Section — Marc, Institutiones Morales

§ 2. On The Obligation Of The Conjugal Act

¶1.
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Two things are to be weighed here: 1. what the obligation is for spouses, whether of rendering or of seeking the debt; 2. what causes excuse from such an obligation.

¶2.

I. On The Obligation Either Of Rendering Or Of Seeking The Debt.

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¶2103.
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  1. Principles. I. EACH spouse is held from justice, and under grave obligation, to RENDER the debt to the other spouse reasonably and seriously seeking. - This is clear from the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:3): "Let the husband render the debt to the wife; and likewise the wife to the husband." The reason is that by force of the matrimonial contract "the woman does not have power over her own body, but the man. And likewise the man does not have power over his own body, but the woman" (ibid.). And therefore they cannot deny to each other the use of marriage without injustice, which is, of itself, a mortal sin; because it is a denial grave from its nature, at least if it is done more often, or obstinately.1

We said 1. to one seeking reasonably; for if the one seeking is not master of himself, as a madman or one perfectly drunk, because he does not seek in a human manner; or if he seeks unjustly, immoderately, at an unseasonable time, and whenever generally a legitimate cause of denying intervenes, the obligation ceases, at least that of justice; although then there can still be an obligation of charity, namely for avoiding in the one seeking a danger of incontinence, anger, blasphemy, etc., as will be explained below (n. 2104, 2).

We said 2. to one seeking seriously; for if a spouse seeks weakly, or easily yields to the prayers of the one denying, according to the common opinion it is not mortal, unless the one seeking is placed in danger of incontinence; indeed, not even venial, if some cause of denying is given. Yet it makes no difference whether he seeks expressly or tacitly; for it suffices if by certain signs he manifests that he desires that act, although because of modesty he does not dare to demand it.2

(1) Book VI, 938; H. A., n. 44. (2) H. A., ibid.; Book VI, 948.

¶2104.
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  1. II. NEITHER spouse is held PER SE, or from justice, TO SEEK the debt; but indeed PER ACCIDENS, from charity or another virtue, he can be obliged to this.3 - 1. He is not held from justice, because no one is held to use his own right. This, more probably, St. Alphonsus also admits, although the coparty is in formal danger of incontinence; because if no express or tacit seeking occurs, no obligation of justice to render is present. A spouse indeed obliged himself not to break faith, but not to impede the other from breaking faith. - 2. He can be obliged PER ACCIDENS, namely from charity or from another virtue, gravely or lightly, according as this or that virtue urges. But authors commonly teach that there is a grave obligation of seeking from charity, when this is judged necessary for avoiding incontinence in either spouse, or for fostering mutual love. They admit the same if the generation of offspring is very necessary for the public good or for the peace of the family.4

Spouses can MAKE AN AGREEMENT not to use matrimony, and then neither can be compelled to render the debt; but this agreement, which is rarely expedient, can be rescinded by mutual consent. Indeed, when danger of incontinence supervenes, it must be remitted from charity, at least for a time, so that incontinence may be avoided.

(3) Book VI, 928, 938, 940. (4) Ibid., 938.

¶2105.
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  1. From the things said you will resolve:5 - 1. A wife sins mortally if she obstinately denies even for one time only, while the husband seeks seriously and insistently.
  1. Likewise, if in rendering she shows great delay, with danger or even with the intention of deterring the husband from seeking; if she does not grant the debt except when compelled; if she harshly and insultingly reproaches the husband for his requests. Thus commonly.

  2. Those worst husbands gravely offend who, whether from avarice so that they may avoid offspring, or from malevolence, or from love conceived toward others, never or almost never know their own wives, although they ought to presume well that the wives bear this most unwillingly.6

  3. Denial of the debt is EXCUSED from grave fault on account of smallness of matter, if it occurs rarely, e.g. once in a month to one seeking often, short of danger of incontinence or grave dissension; likewise, if the rendering is delayed somewhat, for instance from day to night, from night to morning.7

(5) Aertnys, n. 32. (6) Berardi, Prax., n. 336. (7) Book VI, 940.

¶3.

II. On The Causes Excusing From The Rendering Of The Debt.

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¶2106.
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  1. In one spouse the OBLIGATION of rendering the debt CEASES when the RIGHT of demanding ceases in the other. For these are correlatives.

Now the right of demanding BEGINS after the two-month period from the celebration of matrimony, or after the first rendering of the debt, as was said (n. 1981 and 2087); and it CEASES entirely through legitimate causes of divorce, especially through adultery, as will be said below (n. 2124, 1). - It can also cease on account of very many other causes, both on the part of the one seeking and on the part of the one rendering; which causes now come to be explained.

¶2107.
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  1. I. On the part of the ONE SEEKING, first of all the ILLEGALITY of the seeking itself can stand in the way; in this matter, St. Alphonsus teaches that a distinction must be made thus:
  1. If the illegality holds on the part of the act and is grave, for instance because one seeks in a sacred or public place, or with proximate danger of abortion or death, the other cannot render without grave fault; since an act grave evil in itself can never be cohonestated by any cause, nor therefore can it be demanded. - But if the illegality is light, because it is sought, for example, in an unnatural position, or in the time of menstruation or puerperium, it is licit to render with a just cause which cohonestates the act, e.g. lest the indignation of the consort be incurred. Indeed, if the one seeking has a just cause of seeking thus, the other is bound to render. But every reasonable cause being absent, he is not bound to render, indeed he cannot do so short of venial fault.

  2. If the illegality holds on the part of the one seeking alone, e.g. because he has a vow of chastity, or because he seeks for a depraved end, according to the more common and more probable opinion the coparty is bound to render, nevertheless with an admonition first given, if fruit is hoped for, that the one seeking desist.8 If the husband is an onanist, see n. 2118, q. 2.

(8) Conf. diretto, XVII, 15.

¶2108.
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  1. II. On the part of the ONE RENDERING, there is held to be a just cause of denying the debt IF GRAVE HARM or DANGER would threaten from it.9 - The reason is sought from the order of justice and charity, from which spouses are not judged to have obliged themselves to render the debt with grave harm. If grave and proximate danger of life is present for either spouse, neither can seek or render; because no one is master of his own life, or of the life of another.

Hence: 1. A wife is exempted from rendering the debt who, by her own experience or by the judgment of experts, has learned that she cannot bring forth offspring without grave danger to life. Yet, for avoiding her own or her spouse's incontinence, or for avoiding dissensions, she could expose herself to a danger that is only probable and remote; because although a human being is not master of his own life, nevertheless he can expose it on account of charity.10

  1. A healthy spouse is exempted if the coparty suffers from a contagious disease, e.g. plague, venereal disease, and danger of infection threatens. - Yet, for a just cause, he can undergo a danger that is not entirely proximate from a motive of charity, namely by applying preservative means.11

  2. A spouse who is feverish, or affected by another grave disease, is exempted, namely on account of notable debilitation of the body; likewise a wife, if she suffers from beginning cancer of the uterus, so that after the conjugal act she is subjected to a copious outpouring of blood; or if she undergoes intercourse with very acute pain which is repeated each time.12 - But she is not exempted on account of labors and pains, even unusual ones, of pregnancy, birth, lactation, education, etc.13

(9) Book VI, 950. (10) Ibid., 950. (11) Ibid. (12) Cf. Berardi, Prax., 342. (13) Book VI, 952.

¶2109.
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  1. IT IS ASKED. Whether harm which is feared for OFFSPRING exempts from the obligation of the conjugal debt?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. If harm is feared for offspring already conceived, e.g. if it is established that in a particular case by intercourse there is harm to its life or formation, or danger of abortion is induced, spouses do not have a right to intercourse14 (cf. n. 2102).

  1. But if it is a question of offspring to be conceived, the debt must be rendered, although it is to be feared lest offspring be born infirm; since it is better for it to be thus, than not to be at all. But if the wife has already experienced that she brings forth dead children, authors more commonly hold that, danger of incontinence in herself or in the coparty being excluded, she cannot render the debt, chiefly on account of this reason, that she herself undergoes danger of life from the death of the fetus in the uterus.15 - If it is established concerning this danger, the aforesaid opinion will indeed urge; but because rarely is it established concerning it, and spouses would be placed in great danger of incontinence if on account of this cause they had to abstain perpetually from the use of matrimony, hardly, or not even hardly, is the debt to be denied on account of the aforesaid reason.16

  2. If, finally, an excessive multiplicity of offspring is feared, this of itself seems a sufficient reason for denying the debt, provided that in neither spouse there is danger of incontinence. But since such danger is scarcely ever absent, it is clear that a spouse is not easily excused from rendering the debt on account of the multiplicity of offspring.17

(14) Ibid., 924. (15) Book VI, 951-953; H. A., n. 49, fin. (16) Berardi, Prax., n. 346. (17) Book VI, 941; cf. Frassinetti, tr. 18, not. 178.