Article — Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)
Article I. On the Vice of Detraction
- Detraction is a hidden and unjust violation of another's reputation, or the unjust blackening of the reputation of an absent neighbor. But reputation is the good estimation which others have concerning the life and morals of someone 1.
1 Perhaps the Author narrows too much the matter of detraction. Indeed the excellence whose estimation can be injured is not only virtue and honesty, but also wisdom, learning, talent, eloquence, distinguished character, etc.; indeed there are also goods of body or of fortune, such as strength, beauty (by which women are commended), health, nobility, wealth, legitimate birth, etc. The Author touches on these and things of this sort below, n. 456, res. 9.
Detraction is called such simply if the reputation of the neighbor is violated by revelation of a true crime; but it is denominated calumny if the violation of reputation follows from the attribution of a false crime.
Detraction can happen in various ways: 1. directly, if a false crime is imposed, if a true one is amplified, if a hidden one is manifested, if a good work is taken in a sinister way; 2. indirectly, namely by denying the good works of the neighbor, or by diminishing them, or even sometimes by being silent when others praise, or by praising coldly.
- Principles. - I. Every direct detraction, whether it is calumny or detraction simply, is mortal from its genus, because it is against justice; and indeed it is a graver sin than theft, because it unjustly deprives the neighbor of a greater good, as is clear from the common sense and from Sacred Scripture, Prov. 22. 1, where it is said: "A good name is better than many riches"; and ibid., 24. 9: "The detractor is an abomination of men."
II. The gravity or lightness of detraction is to be taken chiefly from the gravity or lightness of the damage which the neighbor can suffer from it, and not only from the gravity of the defect or crime which is narrated concerning the neighbor. Hence, to know in a particular case the gravity of detraction, one must attend to the quality, 1. of the person detracting, namely whether he is grave and discreet, or garrulous and light; 2. of the person injured, whether he is of good or bad reputation, etc. The reason is that greater faith will be given according to the greater or lesser authority of the speaker; likewise greater or lesser detriment of reputation will follow according to the measure of the greater or lesser estimation which the injured person enjoys. - St. Lig., n. 967.
- III. It is never lawful to attribute a false crime to another, as is clear from proposition 44 condemned by Innocent XI. Yet it is lawful from a just cause to manifest a hidden crime of another, even with loss of that person's reputation; because sometimes public or private good requires this, and then the right of the neighbor to preserving reputation is overthrown by a stronger right. - St. Lig., n. 972.
IV. But the causes on account of which the crime of another can lawfully be revealed are the following: 1. notable utility of the revealer himself, for example for asking counsel or help in a grave matter, with nevertheless any affection toward detraction removed; 2. utility of the delinquent, namely for his instruction or correction, etc.; 3. public utility, as for preventing evils threatening the Republic or Religion or some Community; - 4. grave utility, even private, whether of the hearers or of others, for example so that they may be freed from evils, damages, or inconveniences certainly or probably going to happen. The reason of these things is that then the one manifesting another's sins injures neither justice nor charity. 1. He does not injure justice, because the neighbor does not have a right so strict to his reputation that others are obliged to cover the truth when its manifestation is necessary for avoiding grave damage, whether one's own or that of others; 2. He does not injure charity, because charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience; and just as you are not bound to impede the damage of your neighbor, however great, with grave damage to yourself, so neither are you bound in the case to conceal the hidden crime of the neighbor 2. - St. Lig., n. 968.
2 Indeed, charity in these adjuncts demands that the truth not be hidden. For charity ought to be ordered; but ordered charity requires that the innocent be favored rather than the guilty. Therefore he acts most perversely who, lest something evil should happen to a robber or thief, wicked companions, or one laying snares for honesty, etc., by his silence commits it that the life, fortunes, innocence, or honesty of others are endangered.
- Questions. - Q. 1. Whether he sins gravely who reveals the single mortal sin of another?
Resp. 1. It is not always a grave sin to reveal another's sin, even if it is manifested to several. Therefore one must attend to the adjuncts of things and persons, from which you will gather whether someone suffers a grave loss of reputation from the revelation of the sin.
Resp. 2. If the sin gravely dishonors either in itself or relative to the one defamed, certainly the detractor gravely offends whenever he manifests a sin of this sort, although single, to several, because grave damage of reputation is brought upon the neighbor.
Resp. 3. But whether it is mortal to reveal such a sin to one prudent and discreet man, with special malice removed, is disputed.
The first opinion, more common and more probable, says that grave sin is committed unless inadvertence or great levity excuses. The reason is, 1. because injury to reputation even with one grave person is judged grave, as is clear from rash judgment, which per se is grave; 2. because often men bear it more bitterly that they are injured with one grave person than with three or four others.
The second opinion, sufficiently probable, denies it. The reason is that since reputation consists in the common estimation of men, he who has lost a good name among only one or another is not judged absolutely defamed. - St. Lig. has it as probable, n. 973 3.
3 ** To this matter St. Alphonsus brings (l. c.) these words of St. Thomas (Quodlib., 11, art. 13, ad 3): "If someone reports the fault of a neighbor to a prelate, intending either caution for the future, or something of this sort which he would see to be expedient for the amendment of the neighbor, he does not sin. But if he reports this, whether to a prelate or to some friend of his, from malice, then he sins mortally. But if from incaution he has said this to someone, yet in such a way that nothing else results from it, either infamy or reproach to the delinquent neighbor, then he does not sin mortally, although he acts incautiously." To these last words St. Alphonsus subjoins this commentary: "Nor should you say that that word, 'from incaution,' is understood for inadvertence; for from this one never sins mortally; but it is altogether understood as imprudence or levity of mind, which is only venial; and then only will it be mortal when from it there results infamy or reproach to the delinquent." But a commentary of this sort is a little obscure.
Indeed, so that its own sense may be attributed to the words of St. Thomas, a twofold hypothesis can be established: the first is that he who reveals the crime knows that no other damage is going to come from it; nevertheless he does not have a reasonable cause for revealing the crime; and then there is place for what St. Alphonsus says, that one sins venially by levity of mind, whence the defamation which follows is probably light. Another hypothesis is that he who reveals the crime does not have before his eyes the damage to the neighbor which can follow from it; and then what can excuse him from mortal fault except inadvertence? For it is plain that we cannot ascribe to St. Thomas a sense of this sort, that detraction is judged venial or mortal only from the event, about which the one revealing the crime thought nothing. Therefore the words of St. Alphonsus must also be understood in this way.
- Q. 2. Whether detractions in matters diverse in species differ in species?
Resp. A twofold probable opinion is given.
The first opinion affirms. The reason is that the reputation which someone possesses, for example concerning chastity, is one, and another is that which he has concerning justice; since he is not defamed in fornication, although he is dishonored in theft.
The second opinion denies it. The reason is that, although such detractions are distinguished in species materially, nevertheless morally they injure one reputation of a man, because they tend toward one formal object, just as contumelies are of the same species because of the unity of honor against which they tend. - Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 265, etc. 4.
4 Therefore the Confessor would imprudently require from a penitent that he express the matter of detraction; both because he would unjustly impose a certain obligation which, since it is uncertain, the penitent does not have; and also because not rarely the confession itself would not be immune from the vice of detraction, since from this both persons and the crimes of persons could become known to the Confessor.
** The VV. here note two things (p. 921) concerning this question and Note. And first they say that Gury agrees with St. Alphonsus in this, that those contumelies do not differ in species; but differs in this, that he recognizes one sin in number there, while the holy Doctor teaches that several are present. - Resp. Gury says neither one nor several sins. But if the VV. argue that one sin is asserted by Gury from this as a necessary consequence, because he says there is one species, how could the holy Doctor have affirmed one species and at the same time that there are several sins?
2. The VV. carp at the Note because it says that the Confessor would imprudently require from the penitent that he express the matter of detraction; and they subjoin that the confessor acts most prudently by inquiring from the penitent how many diverse crimes of the neighbor he revealed. - Resp. 1. Even if it were granted that it must be expressed how many diverse crimes someone revealed, it would not follow from this that the matter of these crimes must necessarily be expressed; therefore what remains is that the Confessor would imprudently require this from the penitent. - Resp. 2. The obligation which the VV. defend of expressing that number of crimes is finally, even they confessing it, only probable. But, St. Alphonsus teaching, it is unjust to impose an obligation which is not certain, especially when there is danger present of injuring the neighbor's reputation with the confessor. Therefore.
Moreover, it certainly would have been more opportune that the VV. in no way touched this question. For that paragraph which Holzmann and Concina, and then St. Alphonsus, afterwards copied from Croix (lib. 5, n. 161), certainly presents nothing except confusion of ideas. And indeed, if you inspect the authors against whom he fights, you will find them contending that these contumelies agree in one lowest species, and therefore (as Croix himself reports from their opinion) that they make up one greater infamy. In like manner, if you inspect those whom Croix opposes to them, you will discern that, on the contrary, they stand for multiple species. Thus, for example, Navarrus (Sum., cap. 6, n. 18) holds that several sins are present, because those injurious words are not of one species; nor otherwise Azor (p. 1, lib. 4, cap. 4, q. 5): "I respond that many come to be in species and are increased in number when speech is referred to objects diverse in species, as if Titius contumeliously calls Caius a heretic, robber, adulterer; he commits three sins diverse in species." But after these things Croix, as if he were disputing from the sense of the authors alleged, first uses equivocal phrases concerning diversities either of reputation or of objects; and he then concludes that these reputations can no more make up one reputation in number than three fasts one fast, as if moreover a triple transgression of a fast were to be compared with several contumelies brought forth by one act, as the question proposed by him bears, or doubt could be moved whether three fasts differ in species. And thus indeed it is wrapped in shadows both why he alleged the authors and on what principles relying he draws forth that resolution.
But perhaps this question does not become clearer with St. Alphonsus (lib. 5, n. 48). For the authors from whom he departs you discern to be the same as with Croix, except that he joins Azor with Lugo, although nevertheless Azor, as is clear from his words alleged above, holds the opposite opinion from Lugo. But to these he opposes those whom Croix also opposed. Now the dispute between them is, as we have seen, whether those multiple contumelies are of one and the same species, or of multiple and diverse species. To the authors alleged by Croix the holy Doctor adds Collet, Holzmann, and Concina. But Holzmann and Concina, not otherwise than Croix, use equivocal formulas; but Collet asserts multiple sin in those contumelies because, he says (De Pecc., p. 1, c. 3, art. 2), "they are sins diverse in species." Therefore does St. Alphonsus defend that multiple sin is present because the contumelies differ in species? But the VV. contradict this, who, as we saw above, affirm that Gury here agrees with St. Alphonsus in asserting unity of species. What reason, therefore, remains on account of which St. Alphonsus teaches that there are several sins there? Indeed, the holy Doctor from Holzmann (p. 1, n. 674) brings the reason that diverse rights to reputation or honor are injured; "for by this, that someone is defamed in one crime, he is not therefore defamed in another." But this argument would rather prove that those contumelies are diverse in species, as in reality the patrons of multiple species were arguing thus. Against these Lugo argues thus (De Poenit., d. 16, n. 265): "Molina gives the best reason, namely that all contumelies receive malice from this, that they injure honor, just as thefts injure fortunes; therefore just as thefts are of the same species in the reason of theft, whether they are done in this way or that; so it must be said concerning the removal of honor. Hence the same must be said of detraction, that it is not varied in species according to the diversity of the matter in which reputation is taken away; because reputation is always of the same species in the genus of morals. Similarly in rash judgment it is not necessary to explain the matter in which judgment is made, but it is enough to say: so many times in grave matter I rashly judged concerning some persons; because good estimation also, which is taken away through rash judgment, is of the same species in the genus of morals."
And from here an obvious response is made to those things which Croix has (l. c.), namely that there are three sins because rights to three diverse reputations are injured; for by this, that someone is praiseworthy in the virtue of justice, he does not become praiseworthy in the virtue of chastity, and by this, that he is known to be a thief, he is not therefore known to be immodest, but retains a right to this reputation; therefore these reputations are diverse objects. For another could easily reply: there are three sins because rights to three diverse fortunes are injured (imagine an ox, a horse, and a cart); for by this, that someone is a just possessor of an ox, he does not therefore become a just possessor of a horse or cart; and by this, that he possesses a horse badly, he is not therefore an unjust possessor of an ox, but retains his right to this; therefore these fortunes or substances are diverse objects. This indeed neither Croix nor his followers can or wish to admit; but what disparity can be assigned? St. Alphonsus, so that he might meet the difficulty, wrote (l. c.): "Nor does it stand in the way that he who takes away several diverse things commits a single theft; for then one right of his to his goods is injured; but when he is defamed in several matters, several of his rights are injured according to several respects which reputation has toward diverse virtues." But another in the same way will be able to reason thus, so that he may prove that there are several thefts there. Nor does it stand in the way that he who defames in several diverse matters commits a single detraction; for then one right of his to his reputation is injured. Since (as Molina says, tom. 5, disp. 19, n. 3) "the injustice of detraction does not consist in that by which, as by a means and instrument, prejudice is unjustly done to the neighbor's reputation..., but consists in the prejudice inflicted on the reputation of the neighbor; wherefore, since the object of detraction broadly taken is reputation as to prejudice which is inflicted unjustly on it, not the diverse means by which that prejudice is inflicted, and since the prejudice unjustly inflicted is always of the same reason, by whatever means that prejudice is inflicted..., it follows that one right of another to reputation is injured. But when someone is injured in several diverse goods of fortune, several of his rights are injured according to several respects which the right of property has toward diverse goods of fortune." But does this reasoning have less strength than the preceding one of St. Alphonsus? Namely, diverse contumelies or detractions, not otherwise than diverse objects of theft, have diversity only in physical being, not in moral being. Wherefore Bonacina rightly concludes (De Pecc., disp. 2, q. 4, p. 2, n. 13) that the opinion which contends that the diversity of several injuries is to be expressed in confession is to be held in the same place as that which holds that the altogether determinate quantity of theft is to be opened in confession.
Q. 3. Whether a public crime can be revealed to those ignorant of it?
Resp. It is affirmed, because this seems to be neither against justice nor against charity, whether it is public by publicity of law or by publicity of fact. - St. Lig., n. 974.
- Q. 4. Whether a crime public in one place can be revealed in another place where it is unknown?
Resp. 1. It is affirmed as more probable per se, at least without grave sin, if there is question of a nearby place, or of a place where it is easily and shortly going to be made public. The reason is that reputation to be lost shortly and necessarily is of no or certainly not of great estimation, and morally speaking has already been cast away.
Resp. 2. If there is question of places to which the divulgation is not going to come, or not except after a long time, one must distinguish:
- As regards notoriety of law, 1. It is not against justice, because the judge, when he publicly condemns someone, intends to despoil the guilty person of reputation, so that he may be an example everywhere to the rest. Thus commonly. - 2. Nor more probably is it against charity, at least gravely, because it contributes greatly to the common good for the sentence to be made known everywhere, so that the penalty may be more efficacious and the guilty person may be known even by inhabitants of a remote region, who could have business to transact with him. - Thus more commonly with Lugo, the Salamancans, St. Lig., n. 974.
- As regards notoriety of fact, it is disputed among theologians.
The first opinion, very probable, says that it is not per se illicit, because neither is there sin against justice nor against charity, at least gravely, provided there is question of crimes which render a man pernicious. The reason is that it conduces to the public good that criminal men be known, so that all can beware of them. - St. Lig., n. 964; Hom. apost., n. 12; in Retr., n. 12. The second opinion on the contrary says that it is a sin both against justice and against charity: 1. against justice indeed, because one defamed in one place has not lost the right to reputation in another remote place to which the reputation of the crime is not shortly going to arrive; therefore he who defames him there does injury to him; 2. against charity, because one defaming harms the neighbor in a grave matter, or in reputation, which elsewhere he continues to possess without injury to him. - Billuart, Antoine.
- Q. 5. When can a crime or fact be called public or notorious?
Resp. 1. It is called altogether public or famous when it has become known to the greater part of the community, or city, town, village, etc.
Resp. 2. It is called simply public or notorious when it has become known to so many persons that it can be hidden by no tergiversation, and it is morally impossible that it should not come into the knowledge of the community. But it is very difficult to determine the knowledge of how many persons is required for a crime to be able to be judged public. Theologians have assigned various rules according to the varied number of persons who compose the community. According to the more common opinion, a crime can be called public if fifteen know it from a community of one hundred persons; or twenty of diverse families in a community of one thousand persons; or forty persons dispersed in a town of five thousand persons. - Thus St. Lig., n. 975. But, as Billuart says better, de Iustitia, diss. 15, art. 2, §5, this is remitted to the judgment of a prudent man, who, after attending to the number of the community, the garrulity of men, and other circumstances, may judge whether it is possible for the matter to remain secret.
- Q. 6. Whether one sins gravely who only reports grave sins of another as heard from others, for example if he says: It is reported, they narrate, I heard this or that about such a one?
Resp. 1. He sins gravely against charity and justice if he reports in such a way that others are more likely and deservedly to believe it, for example if he asserts that he heard the things which he narrates from a person worthy of trust, because then he furnishes sufficient cause for believing evil; otherwise, if probably faith is not given to the words, because no infamy will arise from it. But much more easily he will sin gravely who reports, even as merely doubtful, the enormous sin of another, for example heresy, sodomy, etc.
Resp. 2. He sins gravely against charity if he reports things heard before those who probably will believe them from levity or their own malice; because under grave sin each one is bound from charity to remove the occasion of damage to another when he easily can. Yet he does not seem to sin against justice, because he is not an efficacious cause of damage. - St. Lig., n. 978. - Billuart, ibid., art. 2, §4, and others commonly.
- Q. 7. In what way does one hearing detraction sin?
Resp. 1. He certainly sins gravely against justice who efficaciously induces another to detract.
Resp. 2. He sins gravely against charity who rejoices over grave detraction done by another, because he rejoices over the grave damage of the neighbor. Except if he rejoiced only over the hearing of a new or curious thing, but not over the detraction itself.
Resp. 3. A Superior sins against charity if he does not impede detraction insofar as he conveniently can, even if he does not rejoice over it; because upon him there rests a special obligation of correcting the detractor, or of obviating the damage of the defamed subject. But more probably he does not sin against justice, 1. if he is the Superior of the detractor, because he is not bound to watch over the good of another who is not his subject; 2. if he is the Superior of the defamed person, because it does not fall upon him from justice to attend to the temporal good of the subject. - St. Lig., n. 979.
Resp. 4. A private person is for the most part excused either altogether or at least from grave sin if he does not impede detraction, whether from shame or fear or even negligence, even if he conveniently can, provided he does not rejoice over it, and no other damage besides infamy is added. The reason is that in this matter it often cannot be established that correction will be of profit; indeed often it is dangerous, and one can deservedly fear lest the detraction rather be increased or prolonged. Yet he will not lack some fault if he can easily apply efficacious correction. - St. Lig., n. 979.
But they are also excused from venial sin who, when they notice detraction, depart, wipe out the conversation, or turn away the face and show themselves sad, according to that saying of Prov. 25. 23: "A sad face scatters the detracting tongue."
- Q. 8. Whether it is lawful to defame oneself?
Resp. It is affirmed per se, if it is done with a right intention, scandal and the damage of others being removed. The reason is that it is not against justice, since each one is master of his own reputation; nor is it against charity, because this does not oblige one to preserve external goods except insofar as one's own salvation or that of the neighbor requires it.
But per accidens you will sin, and even gravely, if your reputation is necessary for your office, or if damage to life for you, or infamy for others, can arise from this. - St. Lig., n. 985.
- Resolves. - 1. It is a grave sin to detract even from the dead in a grave matter; for they are not despoiled of the right to reputation, although they have departed from among the living. Hence historians who brand the memory of the dead with a mark of disgrace without sufficient cause, by manifesting hidden things, exaggerating known things, and not reporting the penance performed, can sin gravely. - St. Lig., n. 978.
- It can be mortal to reveal so many things, even if the individual things are not grave, about someone placed in conspicuous dignity, that his reputation is notably injured, although this is done over a long time.
- It is mortal if you say that someone is an adulterer, although you have probable indications of this, because you bring grave harm upon his reputation. Indeed, the same must be held even if you should say that it is probable that he is such.
- It is grave to say of a Priest that he committed a duel, or that he is a lover of girls, and other things of that sort. But often it is not lethal to assert this of a soldier, or even of a young man of middling reputation; nor to say of a girl that she is talkative, proud, etc. - St. Lig., n. 967.
- It is not mortal to speak badly of someone unknown or indeterminate, for example, that in such a place there are many wicked, drunken, immodest persons; because grave injury is inflicted on no one. Likewise it is not grave to recount some crime about someone whom the hearers do not know and are never going to recognize, even if he is named. Indeed this per se is free from every fault.
- Yet it is lethal, at least commonly speaking, to detract gravely from some Monastery, although no Religious is named, for example, if it is said that in it a depraved life is led, that a grave sin was perpetrated. The reason is that the Religious of the same Community are so joined together among themselves that before outsiders they are considered as if solidary, one for the others. Hence the whole Community is accustomed to be stained among the imprudent and simple. - St. Lig., n. 979.
- It is not mortal to say of a public drunkard that he was drunk on this day, even if he did it secretly; indeed sometimes no sin is present, if someone has lost all reputation with regard to something, for example, if you say of a prostitute that she committed fornication. Nor is it mortal to dishonor an infamous person in one crime by another very closely related crime, for example, if concerning an adulterer you say that he sent love letters, or concerning a drunkard, that he quarreled with his wife; because such a revelation is not a new infamy, or at least not grave. But to defame someone by a disparate and unconnected crime can be mortal, because he who is dishonorable in one genus of vice has not for that reason lost the right of reputation with regard to the others. - St. Lig., Hom. apost., n. 14, and others commonly.
- He does not sin, at least gravely, who, only for the sake of consolation, the intention of detracting being excluded, narrates to some friend an injury done to himself by another, even if some infamy comes from this to the author. Hence probably they are excused, at least from mortal sin, servants revealing injuries inflicted on themselves by masters, wives by husbands, sons by a father, Religious by a Prelate, etc.; because the author of the injury cannot reasonably be unwilling, and demand a thing so difficult, that the injured person should lack necessary consolation or counsel. Yet care must be taken lest it be said to many, and lest the person be named more openly than is necessary for counsel or consolation. - St. Lig., n. 973.
- He does not sin gravely, generally speaking, who reveals the natural defects of mind or body of another, by saying, for example, that he is stupid, ignorant, etc.; because such defects are not moral, nor do they notably lessen reputation. Except unless grave damage is going to follow from this. But this depends especially upon the circumstances. - St. Lig., n. 967. - See Cases, n. 420 and following.