The Notion, Division, and Morality of Detraction

The Eighth Commandment of the Decalogue is, “ Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.”¹ Primarily it forbids the giving of false evidence, especially in a court of justice, against one’s neighbour, by which his reputation is unjustly injured. But because the same effect is produced by rash judgements, calumny, tale-bearing, backbiting, contumely, lying, and the betrayal of secrets, all these sins are also forbidden by this commandment. Inasmuch as it is virtually positive, it prescribes the telling of the truth.

¹ Exod. xx. 16.

I. Notion. Detraction is the unjust denigration of another's reputation. If it is done before the defamed person, there is added insult or injury of honor (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 73, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, III, 966).

II. Division. Detraction is distinguished into simple detraction and calumny, according as it is committed by revealing what is true, or by imputing what is false.

III. Morality. 1. Detraction, both simple detraction and calumny, is opposed to justice and is grave from its kind. It is opposed to justice because it deprives a man of a good justly possessed. It is grave from its kind, which is clear from Sacred Scripture,¹ and likewise from reason; for "to take away someone's reputation is very grave, because among temporal things reputation seems to be more precious, through the lack of which a man is impeded from doing many good things; on account of which it is said in Ecclesiasticus 41: Have care for a good name, for this will remain to you more than a thousand great and precious treasures; and therefore detraction, speaking per se, is a mortal sin" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 73, a. 2). Yet they can become venial because of slightness of matter. Finally, that the aforesaid sins are opposed to justice is sufficiently elicited from what has been said (St. Alphonsus, III, 966). Besides, note:

a) The malice of calumny is graver than the malice of simple detraction; for the former injures an absolute right to reputation, the latter a limited right. For everyone has the right that what is false never be imputed to him; but with respect to revealing what is true, he has only the right that it not be revealed without a relatively grave cause.

b) The gravity of matter, if there is question of injury of reputation, depends: 1° on the gravity of the thing revealed; 2° on the judgment which the hearers make, considering their region and condition; 3° on the greater or lesser authority of the detractor; 4° on the condition of the person against whom detraction is made (St. Alphonsus, III, 967).

Objection. A bad man does not have the right of retaining the reputation of goodness.

Response. I deny the assertion, since on the one hand no one is certainly held to deprive himself of reputation; and on the other hand, per se it belongs to no private person to deprive another of a good which the latter has and possesses without injury to another; nor can public authority do this unless public order demands it.

2. Simple detraction and calumny, insofar as they are opposed to justice, do not differ in species, because they injure the same good or right. But to calumny there is added the species of lying. Furthermore, detractions in different matters seem to be of the same species, because, insofar as they are injurious to reputation, they are not morally diverse, but differ only according to more and less (St. Alphonsus, III, 978).

Objection. Reputation consists of parts distinct in species; for one reputation is that which someone possesses concerning chastity, another concerning justice, and therefore injuries of reputation ought to differ in species according as they violate parts of a different species.

Response. The parts of which reputation consists are indeed diverse in species in themselves, but insofar as they constitute reputation, they differ only according to more and less.

Corollary I. Ordinarily it is venial to reveal: 1° natural defects of mind or body; 2° venial faults; 3° a defect which is indeed grave, but which is sufficiently common in men of such a condition (St. Alphonsus, III, 967).

Corollary II. Generally, unless the matter is known, it is mortal to say of a superior that he is a liar; of a religious or priest, that he has been drunk, or that he is a lover of girls; likewise to use words which provide occasion for suspecting something grave, as if "you should say nothing in particular, but only in general, for example, that you know something about him, which, if you should say it, would affect him with great shame" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Corollary III. He who narrates the hidden crime of someone who has already been defamed in other matters sins gravely if the new revelation notably increases the prior infamy, or brings a new grave infamy, for example if about one infamous in one species a crime of another species is narrated, not very connected with the prior one (St. Alphonsus, III, 976).

Corollary IV. He who, in reporting someone's hidden crime, at the same time reports his repentance, is guilty of grave detraction, unless the repentance is so great that it entirely destroys the infamy.

Corollary V. Several slight detractions can coalesce into grave matter, because taken together they can contain a grave injury of reputation.

Corollary VI. What has been said about injury of reputation should also be applied to defamation of the dead, although it is less grave to detract from the dead than from the living, and the detraction is the less, the longer the person has been dead. But what is lawful for historians, see n. 1070.

3. Detraction from some person also contains a graver sin if the infamy of the defamed person redounds to the community, or to the family, to which he belongs; and the sin is graver in proportion as a greater and more common good is injured. Yet note that the defamation of a member commonly redounds into the community the more, the smaller it is in number, and therefore redounds more into a family, which of itself is smaller in number (St. Alphonsus, III, 978; Homo Apostolicus, tract 11, n. 16).

¹ Prov. XXIV, 9; Rom. I, 30, 32; 1 Cor. VI, 10; Jas. III.

Question 1. How great a sin is it to reveal a grave defect to one or another person who certainly will keep the matter secret?

Response 1. If it is done on account of a just cause, for example for the sake of instruction or counsel, there is no sin. The same seems to be said if it is done only for the sake of consolation, but not from the intention of blackening the neighbor. The reason is that one affected by injury seems to have the right of lessening his grief with some damage to him who inflicted the grief. Hence servants, wives, and children who reveal injuries inflicted on them by a master, by a husband, or by a father seem to be excused (St. Alphonsus, III, 973).

Response 2. If it is done without cause, it is disputed whether it is a grave or slight sin. Now a sufficiently probable opinion recognizes only a slight fault, because, since reputation consists in the common estimation or the estimation of many, it does not appear that it is notably injured by the bad opinion of one person or another (St. Alphonsus, III, 973; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 73, a. 1, ad 2). Nor should it be said that by defamation before one person, just as by one person's rash judgment, reputation is gravely injured. For it is answered that in rash judgment there is an accusation of a false or wholly uncertain crime, but in our hypothesis the revelation of a true crime is supposed. Yet authors except the case in which someone reveals the offense to a person, for example to a superior or master, from whom the delinquent reasonably wishes it to be hidden before others (St. Alphonsus, III, 973). Moreover, the narration of a false crime is always mortal, because I have a firmer right that a false crime not be imputed to me than that a true crime not be revealed to another. Finally, even the revelation of a true crime to one trustworthy man can accidentally be grave, namely if it contains whispering or tale-bearing (n. 1079).

Question 2. Of what kind and how great a sin is it to reveal a defect which per se would constitute grave matter, but as heard from others?

Response 1. If you report it in such a way that others, by force of the narration itself, believe what is reported, there is a grave sin against justice; for example, "if you assert that you heard it from a person worthy of trust, ... because you give a sufficient cause for believing the evil" (St. Alphonsus, III, 977).

Response 2. If you report it in such a way that others are going to believe from their own levity or malice alone, you do not sin gravely against justice, because you are not the cause but only the occasion of grave damage. But you sin against charity, because everyone is held to impede grave damage to the neighbor as much as he conveniently can (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). Indeed, if there is discussion of an enormous crime, there is also grave sin against justice. The reason is that on the one hand even suspicion of such a crime gravely injures reputation; on the other hand the narration must be called at least a cause of suspicion (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Question 3. To what extent is it a sin to report the crime of a person entirely unknown, or without the person being named?

Response. Per se this contains no detraction. Yet except: 1° if there is danger that the person can afterwards become known or come under suspicion; 2° if a report of this sort redounds to the family, community, etc., of him whose crime is reported; in which case there is grave or slight sin according as that person's reputation is gravely or slightly injured. Hence, for example, he would sin gravely who said that someone from this religious community had committed such a crime (St. Alphonsus, III, 978). "Nevertheless, if the order were large, it should not be considered a grave sin ... to name the order which is not of strict observance" (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tract 11, n. 16; p. 9).

Question 4. Whether it is lawful to detract from the deceased.

Response. No, because the soul of the deceased, no less than a living man, has a right to reputation. Yet "to defame a dead person is less grave than to defame a living one," because he has less need of reputation (St. Alphonsus, III, 978).

Question 5. To what extent is it a sin to divulge further a notorious crime?

Response. A crime can be notorious: 1° by law; 2° by fact; 3° by report. It is called notorious by law when it is established by a sentence of a judge. It is notorious by fact when it has been committed before so many persons of the community that it will certainly and quickly be divulged more and more. It is notorious by report when it has been narrated to so many persons of the community that it will certainly and quickly be narrated more and more (St. Alphonsus, III, 975; VII, 141). Furthermore, some crime can be notorious either only relatively, for example with respect to a college, community, family, or neighborhood, or absolutely, with respect to all who inhabit the same region or city. Now:

1. A crime notorious by law can be divulged without injustice in whatever place and time. For the judge by law deprives the accused absolutely of reputation, just as he can deprive him of goods of fortune; indeed public trials are held for this end, that from publicity a partial penalty may be had through defamation. Nor does he who divulges a crime of this sort per se, i.e. unless he acts from evil affection, sin against charity. For the accused has also been condemned for this reason, that others may be deterred from crime; there is added that it has been expedient for the common good that each one be known as he publicly is (St. Alphonsus, III, 974).

2. A crime notorious either by fact or by report may be revealed as follows:

a) It is lawful to reveal it to members of the same convent or college.

b) With respect to revelation in another community, this must be said:

alpha) It is lawful if, considering the circumstances, knowledge of the crime is going to arrive there quickly. Wherefore note that today communications between convents are more frequent, so that revelation will with difficulty be a grave sin. The contrary must be said about a different province and about an autonomous monastery.

beta) If knowledge of the crime is not, or is not quickly, going to arrive in another community, it is illicit and unjust to reveal it there, if there is question of a restricted community, i.e. of a house, convent, or college. The same must be said theoretically if there is question of a city, town, or village, because one defamed in one place still justly possesses reputation in the place to which knowledge of the crime is not going to arrive quickly; therefore he does injury to him and sins against justice who defames him there. Nor is it valid if you say that he no longer has anywhere a right to reputation, from the fact that his crime is public somewhere. For by what reason would he have lost this right? Not through the crime itself according to itself; otherwise whoever had committed a crime, however hiddenly, would no longer have a right to reputation, and no one would sin against justice by spreading it abroad; which no one admits. Not through the crime as public in one place; for it is and will be unknown elsewhere unless you reveal it, and accordingly it is so related there, where it is unknown, as if it were absolutely hidden.¹ I have said theoretically, because practically, on account of more frequent communication between different places, a crime public in one place will quickly be divulged in another place. Finally, it is always lawful to divulge crimes which render a man pernicious, because it is expedient for the common good that pernicious men be known by all: such are, for example, murderers, thieves, scandalously lustful persons, etc. (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Question 6. Whether it is lawful again to reveal a crime which through forgetfulness has become hidden.

Response. Affirmatively, if there is question of a crime notorious by law, as was said above. Otherwise, if there is question of a crime notorious by fact or by report. To manifest this again is certainly opposed to charity; and also to justice, as it seems, because through forgetfulness the matter has been reduced to the state in which it was before publicity (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tract 11, n. 13).

¹ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iustitia, diss. 15, a. 1, § 5.

445. • Detraction is a hidden and unjust violation of another's reputation, or the unjust blackening of the reputation of an absent neighbor. But reputation is the good estimation which others have concerning the life and morals of someone ¹.

¹ Perhaps the Author narrows too much the matter of detraction. Indeed the excellence whose estimation can be injured is not only virtue and honesty, but also wisdom, learning, talent, eloquence, distinguished character, etc.; indeed there are also goods of body or of fortune, such as strength, beauty (by which women are commended), health, nobility, wealth, legitimate birth, etc. The Author touches on these and things of this sort below, n. 456, res. 9.

Detraction is called such simply if the reputation of the neighbor is violated by revelation of a true crime; but it is denominated calumny if the violation of reputation follows from the attribution of a false crime.

Detraction can happen in various ways: 1. directly, if a false crime is imposed, if a true one is amplified, if a hidden one is manifested, if a good work is taken in a sinister way; 2. indirectly, namely by denying the good works of the neighbor, or by diminishing them, or even sometimes by being silent when others praise, or by praising coldly.

446. Principles. - I. Every direct detraction, whether it is calumny or detraction simply, is mortal from its genus, because it is against justice; and indeed it is a graver sin than theft, because it unjustly deprives the neighbor of a greater good, as is clear from the common sense and from Sacred Scripture, Prov. 22. 1, where it is said: "A good name is better than many riches"; and ibid., 24. 9: "The detractor is an abomination of men."

II. The gravity or lightness of detraction is to be taken chiefly from the gravity or lightness of the damage which the neighbor can suffer from it, and not only from the gravity of the defect or crime which is narrated concerning the neighbor. Hence, to know in a particular case the gravity of detraction, one must attend to the quality, 1. of the person detracting, namely whether he is grave and discreet, or garrulous and light; 2. of the person injured, whether he is of good or bad reputation, etc. The reason is that greater faith will be given according to the greater or lesser authority of the speaker; likewise greater or lesser detriment of reputation will follow according to the measure of the greater or lesser estimation which the injured person enjoys. - St. Lig., n. 967.

447. • III. It is never lawful to attribute a false crime to another, as is clear from proposition 44 condemned by Innocent XI. Yet it is lawful from a just cause to manifest a hidden crime of another, even with loss of that person's reputation; because sometimes public or private good requires this, and then the right of the neighbor to preserving reputation is overthrown by a stronger right. - St. Lig., n. 972.

IV. But the causes on account of which the crime of another can lawfully be revealed are the following: 1. notable utility of the revealer himself, for example for asking counsel or help in a grave matter, with nevertheless any affection toward detraction removed; 2. utility of the delinquent, namely for his instruction or correction, etc.; 3. public utility, as for preventing evils threatening the Republic or Religion or some Community; - 4. grave utility, even private, whether of the hearers or of others, for example so that they may be freed from evils, damages, or inconveniences certainly or probably going to happen. The reason of these things is that then the one manifesting another's sins injures neither justice nor charity. 1. He does not injure justice, because the neighbor does not have a right so strict to his reputation that others are obliged to cover the truth when its manifestation is necessary for avoiding grave damage, whether one's own or that of others; 2. He does not injure charity, because charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience; and just as you are not bound to impede the damage of your neighbor, however great, with grave damage to yourself, so neither are you bound in the case to conceal the hidden crime of the neighbor ². - St. Lig., n. 968.

² Indeed, charity in these adjuncts demands that the truth not be hidden. For charity ought to be ordered; but ordered charity requires that the innocent be favored rather than the guilty. Therefore he acts most perversely who, lest something evil should happen to a robber or thief, wicked companions, or one laying snares for honesty, etc., by his silence commits it that the life, fortunes, innocence, or honesty of others are endangered.

448. Questions. - Q. 1. Whether he sins gravely who reveals the single mortal sin of another?

Resp. 1. It is not always a grave sin to reveal another's sin, even if it is manifested to several. Therefore one must attend to the adjuncts of things and persons, from which you will gather whether someone suffers a grave loss of reputation from the revelation of the sin.

Resp. 2. If the sin gravely dishonors either in itself or relative to the one defamed, certainly the detractor gravely offends whenever he manifests a sin of this sort, although single, to several, because grave damage of reputation is brought upon the neighbor.

Resp. 3. But whether it is mortal to reveal such a sin to one prudent and discreet man, with special malice removed, is disputed.

The first opinion, more common and more probable, says that grave sin is committed unless inadvertence or great levity excuses. The reason is, 1. because injury to reputation even with one grave person is judged grave, as is clear from rash judgment, which per se is grave; 2. because often men bear it more bitterly that they are injured with one grave person than with three or four others.

The second opinion, sufficiently probable, denies it. The reason is that since reputation consists in the common estimation of men, he who has lost a good name among only one or another is not judged absolutely defamed. - St. Lig. has it as probable, n. 973 ³.

³ ** To this matter St. Alphonsus brings (l. c.) these words of St. Thomas (Quodlib., 11, art. 13, ad 3): "If someone reports the fault of a neighbor to a prelate, intending either caution for the future, or something of this sort which he would see to be expedient for the amendment of the neighbor, he does not sin. But if he reports this, whether to a prelate or to some friend of his, from malice, then he sins mortally. But if from incaution he has said this to someone, yet in such a way that nothing else results from it, either infamy or reproach to the delinquent neighbor, then he does not sin mortally, although he acts incautiously." To these last words St. Alphonsus subjoins this commentary: "Nor should you say that that word, 'from incaution,' is understood for inadvertence; for from this one never sins mortally; but it is altogether understood as imprudence or levity of mind, which is only venial; and then only will it be mortal when from it there results infamy or reproach to the delinquent." But a commentary of this sort is a little obscure.

Indeed, so that its own sense may be attributed to the words of St. Thomas, a twofold hypothesis can be established: the first is that he who reveals the crime knows that no other damage is going to come from it; nevertheless he does not have a reasonable cause for revealing the crime; and then there is place for what St. Alphonsus says, that one sins venially by levity of mind, whence the defamation which follows is probably light. Another hypothesis is that he who reveals the crime does not have before his eyes the damage to the neighbor which can follow from it; and then what can excuse him from mortal fault except inadvertence? For it is plain that we cannot ascribe to St. Thomas a sense of this sort, that detraction is judged venial or mortal only from the event, about which the one revealing the crime thought nothing. Therefore the words of St. Alphonsus must also be understood in this way.

449. • Q. 2. Whether detractions in matters diverse in species differ in species?

Resp. A twofold probable opinion is given.

The first opinion affirms. The reason is that the reputation which someone possesses, for example concerning chastity, is one, and another is that which he has concerning justice; since he is not defamed in fornication, although he is dishonored in theft.

The second opinion denies it. The reason is that, although such detractions are distinguished in species materially, nevertheless morally they injure one reputation of a man, because they tend toward one formal object, just as contumelies are of the same species because of the unity of honor against which they tend. - Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 265, etc. ⁴.

⁴ Therefore the Confessor would imprudently require from a penitent that he express the matter of detraction; both because he would unjustly impose a certain obligation which, since it is uncertain, the penitent does not have; and also because not rarely the confession itself would not be immune from the vice of detraction, since from this both persons and the crimes of persons could become known to the Confessor.

** The VV. here note two things (p. 921) concerning this question and Note. And first they say that Gury agrees with St. Alphonsus in this, that those contumelies do not differ in species; but differs in this, that he recognizes one sin in number there, while the holy Doctor teaches that several are present. - Resp. Gury says neither one nor several sins. But if the VV. argue that one sin is asserted by Gury from this as a necessary consequence, because he says there is one species, how could the holy Doctor have affirmed one species and at the same time that there are several sins?

2. The VV. carp at the Note because it says that the Confessor would imprudently require from the penitent that he express the matter of detraction; and they subjoin that the confessor acts most prudently by inquiring from the penitent how many diverse crimes of the neighbor he revealed. - Resp. 1. Even if it were granted that it must be expressed how many diverse crimes someone revealed, it would not follow from this that the matter of these crimes must necessarily be expressed; therefore what remains is that the Confessor would imprudently require this from the penitent. - Resp. 2. The obligation which the VV. defend of expressing that number of crimes is finally, even they confessing it, only probable. But, St. Alphonsus teaching, it is unjust to impose an obligation which is not certain, especially when there is danger present of injuring the neighbor's reputation with the confessor. Therefore.

Moreover, it certainly would have been more opportune that the VV. in no way touched this question. For that paragraph which Holzmann and Concina, and then St. Alphonsus, afterwards copied from Croix (lib. 5, n. 161), certainly presents nothing except confusion of ideas. And indeed, if you inspect the authors against whom he fights, you will find them contending that these contumelies agree in one lowest species, and therefore (as Croix himself reports from their opinion) that they make up one greater infamy. In like manner, if you inspect those whom Croix opposes to them, you will discern that, on the contrary, they stand for multiple species. Thus, for example, Navarrus (Sum., cap. 6, n. 18) holds that several sins are present, because those injurious words are not of one species; nor otherwise Azor (p. 1, lib. 4, cap. 4, q. 5): "I respond that many come to be in species and are increased in number when speech is referred to objects diverse in species, as if Titius contumeliously calls Caius a heretic, robber, adulterer; he commits three sins diverse in species." But after these things Croix, as if he were disputing from the sense of the authors alleged, first uses equivocal phrases concerning diversities either of reputation or of objects; and he then concludes that these reputations can no more make up one reputation in number than three fasts one fast, as if moreover a triple transgression of a fast were to be compared with several contumelies brought forth by one act, as the question proposed by him bears, or doubt could be moved whether three fasts differ in species. And thus indeed it is wrapped in shadows both why he alleged the authors and on what principles relying he draws forth that resolution.

But perhaps this question does not become clearer with St. Alphonsus (lib. 5, n. 48). For the authors from whom he departs you discern to be the same as with Croix, except that he joins Azor with Lugo, although nevertheless Azor, as is clear from his words alleged above, holds the opposite opinion from Lugo. But to these he opposes those whom Croix also opposed. Now the dispute between them is, as we have seen, whether those multiple contumelies are of one and the same species, or of multiple and diverse species. To the authors alleged by Croix the holy Doctor adds Collet, Holzmann, and Concina. But Holzmann and Concina, not otherwise than Croix, use equivocal formulas; but Collet asserts multiple sin in those contumelies because, he says (De Pecc., p. 1, c. 3, art. 2), "they are sins diverse in species." Therefore does St. Alphonsus defend that multiple sin is present because the contumelies differ in species? But the VV. contradict this, who, as we saw above, affirm that Gury here agrees with St. Alphonsus in asserting unity of species. What reason, therefore, remains on account of which St. Alphonsus teaches that there are several sins there? Indeed, the holy Doctor from Holzmann (p. 1, n. 674) brings the reason that diverse rights to reputation or honor are injured; "for by this, that someone is defamed in one crime, he is not therefore defamed in another." But this argument would rather prove that those contumelies are diverse in species, as in reality the patrons of multiple species were arguing thus. Against these Lugo argues thus (De Poenit., d. 16, n. 265): "Molina gives the best reason, namely that all contumelies receive malice from this, that they injure honor, just as thefts injure fortunes; therefore just as thefts are of the same species in the reason of theft, whether they are done in this way or that; so it must be said concerning the removal of honor. Hence the same must be said of detraction, that it is not varied in species according to the diversity of the matter in which reputation is taken away; because reputation is always of the same species in the genus of morals. Similarly in rash judgment it is not necessary to explain the matter in which judgment is made, but it is enough to say: so many times in grave matter I rashly judged concerning some persons; because good estimation also, which is taken away through rash judgment, is of the same species in the genus of morals."

And from here an obvious response is made to those things which Croix has (l. c.), namely that there are three sins because rights to three diverse reputations are injured; for by this, that someone is praiseworthy in the virtue of justice, he does not become praiseworthy in the virtue of chastity, and by this, that he is known to be a thief, he is not therefore known to be immodest, but retains a right to this reputation; therefore these reputations are diverse objects. For another could easily reply: there are three sins because rights to three diverse fortunes are injured (imagine an ox, a horse, and a cart); for by this, that someone is a just possessor of an ox, he does not therefore become a just possessor of a horse or cart; and by this, that he possesses a horse badly, he is not therefore an unjust possessor of an ox, but retains his right to this; therefore these fortunes or substances are diverse objects. This indeed neither Croix nor his followers can or wish to admit; but what disparity can be assigned? St. Alphonsus, so that he might meet the difficulty, wrote (l. c.): "Nor does it stand in the way that he who takes away several diverse things commits a single theft; for then one right of his to his goods is injured; but when he is defamed in several matters, several of his rights are injured according to several respects which reputation has toward diverse virtues." But another in the same way will be able to reason thus, so that he may prove that there are several thefts there. Nor does it stand in the way that he who defames in several diverse matters commits a single detraction; for then one right of his to his reputation is injured. Since (as Molina says, tom. 5, disp. 19, n. 3) "the injustice of detraction does not consist in that by which, as by a means and instrument, prejudice is unjustly done to the neighbor's reputation..., but consists in the prejudice inflicted on the reputation of the neighbor; wherefore, since the object of detraction broadly taken is reputation as to prejudice which is inflicted unjustly on it, not the diverse means by which that prejudice is inflicted, and since the prejudice unjustly inflicted is always of the same reason, by whatever means that prejudice is inflicted..., it follows that one right of another to reputation is injured. But when someone is injured in several diverse goods of fortune, several of his rights are injured according to several respects which the right of property has toward diverse goods of fortune." But does this reasoning have less strength than the preceding one of St. Alphonsus? Namely, diverse contumelies or detractions, not otherwise than diverse objects of theft, have diversity only in physical being, not in moral being. Wherefore Bonacina rightly concludes (De Pecc., disp. 2, q. 4, p. 2, n. 13) that the opinion which contends that the diversity of several injuries is to be expressed in confession is to be held in the same place as that which holds that the altogether determinate quantity of theft is to be opened in confession.

Q. 3. Whether a public crime can be revealed to those ignorant of it?

Resp. It is affirmed, because this seems to be neither against justice nor against charity, whether it is public by publicity of law or by publicity of fact. - St. Lig., n. 974.

450. • Q. 4. Whether a crime public in one place can be revealed in another place where it is unknown?

Resp. 1. It is affirmed as more probable per se, at least without grave sin, if there is question of a nearby place, or of a place where it is easily and shortly going to be made public. The reason is that reputation to be lost shortly and necessarily is of no or certainly not of great estimation, and morally speaking has already been cast away.

Resp. 2. If there is question of places to which the divulgation is not going to come, or not except after a long time, one must distinguish:

1. As regards notoriety of law, 1. It is not against justice, because the judge, when he publicly condemns someone, intends to despoil the guilty person of reputation, so that he may be an example everywhere to the rest. Thus commonly. - 2. Nor more probably is it against charity, at least gravely, because it contributes greatly to the common good for the sentence to be made known everywhere, so that the penalty may be more efficacious and the guilty person may be known even by inhabitants of a remote region, who could have business to transact with him. - Thus more commonly with Lugo, the Salamancans, St. Lig., n. 974.

2. As regards notoriety of fact, it is disputed among theologians.

The first opinion, very probable, says that it is not per se illicit, because neither is there sin against justice nor against charity, at least gravely, provided there is question of crimes which render a man pernicious. The reason is that it conduces to the public good that criminal men be known, so that all can beware of them. - St. Lig., n. 964; Hom. apost., n. 12; in Retr., n. 12. The second opinion on the contrary says that it is a sin both against justice and against charity: 1. against justice indeed, because one defamed in one place has not lost the right to reputation in another remote place to which the reputation of the crime is not shortly going to arrive; therefore he who defames him there does injury to him; 2. against charity, because one defaming harms the neighbor in a grave matter, or in reputation, which elsewhere he continues to possess without injury to him. - Billuart, Antoine.

451. • Q. 5. When can a crime or fact be called public or notorious?

Resp. 1. It is called altogether public or famous when it has become known to the greater part of the community, or city, town, village, etc.

Resp. 2. It is called simply public or notorious when it has become known to so many persons that it can be hidden by no tergiversation, and it is morally impossible that it should not come into the knowledge of the community. But it is very difficult to determine the knowledge of how many persons is required for a crime to be able to be judged public. Theologians have assigned various rules according to the varied number of persons who compose the community. According to the more common opinion, a crime can be called public if fifteen know it from a community of one hundred persons; or twenty of diverse families in a community of one thousand persons; or forty persons dispersed in a town of five thousand persons. - Thus St. Lig., n. 975. But, as Billuart says better, de Iustitia, diss. 15, art. 2, §5, this is remitted to the judgment of a prudent man, who, after attending to the number of the community, the garrulity of men, and other circumstances, may judge whether it is possible for the matter to remain secret.

452. • Q. 6. Whether one sins gravely who only reports grave sins of another as heard from others, for example if he says: It is reported, they narrate, I heard this or that about such a one?

Resp. 1. He sins gravely against charity and justice if he reports in such a way that others are more likely and deservedly to believe it, for example if he asserts that he heard the things which he narrates from a person worthy of trust, because then he furnishes sufficient cause for believing evil; otherwise, if probably faith is not given to the words, because no infamy will arise from it. But much more easily he will sin gravely who reports, even as merely doubtful, the enormous sin of another, for example heresy, sodomy, etc.

Resp. 2. He sins gravely against charity if he reports things heard before those who probably will believe them from levity or their own malice; because under grave sin each one is bound from charity to remove the occasion of damage to another when he easily can. Yet he does not seem to sin against justice, because he is not an efficacious cause of damage. - St. Lig., n. 978. - Billuart, ibid., art. 2, §4, and others commonly.

453. • Q. 7. In what way does one hearing detraction sin?

Resp. 1. He certainly sins gravely against justice who efficaciously induces another to detract.

Resp. 2. He sins gravely against charity who rejoices over grave detraction done by another, because he rejoices over the grave damage of the neighbor. Except if he rejoiced only over the hearing of a new or curious thing, but not over the detraction itself.

Resp. 3. A Superior sins against charity if he does not impede detraction insofar as he conveniently can, even if he does not rejoice over it; because upon him there rests a special obligation of correcting the detractor, or of obviating the damage of the defamed subject. But more probably he does not sin against justice, 1. if he is the Superior of the detractor, because he is not bound to watch over the good of another who is not his subject; 2. if he is the Superior of the defamed person, because it does not fall upon him from justice to attend to the temporal good of the subject. - St. Lig., n. 979.

Resp. 4. A private person is for the most part excused either altogether or at least from grave sin if he does not impede detraction, whether from shame or fear or even negligence, even if he conveniently can, provided he does not rejoice over it, and no other damage besides infamy is added. The reason is that in this matter it often cannot be established that correction will be of profit; indeed often it is dangerous, and one can deservedly fear lest the detraction rather be increased or prolonged. Yet he will not lack some fault if he can easily apply efficacious correction. - St. Lig., n. 979.

But they are also excused from venial sin who, when they notice detraction, depart, wipe out the conversation, or turn away the face and show themselves sad, according to that saying of Prov. 25. 23: "A sad face scatters the detracting tongue."

454. Q. 8. Whether it is lawful to defame oneself?

Resp. It is affirmed per se, if it is done with a right intention, scandal and the damage of others being removed. The reason is that it is not against justice, since each one is master of his own reputation; nor is it against charity, because this does not oblige one to preserve external goods except insofar as one's own salvation or that of the neighbor requires it.

But per accidens you will sin, and even gravely, if your reputation is necessary for your office, or if damage to life for you, or infamy for others, can arise from this. - St. Lig., n. 985.

189. The generic malice of defamation.

Principle. Unjust defamation (whether it is simple detraction, or calumny) is from its genus a mortal sin both against justice and against charity.

It is proved 1. from Sacred Scripture. "A good name is better than many riches."³⁸⁸ But unjustly to snatch away riches is a mortal sin. Therefore, a fortiori, the detractor commits a mortal sin who unjustly takes away from his neighbor a good name. - The evil-speaking will not possess the kingdom of God.³⁸⁹ But every defamer is a true evil-speaker.³⁹⁰

2. from the common sense of theologians and Fathers. Thus St. Augustine, that he might deter his guests from this vice, had an inscription placed above the table:

Whoever loves by sayings to gnaw the life of the absent, Let him know that this table is forbidden to him;³⁹¹

and St. Bernard inveighs vehemently and with great eloquence against detractors, saying: "Is not the tongue of the detractor a viper? Most savage indeed, surely, which so lethally infects three with one breath," namely, it kills itself, the hearer, and him from whom detraction is made.³⁹²

3. from reason. Man has a strict right to reputation, as is clear from what was said above concerning dominion. But this right is violated through defamation. Wherefore St. Thomas³⁹³ teaches: "To take away someone's reputation is very grave, because among temporal things reputation seems to be more precious, through the lack of which a man is impeded from doing many good things. On account of which it is said:³⁹⁴ Have care for a good name; for this will remain to you more than a thousand precious and great treasures. And therefore detraction, speaking of itself, is a mortal sin." "Yet contumely is a graver sin than detraction, insofar as it has greater contempt of one's neighbor; just as also robbery is a graver sin than theft."³⁹⁵

That calumnious defamation is of itself a mortal sin against justice is easily understood. For it causes great injury to one's neighbor, to whom, although innocent, it falsely imputes a crime. Hence calumny is gravely punished not only by God, but also by civil law. The matter is not so clear if it is a question of simple detraction, i.e., the undue revelation of a true crime. Civil laws are accustomed rather rarely to punish revelations of this kind. But from this it does not yet follow that simple detraction is not even punished by God. For there are many things which civil law does not punish (e.g., simple fornications), which nevertheless are grave sins before God.

The reason why even simple detraction is sinful is that by it 1. the right of one's neighbor is violated, 2. the rights of God are usurped, 3. the social good is damaged. - The right of one's neighbor is violated, and therefore justice is truly injured, because a hidden sinner still possesses a good reputation, from which possession he cannot be expelled except by a just title. But the unjust detractor does not have a just title of expelling the hidden sinner from the good reputation possessed; otherwise it would no longer be detraction, but the lawful revelation of another's crime, concerning which below, n. 192. - The rights of God are usurped by the detractor, because it belongs to God alone to judge the living and the dead according to the hidden things of their hearts, all of which indeed will be made manifest in the last universal judgment. - The social good is damaged by the detractor, because from the undue revelation of a hidden fault there are accustomed to arise contentions, quarrels, and very great hatreds.

That unjust defamation also injures charity is almost self-evident, because, as St. Thomas most rightly says: "Reputation is a disposition toward friendship and ill repute toward enmity";³⁹⁶ and: "He who detracts from his brother seems to detract from the law insofar as he contemns the precept concerning the love of one's neighbor."³⁹⁷

³⁸⁸ Prov. 22, 1.

³⁸⁹ Cf. 1 Cor. 6, 10.

³⁹⁰ St. Thomas also cites the text of St. Paul (Rom. 1, 30), where detractors and whisperers are called hateful to God, but many exegetes understand this text otherwise (cf. Cornely, Comm. in ep. ad Rom.).

³⁹¹ In Migne, Patr. lat. 32, 52.

³⁹² Sermo 17 de diversis n. 4-5 (Migne l.c. 183, 585). Cf. also De modo bene vivendi c. 33 (Migne l.c. 184, 1256).

³⁹³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 2.

³⁹⁴ Eccli. 41, 15.

³⁹⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 3 ad 2.

³⁹⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 74, a. 2 ad 2.

³⁹⁷ Ibid. ad 3.

516. • Detraction is the unjust denigration of the reputation of an absent neighbor. But reputation is the good estimation which others have concerning our excellence, whether true or apparent.

Detraction is called simply such if the reputation of a neighbor is violated by the revelation of a true crime; but it is named calumny if violation of reputation follows from the imposition of a false crime.

Detraction can be done in various ways: 1° directly, if either a false crime is imposed, or a true one amplified, or a hidden one manifested, or a good work explained sinisterly; 2° indirectly, namely either by denying the good works of a neighbor, or diminishing them, or also sometimes by being silent when others praise, or by praising coldly. - But all these modes are, of themselves, of the same species, because all regard the same good of reputation. Yet per accidens they could add a new species, for example contumely, injury in goods of fortune, whispering (which intends the dissolution of friendship), a sin against piety, if the person from whom detraction is made is joined to the detractor by a most close bond, and this mortally, unless there is question of persons joined outside the second degree. Scav.²

517. Principles. - I. Every direct detraction, whether it is calumny, or detraction simply, is mortal from its own genus, because it is against justice; and indeed it is a graver sin than theft, because it unjustly deprives the neighbor of a greater good, as is clear from common sense and from Sacred Scripture: A good name is better than riches; and A detractor is an abomination of men.²

II. The gravity of detraction is to be taken chiefly from the gravity of the damage which the neighbor can suffer from it, and not precisely from the gravity of the defect or crime which is narrated concerning the neighbor. Hence for knowing in a particular case the gravity of detraction, one must attend to the quality 1° of the person detracting, for greater faith is given to a grave man than to a chatterer; 2° of the person harmed, because the more entire reputation and greater dignity he has, the more gravely he will take damage; 3° to the common judgment of men concerning the thing divulged, because by this very judgment, which varies according to the adjuncts of the persons to whom (n. 526. 4°) detraction is made, reputation consists.³

518. III. It is never licit to impose a false crime on another, as is clear from proposition 44 condemned by Innocent XI, p. XVI. Yet it is licit from a just cause to manifest another's hidden crime even with loss of his reputation; because sometimes the public or private good requires this, and then the right of one's neighbor to conserving reputation is broken by a more powerful right.⁴

IV. But the causes on account of which, duly under conditions, another's crime can licitly be revealed are the following: 1° the notable utility of the one revealing himself, for seeking counsel or help in a grave matter, yet with any affection toward detraction excluded; 2° the utility of the delinquent, namely for his instruction or correction, etc.; 3° public utility, as for impeding evils threatening the Republic or Religion or some Community, in which case, of itself speaking, each one is bound to reveal; 4° grave utility, even private, either of hearers, or of others, for example so that they may be freed from evils, damages, or inconveniences certainly or probably going to occur. Thus you can make a master more certain concerning the infidelity of a servant; reveal to another, who consults you about this on account of a grave business,¹ the defects of some person; indeed sometimes you will be bound to this according to the rules of charity. Thus a murderer will have to be revealed if some innocent person were accused of this crime; for the condition of the innocent is stronger.

The reason for these things is that the right in true reputation and false, or apparent and estimated reputation, differs to this extent, that the former is absolute, or to be observed by all always and everywhere, and therefore calumny is never licit (this number III); but the latter is limited, that is, it ceases when others would take grave damage from error concerning someone's excellence: - indeed it ceases even in doubt concerning the gravity of the damage, because in such doubt the innocent must be favored. Wherefore in the cases alleged neither is justice violated, since the neighbor's right is limited, nor charity, because this does not obligate with grave inconvenience.²

I said: duly, however, under conditions, namely 1° that knowledge of this sort has not been had from Sacramental Confession, which, as is clear, it is never licit to use; 2° that the damage cannot be avoided in another way; 3° that it is sufficiently proportionate to the loss of reputation; 4° that neither more nor to more persons be manifested than is necessary for averting the damage; 5° that you have not received the knowledge unjustly by force or fraud, suppose by opening letters, etc., unless nevertheless, because of changed adjuncts, it would be licit for you to seek it even in this way; which case would be if a) revelation were necessary for the common good; b) the other were held from justice to reveal the secret for repairing your damage; c) he were vexing you unjustly.²

519. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does he sin gravely who reveals one mortal sin of another?

Resp. 1° It is not always a grave sin to reveal the sin of another, even if it is manifested to several. Therefore one must attend to the adjuncts of things and persons, from which you will gather whether someone suffers grave loss of reputation from the revelation of the sin.

Resp. 2° If the sin would gravely dishonor either in itself, or relatively to the one defamed, certainly the detractor sins gravely as often as he manifests a sin of this sort, although one only, to several, because grave damage of reputation is inflicted on the neighbor.

Resp. 3° But whether it is mortal to reveal a sin of this sort to one prudent and discreet man, from whom namely there is no danger that it be manifested to others, with the spirit of harming and damage of another genus excluded, is controverted.

The first sentence, more common and more probable, says that one sins gravely, unless inadvertence or great levity excuses. The reason is, 1° because injury to reputation even before one grave person is judged grave, as is clear from rash judgment, which of itself is grave; 2° because often men bear it with more distress to be harmed before one grave person than before three or four others.

The second sentence, sufficiently probable, denies. The reason is that since reputation consists in the common estimation of men, he is not judged absolutely defamed who has lost his good name among one or another only.¹

520. • Quaer. 2° Does he commit sins diverse in number who detracts from someone in several matters, or affects him with diverse contumelies, or detracts from one man before several?

Resp. See what was said in n. 227, questions 1° and 2°.

Quaer. 3° Can a public crime be revealed to those ignorant of it, who dwell in the place where it is already public?

Resp. In the affirmative, because this seems neither to be against justice nor against charity, whether it is public by publicity of law, or by publicity of fact.²

521. • Quaer. 4° Can a crime public in one place be revealed in another place where it is unknown?

Resp. 1° In the affirmative, more probably of itself, at least without grave sin, if there is question of a nearby place, or of a place where it is easily and shortly to be made public, and no grave damage follows for the one defamed from the anticipation. The reason is that reputation to be lost shortly and necessarily is of no estimation, or certainly not of great estimation, and morally speaking is already cast away.³

Resp. 2° If there is question of places to which the divulgation is not going to come, or not except after a long time, one must distinguish:

1° As regards notoriety of law: 1° It is not against justice, because the judge, when he publicly condemns someone, intends to despoil the guilty man of reputation, so that he may be everywhere an example to the rest. Thus commonly. - 2° Nor more probably is it against charity, at least gravely, because it greatly contributes to the common good that the sentence be divulged everywhere, so that the penalty may be more efficacious, and the guilty man may be known also by inhabitants of a remote region, who could have to conduct business with him. - Thus more commonly,¹ with Lugo, Salmant.

2° As regards notoriety of fact, it is controverted among theologians.

The first sentence, very probable, says that it is not of itself illicit, because neither is there sin against justice, nor against charity, at least gravely, provided there is question of crimes which render a man pernicious. The reason is that it conduces to the public good that criminal men be known, so that all can guard against them.² (Q) p. 480.

The second sentence, on the contrary, says that it is a sin both against justice and against charity: 1° against justice indeed, because one defamed in one place has not lost the right to reputation in another remote place, where the reputation of the crime is not shortly going to arrive: therefore he does injury to him who defames him there; 2° against charity, because the one defaming harms his neighbor in a grave matter, or in reputation, which elsewhere he continues to possess without injury. - Billuart, Antoine.

522. • Quaer. 5° When can a crime or fact be called public or notorious?

Resp. 1° It is called altogether public or famous when it has become known to the greater part of the community, or city, town, village, etc.

Resp. 2° It is called simply public or notorious when it has become known to so many persons that it cannot be concealed by any evasion, and morally it is impossible that it not come to the knowledge of the community. But it is very difficult to determine the knowledge of how many persons is required for a crime to be judged public. Theologians have assigned various rules according to the various number of persons who compose the community. According to the more common sentence a crime can be called public if fifteen know from a community of one hundred persons; or twenty from at least three diverse families in a community of a thousand persons; or forty dispersed in a town of five thousand persons.³

But, as Billuart rightly says,¹ in practice this matter is remitted to the judgment of a prudent man, who, with the number of the community, the talkativeness of men, and other circumstances attended to, judges whether it is possible that the matter remain secret. - St. Alphonsus also warns² that a delict made public in one monastery cannot be called absolutely public, and therefore cannot be manifested elsewhere, not even in another monastery of the same Order, although it had frequent communication with it.

523. • Quaer. 6° Can a delict formerly public, but now hidden, be made public without grave fault, at least against charity?

Resp. In the negative, unless there is question of a delict formerly public by notoriety of law, or one pertaining to history.³

Quaer. 7° Does he sin gravely who only reports the grave sins of another as heard from others, for example if he says: It is reported, they narrate, I have heard such or such about that man?

Resp. 1° He sins gravely against charity and justice if he reports in such a way that others are more probably and deservedly going to believe it, for example if he asserts that he has heard the things which he narrates from a person worthy of faith, because then he furnishes a sufficient cause of believing the evil; otherwise, if probably faith is not given to the things said, because no infamy will arise from it. But he will much more easily sin gravely by reporting, even as a mere doubt, the enormous sin of another, for example heresy, sodomy, etc.

Resp. 2° He sins gravely against charity if he reports what has been heard before those who will probably believe it from levity or malice of their own; because each one is bound under grave sin from charity to take away the occasion of another's damage, when he easily can. Yet he does not seem to sin against justice, because he is not the efficacious cause of the damage.⁴ - Billuart,⁵ and others commonly.

524. • Quaer. 8° In what way does one hearing detraction sin?

Resp. 1° He certainly sins gravely against justice who efficaciously - for example, by exciting, praising, questioning - induces another to detract. (a) p. 480.

Resp. 2° He sins gravely against charity who rejoices in grave detraction done by another, because he rejoices in the grave damage of his neighbor. Except if he rejoiced only in the hearing of a new or curious thing, but not in the detraction itself.

Resp. 3° A Superior sins against charity if he does not impede detraction insofar as he conveniently can, even if he does not rejoice in it; because the special obligation is incumbent on him of correcting the detractor, or of meeting the damage of the defamed subject. But the Superior does not sin against justice, either of the detractor or of the defamed; for neither is this one bound from justice concerning the temporal good of a subject, nor that one concerning the temporal good of one not a subject. But a Bishop and pastor are bound from justice to correct a subject detracting, as one sinning.¹

Resp. 4° A private person for the most part is excused either altogether, or at least from grave sin, if he does not impede detraction, whether from shame, or from fear, or even from negligence, even if he conveniently can, provided he does not rejoice in it, and no other damage besides infamy accedes. The reason is that in this matter it often cannot be clear that correction will be profitable; indeed it is often dangerous, and it can deservedly be feared that detraction will rather be increased or prolonged. Yet he will not be free from some fault if he can easily apply efficacious correction.²

But those are excused even from venial sin who, when they notice detraction, depart, turn the conversation to other things, or avert the face and show themselves sad according to that saying: A sad face dissipates the detracting tongue.³

525. • Quaer. 9° Is it licit to defame oneself?

Resp. In the affirmative, of itself, if it is done with right intention, scandal and the damage of others being excluded. The reason is that it is not against justice, since each one is master of his own reputation; nor against charity, because this does not obligate one to conserve external goods except insofar as one's own salvation or that of a neighbor requires it.

But per accidens you will sin, and even gravely, if your reputation is necessary for your office, or if from this damage of life could arise for you, or of infamy for others.⁴

526. You will resolve. - 1° It is a grave sin to detract even from the dead in a grave matter; for they are not despoiled of the right to reputation, although they have departed from the living. Hence historiographers can sin gravely by branding a mark of ignominy upon the memory of the dead without sufficient cause, by manifesting hidden things, exaggerating known things, and not reporting penance done.¹

2° It can be lethal to reveal so many things, although not individually grave, concerning someone constituted in conspicuous dignity, that his reputation is notably harmed. Yet the faithful scarcely attend to the grave malice.

3° It is mortal if you say that someone is an adulterer, although you have probable indications concerning this; because you bring grave harm to his reputation. Indeed the same must be held, even if you said it was probable that he is such.

4° It is grave to say concerning a priest that he has committed a duel, that he is a lover of girls, and other things of this sort. But often it is not lethal to assert this concerning a soldier, or even concerning a young man of mediocre reputation; nor to say concerning a girl that she is talkative, proud, etc.²

5° It is not grave detraction to speak badly concerning someone indeterminate, for example, that in such a place there are many wicked, drunken, immodest persons; because grave injury is done to no one. Likewise, it is not grave to report some crime concerning someone whom the hearers do not know, nor ever will recognize, even if he is named: indeed this of itself is free from all fault, because there is no estimation of one unknown.

6° Yet it is lethal, at least commonly speaking, to detract gravely from some Monastery, although no Religious is named, for example, if it is said that in it an evil life is led, that a grave sin has been committed. The reason is that the Religious of the same Community are so joined among themselves that before outsiders they are judged as though responsible in common one for another. Hence the whole Community is wont to be stained before the imprudent and simple.³

527. • 7° It is not mortal to say concerning a public drunkard that he has become drunk on this day, even if he did it secretly; indeed sometimes no sin is present, if someone has lost every reputation as regards something, for example if you say concerning a prostitute that she has fornicated. Nor is it mortal to dishonor one infamous in one crime concerning another crime closely related, for example, if you say concerning an adulterer that he has sent love letters, or concerning a drunken man that he has quarreled with his wife; because such revelation is not a new infamy, or at least not grave. Yet to defame someone concerning a disparate and unconnected crime can be mortal, because he who is dishonorable in one genus of vice has not therefore lost the right of reputation as regards the rest.¹

8° He does not sin, at least gravely, who, only for the sake of solace, with intention of detracting excluded, narrates to some friend an injury done to him by another, even if from this some infamy comes to the author. Hence servants revealing injuries inflicted on them by masters, wives by husbands, children by a father, Religious by a Prelate, etc., are probably excused, at least from mortal sin; because the author of the injury cannot be reasonably unwilling, and demand so difficult a thing, that the one harmed lack solace or necessary counsel. Yet one must take care lest it be said to more persons, and lest the person be named more openly than is necessary for counsel or solace.²

9° Unless someone is to be affected by grave damage (as, for example, can happen from the revelation of illegitimate birth by which one is deprived of desired nuptials), or by great sorrow, it is slight to uncover the natural defects of the soul or body of another, for example his stupidity, or certain dispositions to more common vices, for example that someone is proud, avaricious, irascible; for the former are not moral, and neither the former nor the latter are judged gravely defaming.³

10° It is not licit in general to reveal another's hidden crime by at the same time narrating the penance done, because some sinister opinion always remains.

11° Of itself it is grave to name a person directly, but only to indicate his defects indirectly (by saying, for example, I know many things about him, but charity forbids me to disclose them), if such things are apt to cast in grave suspicion. (b) p. 480.

1195. DEFINITION. Detraction is the occult and unjust blackening of another's reputation. It is said 1. Occult, namely brought upon one absent, at least from the intention of the detractor: by which part it is distinguished from CONTUMELY, which takes honor away from one present. 2. Unjust: for if it were a just blackening of another's reputation, it would not be formal detraction (Polman, 2. 2, n. 489).

DIVISION. Detraction is called: 1. simply such, or defamation, when a true vice of neighbor is manifested without a just cause; if the manifestation is made for dissolving friendship and sowing discord among friends, it is called whispering; 2. calumny, or infamation, when a false crime is imposed on neighbor.

DETRACTION can be done directly or indirectly, according as namely it either is positively intended, or is foreseen as going to follow from an action or from some locution. But it is committed in various modes, which are customarily expressed in these verses:

Imposing, increasing, manifesting, turning to evil;

He who denies or is silent, diminishes, or praises tepidly.

The first four modes detract directly, the others indirectly. But all are, per se, of the same species, because all regard the same good of reputation. Yet not rarely other things are injured also through detraction, whether religion, piety, or chastity in words, or justice in goods of fortune.

CALUMNY differs in species from simple detraction, because it adds lying to detraction, and moreover is against the right which each one has that a false crime not be imputed to him.

Likewise a special malice is in WHISPERING. It agrees with detraction on the part of the matter, but differs on the part of the end; and therefore it is diverse in species and graver than detraction.

1196. PRINCIPLES. I. Detraction (whether it is infamation or defamation) is a mortal sin from its genus. From its nature it is graver than theft, which is mortal, since it injures the reputation of neighbor, which is a greater good than riches: according to that saying (Prov., 22, 1): A good name is better than many riches.

We have said: 1. Whether it is infamation, which is intrinsically evil, and therefore always illicit, as is established from proposition 44 condemned by Innocent XI: "It is probable that he does not sin mortally who imposes a false crime on someone in order to defend his own justice and honor."

2. Or defamation, which is namely unjust as often as neighbor possesses his good estimation either totally or partially, and can reasonably require silence. For then he has a right that a good useful for many things and, as is supposed, by no means harmful to others, not be taken away from him (see n. 1200, Question 1).

1197. II. The gravity of detraction is taken rather from the gravity of the injury in reputation, or in goods of fortune. The reason is plain from the unshaken principle which St. Thomas expresses: "Sins which are committed against neighbor must be weighed per se according to the harms which are brought upon neighbor: because from this they have the nature of fault" (2.2, q. 73, a. 3). To the gravity of the defect revealed one must attend only afterward.

Therefore to know whether detraction is a GRAVE or LIGHT sin, it must first be distinguished whether it carries with itself PUBLIC infamy, or is restricted to a FEW PERSONS. Then the gravity of detraction is taken: 1. from the nature of the defect which is narrated; 2. from the quality of the person detracting, whether he is grave, light, talkative; 3. from the quality of the person injured, whether he is of good or bad reputation, whether he is of such a condition that the defect revealed brings peculiar infamy; 4. from the quality of the hearers, whether they are discreet or talkative, etc. (Berardi, l. c., n. 482).

The number of hearers certainly makes for the greater gravity of detraction. Yet probably it does not multiply detraction, although it multiplies the sin of scandal. See the things said in the treatise on Sins (n. 332, Question 2).

1198. III. Sometimes it is licit to manifest the true crime of another. For the right of reputation founded in ignorance of a true crime can be elided by a stronger right, when namely a just or proportionate cause requires revelation of the crime; nor can the one defamed reasonably be unwilling (III, 968).

Therefore it is licit to manifest a defect of neighbor: 1. On account of a just cause. But the just causes are the following: a) The spiritual good of the delinquent, when namely for his amendment it is necessary that the matter be manifested to a judge, prelate, master, parent, etc. b) A notable good of the one revealing, for example for taking help or counsel in a grave matter, or for averting grave damage. c) The public good, for example for impeding evils threatening the Church, or the republic, or some community. d) The private good of the hearers and of others, for example that they may be freed from threatening damages; thus, if you know a thief to dwell with another ignorant of it, you can make him more certain, so that he may beware for himself.

"Whence, when it is a question of conferring an office, of contracting marriage, of receiving into Religion, of taking on a physician, preceptor, servant, associate, etc., it is licit to manifest (indeed sometimes one must manifest) the occult impediments, incapacity, crimes of another, whence notable inconvenience would deservedly be feared.

2. Under the due conditions. For it is required: a) That you not intend to defame neighbor, but to avert your own or another's damage; whence, if you can avoid the damage without diminution of the reputation of another, you are held to this. b) That the damage to be averted be sufficiently proportioned to the loss of reputation. It suffices indeed that the damage to be avoided be grave, although somewhat greater damage threatens the one defamed. Indeed, it suffices if you doubt about the gravity of your damage; because, in such doubt, favor must be given to the innocent. Yet except if you know the matter under a committed secret; because in that case a graver and more certain cause is required, as we have said (n. 1187). c) That you proceed cautiously, manifesting the matter neither more nor to more persons than is necessary, and exacting secrecy from him to whom you manifest it. d) That you did not accept knowledge of the crime through force or fraud, for example by opening letters, unless you would also have had a right to this (III, 969; 1. El. qq. ref., 40). Cf. the things said above n. 1188.

Note. The things which we establish here must be developed through those things which are said n. 494 concerning fraternal correction. In communities living under a rule, if it is a question of a matter of great moment, for the most part it is expedient that correction be made by the way of denunciation to the Superior as father. In religious Orders, this is especially valid for the time of visitation. This indeed, from its nature, is a paternal, not a judicial, inquiry. Nevertheless subjects are held to manifest those things which could yield to the damage of observance, or of the community, or of a private third party. Cf. Bouix, de Jure Reg., II, p. 478.

1199. IV. Detraction is not present when the crime of neighbor is notorious either by law, or by fact, or by reputation. The reason is that in these cases neighbor can no longer be said to be in possession of his reputation. Yet charity can persuade many things, indeed impose some things, as regards these.

a) If the crime of neighbor is notorious by publicity of LAW, it is licit to speak about it and to manifest it to others; because, in this case, the guilty person has lost the right to reputation through public authority; nor is charity injured, because the public good demands this, that bridles be thrown upon the wicked through divulgation of the sentence of the judge, and that others may be able to beware for themselves of evil-doers: provided the manifestation is not made from hatred nor from revenge. b) Likewise, it is licit to manifest if it is NOTORIOUS by publicity of FACT or REPUTATION; for such a manifestation is neither against justice, since reputation has now been lost; nor is it against charity (at least gravely), because the delinquent cannot reasonably be saddened from it. c) Similarly, it is not mortal to manifest a crime or offense which is not yet public (or is not public in such a place), but concerning which moral certainty is had that it is going to become public shortly (whether through evidence of fact, or through sentence of the judge); because it harms little, unless nevertheless from such anticipation grave damages would follow (III, 974).

We have said: it is not mortal, but it can be venial. To the matter the distinguished Berardi speaks thus (l. c., n. 481): "The poor," he says, "do not have a right to the substances of a rich man; and nevertheless the rich man from charity ought to assist the poor asking alms, as much as he can. Something similar happens in the case of a wretched man subjected to public infamy. He indeed does not have a right that we be silent; yet he asks in his heart, and perhaps earnestly begs, that we consult for his reputation as much as we can. Therefore silence and compassion are certain alms, which often we can furnish without any sacrifice, and from which therefore we are not easily excused... Further, to these we are held from charity, although ordinarily under light matter."

1200. Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether he sins GRAVELY who manifests in ANOTHER PLACE, to which divulgation has not yet come and is not shortly going to come, a crime public in one place?

Resp. If the crime is public by notoriety of law, it can be published anywhere without injustice; because the guilty person has been legitimately stripped of reputation by public authority, and indeed in punishment of his crime (H. Ap., XI, 13).

But if the crime is public only by notoriety of fact or reputation, there are three opinions. The first says that the manifestation is a grave sin against justice, because the delinquent still possesses his reputation elsewhere. The second holds that it is mortal against charity; for, although the guilty person has lost the right to reputation, nevertheless he would be greatly saddened knowing that his crime (of itself occult) is made public where it is still unknown. The third, more common opinion teaches that this is not grave, neither against justice nor against charity, because it conduces to the common good that evil-doers be known. This reason is very probable, provided it is limited to crimes which render a man pernicious and to be avoided by others, such as robbery, treacherous homicide, scandalous impurity, heresy, and similar things. And then, if the crime is public by notoriety of fact, because namely it was publicly committed, it is freely licit to speak about it; if by notoriety only of reputation it is public, great discretion is required (III, 974; 2. El. qq. ref., n. 12). "For this public reputation is easily feigned. But advert that an offense published in only one family or monastery cannot be called absolutely public; whence it cannot be manifested elsewhere, and not even in another monastery of the same Order which would have frequent communication with it" (H. Ap., XI, 12; Croix, 1, 3, p. 2, n. 1221).

QUAER. 2. Whether he sins MORTALLY who manifests an offense formerly public and now occult?

Resp. Per se, he sins mortally, at least against charity. Except if the offense had formerly been public by notoriety of law, or if it belonged to history.

As Noldin rightly observes (II, n. 653): To historiographers, from the general end of history, greater liberty is accustomed to be conceded, insofar as, without a peculiar reason of good, they can commit to writings the occult crimes of private persons of a past time. Yet it is necessary that they attend to two things: a) If descendants of some very ancient family still live, the principles established as regards detraction are to be strictly observed. b) The offenses of some state in species, for example the clerical, are to be recounted in such a way that the good which is hoped from the narration, by reason of greater scandal going to arise, does not become empty.

QUAER. 3. Whether it is MORTAL only to report the occult sins of another, as heard from others?

Resp. Negatively, "if you report in such a way that it is not probable to you that any infamy will arise from it, because the others are not going to believe."

"But if you report things heard before those who probably are going to believe from their own levity or malice alone, you indeed do not sin against justice, because you are not the efficacious cause of the damage, but you sin against charity, because each one is held to impede grave damage of neighbor, insofar as he conveniently can."

"Finally, if you report in such a way that the hearers probably and deservedly are going to believe (say if you assert that you have heard from a person worthy of faith), then you sin also against justice, because you give a sufficient cause of believing the evil... But if you report some very enormous crime of someone, say heresy, rebellion, sodomy, then you sin gravely, even if you say it doubtfully, because this suspicion alone greatly defames a man" (III, 977; H. Ap., XI, 15).

QUAER. 4. Whether it is a MORTAL sin to reveal the OCCULT crime of neighbor to one or another prudent and taciturn man?

Resp. Distinguish. Either the revelation is made for easing the pain of an offense, or without cause. If the FIRST, Doctors most commonly hold that such a revelation made without the intention of detracting is not sinful, at least gravely; and in this way servants disclosing injuries inflicted by a master, wives by husbands, sons by a father, etc., can probably be excused. If the SECOND, some with Busenbaum judge that it is mortal, because the injury of reputation before one person is judged grave, as is plain from rash judgment. Yet others sufficiently probably deny this: provided the one revealing does not act from malice, nor on the part of the hearer is further manifestation feared. The reason is,

because, since reputation consists in the common estimation of men, he is not judged absolutely defamed who has lost his reputation only before one or another.

Nor does the parity of rash judgment stand in the way; because the malice of rash judgment is not taken from the damage of infamy, but from contempt, malevolence, or injury, which is brought upon neighbor through imputation of a false crime (III, 973).

QUAER. 5. Whether it is a mortal sin to REVEAL the crime of a neighbor who is already defamed from another crime?

Resp. It is not grave if a crime very closely related to that on account of which he has already been marked with infamy is revealed; because from such revelation the infamy is not notably increased: as if you say of a public thief that he is perjured; of a notorious player, that he does not have care for his family.

Otherwise, if another diverse sin is revealed: because one infamous in one genus of vice has not lost the right of reputation in other virtues. Thus it is also grave, concerning a woman defamed in one adultery, to narrate another occult one (III, 976; H. Ap., XI, 14).

QUAER. 6. Whether it is licit to defame ONESELF?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. To defame oneself through the imposition of a false crime is never licit, because it is not licit to lie. If death or grave spiritual or temporal damage of another would follow from such infamation, the one defaming himself would sin mortally, because he would cooperate positively with death or damage.

But what if the guilty person were to confess a false crime for this end, that, the penalty of death being inflicted, he might avoid grave torments? Some deny that he sins gravely, because no one is held to preserve life with so great a torture, which would seem harsher than death itself; but they say that he sins lightly by reason of the lie. But others more probably affirm that he sins gravely, because the false confession would still be an illicit cooperation with his own unjust death (IV, 275).

2. "To defame oneself through revelation of a true crime regularly is not mortal; because it is not against justice, since a man is owner of his own reputation; nor against charity, because this does not oblige to conserving external goods, except insofar as one's own safety or that of neighbor requires this. Yet per accidens it can be mortal, as, for example, if your reputation is necessary for an office, or if damage of life to you, or of infamy to others, would follow from the same" (III, 983).

1201. From the things said you resolve: a) It is not mortal per se to reveal NATURAL DEFECTS of soul, body, or birth; because such defects are not moral; nor is it regarded as infamy among prudent persons that someone, for example, is stupid, illegitimate, one-eyed. But per accidens it can be grave, if namely great temporal damage would follow from it; or if you say concerning an honorable man that he was illegitimately born, or exercised a most vile office, etc. (III, 967; V, 72; 1. El. qq. ref., 54).

b) "It is not mortal to report mortal sins which, ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONDITION OF THE PERSON, do not notably injure his reputation: for example, if you say that a soldier thinks about revenge; that an adolescent is prodigal, given to loves, etc." (ib.).

c) It is not grave to speak ill of someone UNKNOWN or indetermined, for example that in such a place there are many wicked, drunk, impure persons; because thus grave infamy is brought upon no one in species.

d) "But they sin most gravely who detract from some Order or state of religious in common, or from a MONASTERY, by saying, for example, that life is bad in it, that regular observance is not kept, etc. (unless this is plainly notorious), because they do very grave harm; and they are held under mortal sin to restitution to the whole community, from which the remission of the Superior does not excuse" (III, 978).

e) "Similarly it is mortal, the person being kept silent, to name the monastery from which someone has committed a grave occult sin, for example adultery or fornication." The reason is that the religious of the same community are so conjoined among themselves that before outsiders they are judged as it were solidary, one for the others. Hence, the whole community is accustomed to be stained before the imprudent and simple.

D. Detraction, or the unjust blackening of another's reputation by hidden words, can be done in many ways, whether directly: by falsely imputing evil, or exaggerating it, or revealing what is occult, or attributing good to an evil intention; or also indirectly: by denying good, or maliciously keeping silent about it, or diminishing it, or praising coldly. Nor are the direct modes always more efficacious, but the indirect modes of speaking or keeping silent sometimes are more malicious.

But detraction is mortal sin from its genus, and not only against charity but also against justice; its gravity is to be weighed from the gravity of the harm of infamy, or of the damage which the injured person suffers in reputation.

But to manifest to another who is ignorant of it a public crime is not against justice:

a) in the place where it is notorious by notoriety of law, or by force of a judicial sentence promulgated for this region;

b) also in the place where it is notorious by notoriety of fact alone, unless the delinquent has recovered reputation;

c) also in another place in which it is foreseen that it is soon to be legitimately manifested.

Otherwise a public crime, just like an occult one, cannot be manifested except for a grave and indeed proportionate reason.

S. Th., II-II, q. 73 and 74.

423. Detraction or defamation (diffamation, medisance; achterklap, kwaadsprekerij) is the unjust denigration of another's reputation by hidden words. It is said:

1° unjust: for it is not detraction if reputation is injured from a just and reasonable cause;

2° denigration: for just as a man is bright with good reputation, so by defamation he is blackened and obscured, although good reputation is not always totally taken away;

3° of reputation: thus detraction is distinguished from contumely and theft, which deprive one of honor or riches;

4° another's: for no one can commit injustice against himself in his own reputation;

5° by hidden words, i.e., while the one who is defamed is absent: for if it were done while he himself is present, it would now be Contumely, because first, of itself, and formally it would deprive him of honor, but of reputation only materially and consequently.

424. Detraction is divided in various ways:

A. On the part of the matter, one detraction is simple, another calumny (laster), according as it manifests a hidden vice of one's neighbor without just cause, or imputes to him a false crime or vice; therefore calumny adds to simple detraction a lie, and indeed a pernicious one, as bringing unjust damage.

B. On the part of the mode or efficacy of the exterior act, one is direct if a vice is clearly narrated, another indirect if a vice is insinuated by silence or a good quality is denied or diminished. Detraction happens in eight diverse ways: "directly indeed in four ways," says St. Thomas, q. 73, a. 1, ad 3: "1° in one way, when he imposes a falsehood on another; 2° when by his words he increases a sin; 3° when he reveals something hidden; 4° when he says that what is good was done from an evil intention. Indirectly, however, either 5° by denying the good of another; or 6° by maliciously keeping silence"; or, others add, 7° by diminishing; or 8° by praising remissly; yet these two are easily reduced to the fifth and sixth.

Indirect modes of speaking or keeping silence are sometimes more malicious than direct modes, as for example: I do not say all things. There are other deeds of his concerning which it is enough to keep silence! If I could say all the things I know. These are certainly splendid things; would that he had always shown himself such; but what does it help to recall the past! This person is pious, but!... I could provoke his blushing. I know certain things which no one would suspect about him, etc. Sometimes it suffices to keep silence deliberately, and a fortiori to smile or to make a gesture.

C. On the part of intention or the interior act of the will, one is formal, which is done from the explicit intention of injuring reputation; another material, which is done from another motive not necessarily evil, of lightness, lack of reflection, loquacity, utility, without the intention of defamation but with foresight of it.

425. Thesis I. Detraction, whether simple or calumnious, is a sin against justice, mortal from its genus, less grave than homicide and adultery, graver than theft.

The thesis is to be understood not only concerning formal detraction, uttered from the intention of injuring the reputation of one's neighbor, but also concerning material detraction done with full or sufficient advertence to this. It is proved:

1° It is against commutative justice: To take from an unwilling neighbor a notable good to which he has a strict right is a grave sin against justice. But by detraction there is taken from an unwilling neighbor a notable good, to which he has a strict right, namely, reputation, which is a greater good than riches. Therefore. The minor is proved: a) it is evident when calumny is in question, which deprives an innocent man of due reputation, to which he has a right by reason of virtue; b) it also holds concerning simple detraction, which deprives a hidden delinquent of reputation to which he has a right by reason of possession: he possesses a very useful good which he needs and of which therefore he ought not to be despoiled, until it becomes harmful, and meanwhile he keeps the right not to be reputed evil in society as long as he has done nothing evil openly. - Nor should you say: because of sins he deserves justly to be despoiled of reputation. For to judge concerning delicts and penalties pertains to God or to a judge constituted in the name of God; but he who by private authority, without sufficient reason, takes away reputation unduly usurps to himself the rights of God and of judicial authority.

2° It is against legal justice and greatly harms the good of society: for the public good demands that the evils of others not be revealed without sufficient motive; for if it were lawful for all to manifest the hidden sins of one's neighbor, contentions, quarrels, envies, and hatreds would arise on every side, and the peace and tranquility of families and of the whole society would be disturbed.

3° It is also against charity, for as St. Thomas says, q. 74, a. 2, ad 2: "reputation is a disposition to friendship and infamy to enmity," and "he who detracts from his brother seems to detract from the law insofar as he contemns the precept concerning love of neighbor" (ibid. ad 3).

Hence a) Scripture holds detractors and evil-speakers to be hateful to God and men and assimilates them to those who are excluded from the kingdom of heaven;¹ this holds at least concerning calumniators; and b) the Fathers hold that vice as an abomination and a diabolical work. It is useful to remember that St. Bernard said of the detractor that with one breath he infects three souls lethally: he kills himself, the hearer, and him from whom he detracts.²

¹ Cf. Prov. XXIV, 9; Rom. I, 29-30; I Cor. VI, 10.

² Serm. XVII, De Diversis, n. 4-5.

Moreover, "among the sins which are committed against one's neighbor, homicide is graver, by which the life of one's neighbor already actually existing is taken away; consequently adultery, which is against the due order of human generation, through which there is entrance to life. Consequently there are exterior goods, among which reputation excels riches, because it is nearer to spiritual goods, whence it is said, Prov. XXII, 1: A good name is better than many riches. And therefore detraction according to its genus is a greater sin than theft; nevertheless less than homicide and adultery. Yet there can be another order because of aggravating or diminishing circumstances" (a. 3).

426. How great the right to reputation is. - So that both the right to reputation, and the malice of detraction, and the reasons excusing from it may be better understood, the following are to be noted:

A. To each one there belongs a right to ordinary good estimation or good name; although no one of himself has a right to the estimation by which special virtues are attributed to him, nevertheless each one has the right of demanding that in human intercourse he be treated as someone to whom the virtues common among upright men belong: each one, from the fact that he seems to act rightly, and as long as he has done nothing evil publicly, is to be held good until he is proved evil.

Moreover there is a right to this reputation not only true, which is founded in true goodness and excellence, but also to false reputation, which rests only upon apparent and estimated goodness:

1. One can have a right in true reputation directly and of itself: for this reputation is a good positively acquired by one's own acts, in which therefore he exercises full right and dominion; whence this right also is absolute and universal, which demands that each good man be held by all to be such as he truly is.

There exists, namely, a bond between the person and true reputation, which bond can justly be violated by no one except by permission of the owner himself. Therefore this reputation is never lawfully taken away and calumny is always an injury; - nor is public calumny lawfully repeated, because it is cooperation in evil: it confirms a false opinion.

2. The right in false reputation does not arise positively and directly from the internal probity and excellence itself of the man, but negatively from acts, insofar as nothing evil appears publicly in them, and indirectly from the inconveniences which would arise against the private and common good if the hidden defects of others could everywhere be published.

Therefore it is founded positively in public and private necessity:

a) in public necessity, for from the revelation of crimes one's neighbor could not usefully perform his office, he would lose all authority, would lack the good of conversation, and those closely joined would be affected with ignominy, and thus contentions, quarrels, envies, and hatreds would arise on every side by which peace and tranquility in society would be disturbed. And this is still more established because

b) it is also founded in private necessity: for he who lacks reputation is deprived of a great protection against greater vices; on the contrary, fear of losing reputation often restrains the evil themselves, while he who has lost reputation can be restrained by no bridle; besides, as long as the crime is not public, conversion is easier, since human fear is less to be feared. Whence, says St. Thomas, q. 73, a. 2: "to take away someone's reputation is very grave, because among temporal things reputation seems to be more precious, by the lack of which a man is impeded from doing many good things; on account of which Ecclus. XLI, 15 says: Have care for a good name: for this will remain to you more than a thousand great and precious treasures. And therefore detraction, speaking of itself, is a mortal sin."

That right is not absolute, but conditioned by the private and public good, and limited by it; and consequently it ceases when a notable good either of the revealer, or of the delinquent himself, or of others, or of society rather demands that hidden defects be revealed. And therefore no one can be deprived of this false reputation of his unless, from the reputation not taken away, proportionate damage would follow to a private man or to the community, whether in a right already possessed or in a right to be possessed.

B. No one of himself has a right to extraordinary reputation, which is founded in singular gifts and talents, for example, of an outstanding theologian, orator, physician, saint: he does not have a right to such reputation if he does not really possess these things. Wherefore manifestation of the error on which extraordinary reputation rests is not against justice; - nor against charity, provided there is a reasonable motive for manifesting it.

C. The preceding things hold not only concerning private persons, but also concerning moral persons because of similar reasons. Indeed also concerning the dead, in whom the subject of the right to reputation perseveres, namely, the immortal soul, which is not verified for goods of fortune, whose right rests upon the necessities of bodily life; moreover the reputation by which they live among men is a great good which they therefore esteem and desire to retain.

Nevertheless this holds concerning the dead in a lesser degree, because they need reputation less than the living, and therefore are less unwilling in the violation of the right, whence calumny is so much less a sin; and as to detraction, the common right to knowing historical truth is accustomed to prevail, provided notable damage is not at the same time brought upon persons still living or institutions still existing.

427. The gravity of detraction is taken not so much from the gravity of the crime divulged as from the gravity of the harm of infamy, or of the damage which the injured person suffers in reputation. This damage must be considered not only in itself, but also as to the injured person, and as to the efficacy of the detraction.

Therefore one must attend:

1° To the imputed defect in itself: if the defect is grave, ordinarily it notably injures reputation; if light, ordinarily lightly.

Hence a) detraction regarding honesty of life is much graver than that which regards natural defects of body or soul (for example, that someone is imprudent or unlearned), because these are not accustomed notably to lessen reputation, and easily become of public right; - b) if however a natural defect is very disgraceful and brings great sadness to the injured person, it can be a grave sin, for example, if it is said of an eminent man that he is a natural son, of someone that he is the son of a priest; - c) in general to call someone proud, angry, lazy, etc., is not as grave as to narrate particular facts from which those defects are actually manifested: such a general manner of speaking, rather than grave personal fault, denotes natural propensities or venial defects, which by their nature are accustomed to be public; on the contrary, to say that someone is lustful or unjust, because it indicates a habit; - d) it is not grave to report concerning one who is already defamed by sin something connected with that delict, for example, concerning a known adulterer to say that he sent love letters, concerning a husband who is known to be drunk, that he quarreled with his wife; otherwise if the fact is altogether dissimilar, for example, if it is said that he who has lost reputation in doctrine or faith is ruined in morals, or vice versa: for he who has lost reputation in one thing has not therefore lost it in a wholly diverse thing. But there is no sin of defamation if you say of a prostitute that she laid snares for a youth, because she suffers no detriment in reputation, since this is included in prostitution.

2° To the person injured and his condition and dignity. For the gravity of the defect which is manifested depends much upon the condition of the person, and he who enjoys an integral reputation and needs it for exercising an office or business suffers graver damage than he who neither enjoys nor needs it.

Hence a) an accusation of great ambition, hypocrisy, or lust harms a priest or pious monk more and gravely than a layman; likewise an accusation of immodesty harms a girl more than a soldier; on the contrary, an accusation of sloth brings greater detriment to a soldier than to a girl. Regularly it is not grave to say of a light and worldly youth that he is a lover of girls; on the contrary, to say that a bishop is lying, a merchant dishonest, a physician ignorant, is apt to harm gravely in reputation or also in temporal goods;³ - b) to detract from a family or community is unlawful, because the disgrace redounds to the whole community, for example, that in such a monastery certain religious indulge in such a vice, or that regular discipline is not observed, or that such a crime, for example, of fornication, was committed; in such a city nearly all are infected, all the girls corrupted, all the merchants plunderers; - otherwise if in a general way it were said that in monasteries there are not lacking some who sin gravely, in a great city there are many unjust persons, many corrupted girls.

³ It can happen that the injury of reputation is slight in itself, but apt for bringing grave damage in goods of another genus, as if someone narrated that the man whom a hearer wished to take on for the office of secretary was talkative. Then to the light sin of detraction there would be added a grave injury of charity or justice in temporal goods.

3° To the efficacy of detraction, which depends both upon the quality of the detractor, and upon the number, disposition, and quality of the hearers.

a) Upon the quality of the detractor: a man who is held to be grave, prudent, and truthful harms more than one light, talkative, and lying; and he who reports something as seen harms more than if he reports it as heard from persons of uncertain authority; if however he narrates a grave thing as heard from a trustworthy person, or if from the circumstances he foresees that the hearers will believe it, or if he reports a thing so enormous that the mere suspicion of it gravely defames, such as sodomy committed by a priest, he sins gravely.

I say 1st. Every detraction is a mortal sin from its genus, because it is opposed to justice, which obliges under grave matter; and since the goods of reputation are better than goods of fortune, detraction of itself is a graver sin than theft. But the gravity or lightness of detraction is not to be measured precisely from the gravity of the defect or crime which is narrated concerning the neighbor, but chiefly from the gravity of the harm which the neighbor can suffer from it. Wherefore, to know in a particular case the gravity of the sin, one must attend to the quality both of the person detracting and of the person injured. The reason is that greater or lesser trust will be given according to the greater or lesser authority of the one speaking, and greater or lesser detriment to reputation will follow according to the measure of the greater or lesser estimation which the injured person enjoys. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 967.

I say 2nd. Although in no case whatsoever is it ever licit to attribute a false crime to another, since a lie is something intrinsically evil, nevertheless, from a just cause, it is licit to manifest the hidden crime of another even with loss of his reputation; because circumstances can be present in which the right of the neighbor to preserving reputation is overcome by a stronger right, and then neither would charity urge, because it does not oblige with grave inconvenience, nor justice, because a right against a prevailing right is not given. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 968 and 972.

I say 3rd. The detractor is bound in justice, as far as can be done, both to repair the reputation unjustly taken away and to compensate all temporal harms arising from defamation and in some way foreseen. The reason for the first is that through the taking away of reputation a damaging injury has been inflicted by the violation of a strict right, which ought to be restored in full. But the reason for the second is that all harms arising from detraction are to be attributed to the detractor as to their efficacious cause. Notice nevertheless that the obligation of restoring reputation is personal, but the obligation of repairing harms which have arisen from defamation is real, and therefore passes to heirs. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 991 and 996.

I say 4th. Restitution of reputation is to be made in one way by a calumniator, and in another by a simple detractor. For the calumniator is bound to retract what he said, and indeed in itself even with loss of his own reputation if reparation cannot otherwise be made; because the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty, and the latter ought to impute to his own malice whatever he is about to suffer on account of this. But the simple detractor cannot retract what he said, because thus he would lie; wherefore in another way, as far as is in him, he ought to restore the reputation, saying, e.g., that he spoke badly, that he erred, or something similar; for not only do those err who recede from truth, but also those who recede from rectitude, according to that saying, Prov. xiv, 22: "They err who work evil." But often that manner does not suffice among intelligent and astute persons, who rather from these formulas conjecture that the crime is true, since it is not asserted openly to be false. Therefore then the detractor, being silent about what was said, when occasion is given, with dexterity and truth ought to praise and honor him from whom he detracted. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 992.

Question 2. Do detractions differ in species in matters diverse in species?

Response. Negatively, probably, because although such detractions are distinguished materially in species, nevertheless morally they injure one reputation of a man, no otherwise than contumelies are of the same species on account of the unity of honor against which they tend. Wherefore the confessor ought not to inquire concerning what matters the penitent detracted about, not only because the obligation is not established, but also because from knowledge of the different matter of detraction he could easily come to knowledge of the very person who was detracted from, and thus the confession itself would not be immune from the vice of detraction. Indeed, because it is also probable that detractions concerning different matters, if they are not otherwise interrupted, are one sin in number, the confessor ought to abstain from inquiring not only what the matters of detraction were, but also whether they were many. - Cf. Lugo, de Paenit., disp. 16, n. 265. - Baller., note (a), p. 429.

Question 6. How do those hearing detraction sin?

Response. Just as those who so listen that they add new stimuli to detractors contract the whole malice of detraction, and therefore injure justice, so those who, when they notice detraction, depart, cut off the conversation, or turn away the face and show themselves sad, are altogether excused, according to that saying, Prov. xxv, 23: "A sad face dissipates a detracting tongue." - But, outside this twofold case, a distinction must be made between private persons and superiors. A private person for the most part is excused either altogether or at least from grave sin if he does not impede detraction, from shame or fear or even from negligence, even if he conveniently can, provided that he does not rejoice in it, nor that besides infamy another harm is added. The reason is that in this matter it often cannot be established that correction will be of profit; indeed it is often dangerous, and it can rightly be feared lest the detraction rather be increased or prolonged. But a superior sins against charity if he does not impede detraction insofar as he conveniently can, even if he does not rejoice in it; because there rests upon him a special obligation of correcting the detractor, or of obviating the harm of the defamed subject. But more probably he does not sin against justice, neither the superior of the detractor, because he is not held to watch over the good of another who is not a subject; nor the superior of the defamed person, because it is not incumbent upon him in justice to attend to the temporal good of a subject. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 979, 980 and 981.

Detraction is the unjust injury and darkening of another's good fame by occult words. So D. Thomas here, where the Thomists, and D. Bonaventure in the Mirror of the Soul, chapter 1. toward the middle, and p. 1. Centil. sect. 13. at the end, and the little work Declaratio terminorum Theologiae.

I note, however, that occult utterance is not intrinsic to detraction, but pertains to the manner in which it is for the most part done; for if anyone imputes a secret, or false, crime to another in the presence of others, this man certainly sins also by detraction, and not by contumely alone. But it pertains to the manner of detraction that it be about an absent person, according to that, Ecclesiasticus 10: The serpent bites in silence; but he is nothing less than he that detracteth secretly, as Valencia notes, question 17. p. 1. after D. Bonaventure, cited in the first place, and this S. Thomas indicates in his reply ad 1.

The differences, or divisions, of Detractions are taken from the various ways in which one can voluntarily darken someone's fame, as is seen in D. Bonaventure in the places alleged, Adrian quodl. 11. D. Thomas here ad 3. Alensis 2. p. question 146. member 1. Sotus l. 5. on Justice, question 10. article 1. Navarrus Manual. chapter 18. number 21. Valencia in the place cited.

Detraction is divided, on the part of the will, into direct and indirect.

It is direct when one detracts in order to darken fame; indirect, when one speaks imprudently, or ignorantly, something that harms fame. So D. Bonaventure, loc. cit. of the Mirror: the direct is called formal Detraction; the indirect, material.

Secondly it can be divided into Direct and Indirect on the part of the external act, or of the manner in which one defames another. And on this part detraction is direct, according to D. Thomas here ad 3. and D. Bonaventure in the places adduced, Centil. and of the Mirror, when one defames another by attributing to him something evil; which happens in four ways, namely, either by falsely imputing a crime to another, or by augmenting it in words; or by revealing a hidden crime, even if true; or by saying that it was done by him with an evil intention — and if this is said lightly, without proofs, it is also rash judgment, as all say with D. Bonaventure, chapter one of the Mirror of the Soul, toward the middle.

But indirect detraction, from the same chapter, is when one defames another by conducting himself in a manner undue toward the other's fame; and this in three ways, either by denying that person's good, or by maliciously keeping silence when it ought to be said, or also by diminishing it. The Gloss on Daniel 7. adds also indicating by nods, and feigning that one says it out of charity and piety — which modes are the worst; and the Gloss says these ten modes are those ten horns of the great Beast.

It is most certain that direct detraction, with the intention of blackening reputation, is a mortal sin. So D. Bonaventure in the places cited, question 11; D. Thomas here, and the others commonly, as at Valencia question 17, p. 2; Fagundez book 8, chapter 1, number 8.

The Holy Doctor shows this with many testimonies of Scripture in the Bible of the Poor, chapter 71, where he shows it to be the wickedness of the impious and of the worst of men, and he gathers the gravity of this crime from the punishments inflicted by God.

Thus Numbers 14: the children of Israel detracted to their own harm from those who had brought back word of Josue and Caleb from the land of promise, proclaiming them liars and deceivers together with Moses. Numbers 16: Core, Dathan, and Abiron were swallowed alive into hell, and others were consumed by living fire.

Those who detract from Saul, 1 Kings, are called children of Belial. Absalom, 2 Kings 15, detracted from his father's government, and he was hung by God on an oak and damned.

Christ, Matthew 9, Luke 5 and 19, gravely reproached the Pharisees as they murmured, as being lost men.

It is proved by D. Bonaventure, and from Luke 19, out of Wisdom 1: Keep yourselves from murmuring, which profiteth nothing, and from detraction refrain your tongue.

Then he recounts the murmurings of the people in the desert and their damnation, and adduces this from 1 Corinthians 10: Neither murmur ye, as some of them murmured, and perished by the destroyer.

The Holy Doctor proves the same in the Mirror of the Soul, chapter 1, from that passage of Romans 1: Detractors are hateful to God, worthy of death; and not only they who do such things, but they also who consent to them.

It is proved secondly by D. Bonaventure in the Pharetra, book 3, chapter 3, from D. Isidore, in the Synonyms, chapter 10: Detraction is a grave crime; detraction is a grave damnation.

D. Bernard, sermon 24 on the Canticle: There is one detractor who speaks, and utters but one word; yet that one word, in one moment, infects the ears of a multitude of hearers and kills their souls. And book 2 of the Considerations: To detract, or to hear a detractor — which of these is the more damnable, I should scarcely venture to say.

D. Anselm, On Similitudes, chapter 147: There are three kinds of homicide which are punished with equal penalty: the killing of men, the detraction of neighbors, and fraternal hatred. And chapter 149: It is detraction whenever anyone says anything of another with the intention that he may be the less loved or esteemed.

The reasoning of D. Bonaventure, which all follow, is in the Mirror of the Soul, chapter 1: to steal another's goods is a grave sin in its genus, against the seventh precept, as if you stole a neighbor's ox or money; but reputation is a more precious thing than outward riches, as is said in Proverbs 23. Therefore it is worse to detract from reputation than to steal money; whence the Holy Doctor further deduces that such a one is more bound to restitution than a thief, because he took away a greater good against justice.