Chapter II. On the Obligation of Conjugal Intercourse

I. The obligation of asking for the debt is absent in itself, because no one in itself is bound to use his own right. By accident there can be an obligation, and indeed of charity, for example if the partner seems to be in danger of incontinence, or if otherwise quarrels cannot be ended or averted (St. Alphonsus VI, 929).

II. The obligation of rendering the debt is circumscribed by these points:

1. Existence of the obligation. There exists an obligation of rendering the debt to one who reasonably and seriously asks for it. "Let the husband," says the Apostle, "render the debt to the wife; and likewise also the wife to the husband. The woman does not have power over her own body, but the man. Likewise also the man does not have power over his own body, but the woman."¹ Moreover, it is an obligation of justice, as is clear both from the fact that the Apostle speaks of the debt to be rendered, and repeats the obligation from the fact that spouses have power over the body of the partner; and from can. 1111; and from the nature of marriage, which is an onerous contract. Moreover, the obligation from the cited canon exists from the beginning of marriage, and therefore the so-called two-month privilege has been abrogated, that is, the privilege by which a spouse deliberating about entering a Religious Institute strictly so called could deny the debt for two months after contracting marriage. Finally, note that a spouse, in practice the husband, is bound to render the debt even if "the wife tacitly only demands it, for example if she shows some indication which signifies a tacit petition; because in women, on account of their innate modesty, such signs are held as a true petition" (St. Alphonsus VI, 928; St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 64, a. 2).

2. Gravity of the obligation. The obligation of rendering the debt is commonly grave, because there is question of an act or of a matter which is grave. Make exception: 1. when the partner asks less insistently, for example if he asks weakly, or, when asked to desist from the petition, easily consents; 2. if the debt is rarely denied to one who asks often, for example once in a month; for this, in view of the frequency, does not seem grave. Besides, a brief delay, for example from day to night, is easily excused from grave and even from light fault. Nevertheless if, in the excepted cases, the partner were cast into danger of incontinence by the denial, there would be a grave obligation of charity (St. Alphonsus VI, 940).

Corollary. They sin gravely: 1. wives who show great delay in rendering, or do not grant the debt unless coerced, or reproach the husband insultingly for his petitions; 2. husbands who, whether in order to avoid offspring or from love conceived toward others, never or almost never know the wife, although they ought to presume that the wives bear this with difficulty.

3. The causes excusing from the obligation are:

a. Cessation of the right of demanding the debt, namely by the spontaneous renunciation of the spouses. Renunciation can be made explicitly or implicitly, by both or by only one party. It is presumed to have been made implicitly if both spouses, by mutual consent, emit a vow of chastity; nevertheless, in itself it is not repugnant that those vowing retain the right to intercourse (St. Alphonsus II, 61 and VI, 944, 948).

b. Deprivation of the right of demanding the debt, namely through adultery, sodomy, unnatural lying together with a person of diverse sex, or bestiality; according to that saying: Let faith be broken with the one who breaks faith. But the innocent spouse is excused until that spouse has condoned the crime or committed a similar crime (St. Alphonsus VI, 945, 960, 966; St. Thomas, In IV Sent., dist. 35, q. unica, a. 1, corp.; Supplement, q. 62, a. 1; can. 1129, 1130).

c. Defect of reason in the one asking, as if intercourse is asked by one perfectly insane or wholly drunk. The reason is that a petition of this sort is not a human act. There is added the danger lest offspring be born defective in mind and body² (St. Alphonsus VI, 948). Nor is there an obligation of rendering the debt if one perfectly insane or wholly drunk is in danger of incontinence, because an act materially evil can be permitted on account of the harm to offspring to be feared. - To one semi-insane and semi-drunk, and likewise to an insane person who has a lucid interval, the debt is in itself to be rendered (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). Moreover, on account of the harm to be feared, it is generally and in itself to be advised that intercourse with a drunk or insane person be avoided.

d. A grave inconvenience to be feared either for the one asking, or for the one rendering, or for offspring already conceived. The reason is that in all debts great difficulty excuses from payment (St. Alphonsus VI, 950, 952; cf. St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 64, a. 1).

Many grave inconveniences, such as death, notably harmful infection, another disease, or a notable increase of this disease, not only excuse from rendering the debt, but also render the rendering unlawful, unless a grave cause, for example the danger of incontinence of oneself or of the partner, or a grave quarrel to be avoided, is present (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.); nevertheless a grave cause does not render intercourse lawful if death is proximately going to follow from it (n. 93).

Other inconveniences, such as very sharp pains either in intercourse or in childbirth, or immense fatigue, can indeed excuse from rendering the debt, but, as is clear, do not in themselves prohibit it.

Finally, if, for example, the husband has truly vexed the wife during the day and asks in the evening, the psychological difficulty itself seems to excuse the wife, unless the husband either explicitly or implicitly, for example by his manner of asking, has offered some satisfaction to her.

It was said: "A grave inconvenience to be feared for offspring already conceived excuses from intercourse." For the inconvenience of offspring to be conceived commonly does not excuse from rendering the debt, because it is always better for the offspring to be thus than not to be (St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 64, a. 1, ad 4; St. Alphonsus VI, 951). If, however, a woman has learned by experience that she gives birth to dead children, she is excused from rendering the debt if, according to the judgment of a physician, it is rightly feared that the death of the fetus in the uterus would expose the mother herself to grave danger (St. Alphonsus VI, 953).

Note. To grave inconvenience is also referred an immoderate petition, either absolutely, as if someone habitually is not accustomed to be content with one or another act of intercourse daily, or, for example, were to ask four times in a night; or relatively to weakness of body, for example on account of incipient phthisis or some other chronic infirmity (St. Alphonsus VI, 940).

¹ 1 Cor. 7:3-4.

² Capellmann-Bergmann, op. cit., p. 328; Von Olfers, op. cit., p. 69, judges that the danger is absent if intercourse is had with one who is drunk only actually, not habitually; yet others contradict him.

Question 1. Whether fear of more numerous offspring, for whom sufficient provision cannot be made, excuses from rendering the debt.

Response I. If the evil threatens through the fault of the husband, it seems that one must answer affirmatively, "because you are not compelled to render his right to another, if he refuses to render yours to you" (St. Alphonsus IV, 999). But in the proposed case the husband refuses to render to the wife the cooperation owed to the bodily education of offspring by force of marriage and of intercourse had. Therefore the wife is not bound to render his right to the husband until he has amended himself. The argument is confirmed, or is even proposed, by this reasoning: let faith be broken with the one who breaks faith. Now, since the education of offspring, together with their procreation, is the primary end of marriage (can. 1013, § 1), cooperation toward the bodily education of offspring, equally as cooperation toward their procreation, seems to pertain to the matrimonial fidelity owed to the wife; this fidelity, in the hypothesis laid down, is broken by the husband. Therefore.

Response II. If the evil threatens without fault of the husband, it is disputed. Some judge that the wife is excused, provided the danger of incontinence is absent. The reason alleged is that in all debts great inconvenience excuses from payment. Others deny this, because the inconvenience of which we speak is intrinsic to the conjugal debt. Moreover, because in practice the danger of incontinence will scarcely be absent, for there is question of continually denying the debt, otherwise the end of the denial would not be obtained, in practice the debt cannot be denied (St. Alphonsus VI, 941).

Question 2. Whether a spouse is excused from the debt if the partner forbids the offspring to be educated Catholic.

Response. It seems that one must answer affirmatively, because, as we said above, you are not compelled to render his right to another if he refuses to render yours to you. But in the case the partner stands in the way of the partner's right to educate the offspring Catholic. Therefore. And this holds whether the spouse has promised or has not promised Catholic education.

e. A sinful petition excuses as follows:

1. If the petition is sinful because an act is asked for in circumstances which render it unlawful, or because an unlawful thing is asked, for example sodomitic intercourse or intercourse to be performed before others, the partner is not only excused from rendering the debt, but is also forbidden to render it. The reason is that no one enjoys a right of asking for an unlawful thing. If, however, the malice of the act or unlawful thing is only venial, for example if without a just cause intercourse to be performed from behind is asked for, there is easily present a reason which renders the rendering lawful, though not obligatory (St. Alphonsus VI, 943, 946).

2. If the petition is sinful because the one asking is held by an impediment, for example by a vow, it is lawful to render the debt. The reason is that an impediment which holds one party does not deprive the other of the right of having intercourse. It is disputed whether in the case there is an obligation of rendering the debt. Now it seems that this must be affirmed, because intercourse in the case, although asked illicitly, is nevertheless asked lawfully, and therefore the petition must be satisfied, "just as if someone were to emit a vow not to exact from you the money owed, if he later asks, you are bound to render it, because through the vow the creditor did not lose his right" (St. Alphonsus VI, 944). Moreover, when "a spouse foresees that the other, impeded by a vow or another impediment, will ask illicitly, then it will be safer for the spouse himself to forestall it; and if the other has already asked, then he himself should also ask, saying: I wish you to render to me. But Sanchez rightly says that wives are rarely bound to this, because it would be a great burden to them, on account of the natural modesty of women, to be bound always to ask" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

3. If the petition is sinful on account of the manner of asking, for example if it is made for pleasure alone, intercourse ought to be granted, because it is asked lawfully, indeed also licitly if the one asking so wishes (St. Alphonsus VI, 946).

III. Consequences of the obligation set forth. From the obligation of rendering, indeed sometimes of asking, the debt, there follow:

a. The obligation of cohabiting.¹ Now it belongs to the husband, since he is the head of the conjugal society, to choose the domicile. Moreover, the obligation of cohabiting is essentially mutual. Hence one cannot be absent from the other for a rather long time without necessity or the consent of the partner. But the husband who must be absent for a long time is bound to take the wife with him, if she desires this and it can conveniently be done; and the wife must follow the husband if he requires this, unless, however, a grave reason excuses (St. Alphonsus VI, 939).

b. The obligation of using at least the same bedroom or chamber; that is, the right and obligation of using the same marriage bed or bed ought not to be urged, provided they spend the night in the same bedroom and can come together at will. Besides, the obligation seems to be satisfied if, as is in use in some families, wife and husband indeed have a distinct bed and room, but the room is adjoining, and free and easy access to the other's room and bed lies open to each, although this practice is very much to be dissuaded.²

c. The obligation not to render themselves impotent for the debt. A spouse who by unlawful means renders himself impotent for the conjugal debt sins mortally, because the law of justice obliging to the rendering of the debt also forbids that anyone by unlawful means render himself impotent. Hence a husband who, whether by frequent pollutions or by access to other women, renders himself impotent, or notably less apt, for paying the debt, beyond the sin of adulterous pollution or of adultery, seems to commit a new fault against the law of justice. Indeed a spouse could sin gravely who, by works in themselves lawful but indiscreet and by no means necessary, such as excessive mortifications, vigils, or labors, rendered himself notably less fit³ (St. Alphonsus VI, 942).

Note. Vasectomy (n. 87), oophorectomy (n. 86), and excision of the ovaries, admitted for the end that procreation of offspring be impeded, are gravely unlawful, both because they contain mutilation which is not necessary for the preservation of the whole, and because, done for that end, they are directly opposed to the good of the species; besides, if they are done without the consent of the partner, they are opposed to that partner's right.

¹ Cf. Gen. 2:24; c. 1, de coniug. lepros., IV, 8; can. 1128; Civil Code, arts. 161, 162.

² Cf. Gasparri, Tractatus Canonicus de Matrimonio, n. 1077.

³ Cf. Theologia Mechliniensis de Sponsalibus et Matrimonio, n. 43, q. 10.