But one is by no means bound, speaking of itself and by reason of justice, because of the same reason just given; for neither is a debtor bound to restore a thing which the owner is going to abuse even lightly for sinning, but he can delay restitution. Indeed, charity rather obliges to this, yet it does not press with proportionate inconvenience of the spouse. Wherefore, such inconvenience being excluded, if from denial a far graver sin of the spouse would follow, e.g., hatred, quarrels, etc., then one would be bound to render by reason of charity; and therefore for the most part one is obliged to render. Laymann, l. c. n. 18. St. Alphonsus contradicts, who in this question, as also in the preceding one, simply affirms that the spouse both can and is bound to render the debt because of the reason explained above for the first opinion. Cf. here n. 125 and following.

203. As a spouse is bound to render the debt to one asking, is he also bound to admit touches and other incomplete acts which the other spouse may wish to exercise in the other, independently indeed of the conjugal act, but short of onanism or pollution?

Resp. St. Alphonsus affirms, l. c. n. 934. But it seems one must respond: negatively, by reason of justice. For the spouse, properly and strictly speaking, does not have a right except to asking for the debt of the conjugal act; but to other things he does not have a right, properly and strictly speaking, in the rigor of justice, except in order to the rendering of that debt. But by reason of charity, for instance to avoid the spouse's sin, to foster his love and the peace of the family, etc., a spouse can also be bound to admit those acts, unless, however, grave inconvenience is present, since charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience. Cf. L. l. 6. n. 946.

204. Prop. 3. The aforesaid obligation of rendering the debt does not press in certain cases, namely: 1. in the first two months; 2. if the other party has committed adultery; 3. if the one asking has committed incest with blood relatives of the other party within the second degree; 4. if there has been a pact concerning non-use of marriage; 5. when, because of grave danger to soul or body, divorce or separation from bed, or even habitation, is lawfully made; and this divorce indeed can also lawfully be made either for a time or in perpetuity because of adultery or by mutual consent.

205. Proof of the first part: The obligation of rendering the debt does not press in the first two months. "In the first two months after marriage has been entered into by words de praesenti, spouses are not obliged to render the debt by which the marriage would be consummated, because by the sacred canons, c. Ex publico, de Convers. coniug., in those two months, while the marriage is only ratified and not consummated, they can deliberate about assuming Religion: read Sanchez, lib. 2. de matr. disp. 22. But if they are certain that they do not wish to be Religious, they are still not obliged to render. Thus Praepositus in 3. p. q. 3. dub. 6. n. 47. apud Diana, p. 4. tr. 4. res. 33.; Sanchez favors this, l. c. n. 16., against Coninck, de Sacr. d. 26. dub. 4. concl. 2. n. 46., because that intention does not remove the right which they have during that whole two-month period, which right indeed was given absolutely, although for that extrinsic end of deliberating. After consummation of the marriage, at whatever time made, it will always thereafter be necessary to render; because there is no longer place for Religion." Tamburini, Explic. Dec. l. VII. c. III. Sect. 5. n. 25.

206. Note. The aforesaid faculty of entering religion "is understood," says St. Alphonsus, 958, "provided the marriage was not necessary for legitimating offspring, or repairing scandal, or the honor of the betrothed woman, who because of infamy would no longer be able to find nuptials. But Sanchez, etc., say that if, after the two months have passed, a spouse enters Religion, he would profess illicitly, but validly, because the Council in d. can. 6. pronounced indistinctly thus: If anyone says that a ratified and non-consummated marriage is not dissolved by the solemn profession of Religion of one of the spouses, let him be anathema. But for a marriage to be called consummated, penetration of the feminine vessel is not sufficient, but effusion of semen into it is required; thus commonly the doctors, etc. But either spouse can lawfully deny the debt within the two months, although he does not have the intention of entering Religion, because he uses his own right; thus commonly Palaus, etc. Yet a spouse would sin who contracted marriage with the intention of entering Religion." Cf. also n. 870 at the end.

915. Principles. - I. There is an obligation of justice, grave of itself, to render the debt to the other spouse who seriously and reasonably seeks it. The reason is that, from the very nature of the matrimonial contract, spouses transfer to one another power over their bodies in order to conjugal use. It is also deduced from the words of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 7:3: Let the husband render the debt to the wife, and the wife likewise to the husband; the woman does not have power over her own body, but the husband; and likewise the husband does not have power over his own body, but the woman.

II. Of itself no obligation to seek the conjugal debt urges. The reason is that neither spouse is bound to use his or her right, and each can remit it. Accidentally, however, there can be an obligation of seeking from charity or another virtue, especially in the man; for example, if he judges that the other party is placed in danger of incontinence on account of modesty in seeking, or if the request is necessary for fostering or restoring conjugal love, etc. - See St. Ligorius, nos. 928, 929.

III. The obligation to render the debt ceases when the right to demand it ceases; but the right is extinguished chiefly in the following cases, namely: 1. if one of the spouses has committed adultery; 2. if the one seeking lacks the use of reason, because that person's request is not human; 3. if the one rendering can reasonably fear harm or grave danger to health, because spouses are not judged to have obligated themselves to render the debt with so great an inconvenience; 4. if the one seeking, on account of incest committed with the blood relatives of the other in the first or second degree, or for another cause, has lost the right of seeking ¹.

¹ Perhaps the loss of a right over the body of the other is here confused with an illicit use of the right on account of some circumstance. Therefore these things do not agree with those said above, no. 909, where it is established that the spouse who contracted affinity on account of incest can, indeed is bound to, render the debt to the other.

916. Resolutions. - 1. Spouses are bound to cohabitation, nor can one be absent for a long time without the consent of the other or without necessity; for this obligation follows from the obligation itself of rendering the debt. But just causes for being away for a long time are the public good, the support or protection of the family, and the avoidance of injury from enemies, etc. But a husband who must remain elsewhere for a long time ought to bring his wife there, if he conveniently can, so that she may cohabit with him. - St. Ligorius, no. 938.

2. A spouse sins gravely by denying the debt whenever there is danger of incontinence or of grave vexation in the other party. Likewise, if the spouse denies it to the other who seriously seeks it. It is otherwise, however, if the other party benevolently remits it or seeks it remissly.

3. One who denies does not sin when the other seeks immoderately, for example, after the third or fourth time in the same night; nor if the spouse delays for a short time, namely, until night, or if from night the spouse delays until the morning, always excluding, however, danger of incontinence. - St. Ligorius, no. 940.

4. Wives are to be reprehended who deny the debt to their husbands without sufficient cause, even if they seek it remissly; or who do not grant it unless compelled and harshly and contumeliously reproach the husband for his requests.

5. A wife is not excused from rendering the debt on account of the ordinary inconveniences of childbirth, pregnancy, or nursing, nor on account of pains which are indeed grave but brief in time, nor on account of prolonged but moderate pains, for example, of the head for several months after childbirth, nor on account of health somewhat weakened; because all these things are annexed to the matrimonial condition. It is otherwise, however, if danger of life or of a most grave illness would truly have to be feared according to the judgment of a prudent physician. - St. Ligorius, no. 952.

6. There is no obligation to render the debt to the other spouse laboring under a disease grave in itself and contagious, such as plague, venereal disease, or something similar. Likewise, those laboring under a strong fever or another grave illness are excused from rendering the debt on account of notable weakness of the body. - St. Ligorius, no. 950.

7. A spouse is not excused from rendering the debt on account of fear of more numerous offspring; for the procreation of offspring pertains to the principal end of matrimony, whence that inconvenience is intrinsic to matrimony itself. - St. Ligorius, no. 941.

16. 1° On the liceity of conjugal copula by reason of the end. That marital copula is in itself an honorable, laudable, and therefore meritorious work has already been proved elsewhere. But here it is asked what end the spouses ought to intend in order that such an act be licit.

(a) It is certain that the conjugal act is licit when it is exercised for the ends on account of which marriage was instituted by God, namely for the generation of offspring, - as a remedy for concupiscence, - or for satisfying the consort legitimately asking; for then the pleasure which the spouses enjoy is ordered to a superior end intended by God Himself.

(b) It is likewise certain that the same act is licit whenever it is performed for any honest end whatever, e.g., for fostering conjugal love, for the health of the body; for an act good of itself, elicited for an honest end, cannot be evil; moreover any honest end ultimately tends toward the ends intended by God in the very institution of marriage.

17. (c) It is also certainly established that that act is illicit, at least venially, when it is so exercised for pleasure alone that all honest ends are positively excluded: for then there is present a perversion of the order of nature, while one wishes to enjoy venereal delight against the order intended by God, by positively excluding every end by which such an act can be rendered honorable. The sin is grave if means are employed for preventing generation, as is said below, n. 40; venial, if means of this sort are not employed.

(d) But if the conjugal act is indeed exercised for pleasure, yet in such a way that honest ends are not excluded, nor even virtually included, certainly mortal sin is not committed; indeed, according to some¹, there is no venial fault, because it is licit to seek delight good in itself, without its being positively referred to an honest end, provided this end is not excluded. Nevertheless, according to the common opinion², it is a venial sin to exercise the conjugal act for pleasure alone, not referring it virtually to some honest end; for since delight is a means to an end, and is annexed to the operation so that we may elicit the act more easily and better, it is a disorder to stop in delight as in an end, and in no way refer it to an honest end. - In this sense this ninth proposition was deservedly condemned by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679: "The conjugal work exercised for pleasure alone is entirely free from all fault and venial defect."³ - But in practice most spouses either virtually refer this act to an honest end, or think themselves guilty of no fault, provided they have copula rightly, and they can be left in good faith⁴.

¹ Thus especially Ball. P., n. 323-361, ed. 3, with the authors cited there.

² Cf. Vindiciae Alphons., p. 822-840.

³ Apud Denzinger, n. 1026; cf. Viva, Thes. damnat., in this place.

⁴ If someone wishes to instruct penitents concerning right intention and moderation in the conjugal debt, let him refer them to St. Francis de Sales, Introduction a la Vie devote, Part III, chap. 38-39.

(e) But if delight is intended secondarily and moderately together with another honest end, there is no sin, even venial, because delight is sought in an ordered way as a means to something good.

18. Corollaries: (a) Spouses sin gravely who exercise copula with an adulterous affection, i.e., thinking of another person as present and desiring to have copula with that person; for then they affectively commit adultery. But if they think of another person, and of that person's beauty, so that they may excite themselves for the conjugal act, without any depraved desire, they do not sin; nevertheless this is dangerous, since the will is easily carried toward the object thought of.

(b) The conjugal act is licit for the sterile, for whom there is no hope of begetting offspring; for, besides the generation of offspring, there are other honest ends, e.g., quieting of concupiscence, by which copula can be rendered honorable. - Nor do those sin even venially who use marriage as a remedy for concupiscence: for this is one of the ends on account of which marriage was instituted; moreover one who wishes to avoid incontinence, by that very fact intends to preserve conjugal chastity.

19. (c) Spouses who, because of poverty or another honest end, internally desire that offspring not be conceived from copula, do not sin, provided they use no illegitimate means for impeding generation.

(d) The conjugal act is licit even if it is foreseen that perhaps the woman is going to suffer abortion or give birth to dead offspring; for such an effect occurs by accident, and therefore can be permitted for an honest end, e.g., the quieting of concupiscence. But the offspring conceived, even if it be deprived of supernatural beatitude, can enjoy a certain natural happiness, as is explained in the Treatise on God the Creator, n. 205.

20. 2° On the liceity of the conjugal act by reason of circumstances. (A) Things to be noted beforehand. (a) That copula be done legitimately, three things are generally required and suffice: penetration of the due vessel, or vagina; effusion of seed within the vagina; and retention of the seed by the woman, so that it can be drawn into the uterus and, at the opportune time, fecundate one of the ova which descend from the ovaries. - The general principle is that those sin gravely who knowingly and willingly do not observe these three things substantially in exercising copula; for then they act against the primary end of marriage.

21. Nevertheless, since today it is established that conception can take place without penetration of the vagina - provided that virile seed is poured forth at the lips of the female organ - the man who, because of some defect, cannot accomplish copula more perfectly can perform it in this imperfect manner, even if by accident part of the seed is lost; for, provided there is hope of begetting offspring, spouses can attempt coitus in the better manner in which it can be done.

(b) When these three things have been substantially observed, disorder concerning the accidentals of copula does not exceed venial sin, provided nevertheless that from the disordered circumstances there does not follow grave scandal or some other spiritual or temporal harm. The reason is that, these things being observed, generation can take place and the primary end of marriage be obtained.

22. (B) On the position of copula. (a) The natural position is that the man be above and the woman beneath, since this mode is generally more apt for the infusion of seed. Nevertheless no position, even unnatural (sitting, standing¹, or with the woman above, etc.), of itself impedes generation, since seed can ascend into the uterus by attraction; hence change of the natural position does not exceed venial sin, provided the danger of pouring forth all the seed outside the vessel is excluded; even if a not small part of the seed is dispersed by accident, it is not mortal sin, because the smallest part of seed suffices for fecundation.

¹ According to experts of the medical art, to exercise copula sitting and especially standing can induce certain diseases. Cf. Vigouroux, Tr. de Medecine, vol. IV, p. 65. Hence on this head spouses are to be kept from a position of this sort.

(b) If a change of the natural position is made for a legitimate cause, e.g., because of danger of abortion during the time of pregnancy, or because of difficulty of coming together otherwise, there is no sin, even venial.

Hence in practice spouses must not be questioned concerning the position which they employ in exercising the conjugal act, since this is not necessary for the integrity of confession. If they inquire concerning it, let it be answered that the natural position is to be observed insofar as it can be done. If they accuse themselves of an unnatural position, let it be asked only whether they so act in order to impede generation.

23. (C) On place. (a) Modesty and charity demand that the use of marriage can take place only in a secret place, lest scandal be furnished to others. Therefore those sin gravely who have copula before others, especially younger persons, who can suffer scandal from it. Therefore parents must take care lest children sleeping in the same bedroom acquire knowledge of the marital matter.

(b) In a sacred place the use of marriage is prohibited under penalty of sacrilege, outside a case of necessity, which today will hardly ever occur.

24. (D) On time. (a) By today's discipline the conjugal act is strictly prohibited on no feast days. It is nevertheless more advisable to abstain from asking the debt on feast days, or days of fasting, and on the night preceding Holy Communion; nevertheless it is to be rendered to one legitimately asking, especially if in the other consort danger of incontinence could be feared. Hence those who have had copula in an honorable manner must not be kept from Communion.

(b) During the time of the ordinary menstrual flow, copula is not illicit of itself¹, since conception can then take place, and indeed more easily than at another time². But women, when they suffer the flow, naturally abhor every marital congress; moreover not without danger to health do they render the conjugal debt; the man himself can contract some disease (urethritis), if the blood which remains in the vagina is in some way vitiated³; hence it is more advisable at that time to abstain from copula. - During the time of an extraordinary flow, which endures for a longer time, copula is licit, provided the disease under which the woman labors and which causes the flow is not much aggravated by it: concerning this the physician will judge. But the man who cares for the health of his wife will abstain in these circumstances from frequent copula, so that that disease may more easily decrease and be cured.

¹ Under the Old Law it was prohibited, and indeed under penalty of death (Levit., XV, 19-20; XX, 18); perhaps because in warm regions that flow is wont to be more copious, and the part of the blood which remains in the organs is easily corrupted, and can induce very bad diseases in the man coiting.

² Hence the sterile can be admonished to have copula at the time of menstruation, if at other times they have not conceived.

³ Vigouroux, op. cit., p. 64. - It is in no way to be feared that, through copula had at that time, leprosy is contracted or monsters are generated: for this is a fable long since exploded.

25. (c) During the time of pregnancy, copula is not of itself illicit although generation can no longer take place, because there can be other ends for rendering it honorable. But by accident it can be illicit because of danger of abortion. Now that danger in healthy wives is not probable, if copula is had moderately; but unrestrained and often repeated copula can easily induce abortion, especially in the first⁴ and last times of pregnancy, and under this respect it is more or less illicit according to the gravity of the danger which it brings.

⁴ The state of beginning pregnancy is not easily recognized; nevertheless, if the spouses suspect pregnancy, moderation in copula must be recommended to them.

26. (d) During the time of puerperal purgation, which follows childbirth, copula is illicit not indeed because of itself, but because of the harm which threatens the wife¹, and therefore gravely or lightly, according as the harm brought is grave or not. Now, according to Capellmann (p. 154), generally during the first two weeks after childbirth grave harm can be brought, and light harm during the four following weeks; but account must also be taken of the condition of each person in particular. When the harm which is feared is light, a reasonable cause excuses from every sin.

¹ "Childbed brings many things with it which at any other time would have to be called morbid, although here they are physiological... The things which happen at this time in the organs of generation, the changes and injuries produced by pregnancy, already of themselves dispose to various diseases: to flows of blood, inflammations, aberrant positions of the uterus." (Capellmann, p. 154).

27. (e) During the time of lactation, copula is licit; for the danger of infecting the milk, and therefore of harming the offspring, concerning which older authors speak, does not exist in any way. If a new conception occurs (which rarely happens during the time of lactation), the milk indeed is lessened and soon ceases, but is not corrupted; and the offspring can be nourished by artificial lactation. Hence spouses are not bound to abstain from copula during the whole time of lactation.

28. (f) During the time of illness of either spouse, the use of marriage is illicit when grave danger of life or health can prudently be feared from it; but if the danger is neither proximate nor certain, a grave reason excuses: concerning this a physician is to be consulted.

1. When there is question of syphilitic or venereal disease, copula is gravely illicit, because of the morally certain danger of infecting the consort and the offspring²; this danger is so grave and dreadful that, although the older theologians speak more mildly concerning it, moderns with Capellmann (p. 159) deservedly say: "In this matter I judge that not even the danger of incontinence is an honesting cause."

² Concerning this Capellmann writes, p. 159: "Infants are syphilitic like the parents, at least for the most part, even when the syphilis of the parents lies hidden; abortion will be very frequent, or an immature infant is brought forth, or the very infants born mature perish most miserably in the first months of life. Hundreds of infants in this way, and often not even baptized, pay for the sins of the parents." How dreadful syphilis is, authors on medical matters describe, e.g., H. Vigouroux, Traite de Medecine Pratique, vol. IV, p. 202-304; Duclaux, L'Hygiene sociale, Paris, 1902, p. 224-266; Surbled, op. cit., p. 76-99; Stall, What a Young Man ought to know, ch. IV-VI.

2. In contagious diseases which can induce death in a short time, copula is not licit, since no one is master of his own life; in others, where such danger is only remote, e.g., in phthisis, it is licit for a grave cause.

3. In non-contagious diseases, copula is illicit if they are joined with fever and great pain, since these ordinarily are much aggravated through copula, and in certain cases danger of death is present. Almost the same must be said of chronic illnesses by which the organs of generation in women are affected; for although they are judged light at the beginning, through the use of copula they are often aggravated, so that afterward they are not easily healed. Hence, if the physician judges that one must abstain from copula for some time, it is fitting to obey his commands. - But if the diseases are lighter and not greatly debilitating, they do not easily become worse through copula; and therefore they do not prohibit the use of marriage.

29. (g) Copula, after much drinking of intoxicating liquors, is not licit, because offspring conceived in drunkenness is in danger lest it be born foolish or deaf-mute or liable to drunkenness. After a copious meal the use of marriage is not free from danger, and even today's physicians assert that "not rarely those passing from table to copula are struck by sudden death"; nevertheless the danger for healthy men is not proximate. In antiquity it was held that copula after a bath or bloodletting was dangerous and therefore illicit; but this is denied by moderns.

30. Besides copula itself there are other acts more or less connected with it, concerning whose liceity one must inquire. Now there are three principles from which the morality of these acts can be judged: (a) whatever is truly useful for the generation of offspring is absolutely licit; (b) whatever is done besides, but not against, generation does not exceed venial sin; (c) whatever works against conception is mortal. This must be explained a little more fully.

31. 1° Whatever is useful for the generation of offspring is absolutely licit. (A) Imperfect venereal acts, whether mutual or solitary, such as looks, touches, embraces, kisses, conversations, etc., are licit for spouses when they wish to accomplish copula, insofar as they conduce to performing the conjugal act more perfectly and easily. For when the end is licit, by that very fact the means naturally ordered to the end are licit; now all those acts are ordered to copula and are as it were its beginning. - Nevertheless spouses ought not to linger too long in acts of this sort, lest perhaps pollution follow before copula; for if they intended effusion of seed outside marital copula, they would sin gravely, since they would seek complete venereal delight against the order of nature. But if sometimes pollution follows besides intention while they occupy themselves with these previous acts, there is no sin.

32. (B) Hence, if the man has emitted seed before the woman emits seed¹ (which not rarely occurs, since many women are colder than men), she can by touches or another mode excite herself to emission; for although the seed of the wife is not necessary for generation, it completes the conjugal act and quiets concupiscence; and if women, after irritation of the organs which arises from copula, were held to restrain nature, they would often be exposed to danger of sinning gravely. Moreover seminal emission of this sort contributes something so that the virile seed may more easily and more certainly ascend into the uterus and be joined with the ovule, and therefore favors conception.

¹ Here there is not question of true seed, which in women is nothing but the ovum; but of the vulvo-vaginal secretion which is emitted with pleasure.

Some think that this is also licit for the woman when the man, an onanist, withdraws himself before emission²; for since, as we suppose, she legitimately began the conjugal act, she can complete the same: otherwise, the genital organs remain irritated. But it is more commonly taught that this is not licit³; for since the man has not emitted seed within the vagina, conception cannot take place, and emission on the part of the woman would be pollution.

² Capellmann, p. 143-144.

³ Lehmkuhl, n. 858; Noldin, n. 65.

33. 2° Whatever is done besides, but not against, the generation of offspring, does not exceed venial sin. For venereal delight is licit for spouses when it is referred to some honest end, as was said above (n. 16); but if it is taken on account of itself, it is only venially illicit, provided danger of pollution is absent and nothing is performed against the chief end of marriage; for the disorder which is found in such acts is accidental and light. Hence:

(A) Mutual imperfect acts (touches, kisses, embraces, etc.), even when they are not ordered to copula, nor rendered honorable by any honest end, but are exercised for pleasure alone, are only venially illicit¹, provided proximate danger of pollution is absent, even if sometimes pollution should follow by accident: for then it is neither foreseen nor willed. Indeed, acts of this sort are altogether licit if they are rendered honorable by some honest end, e.g., for fostering mutual love, etc.

¹ Nevertheless those acts which are very obscene are commonly excepted, e.g., to put the genitals into the mouth of the woman, to penetrate the posterior vessel, to lick the genitals, etc. But these acts are gravely illicit, not precisely because obscene, but because for the most part they induce grave danger of pollution; hence, if in fact in certain persons such a danger did not exist, sodomitical affection having been excluded, they would not be gravely sinful. Nevertheless spouses are to be deterred from these, lest, the sense of conjugal modesty having been lost, they fall into worse things.

(B) Solitary imperfect acts, e.g., base touches exercised on one's own body, are indeed venial sins because they are done for pleasure alone; but not mortal, if they are performed without proximate danger of pollution. But those who so indulge themselves at a time when marital copula cannot be had easily expose themselves to the danger of proceeding further; not so if in those circumstances in which legitimate copula can be exercised, since, danger occurring, they can ask the debt.

34. 3° Whatever is against the generation of offspring is gravely illicit, since it is opposed to the primary end intended by God in the institution of marriage. Hence:

(A) Voluntary pollution outside conjugal copula, and whatever can induce proximate danger of pollution, are no less illicit in the married than in the unmarried; indeed they are graver, because besides chastity, the right of the other consort is injured; for, as St. Paul says², "the woman does not have power over her own body, but the man; and likewise also the man does not have power over his own body, but the woman." Hence also copula with a strange person is adultery, including two mortal sins, one against chastity, the other against justice; and if adultery is had between two married persons, there are three sins, one against chastity and two against justice, because the rights of two are injured. This indeed is true even if the other spouse cedes from his or her right; for here there is question of the right which arises from the very unity of marriage, as it has been established by God under the New Law, and therefore it cannot be alienated by the private authority of the spouses.

² I Cor., VII, 5.

Even in the wife pollution is a grave sin; for although it is not the effusion of prolific seed, but only the secretion of some humor useful for generation, but not necessary, nevertheless it is joined with complete venereal delight, and therefore ultimately is referred to generation; therefore to induce it, without any order to conjugal copula, is a grave disorder, since it is done against the order intended by nature.

35. (B) Sodomitic copula had between spouses is also a grave sin, i.e., penetration of the posterior vessel with effusion of seed in the same; for it is a grave disorder against nature, since it renders conception impossible; and also against conjugal fidelity, which forbids spouses to use the body of the consort except in a mode apt for generation; it also induces very bad diseases in the woman¹.

¹ See these described apud Surbled, op. cit., vol. II, p. 58-63.

Nevertheless to begin copula in the posterior vessel with the intention of consummating it in the vagina; or to touch the posterior vessel with the genitals, provided the effusion of seed is forestalled, and every sodomitical affection is excluded, are probably not mortal sins: because the former act is done as a preparation for copula in the due vessel, but the latter is only a touch between spouses not prohibited under grave obligation. Nevertheless they are to be exhorted to abstain from these things, as being indecent, and lest perhaps they soon commit sodomy itself.

An act by which spouses come together after the manner of animals, yet so that copula takes place in the due vessel, must be distinguished from the sin of sodomy; in which case some say that they came together in a posterior manner or from behind. Then the confessor ought to ask whether generation was possible in this mode or not; if they answer that it was possible, it is inferred that the act was not sodomitical, but only disordered in position; and this sin indeed does not exceed venial sin.

36. Here it is asked whether a wife can cooperate with sodomitical copula. The Sacred Penitentiary, April 3, 1916², responded thus: "But if the husband should wish to commit with her the crime of the Sodomites, since this sodomitical coitus is an act against nature on the part of each spouse thus coiting, and it is gravely evil by the judgment of all Doctors: hence, for no cause at all, not even to avoid death, can the wife licitly comply with her immodest husband in this matter." Therefore the opinion of those who, before this decree, thought that the woman could suffer that concubitus in order to avoid death cannot be admitted; but the common doctrine must be held, namely that that cooperation, even passive, is a sin against nature.

² Apud Marc, Institutiones Morales, 16th ed., 1920, n. 2116.

(C) Onanistic copula is also gravely prohibited; it must be treated specially because of its frequency and depraved consequences.

37. Corollaries. (A) On artificial fecundation. This occurs when virile seed cannot naturally be retained in the female organs; then, by the aid of a syringe, it is introduced into the uterus itself, often with a happy outcome, i.e., with conception of offspring. This can be done especially in a twofold mode: (a) legitimate copula having first been had between spouses, the seed received in the vagina is drawn out by the aid of a syringe and injected into the uterus; (b) the man pours forth seed by solitary or onanistic pollution, which by syringe is introduced into the organs of the woman. Now the former mode is not illicit, provided fecundation cannot take place naturally, because it is employed only for aiding nature; but the latter is gravely illicit, because the means employed, namely directly voluntary pollution, is something evil in itself. Hence the Holy Office, March 24, 1897, when this doubt was proposed: "Whether artificial fecundation of a woman can be employed?", responded: "It is not licit."¹

¹ Apud Acta S. Sedis, XXIX, p. 704.

38. (B) On the internal sins of spouses. (a) It is a grave sin to wish for copula with a strange person, or to rejoice concerning copula had or to be had with that person: for this is nothing else than internally to consent to adultery.

(b) Venereal delight concerning copula had or to be had with one's own spouse, or the desire of it, the proximate danger of pollution nevertheless being excluded, is not a sin: because it is joy or desire concerning a licit thing. Hence, if one spouse is absent, a vivid thought of this sort is very dangerous, since on the one hand it induces danger of pollution, and on the other this danger cannot be averted through marital copula. In every case spouses are to be exhorted to abstain from these delights, since for the most part they are sought for pleasure alone.

(c) Delight or desire concerning acts between spouses venially illicit is a light sin; concerning things prohibited under grave obligation it is a grave sin; for delight and desire put on the morality of the object sought.

223. - That is perfect intercourse by which both spouses, from the carnal union of both, with the seed of the husband within the wife's vagina, are said to become one flesh.

This act, between spouses, is morally good from its object. It therefore remains to inquire what it requires from the end and what, besides, from the circumstances.

224. - We consider here the proximate end of the agent. Now, with attention to the end:

1. Intercourse is honorably requested for the generation of offspring; for testifying love; and for calming concupiscence.

For nature itself has placed these utilities in conjugal intercourse; nor, by the separate pursuit of one end, is the other or the third impeded per se. "Because, although intercourse is not had for the sake of propagating offspring, nevertheless the propagation of offspring is not obstructed for the sake of this lust, either by an evil wish or by an evil deed": thus St. Augustine ¹ confirms this doctrine, relying upon the very passage of the Apostle: "Defraud not one another, except perhaps by consent, for a time, that you may give yourselves to prayer; and return together again, lest Satan tempt you because of your incontinence" ².

¹ De nuptiis et concupiscentia, chapter 15, no. 17 (M. 44, 423).

² 1 Corinthians 7:5.

2. Intercourse is honorably rendered to the spouse requesting it whenever no grave harm, whether one's own, that of the other spouse, or that of offspring already conceived, stands in the way.

For one who complies with the requesting spouse observes the right acquired by that spouse in an honorable matter.

a) One's own harm can nevertheless stand in the way, for example, on account of a disease with which the rendering spouse is affected or of which he must fear certain contagion to himself.

Nevertheless, if a grave reason for assenting is added, for example, lest the requesting spouse sin formally, especially lest he become an adulterer, or lest domestic peace be banished, the rendering spouse can permit this evil to himself on account of a proportionate cause of this kind, provided death itself does not seem to threaten from intercourse. For then intercourse is excused only on account of a most grave and most urgent necessity, such as can arise from serious threats of death or infamy.

b) The harm of the other spouse can also stand in the way, who, for example, on account of a cardiac disease is prohibited by a physician from every use of marriage. For from charity and piety, one spouse ought to meet the grave harm of the other. This obligation, however, does not subsist with grave inconvenience, for the harm of one who wills it can more easily be disregarded than one's own harm. But if death threatens the other spouse who requests, the other cannot cooperate in that rash outpouring of life which the spouse requesting intercourse contemplates, unless excused by a most grave inconvenience ³.

³ Cf. Lehmkuhl, II, 1083.

c) The harm of offspring already conceived can also stand in the way. This harm must be guarded against more absolutely: for the offspring has an inviolable right, concerning which no other person can dispose, lest harm be inflicted upon it; and the parents are bound by a grave duty of piety to guard against these harms. Therefore, in order that a spouse, by rendering the debt, may cooperate materially in this harm, the harm must at least be truly grave. Nor will the rationale of preventing the sin of the other be sufficient.

But if it is a question of offspring to be conceived, which is foreseen to be born either dead or infected with disease, some hold the use of marriage not for that reason unlawful, since it is better for the offspring to be or to have been than not to have been ⁴; others concede the use of marriage, at least in the danger of incontinence ⁵.

⁴ Cf. Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 21, nos. 24 and 25; Génicot, II, 544.

⁵ Thus Lehmkuhl, II, 1064, 3.

Unless we were prohibited by a consideration of a different order, we would rather assent to the former. For the patrons of the other opinion also concede that it is better for the offspring to be born infirm than not to be born, and they consequently require the condition of the danger of incontinence less consistently. But the essential subordination of spouses to the species, or the primary end of marriage, not only forbids them to generate contrary to the order which the good of the species demands, but also imposes upon them the positive duty of bringing it about that birth occur in that manner which the good of the species demands, and consequently that a living and healthy fetus be brought forth. Yet, because the duty is positive, it admits excuse from a proportionate reason; and such a reason is had more easily here because fertilization after intercourse is uncertain and because no harm is inflicted upon the offspring perhaps to be conceived. And the harm of incontinence is also social. Wherefore intercourse is excused by the danger of incontinence.

225. - Hence the following cases are resolved:

1. If a physician declares that a new conception will certainly be fatal to the wife, the wife ought to decline intercourse. But if death does not threaten so closely, the wife can place herself in the danger for a grave cause. For, since conception itself is doubtful, the danger seems neither certain nor proximate. (Cf. Lehmkuhl, II, 1082.)

On these matters, however, one must approach a physician who is at once expert and God-fearing. For there are not lacking those who, because of slight indications, inconsiderately prohibit persons who are little continent from the honorable use of marriage. Wherefore Génicot ⁶ judges that it is very rarely established that there is such a danger from a future birth on account of which there is a grave obligation to abstain from the use of marriage.

⁶ Vol. 2, no. 544, 5.

2. For those suffering from consumption, intercourse is harmful to themselves rather than to the other party, though not always gravely so. Therefore, spouses of this kind are not bound per se by a grave obligation of abstaining; but excuse from a moderate obligation is easily at hand. Wherefore, while nevertheless observing the diseased condition and the counsels of the physician, moderation alone in use is to be preached to them. This will be very opportune, since they are accustomed to be ardent.

3. That, for a grave cause, the infected party should request intercourse by which venereal disease seems likely to be introduced, after the other has been admonished and consents, can be tolerated ⁷. But the other party is certainly permitted to admit that intercourse on account of a cause of this kind, for example, if otherwise prolonged abstinence would be imposed with danger of the husband's incontinence.

⁷ Génicot, II, 544; Lehmkuhl, II, 1083, V, 2.

4. Necessity or common utility of having, for example, one who may succeed to a kingdom can make intercourse, although it be gravely dangerous, not only morally good but also obligatory ⁸.

⁸ Cf. Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 24, no. 11.

5. Unless they are excused by a grave cause, such as the danger of incontinence, spouses cannot use marriage when they foresee a certain necessity of applying a remedy or treatment from which abortion, although not intended, will certainly or probably follow if the intercourse has been fruitful.

6. Furthermore, intercourses harmful to either party, or which give no hope of living offspring, are prudently to be dissuaded, just as they are condemned by the common opinion of men. Prudently, I say, that is, with the cause for using marriage also considered. But above all we shall turn away from intercourse those who thence incur common reproach, such as those who, infected with syphilitic disease, have not recovered sufficiently to be judged harmless by an upright and expert physician. The use of an antiseptic ointment can sometimes be permitted here, at least if the probability of conception is not removed by its use.

226. - You will ask whether one who has requested intercourse for pleasure alone sins.

Concerning this matter there is this statement of St. Thomas: "It is disordered and vicious if anyone uses food and venereal things for pleasure alone" ⁹. And among the propositions condemned by a decree of the Holy Office on 2 March 1679 by Innocent XI, at least as scandalous and pernicious in practice, there is found this one, no. 9: "The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely free from all guilt and venial defect."

⁹ Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 83.

The question, however, is easily answered in this manner. One who explicitly thinks of nothing except pleasure either positively excludes or does not exclude a further or different end. If he has positively excluded a further or different end, he sins, because he repudiates an honorable good, or refuses to act honorably; for man was created for an honorable end.

But if he has not excluded a different end, he will not sin except through an immoderate desire, by which he wishes to be delighted contrary to some duty, or through immoderate use. For it is honorable in this life to admit permitted pleasures moderately. Therefore, while he explicitly seeks moderate pleasure alone, he tacitly approves and intends that moral goodness. Wherefore one who acts thus will also be conscious of an honorable action, unless he has been deceived by the dicta of the rigorists.

To use other words: one who wishes pleasure only moderately wills it insofar as it is suitable to man, and consequently refers it tacitly to the utility which pleasure is seen to have in the present life.

Although, therefore, we profess that it is unlawful for you to use marriage, even moderately, for pleasure alone, we shall bring no scruple of sin to those who seek pleasure in the moderate use of marriage, as though they had acted for pleasure alone. Indeed, we shall tear scruples of this kind from the soul, lest Catholics appear fearful, but rather that they may strive toward better things with a nobler affection.

But the sin of a spouse who has wished to use marriage immoderately is to be measured from the duty which he omits, and does not exceed a venial sin ¹⁰.

¹⁰ Cf. the learned dissertation of Ballerini, Opus theologicum, vol. 6, nos. 323-361.

Moreover, it is established among all that no one is prohibited from receiving the pleasure joined to the right use of marriage. For "the pleasures of good operations are good, but those of evil operations are evil" (I-II, q. 34, art. 1).

227. - We shall consider in order the circumstances: who, why, when, in what manner, by what aids, and where. This one thing remains to be noted. To the question why, through the principal end itself and proximate, an answer can be given. But since we have now considered this, concerning the more remote or less principal and more extrinsic end something must be said in answer to the question why.

228. - One who is naturally sterile, indeed, as many hold, one who is impotent if it is that impotence which does not impede intercourse, whether the impotence be temporary or subsequent to marriage, is not prohibited from the complete use of marriage, insofar as he is capable of intercourse, that is, of penetration with seminal emission broadly so called.

In our opinion, no discussion of impotence subsequent to marriage is to be had here. For we judge all who are able to exercise intercourse to be potent; but concerning the others, that is, concerning those who are unable to copulate, the question of the lawfulness of intercourse is moved uselessly ¹. We have therefore mentioned impotent persons on account of the opinion of those who think that a wife who is unable to furnish an ovum, or a husband who is unable to furnish prolific semen because of a defect of an organ, is impotent.

¹ Concerning some, however, who, for example, at an advanced age, are able to pour out semen only at the opening of the vagina, something will be said below, no. 240, 4.

After marriage has been contracted, a man from whom both testicles are removed does indeed become impotent, but not immediately: he remains capable of fertilization for some days and of intercourse for some time.

229. - What if someone is doubtfully impotent?

R. 1. One who is doubtfully impotent does not lawfully contract marriage unless, after a diligent investigation, he has first found himself to be either certainly or at least probably potent ². For in a serious doubt concerning potency or impotence, the natural law seems to be interpreted in such a way that it does not impose celibacy, but permits access to a state lawful in itself for all, whose faculty is most useful to uprightness of morals. Moreover, sufficient provision is made here, as in other administrations, for the reverence owed to the sacrament through a conditional intention. This is now confirmed by canon 1068, § 2: "If the impediment of impotence is doubtful, whether by a doubt of law or by a doubt of fact, marriage is not to be impeded."

² St. Alphonsus, book 6, no. 1102; Lehmkuhl, II, 977.

A doubt is understood to be prudent ³, not that slight doubt which does not exclude moral certainty. Now a doubt of law will be present if it is disputed whether such a defect, for example, an occluded deferent canal, deprivation of the ovaries, or the necessity of undergoing a grave operation, renders someone impotent or sterile; a doubt of fact, if the necessity of the operation, or the capacity for erection and emission in the man, has not truly been established.

³ Cf. Wernz, vol. 4, part 2, no. 216, VIII.

Moreover, Lehmkuhl ⁴, following St. Alphonsus ⁵, wisely warns that a party whose potency alone is doubtful will be gravely injurious to the other unless he makes the other more certain concerning his condition.

⁴ Theologia moralis, II, 977, at the end.

⁵ Book 6, no. 1102.

2. After marriage has been contracted (even if an injury was committed against the other party), those who are doubtfully capable can, with the law of nature considered, attempt intercourse as long as some true hope of potency remains.

Formerly, at the petition of the other party, an ecclesiastical judge granted an experience of three years ⁶, to be computed from the sentence rendered or from the attempted intercourse, according as the complaint had been moved soon after the marriage or only later. If, after three years had elapsed, the impotence was at least morally established, the judge, sometimes after a supplementary oath and the testimony of the seventh hand had been requested, gave a sentence concerning the nullity of the marriage; this sentence, however, never passed into a res judicata, so that, if potency supervened, the marriage was to be restored of itself.

⁶ Cf. chapter Laudabilem, De frigidis et maleficiatis (IV, 15), or Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 17, no. 26, or Ballerini-Palmieri, vol. 6, no. 887.

But from the year 1817 the Holy See no longer had recourse to an experience of this kind, and this manner of proceeding was suppressed by the new Code.

I. Honesty of the object. 1. Perfect copulation, by which both spouses, from the carnal conjunction of both, with the semination of the man within the vagina of the wife, are said to become one flesh, is honest from its object. It is required besides that it be honest from the end and from the circumstances.

II. Honesty of the end. 2. With attention to the end, copulation is honestly asked for generating offspring, for testifying love, for quieting concupiscence; for nature itself assigns these utilities to conjugal copulation.

But the petition of the other is a sufficient reason for rendering, unless grave harm stands in the way, whether one's own, or that of the other spouse, or that of offspring already conceived.

One's own harm: it is a disease with which the one asked is affected, or whose contagion he has certainly to fear. Yet a grave reason for consenting, lest the one asking formally sin, especially lest he become an adulterer, lest domestic peace be absent, permits the spouse to admit that copulation, provided death does not seem to threaten from the copulation. For then only the most grave and most urgent necessity of avoiding a serious danger of killing or of infamy will excuse the copulation.

Harm of the other spouse, who, for example, on account of cardiac disease is prohibited from every use of marriage. Yet the obligation of denying, which is from charity and piety, does not subsist with grave inconvenience; for more easily than one's own harm can the harm of another willing person be put after. Nevertheless a most grave inconvenience is required so that one can cooperate in a copulation from which death threatens the other who is asking.

Harm of offspring already conceived, for example danger of abortion. For offspring has an inviolable right that harm not be brought upon it. Therefore the material cooperation of the one rendering the debt demands the excuse of harm at least truly grave and involuntary: the reason of avoiding another's sin does not suffice.

As to offspring to be conceived, certainly it will always profit this more to be born thus (for example infected by disease) than not to be born. Nevertheless the essential subordination of spouses to the species imposes upon them a positive duty of caring that offspring be born vital and healthy. Wherefore we agree with those who do not permit the use of marriage with this kind of foreseen harm except on account of danger of incontinence, or another proportionate cause, which is the more easily present because fecundation after copulation is uncertain, nor is the harm of the offspring to be conceived so certain.

Wherefore: a) very rarely is such a danger from a future birth established, on account of which there is a grave obligation of abstaining from the use of marriage (Gen. II, 544, 5°); b) to those laboring from phthisis only moderation in use is to be preached: they harm themselves rather than others, nor always gravely; yet attention must be paid to the morbid state and to the counsels of the physician; c) for a grave cause it can be tolerated that one who is affected by venereal disease ask copulation from the other, who has been warned and consents, which the other, on account of this kind of cause, is safely permitted to render, especially today, when sufficiently efficacious remedies seem to be at hand; d) for a grave cause, for example danger of incontinence, spouses must be excused so that they use marriage with the foreseen necessity of applying a remedy or rough treatment from which abortion follows per accidens.

But we shall concede this to the common opinion of men, that prudently, with the cause also of using marriage considered, we should dissuade copulations which fall into common reprehension, for example of those who have not sufficiently recovered from venereal disease.

Concerning copulation for the sake of delight, the things said in fundamental theology, n. 117, return.

III. Honesty of circumstances.

a) Who. No one who is capable of copulation is to be kept from the use of marriage. One who, after prudent investigation, is doubtfully impotent, both can contract matrimony conditionally and attempt copulation, so long as some true hope of potency remains. Nor will the pollutions which thence follow per accidens be imputed to those spouses.

But one who labors under certain temporal impotence will not be able meanwhile to attempt copulation. If, however, the impotence in the man is a defect of erection which is hoped to be gradually corrected by repeated attempts, or in the woman vaginismus (i.e. excessive sensitivity of the vagina which admits no contact) which perhaps will admit penetration, the man will be able to exercise those attempts, provided he procures in the better way he can the introduction of semen. For the individual attempts can be regarded as so many rightly begun copulations. Therefore there will be place for applying the principle of the double effect. Indeed many permit the copulation itself simply, of whatever sort, to the spouse made impotent, provided he, being capable of erection, pours forth the semen within the vessel of the wife.

Perpetual sterility, even badly procured, now does not impede the use of marriage: it is enough that the authors of the sin expiate it by penance. But a temporal impediment (for example, if the oviducts have been tied) must be removed as soon as possible by those who wish to use matrimony: copulation otherwise done would be infected with the vice of onanism. But if for a few days it will have been incurable, the innocent spouse, not participating in the delict, is not deprived of his right of asking the debt. The other, however, must through abstinence, if it is not too difficult, recall his action to honesty, which could not have been honest except with the purpose of abstaining meanwhile from marriage¹.

Mutual promise of not using marriage can be taken away by the opposite consent. A unilateral promise can be remitted by the other. Wherefore the one promising, who has renounced his right, is nevertheless not prohibited from amicably asking the debt.

A vow of chastity changes no rights. Wherefore one asking illicitly, on account of the vow, is indeed to be turned away from his counsel, unless the other, who is free from the vow, wishes, by asking the debt, to render the matter wholly lawful. To one persevering in the purpose of asking, the other can assent. And likewise it must be said if each separately, with the other party assenting, has been bound by such a vow.

For a vow emitted during marriage without the consent of the other, if it is neither of asking nor of rendering, is null; if the vow is of not asking, in the wife alone it is valid, because the husband, by a similar vow, would render the use of marriage too impeded for his wife: wives, through timidity and modesty, are wont to shrink from asking the debt.

But asking is of itself impeded by a vow which had been made before matrimony. For a valid vow, as far as can be done, must be observed. Yet he renders rather than asks, and therefore acts licitly, the husband who asks the debt when he observes that the wife, not daring to ask, is in danger of incontinence. The same is also licit to him if within matrimony, with the wife assenting, he has emitted the vow. Moreover, for a wife who, ignorant of the matter, married a man who was bound by a vow, it can be too hard that she herself, by asking the conjugal act, should be forced to do violence to her own modesty. In these circumstances the husband also can and must, as if acting for the wife, ask the conjugal debt, as he understands it to be desired by the wife. But it is better to obtain a dispensation from the vow (Cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor., II, 1080).

But a simultaneous vow of chastity emitted by both with mutual consent, of itself contains an agreement by which each renounces his own right of asking (at least as to the exercise or use). Wherefore of itself neither can then either ask or render the debt, since the one asking asks without right. Yet the husband is not prohibited from using his probable power of irritating the vows of the wife and rendering her free. She can then remit the agreement and indirectly irritate the vow of the husband, so that she may recover an unimpeded use of marriage.

But sins done against the vow are opposed to religion alone. It is clear, moreover, that such vows are not to be made except seriously and prudently, and that spouses must be turned away from inconstancy of mind in a good purpose.

¹ Nevertheless this obligation of recalling a past action to honesty is not perceived by all. Wherefore there will be one who will permit copulation to both simply, or with consideration of the difficulty of continence omitted.

b) When. Copulation is not prohibited either while the spouse is pregnant or while she is giving the breasts. Moderate diligence will have to be used, in the former case, to avert the danger of abortion if any should be present, especially in the first weeks.

During the time of menstrual flow, no positive prohibition now exists, but copulation then is to be dissuaded, lest harm be done to mutual esteem and love by an insolent and unbecoming petition of this kind, unless, for obtaining fecundation of a sterile wife, physicians advise that this time is to be chosen.

After birth, abstinence for one week, indeed for two weeks, is to be prescribed, because copulation then would be dangerous for the wife. But a sensible man will abstain from the use of marriage until the organs have been fully quieted, i.e. for about six weeks.

Nothing serious can be objected to copulation which takes place after a meal, after a bath.

When the wife is sick, the things said concerning copulation perhaps harmful return.

By no positive law is the use of marriage forbidden on the night before Holy Communion. Nor is the spouse to be held back from more frequent approach to the holy table on account of the conjugal debt. That sometimes, before more solemn days, spouses abstain by mutual consent, St. Paul himself seems to advise (1 Cor. 7, 5).

Those spouses also are to be praised who, imitating Tobias, have wished voluntarily to dedicate to God the first-fruits of their matrimony by a three-day abstinence.

c) How. 1. The natural mode is that the man, lying above, know the wife lying beneath and turned toward him. But no change of position will be mortal, so long as it permits sufficient semination within the vessel, so that the copulation of itself (other circumstances being omitted which can exclude that hope) brings a truly probable hope of fecundation. It matters little that part of the semen is lost beyond intention.

2. Application of the semen to the opening of the vagina does not bring a truly probable hope. And the very notion of true congress seems to be lacking, so that I would say rather that two simultaneous pollutions are being exercised. Wherefore we judge that this mode is never lawful. Nevertheless there are approved authors who concede it, when the other mode is here and now impassable, for example on account of the excessive heat of the man, who immediately experiences pollution, or on account of nervous incapacity of erection, or vaginismus. Wherefore, until the Holy See has decided the matter, with attention to that extrinsic probability of the opinion permitting it, we will not then condemn that use. But no Catholic author permits that this mode be employed with the counsel that offspring be avoided, or that, with the hope of fecundation diminished, a childbirth dangerous to the wife be forestalled.

But a modest penetration of the vagina already preserves the notion of true copulation. Wherefore that mode chosen studiously does not exceed venial fault.

It is consonant with nature, and is also to be commended for the sake of health itself, that both spouses experience the heat of pleasure at the same time. Yet because it seems sufficient for the law of union that the heats of both be morally joined, this is not grave, and, with some cause acceding, it will be without fault that, whether during copulation or immediately after copulation, the wife is brought by her own touch or by the touch of the husband to enjoy perfect pleasure. A just cause will be present if, on account of lesser heat, the wife could not be moved in the congress itself, or if the man himself is scarcely excited otherwise than by seeing the excitement of the wife and could complete the copulation. But the same cannot be permitted to the man after the wife has withdrawn herself: it would be delayed pollution.

d) Why. By intention contrary to the end of generation, spouses are altogether and under grave sin prohibited from doing anything positive by which conception is impeded or made less probable, at least if they have thought that they would effect a serious or notable difficulty. Thus the man could not, content with partial semination, withdraw himself and deliberately waste the remaining semen outside the vessel¹. But to abstain from the better mode, which nevertheless was at hand, and to employ that mode which in itself is honest or only lightly sinful; to abstain, I say, lest offspring be generated, will not be gravely culpable.

Indeed, for the causes which explain it, the intention itself will be able to be good in itself (Cf. De Smet, De sponsal., n. 209; Noldin, De sexto, n. 68).

¹ It must be said otherwise if, by reason of the mode employed, part of the semen is poured forth per accidens or beyond intention.

e) With what aids. The Holy Office has rejected artificial fecundation whenever the semen to be infused must be obtained by previous pollution. - But if, for begetting offspring, it seems conducive that the semen, after it has been received in the natural way (not therefore in a condom), is then extracted so that it may be cast more deeply into the vagina, that matter seems to fall under no reprehension. It will also be lawful by some manner of puncture to take semen from the epididymis of the husband so that it may be infused into the vessel of the wife: for, without any venereal abuse, the end of matrimony will be obtained in this way.

If the man, in order to excite himself, has need of obscene images, their looking upon before copulation will be made honest by that utility and end. Yet desire of another person will have to be excluded. For it would be wicked to complete copulation with an adulterous mind. But he is not an adulterer who, as it were, clothes his own wife with another's beauty, so that thus he may increase affection toward his own spouse.

f) Where. A secret place is demanded by the very sense of modesty. Wherefore those who perchance are discovered in the act of marriage can break off the copulation, even with certain foresight of pollution (short of consent to the pollution).

From the reverence owed to a sacred place, it is evident that one must not there indulge the work of marriage. Yet those who have been shut up for a long time (for several weeks or for a month) in a sacred building, or are in danger of incontinence, are excused by necessity itself.

What if the marriage is of doubtful validity? 1. Before serious investigation of the matter, or before the marriage has been made certain by dispensation, the one doubting, for his part, must abstain from every active use, perfect or imperfect, of marriage; yet to the other party, living in good faith, he can and must render the debt. The case was authentically solved by Innocent III in c. 44 De sent. excomm. (V, 39). Nor is he forced to disturb that good faith by an admonition which would often be full of inconveniences. For possession of good faith gives to the asking spouse a certain right, which also, according to the opinion of Sanchez, prevails over the right of a prior spouse, which he says is uncertain because it is of an uncertain subject, i.e. perhaps of one not living (Matr., l. 2, d. 42, n. 6; cf. c. 2 De secundis nuptiis, IV, 21). If the doubt is common, each must suspend every use of matrimony before investigation of the doubt or an obtained dispensation.

2. If inquiry is shown from the beginning to be going to be fruitless, or if the doubt, from inquiry made, has turned out invincible, most, on account of the right of possession, permit to those who contracted in good faith every use, even active and spontaneous, of marriage. And St. Alphonsus thinks sufficiently probable the opinion which contends that the right of possession suffices for this, even if no other probable reason can be alleged for the value of the marriage.

3. If the marriage was contracted in bad faith, i.e. with doubt concerning an impediment, a probable opinion even then concedes the use of marriage to persons thus married, on account of the principle: in doubt one must stand for the value of matrimony.

If, however, it is a question of doubt concerning the impediment of ligamen, many deny active use to either one doubting, or every use of marriage to both doubting. For the possession of the prior marriage, which the doubting spouse unjustly violated, can stand in the way. Thus St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 906, alleging c. Dominus, 2, De secundis nuptiis (IV, 21). "But in reality the Pontiff does not say there that abstaining from asking is necessary, even when after diligence the doubt remains. Besides, in the same place St. Alphonsus admits that the opposite opinion is more common, which can be confirmed from those things which St. Alphonsus discusses at the end of n. 904, contending that the sentences of law regard those who by a reflex judgment have not yet put away the doubt; and indeed he affirms this there also concerning the case of the doubtful death of a spouse" (Ball.-Palm. VI, 424).

But when litigation concerning the value of the marriage has been moved, the spouses preserve the right of asking and rendering which they had before the suit, and this until a twofold sentence for nullity has been passed.

What if, after a marriage of uncertain value but whose two parties certainly live, another marriage is contracted in good or bad faith, whose value depends altogether on the nullity of the prior one? For example, Caia deserts Titius, with whom she had celebrated marriage some weeks before, alleging this cause, that the intention of marrying had been lacking to her. Titius contracts other nuptials with Sempronia. Observe how this case differs formally from a case in which only the life of the prior spouse is uncertain. For the title or right of the latter was certain, but the possession, or fact, was uncertain; while in the present case the possession of the prior marriage is certain, but the right uncertain. Wherefore of itself the prior marriage is to be preferred. If, however, the person with whom he married second was ignorant of the matter and contracted in good faith, possession also supports this person, on account of which she can ask the debt. And the other marriage can also be preferred, if it is valid by a much greater probability. But one who in infidelity contracted doubtfully can, after baptism, make new nuptials with a Christian party on account of the privilege of faith.

You ask by what use matrimony is consummated. The common opinion is that matrimony is consummated by perfect copulation (cf. n. 52) (Wernz, Ius Decr., IV, 432).

For then there has been a commingling of the seeds such as the ancients understood to suffice that the spouses become "one flesh"; and all admit that this is required and suffices for consummation (Cf. St. Thomas, Suppl. 3 P., q. 55, art. 4, ad 2). Lehmkuhl, however (II, 998), theoretically postulates that the woman has supplied a mature ovum in the usual way. Wherefore, concerning the consummation of marriage with a wife whose ovaries have been perfectly excised, doubt can be had (Cf. Wernz, IV, 432, note 51). This commingling of seeds is presumed in both fora if on the part of the man the act has been completed.

Formerly there were, for example, Ledesma¹, who, distinguishing the requisites for affinity and for the consummation of matrimony, said that not indeed for affinity but for consummation there sufficed a copulation through which the barrier of the woman is opened, even without semination: and this on account of the injury itself done to the woman.

Finally, what if conception has happened without copulation? Sanchez² affirms that the matrimony has been consummated, whom Lehmkuhl, l.c., favors, because in the conceived offspring the spouses have especially been made one flesh. Yet not a few today deny this, with C. Gasparri (De matrimonio, II, 1302).

Indeed, according to the opinion of Sanchez, l.c., by any internal reception of male semen into the vessel of the woman, even if it has happened without any copulation, matrimony is consummated. This opinion, formerly common, today seems to be less received in the Curia.

II. - What Use of Marriage Is Owed

¹ Tractatus de magno matrimonii sacramento, q. 58, art. 1.

² De Matrimonio, l. 7, d. 61, n. 15 (on account of those things which he says concerning simple internal reception of semen).

1. From justice the conjugal act must be rendered to the other spouse who asks it expressly or tacitly, yet reasonably and seriously. And this obligation is grave in its genus.

He does not ask reasonably who asks copulation in an unnatural manner (even if it is substantially honest), or too frequently, for example several times in the same night. Nor does he who asks in a state of madness or drunkenness, since the act is not human. And he who by prayers is led to change his counsel withdraws from the petition. That party asks tacitly who complains of the rarity of use or of offspring.

If, after the frequency of use has been considered, the matter appears light, to deny the debt sometimes will be able to be a light sin, if danger of incontinence is absent.

A just cause will excuse from rendering the debt, for example a harm to be feared, one's own rather notable sickness, and, as seems to us with many, the danger of bringing forth a dead fetus or monstrous or miserable offspring.

But offspring multiplied too greatly is not a just cause for denying the debt. For the intention of avoiding offspring could not be obtained without long abstinence, joined with too great danger of incontinence, which the other spouse is not bound to admit. At most, the matter could be arranged so that the use of matrimony is reserved for those days on which there is less hope of fecundation (i.e., according to Capellmann, after 14 days from menstruation until 4 days before the new menstruation).

It also happens that, from a psychological state and neuropathy, one spouse is invaded by an almost insuperable fear, for example, of birth or of offspring. Such a one is efficaciously to be exhorted to put away that fear; yet scruples are not to be cast upon him with slight hope of success, since the healthy spouse, in order to avoid graver evils, will easily remit enough from his own right, although the matter is unpleasant to him, so that the other may be excused from grave sin.

To the party who has fallen from his right by adultery (to which sodomitical or bestial copulation is assimilated), or by a valid abdication, for example that of a professed religious, the act will not have to be conceded from justice. To him who illicitly asks an act which the other can licitly do (as if the one who alone is bound by vow asks it), assent does not seem to be owed: the one asking, if he is repelled, is not reasonably unwilling.

— From charity and piety toward the spouse, the family, and the fatherland, copulation must be asked when it is necessary for averting an imminent danger of incontinence in the other spouse; or for strengthening peace and mutual friendship; or when the fatherland demands an heir of the kingdom, and the peace and tranquility of the family demand a son who may succeed the parents.

III. What Use of Marriage Is to Be Desired

— That use of marriage is to be desired which is made by mutual consent, willingly, and with moderate frequency. After the fervor of the first weeks, many hand down this norm for the stronger age, which is said to flourish between 25 and 40 years, that congresses be had twice or three times in the week. But since powers vary, others more prudently counsel that, artificial excitations having been removed, spouses rather obey desire arisen spontaneously.

Moreover the wife is to be reproved who has accused herself because she deliberately restrains excitement, whether under the false pretext of religion, or, what would be worse, because she is impelled by some anger or aversion of mind. But she is to be exhorted that in rendering the debt she show herself prompt and easy.

The man, on the contrary, who has accused excess is to be exhorted to a tempered, human, and becoming use of his right, without those sordid arts which, together with mutual esteem, lessen the happiness of marriage.

For the rest, the use of marriage is commanded to spouses by no positive law.

I. The conjugal act can also be obligatory; for copulation can be exacted from justice by either spouse, because each has power over the body of the partner (I Cor. VII, 2-3), and indeed from a bilateral onerous contract, so that per se and generally the partner is bound to render it; wherefore it is usually called the conjugal debt. Hence spouses can also sin by defect (can. 1111).

A. There is per se no obligation of seeking, because no one is bound to use his own right; per accidens, an obligation from charity and piety can exist, for example if a spouse judges, especially the man, that the partner placed in danger of incontinence does not dare to seek, or if the use of marriage appears necessary for fostering love or averting dissensions.

B. There exists a per se grave obligation of rendering from justice whenever one party reasonably, seriously, and legitimately seeks, whether expressly or tacitly, because in the matrimonial contract they mutually handed over their bodies for conjugal use; but to deny this of itself brings grave trouble to the other. Per accidens, however, it will be light, as if the debt is rarely denied, for example once in a month to one seeking rather often; if it is deferred for a brief time, for example from day to night, from night to morning; if the other seeks mildly, not urgently, and easily acquiesces to the one denying; provided that in these circumstances danger of incontinence or of another grave inconvenience is absent.

II. The obligation of rendering ceases in one when the right of seeking ceases in the other:

a. If the one seeking has admitted formal, certain, consummated adultery, sodomy properly so called, or bestiality; for fidelity is broken for the one breaking fidelity. Make exception if the other has sinned similarly, or was an accomplice of the sin, or, knowing and willing, condoned the sin (can. 1129).

b. If the person wholly lacks the use of reason or is in a state of perfect drunkenness, as long as the state lasts; for he who lacks the use of reason does not seek in a reasonable and human mode.¹

¹ There can also be danger for offspring to be conceived from copulation instituted after much intoxicating drinking, namely lest the offspring be born foolish, or deaf-mute, or liable to drunkenness.

c. If copulation is the cause of grave extrinsic danger or inconvenience, either for the one rendering, or for the one seeking, or for offspring already conceived;² nevertheless, when sufficient reason accedes, for example dissensions or incontinence of oneself or the partner to be avoided, someone could from charity render to the partner and expose himself or herself to proper danger, unless, however, death threatened from copulation.³

² In particular there is grave inconvenience of denying: a. if the wife labors under incipient cancer of the uterus, so that after coitus she is subjected to copious emission of blood; b. if she undergoes coitus with very acute pain which is repeated in individual copulations; c. if she herself is gravely ill or if the partner labors under a contagious disease, such as leprosy or venereal disease, which either brings danger of swift infection, or moves insuperable horror; d. if either labors under organic defect of the heart, for then coitus not only harms greatly but can even produce sudden death; e. if the wife knows by experience or by the judgment of a physician that she undergoes grave danger of death in childbirth. Hence Father Vermeersch says, n. 225: "If a physician declares a new conception will certainly be fatal to the wife, the wife must decline copulation. But if death does not threaten in this way, the wife can bring herself into danger because of a grave cause. For since conception itself is doubtful, the danger does not seem to have arisen nor to be proximate. But concerning these things it is necessary to approach a physician both skilled and fearing God. For there are not lacking those who, because of slight indications, inconsiderately prohibit persons little continent from the honorable use of marriage. Wherefore Genicot judges that such danger from future childbirth very rarely is established, because of which there would be a grave obligation of abstaining from the use of marriage." Compare Dr. Ausems, Het herhaalde moederschap.

³ That this is according to the mind of Saint Thomas is clear from his response ad 4, a. 1, q. 64 in the Supplement.

d. If the partner seeks immoderately, for example several times, three or four times, in the same night.⁴

⁴ Men, and much less wives, are not accustomed to exceed the mode in seeking the debt except in the first months after contracting marriage; during which time the moral difficulty also will be slight, either because the man more rarely intends to press strict right, or because he will willingly agree to the wife modestly asking off. Genicot, Th. M., II, n. 554.

e. If the partner seeks in a mode illicit not only on the part of the agent but on the part of the act itself, for example that it be done onanistically, sodomitically, with scandal of others, and so forth.

But a graver harm is required for denying the debt absolutely than for deferring or restricting the rendering of the same. Thus weakness of the wife or great fatigue, which does not suffice for denying copulation absolutely, can be a reason for delay of rendering or for denying it as frequently as is sought by the man. Hence:

1. Wives sin gravely who in rendering the debt show themselves difficult and lingering, with danger of incontinence or adultery in the man or with the intention of deterring him from petition; likewise if they concede the debt only when compelled, if they harshly and insultingly reproach the man for his petitions, indeed if they obstinately deny, even for one time, while he seriously and urgently seeks.

2. Men also sin gravely who, whether from avarice for avoiding offspring or from malevolence, rarely know their wives.

3. Spouses are bound to a common bed (can. 1128) because of the obligation of rendering; therefore per se it is illicit for one, without the consent of the other or with danger of incontinence, to be absent for a longer time, for this is equivalent to denial of the debt. Per accidens it is licit because of grave causes, for example a notable good of the republic or of the family.

4. Hence he is unjust who illicitly separates himself or seeks civil divorce.

5. It is illicit for spouses to render themselves incapable of copulation or generation by excessive labors, vigils, austerities, or a fortiori by pollutions, adulteries, or other illicit acts. Hence husbands are guilty of grave and special injustice who, with the wife unwilling, have admitted vasectomy or castration for this reason, that they may not be able to generate, or so weaken the body that they render themselves almost unequal to the conjugal act, or exercise neo-Malthusian arts. Likewise, on the contrary, wives who, without the husband's knowledge or with him unwilling, not from necessity of present infection but to obtain sterility or to avoid future pregnancy even dangerous, procure for themselves excision of the ovaries or interruption of the oviduct, or place an occlusive pessary at the mouth of the uterus, or use other neo-Malthusian means; likewise physicians who by their art exercise the aforesaid excisions or operations or cooperate with them in some way.

6. Spouses are not excused from the obligation of rendering because of inconveniences inherent to marriage, for example more numerous offspring, inconveniences of gestation, ordinary difficulties of childbirth, grave and unusual but brief pains, light pains although long-lasting, and so forth; because these burdens are attached to marriage and they undertook them by entering marriage.

7. Nevertheless the wife seems to be excused from rendering the debt if the man by his own fault leaves the wife in utmost want, or does not wish to feed the offspring, or has no care of the family.

III. Observations. 1. Ordinarily the confessor is not bound, nor does it befit him, to question wives, except in the most modest mode he can, whether they have rendered the debt, for example whether they obey the man in matters which pertain to marriage, or whether anything troubles the conscience concerning marriage; concerning the rest let him be silent unless he has been asked. Usually in this matter wives little fearing God are to be questioned, especially when they confess that they have been angry with their husbands. But this questioning is ordinarily to be omitted with wives of timorous conscience.⁵

⁵ Aertnijs, Th. Mor., II, n. 515, from Saint Alphonsus, Praxis conf., n. 41 and 35.

2. When asked, the confessor can propose to married persons who are pressed by anxiety concerning the baser things which they do between themselves the threefold rule indicated above (article III, n. I, A, B, C.); let him generally abstain from further questions concerning the nature of the deed; besides, let individual persons be instructed: a. the husband, that he not seek the debt at those times in which copulation can be gravely harmful to the wife, for example in the time of purification or of grave disease; b. the wife, that she is bound under grave sin to obey the man in rendering the debt, unless she is excused from a just cause, for example because of infirmity.

3. Let the confessor order a girl asking what is licit or prescribed for her in a marriage soon to be contracted to ask her mother or another female blood relative in whom she can trust; but if she has no woman of this kind at hand, let him teach in the more honorable mode and briefly. To send her simply to the husband, that she conform herself to all his desires, today generally does not seem expedient, since so many men now seek means against nature, unless in the case in which the honesty of the husband is beyond every exception.

4. Let the confessor beware lest he ask spouses untimely or excessive questions concerning the various modes of coeundi, as these not only are useless but can also generate scandal. Wherefore if the penitent introduces a prudent suspicion, it will be enough for the confessor to inquire whether something against nature or voluntary pollution was present; concerning the rest let him not speak unless asked.

5. In marriage, that things may proceed in a happier mode, let spouses attend that in the use of marriage they consult the satisfaction of the other rather than their own. Especially:

a. let the man: 1. begin to approach the wife not in a fierce but in a gentle mode; 2. use his right discreetly; and thus 3. foster and increase the affection of love in the wife;

b. similarly, let the wife provide to the husband: 1. easiness by which she is prepared in rendering the debt so that she may please the man; likewise 2. cleanliness; and 3. order and neatness of the home.

6. A twofold danger occurs to matrimonial chastity from a twofold vicious inclination: namely to adultery, and to onanism.

A. To impede the first, occasions come to be avoided. Therefore let not the husband be so imprudent that he fosters frequent society or friendship of the wife with other men; likewise the wife: 1. let her not introduce another younger woman to the husband or keep her at home, for example a sister or beautiful maidservant; 2. let her not permit to the husband separate theatrical or worldly frequentations; 3. let her not herself have a separate bed.

B. To avoid onanism it is necessary to repress the imagination together with egoism. Especially let spouses:

1. in true humility, content with their modest condition, not be tormented by desire of a higher one;

2. prefer to the accumulation of riches or idleness the labor of feeding numerous children;

3. in the spirit of Christian abnegation be willing to be deprived of various pleasures for the good instruction of offspring.

By these things, under the influence of divine charity, their union in procreating children for the kingdom of God will be fruitful, and thus a great sacrament in Christ and in the Church.

690. Principle. The conjugal act is licit, and indeed meritorious, whenever it accords with the good of offspring and the good of fidelity.

The individual parts of this very fruitful principle are to be explained and demonstrated. Certain ancient heretics denied the liceity of the conjugal act (for example, Saturninus, Marcion, the Manichaeans, and the Encratites), but several texts of Sacred Scripture manifestly prove not only its liceity, but also its obligation. Thus St. Paul writes: "Let the husband render the debt to his wife; and the wife also in like manner to the husband. The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband; and in like manner the husband also hath not power of his own body, but the wife."³⁸⁰ - In the Old Testament, after their creation, God commanded the first parents: "Increase and multiply."³⁸¹ But according to the present order of things, the conjugal act is the sole means of propagating the human race. Therefore, if God wills the propagation of the human race, He also wills the conjugal act, which consequently is licit in itself. Nor is it required that each and every conjugal act serve directly and immediately for the propagation of the human race; for the whole economy of human propagation greatly excels the propagation of brute animals. Indeed, animals of the female sex are not accustomed to have the instinct, or even the power, of generating except during a brief and determinate time of each year; among them conception is very often completed by a single intercourse; and after that intercourse has been effected, the animals abhor another carnal union. It is altogether otherwise in the human race. Human physiology demonstrates that human conception can occur at any time of the year and commonly is not completed except by repeated conjugal acts. These things clearly demonstrate that the Creator permits spouses carnal intercourse even if human conception cannot follow here and now, for example, during pregnancy. Moreover, the unions of animals are transient, mutable, promiscuous, and produce no spiritual good; on the contrary, the marital union of human beings is stable; there is no promiscuity; spouses are not separated except by death.

But the principal end both of the whole conjugal life in general and of the conjugal act in particular is the spiritual good of the spouses.

Since these things are so, a general rule can be established: The conjugal act is licit when it serves the spiritual good of the spouses, even though conception or generation is neither directly and immediately had nor even intended. Not only supernatural virtues, but also marital love and affection conduce to the spiritual good of the spouses. For if spouses are united by true and constant love, their whole life also becomes happy; each willingly bears the burdens of the other, and almost all the praises which St. Paul attributes to charity can be proclaimed of such marital love, when he says: "Charity is patient, is kind; charity envieth not, dealeth not perversely, is not puffed up, is not ambitious, seeketh not her own, is not provoked to anger, thinketh no evil ... beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things."³⁸²

³⁸⁰ 1 Cor. 7:3 f.

³⁸¹ Gen. 1:28.

³⁸² 1 Cor. 13:4 ff.

694. Principle 1. Whenever either spouse reasonably and seriously requests the conjugal debt, the other is bound in justice to render it, and indeed under grave sin.

Explanation. St. Paul expressly says: "Let the husband render the debt to his wife; and the wife also in like manner to the husband."³⁹⁶ The reason for this obligation is the matrimonial contract, in which one spouse gives the other a right to the conjugal act. This right, however, induces an obligation of justice, and a grave one, since there is question of a matter of great moment. For all theologians teach that marital intercourse is a matter of great moment, since it is necessary for obtaining the primary end of matrimony. Hence a spouse sins gravely who obstinately denies the conjugal debt to the other spouse who seriously and reasonably requests it. Likewise, a spouse sins gravely who by fraud forestalls the other spouse so that the latter cannot request the debt; against such a spouse St. Paul argues: "Defraud not one another."³⁹⁷ Great harms are accustomed to arise from the unjust denial of the conjugal debt, namely, danger of incontinence in the other spouse, quarrels, diminution of love, divorce, and so forth. Hence women especially are to be admonished not to show themselves difficult and morose when husbands reasonably request from them intercourse or other things which are lawful to spouses; likewise, they are to be admonished to strive to please their husbands, according to that saying of the Apostle: "But she that is married [the woman] thinketh ... how she may please her husband."³⁹⁸

Smallness of matter. The obligation of rendering the debt, although of itself grave, nevertheless admits smallness of matter. Hence if a woman once or twice denies the conjugal debt to the husband, deferring it to another time more convenient for herself, it is not a mortal sin, at least if the husband is not in proximate danger of incontinence or great anger is not thereby kindled in him.

The principle thus explained must be restricted in three ways.

³⁹⁶ 1 Cor. 7:3.

³⁹⁷ 1 Cor. 7:5.

³⁹⁸ 1 Cor. 7:34.

695. Exceptions: 1. A spouse is not bound to render the debt to an adulterous spouse. This is evident from those things said above concerning divorce. For if it is lawful because of the adultery of the other spouse to effect divorce as regards dwelling, a fortiori it is lawful to deny the conjugal debt. But if the adultery committed has once been condoned, it is no longer lawful either to effect divorce or to deny the conjugal debt, as was already said above, n. 679.

2. The innocent spouse is not bound to render the conjugal debt to the other spouse if perpetual divorce has been duly pronounced by the sentence of a judge; on the contrary, just as the guilty party can be recalled to conjugal society, so also can that party be obliged to the conjugal debt. The sole exception is the case in which, with the explicit or implicit consent of the innocent party, the other party has emitted a vow of chastity or entered religion. For then every right to intercourse has been extinguished.

3. A spouse is not strictly bound to render the conjugal debt if the other spouse requests it either not seriously or not reasonably. If a spouse does not seriously request the debt, but rather expresses a desire or velleity, that spouse is not judged to urge his or her right; therefore neither is there a strict obligation of rendering the debt, nor does the other spouse sin by not acquiescing in the desire. Nevertheless, such a refusal is not to be employed often, unless the other spouse requests the debt unreasonably. For if the request is certainly unreasonable, the obligation of rendering the debt does not exist. Sometimes it happens, for example, in drunkenness, that the husband requests the debt from the wife altogether unreasonably, and indeed in an inhuman manner, intending nothing other than the truly bestial satisfaction of his own lust. Then the woman can certainly licitly deny the debt; for in the matrimonial contract she did not oblige herself to be a slave of lust, but a companion of life for the husband, and indeed one having the same rights concerning the use of matrimony as the husband has. For in other matters the wife ought to be subject to the husband, but in the use of matrimony she is altogether equal to the husband, as is evident from the text of St. Paul: "And in like manner the husband also hath not power of his own body, but the wife."³⁹⁹ Therefore a woman who suffers grave extrinsic troubles from the conjugal act does not sin if she denies the debt once or twice, provided that she does not always refuse. For example, a woman does not sin by denying the debt to a husband requesting it every day, or while he is drunk, or during a grave illness, especially a contagious one (cf. above, n. 682), or during menstruation or cleansing. Theologians also commonly teach that a woman is not bound to render the debt if she has learned by experience that she cannot give birth without proximate danger of death. The reason is that the husband cannot demand from the wife something which she is unable to perform without proximate danger of death. The husband also requests the debt unreasonably if he wills to abuse matrimony through onanistic intercourse; for most certainly the woman could not oblige herself in the matrimonial contract to an abuse of matrimony, nor even to cooperating (although materially) in the sins of the husband. Whether, however, in this case the woman can render the debt by conducting herself passively will be said in the following article. - Intrinsic inconveniences necessarily connected with matrimony, however, according to that saying of the Apostle, "Nevertheless, such shall have tribulation of the flesh,"⁴⁰⁰ do not excuse from rendering the debt, because they could and ought to have been foreseen from the beginning of matrimony. Hence the following do not excuse: the ordinary burdens of pregnancy, childbirth, and education; nor even numerous offspring already had; nor even fear that the offspring may be born infirm, may die in childbirth, or that abortion may occur.⁴⁰¹

³⁹⁹ Cf. St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 54, a. 5.

⁴⁰⁰ 1 Cor. 7:28.

⁴⁰¹ There are authors, for example, Noldin (De sexto praec., n. 92), who probably excuse a spouse from rendering the debt, with danger of incontinence excluded, if numerous offspring are already present and the spouses are so poor that they are unable to support further offspring. This opinion indeed seems to be admitted if, through the fault of either spouse, the offspring cannot be supported. For if a spouse does not furnish sufficient assistance for supporting the offspring already born, neither does that spouse have the right to generate new offspring. But if the poverty is inculpable, the spouses are to be exhorted to use matrimony moderately, committing themselves to divine Providence, which will certainly assist them.

696. Principle 2. No obligation of requesting the conjugal debt exists per se; per accidens, however, such an obligation sometimes arises from charity.

Explanation. Each spouse indeed has a strict right of requesting the debt, but is not bound to use such a right. For just as each person freely enters matrimony, so each freely requests the consummation of matrimony through carnal intercourse. Per accidens, however, an obligation of requesting the debt can be present if otherwise notable harm should arise for the other spouse. Thus, for example, a spouse is bound at least from charity to request the debt if he or she perceives that the other spouse is in danger of incontinence and does not request it because of modesty; or if the use of matrimony is necessary for fostering marital love.

697. Principle 3. By mutual free consent spouses can licitly abstain from the conjugal act either for a time or even perpetually.

Explanation. This third principle is a corollary of the second. For if neither spouse is bound to request the debt, both spouses can also by mutual and free consent abstain from requesting the debt. Such mutual consent existed in the most holy matrimony between the Blessed Virgin and St. Joseph. Temporary abstinence is sometimes very useful for both the bodily and spiritual good of the spouses; but perpetual abstinence from conjugal intercourse is rarely expedient, because without this intimate conjunction of the spouses marital affection is accustomed to grow cold and grave dangers of infidelity are easily present. Therefore spouses capable of intercourse and of generating and educating offspring should not without a most special reason perpetually abstain from the use of matrimony. St. Paul also seems to intimate this, saying: "Defraud not one another, except, perhaps, by consent, for a time, that you may give yourselves to prayer; and return together again, lest Satan tempt you for your incontinency."⁴⁰²

⁴⁰² 1 Cor. 7:5.

Two things are to be weighed here: 1. what the obligation is for spouses, whether of rendering or of seeking the debt; 2. what causes excuse from such an obligation.

2103. Principles. I. EACH spouse is held from justice, and under grave obligation, to RENDER the debt to the other spouse reasonably and seriously seeking. - This is clear from the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:3): "Let the husband render the debt to the wife; and likewise the wife to the husband." The reason is that by force of the matrimonial contract "the woman does not have power over her own body, but the man. And likewise the man does not have power over his own body, but the woman" (ibid.). And therefore they cannot deny to each other the use of marriage without injustice, which is, of itself, a mortal sin; because it is a denial grave from its nature, at least if it is done more often, or obstinately.¹

We said 1. to one seeking reasonably; for if the one seeking is not master of himself, as a madman or one perfectly drunk, because he does not seek in a human manner; or if he seeks unjustly, immoderately, at an unseasonable time, and whenever generally a legitimate cause of denying intervenes, the obligation ceases, at least that of justice; although then there can still be an obligation of charity, namely for avoiding in the one seeking a danger of incontinence, anger, blasphemy, etc., as will be explained below (n. 2104, 2).

We said 2. to one seeking seriously; for if a spouse seeks weakly, or easily yields to the prayers of the one denying, according to the common opinion it is not mortal, unless the one seeking is placed in danger of incontinence; indeed, not even venial, if some cause of denying is given. Yet it makes no difference whether he seeks expressly or tacitly; for it suffices if by certain signs he manifests that he desires that act, although because of modesty he does not dare to demand it.²

2104. II. NEITHER spouse is held PER SE, or from justice, TO SEEK the debt; but indeed PER ACCIDENS, from charity or another virtue, he can be obliged to this.³ - 1. He is not held from justice, because no one is held to use his own right. This, more probably, St. Alphonsus also admits, although the coparty is in formal danger of incontinence; because if no express or tacit seeking occurs, no obligation of justice to render is present. A spouse indeed obliged himself not to break faith, but not to impede the other from breaking faith. - 2. He can be obliged PER ACCIDENS, namely from charity or from another virtue, gravely or lightly, according as this or that virtue urges. But authors commonly teach that there is a grave obligation of seeking from charity, when this is judged necessary for avoiding incontinence in either spouse, or for fostering mutual love. They admit the same if the generation of offspring is very necessary for the public good or for the peace of the family.⁴

Spouses can MAKE AN AGREEMENT not to use matrimony, and then neither can be compelled to render the debt; but this agreement, which is rarely expedient, can be rescinded by mutual consent. Indeed, when danger of incontinence supervenes, it must be remitted from charity, at least for a time, so that incontinence may be avoided.

2105. From the things said you will resolve:⁵ - 1. A wife sins mortally if she obstinately denies even for one time only, while the husband seeks seriously and insistently.

2. Likewise, if in rendering she shows great delay, with danger or even with the intention of deterring the husband from seeking; if she does not grant the debt except when compelled; if she harshly and insultingly reproaches the husband for his requests. Thus commonly.

3. Those worst husbands gravely offend who, whether from avarice so that they may avoid offspring, or from malevolence, or from love conceived toward others, never or almost never know their own wives, although they ought to presume well that the wives bear this most unwillingly.⁶

4. Denial of the debt is EXCUSED from grave fault on account of smallness of matter, if it occurs rarely, e.g. once in a month to one seeking often, short of danger of incontinence or grave dissension; likewise, if the rendering is delayed somewhat, for instance from day to night, from night to morning.⁷

2106. In one spouse the OBLIGATION of rendering the debt CEASES when the RIGHT of demanding ceases in the other. For these are correlatives.

Now the right of demanding BEGINS after the two-month period from the celebration of matrimony, or after the first rendering of the debt, as was said (n. 1981 and 2087); and it CEASES entirely through legitimate causes of divorce, especially through adultery, as will be said below (n. 2124, 1). - It can also cease on account of very many other causes, both on the part of the one seeking and on the part of the one rendering; which causes now come to be explained.

2107. I. On the part of the ONE SEEKING, first of all the ILLEGALITY of the seeking itself can stand in the way; in this matter, St. Alphonsus teaches that a distinction must be made thus:

1. If the illegality holds on the part of the act and is grave, for instance because one seeks in a sacred or public place, or with proximate danger of abortion or death, the other cannot render without grave fault; since an act grave evil in itself can never be cohonestated by any cause, nor therefore can it be demanded. - But if the illegality is light, because it is sought, for example, in an unnatural position, or in the time of menstruation or puerperium, it is licit to render with a just cause which cohonestates the act, e.g. lest the indignation of the consort be incurred. Indeed, if the one seeking has a just cause of seeking thus, the other is bound to render. But every reasonable cause being absent, he is not bound to render, indeed he cannot do so short of venial fault.

2. If the illegality holds on the part of the one seeking alone, e.g. because he has a vow of chastity, or because he seeks for a depraved end, according to the more common and more probable opinion the coparty is bound to render, nevertheless with an admonition first given, if fruit is hoped for, that the one seeking desist.⁸ If the husband is an onanist, see n. 2118, q. 2.

2108. II. On the part of the ONE RENDERING, there is held to be a just cause of denying the debt IF GRAVE HARM or DANGER would threaten from it.⁹ - The reason is sought from the order of justice and charity, from which spouses are not judged to have obliged themselves to render the debt with grave harm. If grave and proximate danger of life is present for either spouse, neither can seek or render; because no one is master of his own life, or of the life of another.

Hence: 1. A wife is exempted from rendering the debt who, by her own experience or by the judgment of experts, has learned that she cannot bring forth offspring without grave danger to life. Yet, for avoiding her own or her spouse's incontinence, or for avoiding dissensions, she could expose herself to a danger that is only probable and remote; because although a human being is not master of his own life, nevertheless he can expose it on account of charity.¹⁰

2. A healthy spouse is exempted if the coparty suffers from a contagious disease, e.g. plague, venereal disease, and danger of infection threatens. - Yet, for a just cause, he can undergo a danger that is not entirely proximate from a motive of charity, namely by applying preservative means.¹¹

3. A spouse who is feverish, or affected by another grave disease, is exempted, namely on account of notable debilitation of the body; likewise a wife, if she suffers from beginning cancer of the uterus, so that after the conjugal act she is subjected to a copious outpouring of blood; or if she undergoes intercourse with very acute pain which is repeated each time.¹² - But she is not exempted on account of labors and pains, even unusual ones, of pregnancy, birth, lactation, education, etc.¹³

2109. IT IS ASKED. Whether harm which is feared for OFFSPRING exempts from the obligation of the conjugal debt?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. If harm is feared for offspring already conceived, e.g. if it is established that in a particular case by intercourse there is harm to its life or formation, or danger of abortion is induced, spouses do not have a right to intercourse¹⁴ (cf. n. 2102).

2. But if it is a question of offspring to be conceived, the debt must be rendered, although it is to be feared lest offspring be born infirm; since it is better for it to be thus, than not to be at all. But if the wife has already experienced that she brings forth dead children, authors more commonly hold that, danger of incontinence in herself or in the coparty being excluded, she cannot render the debt, chiefly on account of this reason, that she herself undergoes danger of life from the death of the fetus in the uterus.¹⁵ - If it is established concerning this danger, the aforesaid opinion will indeed urge; but because rarely is it established concerning it, and spouses would be placed in great danger of incontinence if on account of this cause they had to abstain perpetually from the use of matrimony, hardly, or not even hardly, is the debt to be denied on account of the aforesaid reason.¹⁶

3. If, finally, an excessive multiplicity of offspring is feared, this of itself seems a sufficient reason for denying the debt, provided that in neither spouse there is danger of incontinence. But since such danger is scarcely ever absent, it is clear that a spouse is not easily excused from rendering the debt on account of the multiplicity of offspring.¹⁷

1647. Principles. - I. There is an obligation of justice, per se grave,¹ of rendering the debt to the other spouse seriously and reasonably asking it. The reason is that from the very nature of the matrimonial contract the spouses mutually transfer to themselves the power of their bodies in order to the conjugal use. This is also deduced from the words of the Apostle: Let the husband render the debt to the wife; and likewise the wife to the husband; the woman does not have power of her own body, but the man; and likewise the man does not have power of his own body, but the woman.²

II. No obligation, per se, urges of asking the conjugal debt. The reason is that neither spouse is bound to use his or her right, and each can remit it. Yet per accidens there can be an obligation of asking from charity or another virtue, especially in the man, for example, if he judges that the consort is placed in danger of incontinence because of modesty in asking, or if the asking is necessary for fostering or restoring conjugal love, etc. - See St. Alphonsus.³

III. The obligation in one spouse of rendering the debt ceases when the right of exacting it ceases in the other: and the right is destroyed chiefly in the following cases, namely:

1° If one of the spouses has committed adultery, provided the conditions enumerated in n. 1552. III. 3° are present. Yet in this case the asking will not be illicit, as it is in the cases of which n. 1643 treats.

2° If the one asking lacks the use of reason, because his or her asking is not human. Yet it is licitly rendered, unless there is danger of scandal, abortion, or another grave harm; indeed it must be rendered if danger of incontinence, even material, urges in the insane or drunken person (yet with a greater evil excluded), or if the spouse is not perfectly insane or drunk.¹

3° If the one rendering can reasonably fear grave harm or danger to health, because spouses are not judged to have obligated themselves to render the debt with so great an inconvenience. Hold the same if evils of this kind are to be feared for offspring already conceived, and also universally, if for the one asking.²

4° If the one asking, because of incest committed with blood relatives of the other in the first or second degree, or for another cause, has lost the right of asking.

5° If it is asked too frequently (n. 1648. 3°).

6° If the other has given sufficient cause for divorce, namely as long as that cause continues to exist (n. 1552. III.).

7° Within the first two months after Matrimony has been celebrated (n. 1551. 2°).

8° If the other asks illicitly; yet in this case it must be distinguished in the following manner. For the illicitness either holds itself on the part of the one rendering alone, or on the part of the one asking alone, or on the part of the act, so that it affects the one asking and the one rendering.

For the first case (for example, if the one asking exacts the act on this condition, that the one rendering impede conception), let this be the rule: he or she is neither bound to render, nor is it licit with one's own sin, even venial, since no obligation or liceity toward sin can exist.³ It is otherwise, as is clear, if what must be called a sin per se is rendered licit by adjunct circumstances, as can happen in an unnatural position, etc.⁴

In the second case there is an obligation of rendering, if there is question only of venial sin, for example, if the act is asked for pleasure alone; for it will scarcely be able to be demonstrated that there is a right of denying some grave debt of justice because the one enjoying that right will use it with slight malice. - But if it is asked with mortal sin (for example, with an adulterous mind, or by one who is bound by a vow of chastity, or by an onanist), that act is licitly rendered, or rather merely permitted, if a grave cause is present (n. 1653. III.) and the proximate danger of consent in the work, insofar as it is evil, does not urge (n. 1654. 2°; 1655. q. 8°). - Indeed St. Alphonsus says that rendering in these circumstances is more probably simply owed, if the one asking has not been deprived of his or her right, for example, through incest.⁵

In the third case, however, one must distinguish. - It is licit to render, if the act is not so intrinsically evil that illicitness can never be taken away by particular circumstances, and if such circumstances are in fact present (n. 1648. 6°. 8°). Otherwise it is not licit; for it would be participation in the illicit act itself.¹

Note. - If warning, or asking that the one exacting desist from sin, is foreseen to be profitable and can be done without grave inconvenience (which will be present for the most part), it must be premised by the consort before the permission, especially if there is question of mortal sin (n. 1654. 3°. 4°). - But if there is question of one impeded from asking, for example, by a vow, it will be safer if the consort forestalls the impeded person by his or her own asking, or adds his or her own asking to the asking of the impeded person already made. Yet the wife, by reason of modesty, will rarely be bound to this.²

1648. Resolves. - 1° Spouses are bound to cohabitation, nor can one be absent for a longer time without the consent of the other, or without necessity; for this obligation follows from the very obligation of rendering the debt. But just causes of going away for a long time are the public good, the support or protection of the family, harm from enemies to be avoided, etc. And a man who must remain elsewhere for a long time ought to lead his wife there, if he conveniently can, so that she may cohabit with him. As regards civil law, see what has been said in n. 445. 2°. 3°.³

Regularly, however, a wife is bound to follow her husband when he changes domicile, even without a just cause (not, however, if he changes it from a base cause); and this: a) notwithstanding a contrary custom, which might exist somewhere; for a custom of this kind, as opposed to the divine law by force of which the man is the head of the wife,⁴ would be intrinsically evil (n. 184. 3°); b) even if the man goes away into a distant region (from which, however, he is not about to return shortly). - Except if either 1) by following the man she would be exposed to danger of life, chastity, grave detriment, or - for example, because the place to which the husband withdraws for a long time is destitute of every religious succor - of salvation; or 2) she would lack nourishment; or 3) there is question of a husband made a wanderer after Matrimony, or, without the wife's knowing it, already a wanderer before it; or 4) by an antenuptial pact it was agreed not to change domicile, which pact nevertheless has an included condition: unless a new grave cause should supervene.⁵

2° A spouse denying the debt sins gravely whenever there is danger of incontinence or grave vexation in the other party. Likewise if he or she denies it to the other seriously asking. But it is otherwise if the consort benevolently remits it, or asks remissly. Yet remiss asking must be altogether distinguished from interpretative or virtual asking, which is had by signs indicating a serious will of asking, and from which the obligation of rendering the debt arises. This is verified especially in a woman, who is most especially subject to modesty, and from shame does not ask expressly what she anxiously asks.

3° One denying does not sin when the other asks immoderately, for example, after the third or fourth time in the same night; nor if he or she delays it for a short time, namely until night, or if from night he or she delays it until morning time, yet always with the danger of incontinence excluded.¹

4° Wives are to be reproved who deny the debt to their husbands without sufficient cause, even if they ask remissly; or who do not concede it except when forced, and who harshly and contumeliously reproach the man for his requests.

5° A wife is not excused from rendering the debt because of the ordinary inconveniences of childbirth, pregnancy, or nursing; - nor even because of pains which are grave but brief in time; - nor because of pains which are long-lasting but moderate, for example, of the head for several months after childbirth; - nor because of health somewhat weakened; because all these things are annexed to the matrimonial condition. It would be otherwise, however, if danger of life or of a most grave disease, from the judgment of a truly prudent physician, had to be feared.²

6° There is no obligation of rendering the debt to another laboring under a contagious disease grave in itself, such as plague, venereal disease, or something similar. Likewise, because of notable bodily debility, those laboring under a strong fever or another grave disease are excused from rendering the debt. Probably, however, notwithstanding grave danger to health, a spouse can render the debt, in order to free the consort from probable danger of incontinence [for it is licit even to expose life for an excellent work of charity (n. 279. 461)], or for another grave cause (for example, for fostering mutual love), provided the disease is long-lasting and is not accustomed shortly and easily to bring death; in these cases it is also licit to ask. Yet the one asking or rendering, with a contagious and grave disease, must manifest this circumstance to the party unaware of it. But the consort is not bound to manifest to the consort an infamous disease, e.g., a venereal one, provided he or she abstains both from asking and from rendering; nor is he or she bound to render in the case in which he or she is unwilling to manifest a disease of this kind; for the conjugal debt does not oblige with loss of reputation.¹

7° Whether a spouse is excused from rendering the debt because of fear of more numerous offspring than he or she can support, if danger of incontinence is absent in the other, is disputed. But since this danger can scarcely be absent, St. Alphonsus is more pleased by the negative opinion.²

8° As regards the obligation of abstaining from the conjugal act because of harm which perhaps could befall offspring already conceived or born, the probability and gravity of the harm on the one side, and the difficulty of lacking the conjugal right on the other side, must be weighed. It is not established that the use of marriage is prohibited because of harm of no great moment, which befalls offspring and cannot be guarded against, if long abstinence is very difficult.³

The conjugal act would indeed be illicit if from it a proximate danger of death for offspring already conceived would arise, for example, because of abortion proximately to be feared (n. 1646. 1°); for circumstances will scarcely ever concur which render it licit to permit abortion (n. 474. II.). Besides, dangers of this kind must not be imagined: hence the liceity of this act is not to be called into doubt unless in a concrete case there is at least prudent fear.

But if there is question of offspring to be conceived, authors oblige to the rendering of the debt, although it is to be feared that the offspring may be born weak, since for him or her it is better "thus to be, than not to be at all."⁴

Finally, the sentence (certainly the more common one) asserting that a wife who has experienced that she bears children dead cannot render the debt unless there is danger of incontinence seems scarcely probable in the concrete, unless this is established with certainty, for example, from the judgment of an expert physician. For how often will it be licit to experience this? Has not healthy offspring often come forth after unhappy births? etc. Add the danger of incontinence, which will especially be present if, because of this cause, one had to abstain perpetually from the use of marriage.¹

S. Th., Suppl., q. 41, a. 3-4; II-II, q. 153, a. 2; c. Gent., III, 122 and 126.

937. The conjugal debt (le devoir conjugal; de huwelijksplicht) is the proper act of conjugal life, namely, carnal copula of itself apt for generation, to which spouses have a right and which they must mutually render to one another, since in this essentially consists the undivided custom of conjugal life. Hence it constitutes the primary office between them, just as the primary end of matrimony is the procreation of offspring, and therefore by the Apostle it is called, as it were by excellence, the conjugal debt: Let the husband render the debt to the wife; and likewise also the wife to the husband (I Cor. VII, 3). Therefore in this spouses are equal by right; hence can. 1111: "to each spouse from the very beginning of matrimony there belongs an equal right and office in regard to the acts proper to conjugal life."

Therefore the conjugal act, per se apt for the generation of offspring, not only is licit if it is done for the due end and with the due circumstances, as was proved above (n. 763), but then it is also an act of the very virtue of chastity, such as befits the conjugal state; and therefore, given the required conditions, it is also meritorious.

Hence S. Thomas, II-II, q. 153, a. 2:

"Sin in human acts is that which is contrary to the order of reason; but the order of reason has this, that it order each thing suitably to its end; and therefore it is not a sin if through reason a man uses certain things for the end for which they are, in a suitable mode and order, provided that end is something truly good. But just as it is a good that the bodily nature of one individual be preserved, so also it is a certain excellent good that the nature of the human species be preserved. But just as the use of foods is ordered to the preservation of the life of one man, so also the use of venereal things is ordered to the preservation of the whole human race; whence Augustine says: What food is to the safety of a man, this intercourse is to the safety of the race. And therefore, just as the use of foods can be without every sin, if it is done in the due mode and order according as it befits the safety of the body, so also the use of venereal things can be without every sin, if it is done in the due mode and order, according as it is fitting for the end of human generation."

We shall speak:

1° of the liceity of conjugal copula,

2° of the circumstances of conjugal copula,

3° of acts connected with conjugal copula,

4° of excess in the use of marriage,

5° of defect in the use of marriage.

S. Th., Suppl., q. 64; q. 59, a. 6; q. 62.

959. Defect in the use of matrimony is not had if either spouse, with the consent of the other party, or both, by mutual consent, do not wish to use their right to the acts of conjugal life, but when, while the other party is urging his right and justly demanding the conjugal debt, the other denies it without a just reason. For since the use of matrimony must be regulated by the moral virtue of chastity, which is in the mean of reason, in it, just as there can be excess, so also there can be defect. Concerning this the following principles hold.

960. Principle I. The conjugal act, of itself, must obligatorily be rendered to the other party who has a right to it and justly demands it. - For copula can be demanded from justice by either spouse, because each has power over the body of the other party, and indeed from a bilateral onerous contract, so that of itself and generally the other party is bound to render it; for which reason it is commonly called the conjugal debt. Hence spouses in this matter are equal in right (can. 1111), and between them there is justice strictly so called and commutative. Hence the Apostle, I Cor. VII, 3-4: Let the husband render the debt to the wife; and likewise also the wife to the husband. The woman does not have power over her own body, but the man. Likewise also the man does not have power over his own body, but the woman.

A. Of asking there is no obligation of itself, because no one is bound to use his own right; by accident an obligation from charity and piety can exist, for example if the spouse judges that the other party, being in danger of incontinence, does not dare through shame to ask, or if the use of matrimony appears necessary for fostering love or averting dissensions.

B. Of rendering there exists an obligation grave of itself from justice, whenever one party reasonably, seriously, and legitimately asks, whether expressly or tacitly, because they have mutually handed over their bodies for conjugal use in the matrimonial contract; but to deny this of itself brings grave annoyance to the other. By accident, however, it will be light, as if the debt is rarely denied, for example once in a month to one asking more frequently; if it is deferred for a short time, for example from day to night, from night to morning; if the other asks remissly, not insistently, and easily acquiesces in the refusal; provided that in these circumstances there is absent danger of incontinence or of another grave inconvenience.

961. Principle II. The obligation of rendering the conjugal debt ceases in one, when the right of asking ceases in the other. - This can happen for many reasons:

a) If the spouse asking has admitted formal, certain, consummated adultery (sodomy properly so called, bestiality): for faith is broken with one who breaks faith. Except if the other has sinned similarly, or has been an accomplice in the sin, or, knowing and willing it, has condoned the sin (can. 1129).

b) If the one asking altogether lacks the use of reason or is in a state of complete drunkenness, as long as the state lasts: for one who lacks the use of reason does not ask in a reasonable and human manner.¹

¹ There can also be danger for offspring to be conceived from copula undertaken after much intoxicating drinking, namely lest it be born foolish, or deaf-mute, or liable to drunkenness.

c) If copula is the cause of grave danger or extrinsic inconvenience, either for the one rendering, or for the one asking, or for the offspring already conceived;² nevertheless, with a sufficient reason being present (for example, dissensions to be avoided, or one's own incontinence or that of the other party), one could, from charity, render to the other party and expose oneself to one's own danger, unless, however, death would threaten from the copula.3

² Specifically, there is a grave inconvenience of denying:

a) if the wife suffers from incipient cancer of the uterus, so that after coitus she is subjected to abundant emission of blood;

b) if she undergoes coitus with very acute pain which is repeated in each copula;

c) if she herself is gravely ill or if the other party suffers from a contagious disease, such as leprosy, venereal disease, which either brings danger of quick infection or excites an insuperable horror;

d) if either party suffers from an organic defect of the heart: for then coitus not only gravely harms, but can even produce sudden death;

e) if the wife knows by experience or by the judgment of a physician that in childbirth she undergoes grave danger of death.

Hence P. Vermeersch says, o. c., n. 225: "If a physician declares that a new conception will certainly be fatal for the wife, the wife must decline copula. But if death is not so imminent, the wife can put herself into danger for a grave cause. For since the conception itself is doubtful, the danger seems neither to have arisen nor to be proximate. But on these matters one must approach a physician at once skilled and God-fearing. For there are not lacking those who, because of slight indications, inconsiderately prohibit persons not very continent from the honorable use of matrimony. Wherefore Genicot judges that such danger from a future childbirth is very rarely certain, such that there would be a grave obligation of abstaining from matrimony."

3. That this is according to the mind of St. Thomas is clear from his response to the fourth objection, a. 1, q. 64.

d) If the other party asks immoderately, for example several times (three or four times) in the same night.1

e) If he asks in a manner illicit not only on the part of the agent but on the part of the act itself, for example that it be done onanistically, sodomitically, with scandal of others, etc.

But a graver harm is required for denying the debt absolutely than for deferring or restricting its rendering. Thus the weakness of the wife or great weariness, which does not suffice for absolutely denying copula, can be a reason for delaying the rendering or for denying it when it is as frequent as is sought by the husband. Hence:

1° Wives sin gravely who, in rendering the debt, show themselves difficult and slow, with danger of incontinence or adultery in the husband, or with the intention of deterring him from asking; likewise if they do not concede the debt except under compulsion, if they harshly and contumeliously reproach the husband for his requests, indeed if they obstinately deny it, even for one time, while he asks seriously and insistently.

2° Husbands also sin gravely who, whether from avarice in order to avoid offspring, or from ill-will, rarely know their wives.

3° Spouses are bound to the common bed (can. 1128) because of the obligation of rendering; therefore of itself it is illicit for one, without the consent of the other or with danger of incontinence, to be absent for a longer time; for this is equivalent to a denial of the debt; by accident it is licit because of grave causes, for example a notable good of the republic or of the family.

4° Hence he is unjust who illicitly separates himself or seeks civil divorce.

5° It is illicit for spouses to render themselves unable for copula or generation by excessive labors, vigils, austerities, or a fortiori by pollutions, adulteries, or other illicit acts. Hence husbands are guilty of grave and special injustice who, against the will of the wife, have admitted vasectomy for this reason, or castration, so that they cannot generate, or so emaciate the body that they render themselves almost unequal to the conjugal act, or practice neo-Malthusian arts; likewise on the other hand wives who, without the knowledge of the husband or against his will, not from the necessity of a present infection, but in order to obtain sterility or to avoid a future pregnancy, even a dangerous one, procure for themselves the excision of the ovaries or the interruption of the oviduct, or apply an occlusive pessary to the opening of the uterus, or use other neo-Malthusian means; likewise physicians who by their art perform the aforesaid excisions or operations or cooperate with them in any way.

6° Spouses are not excused from the obligation of rendering because of inconveniences inherent in matrimony, for example more numerous offspring, the inconveniences of gestation, ordinary difficulties of childbirth, grave and unusual but brief pains, light pains although long-lasting, etc., because these burdens are annexed to matrimony and they undertook them in entering matrimony.

7° Nevertheless the wife seems to be excused from rendering the debt if the husband by his own fault leaves the wife in extreme poverty, or does not wish to feed the offspring, or has no care of the family.

1. Men are not accustomed, much less women, to exceed the measure in asking the debt except in the first months after the marriage has been contracted, at which time also the moral difficulty will be slight, either because the husband more rarely intends to urge his strict right, or because he will willingly yield to the wife modestly begging off (Genicot, Th. M., II, n. 554).

962. Observations. - 1. Ordinarily the confessor is not bound, nor is it fitting for him, to question wives, except in the more modest manner he can, whether they have rendered the debt, for example whether they obey the husband in matters which pertain to matrimony, or whether anything troubles the conscience concerning matrimony; concerning the rest let him be silent unless he has been questioned. For the most part wives little fearing God are to be questioned in this matter, especially when they confess that they have been angry with their husbands. But this questioning ordinarily is to be omitted with wives of a God-fearing conscience.

2. When questioned, the confessor can propose to married persons who are pressed by anxiety concerning the baser things which they do between themselves the threefold rule indicated above, n. 948; - from further questions concerning the nature of the fact he should generally abstain; - besides, each should be taught: a) the husband, that he should not ask the debt at those times in which copula can be gravely harmful to the wife, for example at the time of purgation or of grave sickness; b) the wife, that she is bound under grave sin to obey the husband in rendering the debt, unless she is excused by a just cause, for example by infirmity.

I say. There is indeed never given an obligation of asking for the conjugal debt, except sometimes by accident from charity or another virtue; but there is given a strict obligation from justice, of itself grave, of rendering it to the other spouse asking seriously, reasonably, and with right. The reason for the first is that no one is bound to use his own right. - Nevertheless I said that by accident an obligation of asking can be given; thus, for example, a man is bound from charity to ask, if he judges that the co-party is placed in danger of incontinence and, on account of modesty, does not ask. But the reason for the second is that from the very nature of the matrimonial contract the spouses mutually transfer to themselves the power of their bodies in order to conjugal use. It is also deduced from the words of the Apostle, I Cor. vii, 3: "Let the husband render the debt to the wife, and likewise also the wife to the husband; the woman does not have power of her body, but the man; and likewise also the man does not have power of his body, but the woman." - I said asking reasonably and with right, for the obligation of rendering the debt ceases in one spouse when the right of exacting it ceases in the other; but the right ceases especially in the following cases, namely: 1°. if one of the spouses has committed adultery; 2°. if the one asking lacks the use of reason, for example, if the man were overwhelmed by liquors, for then his petition would not be human; 3°. if the one rendering can reasonably fear grave harm or danger to health, because the spouses are not judged to have obligated themselves to rendering the debt with so great an inconvenience. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, nn. 943 and 946.

You Will Resolve. 1°. Spouses are bound to cohabitation, nor can one be absent for a longer time without the consent of the other or without necessity; for this obligation follows from the very obligation of rendering the debt. But just causes of going away for a long time are: the public good, the family to be fed or protected, harm from enemies to be avoided, etc. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 939.

2°. The spouse denying the debt sins gravely as often as there is danger of incontinence or of grave annoyance in the other party. Likewise if he denies it to the other seriously asking. But otherwise, if the co-party benevolently remits it or asks weakly.

3°. One denying does not sin when the other asks immoderately, for example, after the third or fourth time in the same night; nor if he defers for a brief time, namely to the night, or if from the night he defers to the morning time, with nevertheless always the danger of incontinence excluded. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 940.

4°. Wives are to be reprehended who deny the debt to their husbands, even when they ask weakly, without sufficient cause; or who do not concede except compelled, and harshly and contumeliously reproach the man for his petitions.

5°. A wife is not excused from rendering the debt on account of ordinary inconveniences of childbirth, pregnancy, or nursing, nor indeed on account of pains that are grave but brief in time, nor on account of long-lasting but moderate pains, for example, of the head for several months after childbirth, nor on account of health somewhat weakened; because all these things are annexed to the matrimonial condition. But it is otherwise if danger of life or of very grave disease would truly have to be feared from the judgment of a truly prudent physician. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 952.

6°. There is no obligation of rendering the debt to the other laboring under a contagious disease grave in itself, such as plague, venereal disease, or something similar. Likewise, on account of notable weakness of body, those laboring under fever or another grave disease are excused from rendering the debt. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 950.

7°. A spouse is not excused from rendering the debt on account of fear of more numerous offspring; for procreation of offspring pertains to the principal end of Marriage; whence that inconvenience is intrinsic to Marriage itself. Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 941.

8°. Especially Catholic physicians are bound under grave obligation not to exaggerate the dangers of childbirth but rather to indicate the means by which they may be lessened.

VI. A spouse sins who by unlawful means renders himself unfit for paying the debt; as if he pollute himself, or approach other women, beyond these crimes he perpetrates an injustice against the innocent spouse. Nay, neither can they lawfully by excessive voluntary austerity so extenuate themselves as to become unfit for rendering the debt. But this happens most rarely. From moderate exercises of piety nevertheless, and from fasts prescribed by the Church, a spouse ought not to abstain, that he may become more robust and vigorous for rendering the debt. Nay, in the time of fasts spouses ought to observe continence, although they be not rigorously bound.

VII. A secretly adulterous spouse can ask without sin, not as a thing owed out of justice, but to be granted out of benevolence: because he is not bound to undergo a penalty before the judge's sentence. An innocent spouse can ask the debt from the other spouse who on account of an impediment of affinity contracted from fornication perpetrated after the matrimony has lost the right of asking. If he lawfully asks, by a stronger right he can render. A spouse bound by a vow of chastity cannot render to the other asking, if this one had no right of asking; on the contrary if the right be present, he is bound to render. When a spouse asks unlawfully, because he is bound by a vow of chastity, then the other can render, if the partner cannot be turned away, because the vow does not take away the right of asking arisen from a lawful matrimony, but only effects that he asks unlawfully. Nor hence does it follow that the one rendering becomes a partaker of the other's sin. For a spouse rendering gives his labour to a lawful thing, not to the other's sin, just as one who from grave and pressing necessity seeks a loan from a usurer.

IX. QUESTION IV. Can he who is certain that the matrimony is void render the debt to a spouse asking, ignorant that the matrimony is void, that he may avoid infamy or grave loss? ANSWER. The common opinion teaches that a spouse certainly knowing an impediment annulling the matrimony can in no way render, even if a danger of death threaten, or he be compelled by censures. The reason is evident, because in this case the copulation would be fornicating; therefore it is in no way to be committed for any evil whatsoever, whether death or infamy. The things which are objected are of no moment. An ecclesiastical judge, from invincible ignorance judging the matrimony valid, compels by censures to the observing of the matrimony, and therefore does not dispense. If the judge dispense, when he can, every question ceases.

I presuppose that the use of marriage for the sake of offspring is lawful. Likewise, to avoid the danger of incontinence, as D. Bonaventure teaches in 4 d. 31, art. 2. The reason for the first is that this is the first end of the institution of marriage. The institution, moreover, is from God, as is said in Genesis 1 and 8, Matthew 19, John 2.

The other, however, is conceded in 1 Cor. 7: Again return together into the same, lest Satan tempt you because of your incontinence. So teach Rebello, 2 part. de oblig. iust. lib. 3 de imped. matrim. quaest. 19; Cajetan, sum. verb. usus matrimonii; Soto, 4 d. 32, art. 4; Fagundez, lib. 6, cap. 3; Diana, p. 2, Tract. 4, resol. 115, with others; or at most it is venial, as D. Bonaventure asserts, quaest. 2, with others cited by Sanchez, Tom. 3 de matrim. lib. 9, d. 11. One may also licitly use marriage for health's sake. So Rebello, sect. 1; Cajetan, tom. 1, opusc. tract. 12, quaest. 3; Henriquez, lib. 11 de matrim. cap. 17, num. 7; and others cited in Diana, resol. 218.

I presuppose also that the union of spouses from mere delight is venial. So D. Bonaventure, quaest. 3, from D. Augustine, lib. 1 de nupt. cap. 15, and de bono coniug. cap. 6 and 7; Rebello, loc. cit.; Fagundez, num. 5; Cajetan, verb. usus matrimonii; and this the Saintly Doctor calls a disordination with respect to the final cause. The reason is that marriage makes honorable the union, yet it still retains some disordination. Many, however, with Diana, p. 2, Tract. 4, resol. 116, excuse it even from venial sin.

The Saintly Doctor adds there, and in the Speculum animae, cap. 3, whom others follow: if from such concupiscence one is carried toward the spouse with a meretricious affection, so that he would wish, even if she were not his wife, or in the act should imagine another, it is mortal, and he is held to declare the condition of her whom he imagines, whether she is sacred, or married, or betrothed, or a virgin. But of these we must treat in the Tractate on Marriage.

The Saintly Doctor adds in the Speculum animae that a disordination of manner, of time, etc. may accompany the conjugal act.

With respect to manner, it is certain that it is a most grave sin if one defiles one's wife Sodomitically, as D. Bonaventure notes.

D. Bonaventure here; D. Thomas, quaest. 154, art. 11; either between the thighs, or in any other way by spilling the seed outside the natural vessel, as D. Bonaventure says and as is commonly held, with Sanchez, lib. 9 de debito coniugali, d. 17. The reason is that it is opposed not only to the general but to the special order of nature, as the Saintly Doctor argues in Compend. Theol. verit. lib. 3, cap. 21, and with him Fagundez, lib. 6, cap. 3, num. 17. Understand, however, that this is so if it is done advertently, as Fagundez notes, num. 20.

They ask, however, whether a man who begins the conjugal act Sodomitically with his wife, in order to complete it in the proper vessel, sins mortally.

The first opinion is that it is not mortal, provided the danger of pollution is absent. So Navarrus, lib. 5 consil. tit. de paen. et remiss. num. 7; Ovando, 4 d. 31, quaest. unic.; Angelus, V. debitum 25; Zerola, in praxi paen. cap. 12, quaest. 25; Graffius, tom. 1, lib. 5 de adulterio, conf. 3; Gambacurta, de casibus reser. casu 2; Zancharda, in direct. part. 1, Tract. de matrimonio, cap. 4, § 10.

But that it is not lawful teaches Bonacina, de matrimonio, quaest. 4, punct. 11, num. 12; Sanchez, lib. 9, d. 17; Rodriguez, sum. tom. 3, cap. 88; Basil Pontius, de matrimonio, lib. 10, cap. 11 — whom Diana reports, p. p. Tract. 17, resol. 37. I add Fagundez, in 6 praec. lib. 6, cap. 3, num. 18, who calls it an absurdity to concede this. And I subscribe: for that act is not ordered by nature to that vessel, but is initiatory of an execrable abomination, and is accordingly reduced to it. If, however, he inserts his fingers into the woman's vessel, or his member into her mouth, they deny that it is a mortal sin — Sanchez, de matrim. tom. 3, lib. 9, d. 17, num. 5; Diana, loc. cit.; but Fagundez, loc. cit. num. 19, says it is mortal, as also to rub the member about the unnatural vessel. Diana, part. 3, Tract. 4, resol. 204, condemns this with Pontius, and deservedly, for they can have no order, but are brutish.

They ask further: when the man is sowing and withdrawing his member, may the wife, gravely aroused, excite herself with touches.

They say it is lawful: Sanchez, num. 12; Fagundez, num. 21; and very many others cited in Diana, p. p. tract. 17, resol. 38 — who nevertheless, with Rodriguez, summ. part. 3, cap. 88, condemns such an act.

To me the prior opinion seems more probable. The reason is that it is the consummation of the conjugal union, ordered to generation. For the seed of the woman, though not necessary, nevertheless according to many contributes greatly to generation, as Sanchez proves, num. 8.

As for variation of position — for instance, if the woman is on top — it is more probably not deadly; for the womb of the woman has a power of attracting and retaining the man's seed, as the stomach has for food. So Sanchez, lib. 9 de matrim. d. 16; Navarrus, man. cap. 16, num. 42; Rodriguez, tom. 1, sum. cap. 143; Fagundez, in 6 praec. lib. 6, cap. 3; Diana, p. p. Tract. de circumstantia aggravante, resol. 35; and others cited by these. The same they say if the union is had unnaturally, or sitting, or from the side — provided, however, there is no danger of spilling seed outside the proper vessel.

But if in an extraordinary manner of union he emits some quantity of seed outside the vessel, and, weary of children, at the end of the act pours out all the seed outside the vessel.

It is answered that the effusion of all the seed outside is deadly, nor can the wife, knowing this, render the debt — whatever Basil Pontius may say, de matrim. lib. 19, cap. 11, as reported by Diana, p. p. Tract. 15, resol. 54.

Thus as often as the husband wishes to exercise the act mortally, the wife is not bound, nor can she render it, as Sanchez notes, lib. 9, d. 16, num. 8; but when it is venial, it is probable that she is bound to render it. So Sanchez, loc. cit.; Peter Soto, de matrim. lect. 16; Cajetan, 2. 2, quaest. 154, art. 1; Fagundez, num. 27; Henriquez, lib. 11, cap. 16, num. 6, in gloss. litt. O; Diana, p. p. Tract. de circumstantia aggravante, resol. 35; and others with D. Bonaventure, in 4, d. 32, dub. 4.

But whether to approach a menstruating woman is deadly.

The first opinion is that it is mortal, and of old it was punished by the penalty of death, Leviticus 18, as S. Bonaventure notes, loc. cit., where he observes that the penalty enjoined was upon the husband asking, or even upon the wife, if she herself be the one asking; yet he must render to the one asking, if he cannot otherwise, because he is bound to render his due to his husband.

He concludes, however, from what has been said, art. 3, quaest. 1, that if the time of the menses is, according to nature, customarily once a month, he ought not to ask, because he has a time to attend to generation, so that offspring may be born without danger of monstrosity or of elephantiasis, as D. Jerome admonishes, cited by the Saintly Doctor.

But if he violently renders, the wife is excused; if, however, he knowingly asks, and renders willingly, he sins; for at that time the man has no power over the body of the woman. But if it is a continuous disease, all concede with the Saintly Doctor that it is lawful to ask; otherwise they would be compelled to be long without their right, nor would a monstrous offspring then be born; even if there were danger of this, it would be better that she be, than not to be. So Navarrus, man. cap. 16, num. 32, and others cited by Fagundez, num. 18.

Some, however, say that to ask during the ordinary time of the menses is only venial. Fagundez says this is the common opinion, num. 29. But these things I shall defer to the Tractate on Marriage. So it is said likewise of the sin of one who approaches a pregnant woman, with danger of abortion.

There remains to be considered whether, on account of sacred time, unions are illicit.

First, when the most holy Eucharist is to be received: it is commonly asserted to be venial, as in Sanchez, lib. 9 de matrimonio, d. 13; Fagundez, cap. 4, num. 51, with D. Bonaventure, in speculo animae, cap. 5.

But others say it is not even venial; Fagundez reports them, loc. cit.

On the more solemn principal feasts, the Saintly Doctor judges it venial, loc. cit.; but in compend. Theol. verit. lib. 3, cap. 21 he teaches that it is a sin if it is done from a mere impulse of lust.

In the Confessional, cap. 2, particula 14, he reports the words of Alexander of Hales, who says that the conjugal act is deadly in five ways from mere impetuousness. The first is the cause of satisfying lust through meretricious blandishments; the second, when it is done against the natural use; the third, when it is at a prohibited time; the fourth, in a prohibited place; the fifth, when one approaches a menstruating woman. But in the other passages adduced, and there also before these words, he understands these circumstances of place and time to be mortal if the impulse of lust is grave, preferring delight to God.

For the rest, he judges it not mortal, as I have reported; and it is the common opinion with respect to time; with respect to place, however, I have said enough when the sacrilege was treated.

There are also certain preliminaries to the act. And indeed they ask: whether spouses sin mortally by touching one another and kissing the privy parts for the sake of mere pleasure.

Many assert so. So Paludanus, 4 d. 31, quaest. 3, art. 2; Sylvester, V. debit. coniug. quaest. 7; Rodriguez, tom. 1, cap. 129. But I shall say with Diana, 3 part. tract. 4, resol. 125: woe, woe to the married, if this opinion were true. Therefore he upholds the contrary opinion with Zancharda, de Sacram. matrimonio, cap. 41; Sylvius, 2. 2, quaest. 154, art. 4, concl. 61; Filliucius, tomo 2, tract. 30, cap. 10, num. 195. Diana adds that these men are to be gravely rebuked. Fagundez subscribes, in 6 praec. lib. VI, cap. 3, num. 37, who says they are venial — yet with this condition, that there be no danger of pollution; for then those acts would be deadly.