Article — Marc, Institutiones Morales
Article II: On Detraction
- DEFINITION. Detraction is the occult and unjust blackening of another's reputation. It is said 1. Occult, namely brought upon one absent, at least from the intention of the detractor: by which part it is distinguished from CONTUMELY, which takes honor away from one present. 2. Unjust: for if it were a just blackening of another's reputation, it would not be formal detraction (Polman, 2. 2, n. 489).
DIVISION. Detraction is called: 1. simply such, or defamation, when a true vice of neighbor is manifested without a just cause; if the manifestation is made for dissolving friendship and sowing discord among friends, it is called whispering; 2. calumny, or infamation, when a false crime is imposed on neighbor.
DETRACTION can be done directly or indirectly, according as namely it either is positively intended, or is foreseen as going to follow from an action or from some locution. But it is committed in various modes, which are customarily expressed in these verses:
Imposing, increasing, manifesting, turning to evil;
He who denies or is silent, diminishes, or praises tepidly.
The first four modes detract directly, the others indirectly. But all are, per se, of the same species, because all regard the same good of reputation. Yet not rarely other things are injured also through detraction, whether religion, piety, or chastity in words, or justice in goods of fortune.
CALUMNY differs in species from simple detraction, because it adds lying to detraction, and moreover is against the right which each one has that a false crime not be imputed to him.
Likewise a special malice is in WHISPERING. It agrees with detraction on the part of the matter, but differs on the part of the end; and therefore it is diverse in species and graver than detraction.
- PRINCIPLES. I. Detraction (whether it is infamation or defamation) is a mortal sin from its genus. From its nature it is graver than theft, which is mortal, since it injures the reputation of neighbor, which is a greater good than riches: according to that saying (Prov., 22, 1): A good name is better than many riches.
We have said: 1. Whether it is infamation, which is intrinsically evil, and therefore always illicit, as is established from proposition 44 condemned by Innocent XI: "It is probable that he does not sin mortally who imposes a false crime on someone in order to defend his own justice and honor."
- Or defamation, which is namely unjust as often as neighbor possesses his good estimation either totally or partially, and can reasonably require silence. For then he has a right that a good useful for many things and, as is supposed, by no means harmful to others, not be taken away from him (see n. 1200, Question 1).
- II. The gravity of detraction is taken rather from the gravity of the injury in reputation, or in goods of fortune. The reason is plain from the unshaken principle which St. Thomas expresses: "Sins which are committed against neighbor must be weighed per se according to the harms which are brought upon neighbor: because from this they have the nature of fault" (2.2, q. 73, a. 3). To the gravity of the defect revealed one must attend only afterward.
Therefore to know whether detraction is a GRAVE or LIGHT sin, it must first be distinguished whether it carries with itself PUBLIC infamy, or is restricted to a FEW PERSONS. Then the gravity of detraction is taken: 1. from the nature of the defect which is narrated; 2. from the quality of the person detracting, whether he is grave, light, talkative; 3. from the quality of the person injured, whether he is of good or bad reputation, whether he is of such a condition that the defect revealed brings peculiar infamy; 4. from the quality of the hearers, whether they are discreet or talkative, etc. (Berardi, l. c., n. 482).
The number of hearers certainly makes for the greater gravity of detraction. Yet probably it does not multiply detraction, although it multiplies the sin of scandal. See the things said in the treatise on Sins (n. 332, Question 2).
- III. Sometimes it is licit to manifest the true crime of another. For the right of reputation founded in ignorance of a true crime can be elided by a stronger right, when namely a just or proportionate cause requires revelation of the crime; nor can the one defamed reasonably be unwilling (III, 968).
Therefore it is licit to manifest a defect of neighbor: 1. On account of a just cause. But the just causes are the following: a) The spiritual good of the delinquent, when namely for his amendment it is necessary that the matter be manifested to a judge, prelate, master, parent, etc. b) A notable good of the one revealing, for example for taking help or counsel in a grave matter, or for averting grave damage. c) The public good, for example for impeding evils threatening the Church, or the republic, or some community. d) The private good of the hearers and of others, for example that they may be freed from threatening damages; thus, if you know a thief to dwell with another ignorant of it, you can make him more certain, so that he may beware for himself.
"Whence, when it is a question of conferring an office, of contracting marriage, of receiving into Religion, of taking on a physician, preceptor, servant, associate, etc., it is licit to manifest (indeed sometimes one must manifest) the occult impediments, incapacity, crimes of another, whence notable inconvenience would deservedly be feared.
- Under the due conditions. For it is required: a) That you not intend to defame neighbor, but to avert your own or another's damage; whence, if you can avoid the damage without diminution of the reputation of another, you are held to this. b) That the damage to be averted be sufficiently proportioned to the loss of reputation. It suffices indeed that the damage to be avoided be grave, although somewhat greater damage threatens the one defamed. Indeed, it suffices if you doubt about the gravity of your damage; because, in such doubt, favor must be given to the innocent. Yet except if you know the matter under a committed secret; because in that case a graver and more certain cause is required, as we have said (n. 1187). c) That you proceed cautiously, manifesting the matter neither more nor to more persons than is necessary, and exacting secrecy from him to whom you manifest it. d) That you did not accept knowledge of the crime through force or fraud, for example by opening letters, unless you would also have had a right to this (III, 969; 1. El. qq. ref., 40). Cf. the things said above n. 1188.
Note. The things which we establish here must be developed through those things which are said n. 494 concerning fraternal correction. In communities living under a rule, if it is a question of a matter of great moment, for the most part it is expedient that correction be made by the way of denunciation to the Superior as father. In religious Orders, this is especially valid for the time of visitation. This indeed, from its nature, is a paternal, not a judicial, inquiry. Nevertheless subjects are held to manifest those things which could yield to the damage of observance, or of the community, or of a private third party. Cf. Bouix, de Jure Reg., II, p. 478.
- IV. Detraction is not present when the crime of neighbor is notorious either by law, or by fact, or by reputation. The reason is that in these cases neighbor can no longer be said to be in possession of his reputation. Yet charity can persuade many things, indeed impose some things, as regards these.
a) If the crime of neighbor is notorious by publicity of LAW, it is licit to speak about it and to manifest it to others; because, in this case, the guilty person has lost the right to reputation through public authority; nor is charity injured, because the public good demands this, that bridles be thrown upon the wicked through divulgation of the sentence of the judge, and that others may be able to beware for themselves of evil-doers: provided the manifestation is not made from hatred nor from revenge. b) Likewise, it is licit to manifest if it is NOTORIOUS by publicity of FACT or REPUTATION; for such a manifestation is neither against justice, since reputation has now been lost; nor is it against charity (at least gravely), because the delinquent cannot reasonably be saddened from it. c) Similarly, it is not mortal to manifest a crime or offense which is not yet public (or is not public in such a place), but concerning which moral certainty is had that it is going to become public shortly (whether through evidence of fact, or through sentence of the judge); because it harms little, unless nevertheless from such anticipation grave damages would follow (III, 974).
We have said: it is not mortal, but it can be venial. To the matter the distinguished Berardi speaks thus (l. c., n. 481): "The poor," he says, "do not have a right to the substances of a rich man; and nevertheless the rich man from charity ought to assist the poor asking alms, as much as he can. Something similar happens in the case of a wretched man subjected to public infamy. He indeed does not have a right that we be silent; yet he asks in his heart, and perhaps earnestly begs, that we consult for his reputation as much as we can. Therefore silence and compassion are certain alms, which often we can furnish without any sacrifice, and from which therefore we are not easily excused... Further, to these we are held from charity, although ordinarily under light matter."
- Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether he sins GRAVELY who manifests in ANOTHER PLACE, to which divulgation has not yet come and is not shortly going to come, a crime public in one place?
Resp. If the crime is public by notoriety of law, it can be published anywhere without injustice; because the guilty person has been legitimately stripped of reputation by public authority, and indeed in punishment of his crime (H. Ap., XI, 13).
But if the crime is public only by notoriety of fact or reputation, there are three opinions. The first says that the manifestation is a grave sin against justice, because the delinquent still possesses his reputation elsewhere. The second holds that it is mortal against charity; for, although the guilty person has lost the right to reputation, nevertheless he would be greatly saddened knowing that his crime (of itself occult) is made public where it is still unknown. The third, more common opinion teaches that this is not grave, neither against justice nor against charity, because it conduces to the common good that evil-doers be known. This reason is very probable, provided it is limited to crimes which render a man pernicious and to be avoided by others, such as robbery, treacherous homicide, scandalous impurity, heresy, and similar things. And then, if the crime is public by notoriety of fact, because namely it was publicly committed, it is freely licit to speak about it; if by notoriety only of reputation it is public, great discretion is required (III, 974; 2. El. qq. ref., n. 12). "For this public reputation is easily feigned. But advert that an offense published in only one family or monastery cannot be called absolutely public; whence it cannot be manifested elsewhere, and not even in another monastery of the same Order which would have frequent communication with it" (H. Ap., XI, 12; Croix, 1, 3, p. 2, n. 1221).
QUAER. 2. Whether he sins MORTALLY who manifests an offense formerly public and now occult?
Resp. Per se, he sins mortally, at least against charity. Except if the offense had formerly been public by notoriety of law, or if it belonged to history.
As Noldin rightly observes (II, n. 653): To historiographers, from the general end of history, greater liberty is accustomed to be conceded, insofar as, without a peculiar reason of good, they can commit to writings the occult crimes of private persons of a past time. Yet it is necessary that they attend to two things: a) If descendants of some very ancient family still live, the principles established as regards detraction are to be strictly observed. b) The offenses of some state in species, for example the clerical, are to be recounted in such a way that the good which is hoped from the narration, by reason of greater scandal going to arise, does not become empty.
QUAER. 3. Whether it is MORTAL only to report the occult sins of another, as heard from others?
Resp. Negatively, "if you report in such a way that it is not probable to you that any infamy will arise from it, because the others are not going to believe."
"But if you report things heard before those who probably are going to believe from their own levity or malice alone, you indeed do not sin against justice, because you are not the efficacious cause of the damage, but you sin against charity, because each one is held to impede grave damage of neighbor, insofar as he conveniently can."
"Finally, if you report in such a way that the hearers probably and deservedly are going to believe (say if you assert that you have heard from a person worthy of faith), then you sin also against justice, because you give a sufficient cause of believing the evil... But if you report some very enormous crime of someone, say heresy, rebellion, sodomy, then you sin gravely, even if you say it doubtfully, because this suspicion alone greatly defames a man" (III, 977; H. Ap., XI, 15).
QUAER. 4. Whether it is a MORTAL sin to reveal the OCCULT crime of neighbor to one or another prudent and taciturn man?
Resp. Distinguish. Either the revelation is made for easing the pain of an offense, or without cause. If the FIRST, Doctors most commonly hold that such a revelation made without the intention of detracting is not sinful, at least gravely; and in this way servants disclosing injuries inflicted by a master, wives by husbands, sons by a father, etc., can probably be excused. If the SECOND, some with Busenbaum judge that it is mortal, because the injury of reputation before one person is judged grave, as is plain from rash judgment. Yet others sufficiently probably deny this: provided the one revealing does not act from malice, nor on the part of the hearer is further manifestation feared. The reason is,
because, since reputation consists in the common estimation of men, he is not judged absolutely defamed who has lost his reputation only before one or another.
Nor does the parity of rash judgment stand in the way; because the malice of rash judgment is not taken from the damage of infamy, but from contempt, malevolence, or injury, which is brought upon neighbor through imputation of a false crime (III, 973).
QUAER. 5. Whether it is a mortal sin to REVEAL the crime of a neighbor who is already defamed from another crime?
Resp. It is not grave if a crime very closely related to that on account of which he has already been marked with infamy is revealed; because from such revelation the infamy is not notably increased: as if you say of a public thief that he is perjured; of a notorious player, that he does not have care for his family.
Otherwise, if another diverse sin is revealed: because one infamous in one genus of vice has not lost the right of reputation in other virtues. Thus it is also grave, concerning a woman defamed in one adultery, to narrate another occult one (III, 976; H. Ap., XI, 14).
QUAER. 6. Whether it is licit to defame ONESELF?
Resp. Distinguish. 1. To defame oneself through the imposition of a false crime is never licit, because it is not licit to lie. If death or grave spiritual or temporal damage of another would follow from such infamation, the one defaming himself would sin mortally, because he would cooperate positively with death or damage.
But what if the guilty person were to confess a false crime for this end, that, the penalty of death being inflicted, he might avoid grave torments? Some deny that he sins gravely, because no one is held to preserve life with so great a torture, which would seem harsher than death itself; but they say that he sins lightly by reason of the lie. But others more probably affirm that he sins gravely, because the false confession would still be an illicit cooperation with his own unjust death (IV, 275).
- "To defame oneself through revelation of a true crime regularly is not mortal; because it is not against justice, since a man is owner of his own reputation; nor against charity, because this does not oblige to conserving external goods, except insofar as one's own safety or that of neighbor requires this. Yet per accidens it can be mortal, as, for example, if your reputation is necessary for an office, or if damage of life to you, or of infamy to others, would follow from the same" (III, 983).
- From the things said you resolve: a) It is not mortal per se to reveal NATURAL DEFECTS of soul, body, or birth; because such defects are not moral; nor is it regarded as infamy among prudent persons that someone, for example, is stupid, illegitimate, one-eyed. But per accidens it can be grave, if namely great temporal damage would follow from it; or if you say concerning an honorable man that he was illegitimately born, or exercised a most vile office, etc. (III, 967; V, 72; 1. El. qq. ref., 54).
b) "It is not mortal to report mortal sins which, ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONDITION OF THE PERSON, do not notably injure his reputation: for example, if you say that a soldier thinks about revenge; that an adolescent is prodigal, given to loves, etc." (ib.).
c) It is not grave to speak ill of someone UNKNOWN or indetermined, for example that in such a place there are many wicked, drunk, impure persons; because thus grave infamy is brought upon no one in species.
d) "But they sin most gravely who detract from some Order or state of religious in common, or from a MONASTERY, by saying, for example, that life is bad in it, that regular observance is not kept, etc. (unless this is plainly notorious), because they do very grave harm; and they are held under mortal sin to restitution to the whole community, from which the remission of the Superior does not excuse" (III, 978).
e) "Similarly it is mortal, the person being kept silent, to name the monastery from which someone has committed a grave occult sin, for example adultery or fornication." The reason is that the religious of the same community are so conjoined among themselves that before outsiders they are judged as it were solidary, one for the others. Hence, the whole community is accustomed to be stained before the imprudent and simple.