Article II. On the Obligation of the Conjugal Act

1647. Principles. - I. There is an obligation of justice, per se grave,¹ of rendering the debt to the other spouse seriously and reasonably asking it. The reason is that from the very nature of the matrimonial contract the spouses mutually transfer to themselves the power of their bodies in order to the conjugal use. This is also deduced from the words of the Apostle: Let the husband render the debt to the wife; and likewise the wife to the husband; the woman does not have power of her own body, but the man; and likewise the man does not have power of his own body, but the woman.²

II. No obligation, per se, urges of asking the conjugal debt. The reason is that neither spouse is bound to use his or her right, and each can remit it. Yet per accidens there can be an obligation of asking from charity or another virtue, especially in the man, for example, if he judges that the consort is placed in danger of incontinence because of modesty in asking, or if the asking is necessary for fostering or restoring conjugal love, etc. - See St. Alphonsus.³

III. The obligation in one spouse of rendering the debt ceases when the right of exacting it ceases in the other: and the right is destroyed chiefly in the following cases, namely:

1° If one of the spouses has committed adultery, provided the conditions enumerated in n. 1552. III. 3° are present. Yet in this case the asking will not be illicit, as it is in the cases of which n. 1643 treats.

2° If the one asking lacks the use of reason, because his or her asking is not human. Yet it is licitly rendered, unless there is danger of scandal, abortion, or another grave harm; indeed it must be rendered if danger of incontinence, even material, urges in the insane or drunken person (yet with a greater evil excluded), or if the spouse is not perfectly insane or drunk.¹

3° If the one rendering can reasonably fear grave harm or danger to health, because spouses are not judged to have obligated themselves to render the debt with so great an inconvenience. Hold the same if evils of this kind are to be feared for offspring already conceived, and also universally, if for the one asking.²

4° If the one asking, because of incest committed with blood relatives of the other in the first or second degree, or for another cause, has lost the right of asking.

5° If it is asked too frequently (n. 1648. 3°).

6° If the other has given sufficient cause for divorce, namely as long as that cause continues to exist (n. 1552. III.).

7° Within the first two months after Matrimony has been celebrated (n. 1551. 2°).

8° If the other asks illicitly; yet in this case it must be distinguished in the following manner. For the illicitness either holds itself on the part of the one rendering alone, or on the part of the one asking alone, or on the part of the act, so that it affects the one asking and the one rendering.

For the first case (for example, if the one asking exacts the act on this condition, that the one rendering impede conception), let this be the rule: he or she is neither bound to render, nor is it licit with one's own sin, even venial, since no obligation or liceity toward sin can exist.³ It is otherwise, as is clear, if what must be called a sin per se is rendered licit by adjunct circumstances, as can happen in an unnatural position, etc.⁴

In the second case there is an obligation of rendering, if there is question only of venial sin, for example, if the act is asked for pleasure alone; for it will scarcely be able to be demonstrated that there is a right of denying some grave debt of justice because the one enjoying that right will use it with slight malice. - But if it is asked with mortal sin (for example, with an adulterous mind, or by one who is bound by a vow of chastity, or by an onanist), that act is licitly rendered, or rather merely permitted, if a grave cause is present (n. 1653. III.) and the proximate danger of consent in the work, insofar as it is evil, does not urge (n. 1654. 2°; 1655. q. 8°). - Indeed St. Alphonsus says that rendering in these circumstances is more probably simply owed, if the one asking has not been deprived of his or her right, for example, through incest.⁵

In the third case, however, one must distinguish. - It is licit to render, if the act is not so intrinsically evil that illicitness can never be taken away by particular circumstances, and if such circumstances are in fact present (n. 1648. 6°. 8°). Otherwise it is not licit; for it would be participation in the illicit act itself.¹

Note. - If warning, or asking that the one exacting desist from sin, is foreseen to be profitable and can be done without grave inconvenience (which will be present for the most part), it must be premised by the consort before the permission, especially if there is question of mortal sin (n. 1654. 3°. 4°). - But if there is question of one impeded from asking, for example, by a vow, it will be safer if the consort forestalls the impeded person by his or her own asking, or adds his or her own asking to the asking of the impeded person already made. Yet the wife, by reason of modesty, will rarely be bound to this.²

1648. Resolves. - 1° Spouses are bound to cohabitation, nor can one be absent for a longer time without the consent of the other, or without necessity; for this obligation follows from the very obligation of rendering the debt. But just causes of going away for a long time are the public good, the support or protection of the family, harm from enemies to be avoided, etc. And a man who must remain elsewhere for a long time ought to lead his wife there, if he conveniently can, so that she may cohabit with him. As regards civil law, see what has been said in n. 445. 2°. 3°.³

Regularly, however, a wife is bound to follow her husband when he changes domicile, even without a just cause (not, however, if he changes it from a base cause); and this: a) notwithstanding a contrary custom, which might exist somewhere; for a custom of this kind, as opposed to the divine law by force of which the man is the head of the wife,⁴ would be intrinsically evil (n. 184. 3°); b) even if the man goes away into a distant region (from which, however, he is not about to return shortly). - Except if either 1) by following the man she would be exposed to danger of life, chastity, grave detriment, or - for example, because the place to which the husband withdraws for a long time is destitute of every religious succor - of salvation; or 2) she would lack nourishment; or 3) there is question of a husband made a wanderer after Matrimony, or, without the wife's knowing it, already a wanderer before it; or 4) by an antenuptial pact it was agreed not to change domicile, which pact nevertheless has an included condition: unless a new grave cause should supervene.⁵

2° A spouse denying the debt sins gravely whenever there is danger of incontinence or grave vexation in the other party. Likewise if he or she denies it to the other seriously asking. But it is otherwise if the consort benevolently remits it, or asks remissly. Yet remiss asking must be altogether distinguished from interpretative or virtual asking, which is had by signs indicating a serious will of asking, and from which the obligation of rendering the debt arises. This is verified especially in a woman, who is most especially subject to modesty, and from shame does not ask expressly what she anxiously asks.

3° One denying does not sin when the other asks immoderately, for example, after the third or fourth time in the same night; nor if he or she delays it for a short time, namely until night, or if from night he or she delays it until morning time, yet always with the danger of incontinence excluded.¹

4° Wives are to be reproved who deny the debt to their husbands without sufficient cause, even if they ask remissly; or who do not concede it except when forced, and who harshly and contumeliously reproach the man for his requests.

5° A wife is not excused from rendering the debt because of the ordinary inconveniences of childbirth, pregnancy, or nursing; - nor even because of pains which are grave but brief in time; - nor because of pains which are long-lasting but moderate, for example, of the head for several months after childbirth; - nor because of health somewhat weakened; because all these things are annexed to the matrimonial condition. It would be otherwise, however, if danger of life or of a most grave disease, from the judgment of a truly prudent physician, had to be feared.²

6° There is no obligation of rendering the debt to another laboring under a contagious disease grave in itself, such as plague, venereal disease, or something similar. Likewise, because of notable bodily debility, those laboring under a strong fever or another grave disease are excused from rendering the debt. Probably, however, notwithstanding grave danger to health, a spouse can render the debt, in order to free the consort from probable danger of incontinence [for it is licit even to expose life for an excellent work of charity (n. 279. 461)], or for another grave cause (for example, for fostering mutual love), provided the disease is long-lasting and is not accustomed shortly and easily to bring death; in these cases it is also licit to ask. Yet the one asking or rendering, with a contagious and grave disease, must manifest this circumstance to the party unaware of it. But the consort is not bound to manifest to the consort an infamous disease, e.g., a venereal one, provided he or she abstains both from asking and from rendering; nor is he or she bound to render in the case in which he or she is unwilling to manifest a disease of this kind; for the conjugal debt does not oblige with loss of reputation.¹

7° Whether a spouse is excused from rendering the debt because of fear of more numerous offspring than he or she can support, if danger of incontinence is absent in the other, is disputed. But since this danger can scarcely be absent, St. Alphonsus is more pleased by the negative opinion.²

8° As regards the obligation of abstaining from the conjugal act because of harm which perhaps could befall offspring already conceived or born, the probability and gravity of the harm on the one side, and the difficulty of lacking the conjugal right on the other side, must be weighed. It is not established that the use of marriage is prohibited because of harm of no great moment, which befalls offspring and cannot be guarded against, if long abstinence is very difficult.³

The conjugal act would indeed be illicit if from it a proximate danger of death for offspring already conceived would arise, for example, because of abortion proximately to be feared (n. 1646. 1°); for circumstances will scarcely ever concur which render it licit to permit abortion (n. 474. II.). Besides, dangers of this kind must not be imagined: hence the liceity of this act is not to be called into doubt unless in a concrete case there is at least prudent fear.

But if there is question of offspring to be conceived, authors oblige to the rendering of the debt, although it is to be feared that the offspring may be born weak, since for him or her it is better "thus to be, than not to be at all."⁴

Finally, the sentence (certainly the more common one) asserting that a wife who has experienced that she bears children dead cannot render the debt unless there is danger of incontinence seems scarcely probable in the concrete, unless this is established with certainty, for example, from the judgment of an expert physician. For how often will it be licit to experience this? Has not healthy offspring often come forth after unhappy births? etc. Add the danger of incontinence, which will especially be present if, because of this cause, one had to abstain perpetually from the use of marriage.¹