Chapter II. On Detraction

Detraction is the unjust violation of reputation, or the blackening or diminution of the good estimation which others have concerning the life and morals of an absent neighbor. - It is said, of an absent neighbor, both because generally he who is detracted from is physically absent, and because if he is present, the words are not properly directed to him, and he is considered as if absent.

Detraction is called simply such if the reputation of a neighbor is violated by revelation of a true crime; but it is named calumny if the violation of reputation follows from the attributing of a false crime. Each can be done in a twofold way: 1st. directly, if a false crime is imputed, if a true one is amplified, if a hidden one is manifested, if a good work is taken in a sinister sense; 2nd. indirectly, namely by denying the good works of a neighbor, or by diminishing them, or even sometimes by being silent when others praise, or by praising coldly.

I say 1st. Every detraction is a mortal sin from its genus, because it is opposed to justice, which obliges under grave matter; and since the goods of reputation are better than goods of fortune, detraction of itself is a graver sin than theft. But the gravity or lightness of detraction is not to be measured precisely from the gravity of the defect or crime which is narrated concerning the neighbor, but chiefly from the gravity of the harm which the neighbor can suffer from it. Wherefore, to know in a particular case the gravity of the sin, one must attend to the quality both of the person detracting and of the person injured. The reason is that greater or lesser trust will be given according to the greater or lesser authority of the one speaking, and greater or lesser detriment to reputation will follow according to the measure of the greater or lesser estimation which the injured person enjoys. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 967.

I say 2nd. Although in no case whatsoever is it ever licit to attribute a false crime to another, since a lie is something intrinsically evil, nevertheless, from a just cause, it is licit to manifest the hidden crime of another even with loss of his reputation; because circumstances can be present in which the right of the neighbor to preserving reputation is overcome by a stronger right, and then neither would charity urge, because it does not oblige with grave inconvenience, nor justice, because a right against a prevailing right is not given. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 968 and 972.

I say 3rd. The detractor is bound in justice, as far as can be done, both to repair the reputation unjustly taken away and to compensate all temporal harms arising from defamation and in some way foreseen. The reason for the first is that through the taking away of reputation a damaging injury has been inflicted by the violation of a strict right, which ought to be restored in full. But the reason for the second is that all harms arising from detraction are to be attributed to the detractor as to their efficacious cause. Notice nevertheless that the obligation of restoring reputation is personal, but the obligation of repairing harms which have arisen from defamation is real, and therefore passes to heirs. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 991 and 996.

I say 4th. Restitution of reputation is to be made in one way by a calumniator, and in another by a simple detractor. For the calumniator is bound to retract what he said, and indeed in itself even with loss of his own reputation if reparation cannot otherwise be made; because the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty, and the latter ought to impute to his own malice whatever he is about to suffer on account of this. But the simple detractor cannot retract what he said, because thus he would lie; wherefore in another way, as far as is in him, he ought to restore the reputation, saying, e.g., that he spoke badly, that he erred, or something similar; for not only do those err who recede from truth, but also those who recede from rectitude, according to that saying, Prov. xiv, 22: "They err who work evil." But often that manner does not suffice among intelligent and astute persons, who rather from these formulas conjecture that the crime is true, since it is not asserted openly to be false. Therefore then the detractor, being silent about what was said, when occasion is given, with dexterity and truth ought to praise and honor him from whom he detracted. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 992.

Question 1. Is it grave detraction to reveal to one prudent man some mortal sin of someone, which indeed greatly dishonors him, but does not have a special malice?

Response. Negatively, probably, and the reason is that since reputation consists in the common estimation of men, he is not judged absolutely defamed who has lost a good name only before one or another person. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 973.

Question 2. Do detractions differ in species in matters diverse in species?

Response. Negatively, probably, because although such detractions are distinguished materially in species, nevertheless morally they injure one reputation of a man, no otherwise than contumelies are of the same species on account of the unity of honor against which they tend. Wherefore the confessor ought not to inquire concerning what matters the penitent detracted about, not only because the obligation is not established, but also because from knowledge of the different matter of detraction he could easily come to knowledge of the very person who was detracted from, and thus the confession itself would not be immune from the vice of detraction. Indeed, because it is also probable that detractions concerning different matters, if they are not otherwise interrupted, are one sin in number, the confessor ought to abstain from inquiring not only what the matters of detraction were, but also whether they were many. - Cf. Lugo, de Paenit., disp. 16, n. 265. - Baller., note (a), p. 429.

Question 3. Can a public crime be revealed to those ignorant of it, but living in the same place where the crime is already public?

Response. Affirmatively, at least without grave sin, because reputation lost in relation to the community in which one lives, through publicity of the crime, whether this is of law or of fact, can no longer have grave harm inflicted upon it. But if it is asked whether a crime already public in one place can be revealed where the crime is still unknown, the response is that there is much dispute among theologians; but according to St. Alphonsus and not a few others, probably it is not mortal, whether the crime is manifested where it will easily and shortly be made public, or whether it concerns places to which the divulgation either will never come or will not come except after a long time. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 974 and 975; and Hom. Ap., n. 12. Lugo, de just. et jur., disp. 14, sect. 5.

Question 4. What must be thought concerning the custom prevailing among us of divulging the whole life of those who are to be elected to the highest Magistracies or as Legislators?

Response. It is certainly licit, whether justice is considered or charity, to manifest those crimes which, even if hidden, render the candidate less fit for the office into which he is to be elected, both because the common good ought to prevail over the private, and because according to the mind of the Constitution by which we are governed and of universal custom, those candidates are judged to yield concerning their own right as soon as they consent to popular election. But in this matter there ought to be a limit, and accordingly those are to be condemned who, either from an itch of divulging everything or carried away by party zeal, touch upon even those crimes whose knowledge contributes nothing to the public good. - Cf. Kenrick, tract. 10, n. 139.

Question 5. Does he sin gravely who reports grave and hidden sins of another only as heard from others, e.g., if he says: it is reported, they narrate, I have heard this or that about such a one?

Response. He certainly sins gravely against charity and justice if he reports these things in such a way that others will with reason believe them, e.g., if he asserts that he has heard the things which he narrates from a person worthy of trust, because then he furnishes a sufficient cause for believing the evil; but otherwise if probably belief is not given to the words, because then no infamy will arise from them. But if he reports things heard before those who probably will believe them from levity or malice of their own, he does indeed sin against charity, because each person is bound under grave matter from charity to remove an occasion of harm to another when he easily can, but not against justice, because he is not the efficacious cause of the harm. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 977.

Question 6. How do those hearing detraction sin?

Response. Just as those who so listen that they add new stimuli to detractors contract the whole malice of detraction, and therefore injure justice, so those who, when they notice detraction, depart, cut off the conversation, or turn away the face and show themselves sad, are altogether excused, according to that saying, Prov. xxv, 23: "A sad face dissipates a detracting tongue." - But, outside this twofold case, a distinction must be made between private persons and superiors. A private person for the most part is excused either altogether or at least from grave sin if he does not impede detraction, from shame or fear or even from negligence, even if he conveniently can, provided that he does not rejoice in it, nor that besides infamy another harm is added. The reason is that in this matter it often cannot be established that correction will be of profit; indeed it is often dangerous, and it can rightly be feared lest the detraction rather be increased or prolonged. But a superior sins against charity if he does not impede detraction insofar as he conveniently can, even if he does not rejoice in it; because there rests upon him a special obligation of correcting the detractor, or of obviating the harm of the defamed subject. But more probably he does not sin against justice, neither the superior of the detractor, because he is not held to watch over the good of another who is not a subject; nor the superior of the defamed person, because it is not incumbent upon him in justice to attend to the temporal good of a subject. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 979, 980 and 981.

Question 7. What are the causes excusing from restitution of reputation?

Response. The following are commonly admitted: 1st. if the offense which you revealed to one or more persons has become public by another way, or if the reputation has been repaired in another way, e.g., by the sentence of a judge, etc.; 2nd. if it is prudently judged that the memory of the crime has been effaced by the passage of time or by oblivion; 3rd. if restitution of reputation cannot be made without danger to life, because life is a good of a higher order; likewise if the restitution of reputation is of much less value than the loss which the defamer would have to suffer, e.g., if he were an honorable man and especially very useful to the public good or to religion; 4th. if the reparation is morally impossible on account of excessive distance of places or other special difficulties, which are especially found in the reparation of simple detraction, e.g., if those who heard the detractor cannot be recalled from a preconceived opinion; 5th. if it is judged that belief was not given to the detraction by the hearers, as happens rather often when detraction is done in the heat of anger; 6th. if the defamed person has remitted the obligation expressly or tacitly, provided he can remit it; indeed sometimes presumed condonation suffices. But he cannot remit it when from his infamy there follows scandal or harm either common or to his own, etc., e.g., if it concerns the infamy of a priest, magistrate, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 997 and 998.

Question 8. Is he who is only materially a calumniator, namely because he manifested a false crime which he had thought to be true, bound to restore reputation with danger of losing his own?

Response. A material calumniator, when the error has been discovered, is held to restitution, but not so strictly as he who made the calumny through formal injury: for the latter is held even with detriment to his own reputation, even equal detriment; the former not likewise, but only insofar as he can without his own notable inconvenience. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 993.

Question 9. Is there an obligation of restoring reputation from simple detraction only materially unjust, e.g., if someone detracts from inadvertence?

Response. Affirmatively, as soon as he adverts to the injustice, in the same way as one who sets fire to another's house without formal fault is held to extinguish the fire as soon as he adverts, if he conveniently can; otherwise the harm which follows from it will be imputed to him. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

Question 10. Is one who defames bound to restore reputation even before those who received mediately the crime revealed by him?

Response. Negatively, if he did not foresee, not even confusedly, the propagation of his detraction, and a fortiori if before or after the violation of reputation he demanded secrecy; for then he is not the true and unjust cause of the extension of the harm. - But otherwise it must be said if he detracted for this reason, that he might lead the hearers to repeat the infamy, because then they are to be judged as an instrumental cause which the detractor uses. - But if there was indeed foresight of the propagation, but not an express and positive intention of harming by the help of the hearers, according to St. Alphonsus, more truly he is held, because foresight alone suffices that the detractor be called the true cause of the whole harm. Nevertheless, he seems able to be excused from such a burden not only by reason of moral impossibility, which is often present, but also because after all the true cause of so great a harm is the action freely placed by the hearers. Besides, according to the testimony of Cardinal de Lugo, the practice of confessors is that such a burden is not imposed. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 991. - Lugo, de just. et jur., disp. 15, nn. 15 and 16.

Question 11. Are you excused from restitution of reputation if the injured person also violated your reputation, and does not wish to restore it?

Response. Many theologians deny, but more probably one must affirm with St. Alphonsus; because you are not held to render to another his right if he refuses to render yours to you. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 999.