§ 2. On Inquiry into and Use of Another's Secret

1188. PRINCIPLES. I. He who unjustly inquires into another's secrets, or extorts them, sins against justice, and cannot use a secret so acquired. The reason of the first is that he does injury to him who possesses a right to the secret. The reason of the second is that no one can licitly continue and perfect an unjust action. Whence you cannot use a secret unjustly acquired even for avoiding your own damage (III, 969; V, 70, 5).

1. He sins more gravely who extorts secrets with the mind of using them for the damage of neighbor. He sins only venially who in exploring secrets is led by curiosity.

2. The gravity of the sin must be judged according to the object of the secret, that is, according to the utility which the secrets have for the possessor, insofar as the privation of them brings harm to him, whether in goods of fortune or in his reputation. Nevertheless, the gravity of the sin cannot, for every inquiry, be stated from this rule. For sometimes this inquiry can be assimilated to revelation which is made to one discreet and taciturn man (cf. n. 1200, Question 4).

From these things you conclude: a) He sins who without cause (or without at least the presumed permission of the owner) opens and reads letters (or other private writings) which the owner hides, or has lost by chance, or has torn in such a way that the will of concealing their argument became known.

b) Postal officials of themselves always sin gravely by opening and reading letters. The common good, which from contract they promised to preserve, and the very strict civil law impose this grave burden on them. Cf. Linz. Quart. Schr., 1903, p. 42.

c) They sin gravely who deliberately take pains to hear an accusation of sins made in the confessional (Ami du Cl., 1905, p. 971; Linz. Quart. Schr., 1906, p. 353, 829). Nevertheless, if they use knowledge acquired in this way, so that, for example, they accuse a thief more securely before a judge, they do not by that very fact become the efficacious cause of the damage which the thief suffers from the sentence of the judge. Linz. Quart. Schr., l. c.

1189. II. It is licit, with a just cause or the permission of the owner, at least presumed, to inquire into another's secrets, and to use those acquired in this way. The reason is that no injury is given where the owner consents or reasonably ought to consent. But then he ought to consent when, on the part of the one inquiring, there is present a certain and stronger right: namely a just cause. Finally, it is plain that the use of a thing justly acquired cannot constitute injury.

But a just cause is the necessity of averting grave damage impending to the community, or to you or yours.

Hence, they can licitly open and read another's letters: 1. Public ministers, as often as the public good requires it, for example in time of war. 2. A Superior of a community, from legitimate custom, or from probable suspicion of evil, or even by force of the rule; excepted nevertheless are letters which are sent to Superiors of a higher order, or are received from them. 3. All, insofar as is necessary for protecting themselves or their own from unjust vexation of the writer. We say: from unjust vexation of the writer; for, as St. Alphonsus warns, "it is not licit for you to open the letters of another, for procuring your good, or for avoiding some evil, because this would be against the common good of human commerce; for authors permit this only for protecting oneself from unjust vexation of an enemy" (III, 969; V, 70). 4. All to whom the care of a minor subject is committed, for example parents, tutors, Superiors of a school. Except, as regards matters pertaining to the inmost conscience.

But husbands illicitly read letters sent to a wife. Say the same concerning masters as regards letters which are sent to their servants. Always except if they truly suspect something evil.

Note. a) Friends of friends, sisters of sisters, often do not sin by reading letters, because there is present a tacit consent of the other party to these things. b) If you have justly accepted knowledge of someone's secret, nevertheless you must preserve silence from charity, as often as damage of someone could proceed from revelation. Indeed, by revealing a secret of this kind, you will sin against justice if you understand that the hearers are going to use that knowledge for inflicting damage unjustly (V, 70, 6). Cf. the things said n. 948.