The Virtue of Religion

Vol. I, On the First Precept of th…, II. On Adoration, on Sacrifices, on Oblations, on First Fruits, on Tithes · Vol. I, On the Second Precept of t…, V. On Adjuration · Vol. I, On the Third Precept of th…, II. On the Prohibition of Servile Works

The principal acts of Religion are adoration, prayer, sacrifice, vow, oath, and the sanctification of certain days... Concerning the last three it will be said in the 2nd and 3rd precept. Concerning sacrifice, in the Treatise on the Eucharist. Here therefore only concerning adoration and prayer.

Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 12 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. I, On the First Precept of th…, II. On Adoration, on Sacrifices, on Oblations, on First Fruits, on Tithes

n. 459.

How are the external acts of religion divided? - These acts are distributed into three classes. To the first pertain those acts through which someone exhibits his body for venerating God; such is adoration. To the second pertain those acts by which something from external things is offered to God. Concerning these a twofold consideration occurs. The first indeed is concerning those things which are given to God by the faithful, where one must consider sacrifices, oblations, first fruits, and tithes, and the sanctification of feasts, which is treated in the third precept of the Decalogue. The other is concerning vows, by which certain things are promised to God, and this must be remitted to the second precept of the Decalogue. Finally, to the third class pertain those acts by which something divine is assumed by men, which is either some sacrament, or the divine name itself. But there will be place to speak concerning the assumption of a sacrament in the treatise on the Sacraments. The assumption of the divine name, however, is made in three ways: in one way by way of an oath for confirming one's own words; in another way by way of adjuration for inducing others; in a third way by way of invocation for praying or praising. Concerning prayer it has already been said; concerning the others it will have to be said in the second precept of the Decalogue. Therefore here there will be discussion only of adoration, sacrifices, oblations, first fruits, and tithes. S. Th. 2. 2, qq. 84, 85, 86, 89; Bouquillon, de Virt. relig., l. 1.

n. 460.

What is adoration and of how many kinds is it? - Adoration is honor exhibited to another by an external gesture of the body, by which we testify our submission and the excellence of another; or insofar as it is a sign of internal estimation, reverence, and submission toward another, and consequently also of his excellence. Therefore adoration requires two internal acts: one of the intellect, the other of the will. The former is a speculative judgment concerning the excellence of another, and a practical judgment that it is honorable for us to be submitted to him on account of his excellence and our inferiority with respect to him. But the latter is the command of the will to lower oneself on account of that superior excellence in another. Whence at last the execution itself exists in the exterior gesture of the body.

Adoration is one thing political, another religious, according as it exhibits worship to another on account of a merely civil dignity or excellence, or on account of a supernatural excellence which is found in God and in his Saints. The latter comprehends under itself three species or quasi-species. The first is latria, which, with the genus taken for the species, is also simply accustomed to be called adoration; it is supreme and singular, which we owe to God alone, on account of the divine excellence proper to him, and which therefore is communicable to no other, according to Matt. 4:10. The second is dulia, which belongs to the Angels and other Saints, on account of the supernatural and created excellence which is in them. The third is hyperdulia, which is exhibited to the Blessed Virgin, on account of her supernatural and created excellence, but one altogether singular and greater and more eminent than all other created excellences. Species or quasi-species, because there is not sufficient agreement whether they are one species from one relation to God or threefold from a threefold diverse proper excellence.

Moreover any species of adoration is divided into absolute and respective. It is absolute when something is adored or worshiped on account of an excellence intrinsic to itself; and thus God, the Most Holy Trinity, Christ also as man, and the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist are adored with absolute worship of latria; but the Saints with absolute worship of dulia, and the Most Holy Virgin with absolute worship of hyperdulia. It is respective when something is adored or worshiped on account of an excellence and sanctity extrinsic to itself, but intrinsic to him to whom it is referred in moral estimation; and thus the Most Holy Name of Jesus Christ, the instruments of the Passion, and the Cross are adored with respective worship of latria; relics and images of the Saints, etc., with respective worship of dulia; images of the Most Holy Virgin, etc., with respective worship of hyperdulia. The title "The Penitent Heart of Jesus" is altogether condemned. Holy Office, 15 July 1892. The image of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, representing the Heart alone, is permitted only for private devotion, but is by no means to be exposed on an altar for public veneration. Holy Office, 26 Aug. 1891. Because there is one excellence of the Three Divine Persons, one honor and reverence is owed to them, and consequently one adoration. Trent, sess. 25, Decree on Invocation, etc.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 81, a. 3; q. 82, a. 2 ad 3; q. 84; q. 103, aa. 3, 4; Suarez, de Relig., tr. 2, l. 1, c. 2; Struggl 11 seqq.

A determinate place is not required for adoration as though by necessity of the thing itself, but only according to fittingness, not on account of God who is adored, as though he were enclosed by place, but on account of the adorers themselves: first indeed on account of the consecration of the place, from which those praying conceive special devotion, so that they may be heard more; secondly on account of the sacred mysteries and other signs of sanctity which are contained there; thirdly on account of the gathering of many adorers, from which prayer becomes more fit to be heard. The obligation of adoration is abundantly satisfied by otherwise fulfilling obligations toward God, in which adoration of God is contained implicitly and often also explicitly, as, for example, when prayers are poured forth to God, when one assists at the sacrifice of Mass, etc. E. M.

n. 461.

Can men who have departed from life with a reputation for sanctity be adored? - They can be honored with private worship. But they cannot be honored with solemn and public worship, unless they have been numbered by the Supreme Pontiff in the Catalogue of Saints or Blessed. Public worship, however, is that which is exhibited in the name of the Church, or as instituted by her; private worship is that which proceeds only from private devotion, even if it is done before others. Therefore it is not licit to erect churches or altars in honor of Saints not canonized, or at least not beatified, cf. 463; nor is it licit to invoke them publicly in litanies, nor to expose their relics or images for public veneration, or to carry them around in processions. Yet it is permitted to keep these images or relics privately, to kiss them reverently, etc., because such worship is altogether private, which is not prohibited. Struggl 18; E. M.

Those are called Saints who solemnly, a definitive sentence having been issued, are enrolled by the Roman Pontiff in the catalogue of Saints, and their worship is permitted to all the faithful. Those are called Blessed who, from a special concession of the Roman Pontiff, can be honored with some public worship only in some place or in some Religious Institute. Those are Venerable concerning whom the cause of introduction of their beatification has been signed by the Roman Pontiff. Servants of God are those who have died with a reputation for sanctity or martyrdom. But "Our Most Holy Lord Pius Pope X... forbade Servants of God, whose causes are henceforth introduced, to be called Venerable; likewise he decreed that solemnities are not permitted to be carried out on the occasion of the decree issued concerning the introduction of the cause... nor panegyric orations. But he permitted that Servants of God be adorned with the title Venerable only after the decree issued concerning heroic virtue or concerning martyrdom, yet in such a way that from this permission no argument of granted veneration can be inferred or claimed... Solemnities for giving thanks to God even after the decree issued concerning heroic virtue or martyrdom he likewise prohibited; yet by this prohibition he did not intend to prevent the addition in Masses, as is fitting, of a collect for thanksgiving." S. R. C., 26 Aug. 1913. This Decree also contains several other prescriptions to be observed in the beginning of causes of Servants of God, namely so that the cause may be duly instituted. There are special Instructions concerning the processes of causes of Martyrs in regions of unbelievers. Cf. Consulente Ecclesiastico, 1905, p. 313 seqq. Likewise there is a Decree to be observed concerning judicial order in causes of Servants of God proceeding by way of an excepted case. S. R. C., 11 Nov. 1912. "Our Most Holy Lord Pius Pope X, for treating causes of lesser moment of Servants of God, namely concerning reputation for sanctity in general, concerning non-cult, concerning the validity and relevance of processes, and other similar things, constituted a particular Congregation." Decree S. R. C., 9 Dec. 1908.

n. 462.

You will resolve: It is by no means illicit to place an effigy or statue of some deceased person not canonized, whether in an oratory even public, or in a church, provided this is not done for honoring him with public worship, but from another manifest motive, for example, if he is the founder or benefactor of the church, or his statue is placed at his tomb in the church. Thus also images of emperors, kings, and other distinguished men could be hung; and the Basilica dedicated to Saint Peter at Rome is adorned with images or statues of Pontiffs not enrolled in the Catalogue of Saints. S. R. C., 14 Aug. 1894, Decr.

A priest can indeed accept a stipend and celebrate Mass in honor of a man deceased with a reputation for sanctity, or in thanksgiving for a benefit obtained, etc., provided that he takes the Mass from the feast or from the feria occurring on that day, but not from the common of non-Pontiffs, nor recites a special prayer concerning him or with his name. The reason is that to perform the sacred rite for the aforesaid intention is not to honor someone with public worship, since the intention of the celebrant is something altogether private. Elbel 443; E. M.

n. 463.

Note: For the public worship of relics, it must be certainly established that the relics to be venerated pertain to a Saint or Blessed one solemnly recognized as such by the Church. In addition, the seal of some Bishop or Prelate ought to be affixed; but the seal of the Bishop of the place suffices for relics to be honored with public worship, nor is an authentic written document necessary. In order that new relics, although authentic, be exposed for the public veneration of the faithful in a church or in a public oratory, it is required that they be recognized and approved by the Bishop of the place, even if they were sealed at Rome by the Apostolic Prefect. Trent, sess. 25, de Invocat., etc.; Sixtus V, Const. Dominus omnipotens, 13 Nov. 1588. For ancient relics, their immemorial exposition and public veneration suffice; this rightly supplies any other document and bears before itself a valid presumption of authenticity. For private worship only private moral certitude is required, such as, for example, is had from a man worthy of faith.

A relic of the Cross of Our Lord Jesus Christ for public veneration is to be separated from other Relics of Saints in a special case. S. C. Indulg., 22 Feb. 1847; S. R. C., 25 May 1906; A. A. S., v. 1, p. 507. One sins gravely by stealing notable relics, or even the smallest part of a very precious relic, for example of the Most Holy Cross, because, although they are not estimable by price, nevertheless this taking away can gravely sadden the possessor. But in the Roman district it is prohibited under penalty of excommunication to steal relics, even the smallest, pertaining to churches, from the Constitution of Clement VIII and Paul V. Therefore not in every case is the theft mortal sin, and it is a grave real sacrilege.

As to images, halos, or rays, cannot be placed on images of the deceased, although they are commonly held as Saints, unless they have been beatified by the Church; likewise neither tablets and images, nor lamps or any other lights, namely in veneration and worship, may be hung at their sepulchers. But with the license of the Ordinary or Bishop, it is permitted to keep similar relics of a Saint in a place separated from the church and secret, to receive offerings and tablets, and to recount in little books the benefits received, yet not without the recognition and approval of the Bishop, and with a declaration first made by the author that he does not intend to win for his statements any faith other than that of human history, as Urban VIII established in the Decree Sanctissimus, 13 March 1625, and another special Constitution Caelestis Hierusalem, 5 July 1634; S. R. C., 31 July 1821; General Decree, 14 Aug. 1894; Leo XIII, Const. Officiorum ac munerum, General Decree, sec. 13; Pius X, Encyclical Letter Pascendi, 8 Sept. 1907, paragraph De sacris Reliquiis.

Images of the Blessed are to be painted with rays only; of the Canonized, with a diadem around the head. Ferraris, v. Veneratio SS., n. 46. Likewise images of Our Lord and the Blessed Virgin, of Angels and Saints, ought to be painted or sculpted in that form and habit which from ancient time has been in use in the Church. Urban VIII, Const. Sacrosancta Tridentina, 15 March 1642; Benedict XIV, Const. Sollicitudini, 1 Oct. 1745.

As to the Blessed, it is not permitted to name churches or altars after them, and their images and relics can be retained and exposed only in those churches in which it is permitted to celebrate their office. Urban VIII, cited Decree Sanctissimus; Clement XI, Const. 82, n. 11. Images of Saints are laudably blessed, and privately any priest can bless them. S. R. C., 12 July 1704. S. R. C., 27 Sept. 1659; 17 Apr. 1660; 12 June 1660, Boianen.; Pius X, Motu proprio Sacrorum antistitum, 1 Sept. 1910; L. 1. 3, nn. 45, 532; Epist. Resp. at the end of c. 1; Benedict XIV, de Canon. SS., l. 2, c. 11; Struggl 18; Scav., ed. 12, Milan, 1874, l. 2, n. 168 seqq. There is an Instruction of the S. R. C., 22 May 1912, on the privileges which, in the triduum or octave to be celebrated within the year from beatification or canonization, are usually granted by Rescript of that Sacred Congregation from the Supreme Pontiff. E. M.

463.a What is the nature and obligation of sacrifices? - The offering of sacrifices, considered in common, is from the natural law itself. For it proceeds from natural reason that, just as some things are offered to temporal lords in recognition of dominion, so also we should offer to God, as the supreme lord of all, certain sensible things as a sign of due subjection and honor. But the determination of sacrifices is from human or divine institution. The sacrifice which is offered exteriorly signifies the interior spiritual sacrifice by which the soul offers itself to God, because exterior acts of religion are ordered to interior acts. But the soul offers itself to God in sacrifice, as to the principle of its creation and as to the end of its beatitude. Therefore the honor of sacrifices is to be exhibited to God alone. This also we see observed in every republic, that its supreme ruler is honored by some singular sign which, if it were offered to anyone else, would be the crime of lese majesty. Trent, sess. 22, c. 3.

Moreover there is a threefold good of man. The first indeed is the good of the soul, which is offered to God by a certain interior sacrifice through devotion and prayer and other interior acts of this sort, which are ordered to divine reverence. The second is the good of the body, which is offered to God in a certain way through martyrdom and abstinence or continence, or when someone subjects his own body to some affliction on account of divine reverence, and it is offered by exterior sacrifice. The third is the good of exterior things, from which an exterior sacrifice also is offered to God, if it again is ordered to divine reverence: directly indeed, when we immediately offer our things to God; mediately, when we communicate them to neighbors on account of God.

But sacrifices are properly so called when something is done concerning things offered to God, as that animals were killed and burned, that bread is broken and eaten and blessed. And the name itself sounds this: for sacrifice is so called from this, that man makes something sacred.

Hence sacrifice is commonly defined: the offering of a sensible thing, made to God by a legitimate minister, through real change, for acknowledging his supreme dominion and our subjection. Wherefore only priests offer sacrifices which are specially ordered to divine worship not only for themselves, but also for others. But other sacrifices anyone can offer to God for himself. All are bound to offer interior sacrifice to God, for all are bound to offer a mind devoted to God. Likewise all are bound to offer exterior sacrifice to God when exterior acts of other virtues are assumed into divine reverence, which fall under precept. But as to the exterior sacrifice by which something is exteriorly offered to God in protestation of divine subjection, under the New Law the faithful are bound to that one sacrifice which Jesus Christ instituted at the Last Supper, concerning which there will be discussion in the treatise on the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church, and on the Eucharist. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 85; Lessius, de Virt. Rel., c. 2, d. 4.

463.b What is the nature and obligation of oblations? - By the name of oblation here is understood the presentation of some thing for the worship of God, not so that some sacred thing is as it were consumed, as in sacrifice, but so that it remains whole to be deputed to divine worship, or to be expended for the uses of ministers. In the New Law, oblations of this sort are free, unless they are to be made from the necessity of the Church or from introduced custom. Since the priest is mediator between God and the people, oblations are to be presented to him by the people, not only that he may assume them for his own use, but that he may faithfully dispense them in those things which pertain to divine worship and for the uses of the poor, who, as far as possible, are to be sustained from the goods of the Church, because the Lord too had purses for the use of the poor.

Likewise in the New Law there is no special obligation to offer first fruits from the fruits of the earth received, unless according to the custom of the country and the need of the ministers of the Church. For first fruits are given by way of oblation, of whose nature it is that it be voluntary. But first fruits are offered because we ought to exhibit to God that which is chief, and in recognition of the benefit of God, who grants the earth and the fruits of the earth. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 86.

463.c Is there, and of what sort, an obligation of paying tithes? - The precept of tithes is partly of natural law, partly of positive law. "For natural reason dictates that the people should furnish the necessities of life to those who ministered in divine worship for the salvation of the whole people, just as stipends for livelihood are owed by the people also to those who watch over the common utility, namely Princes and soldiers and others of this sort.... The determination that a tenth part be paid was instituted by the authority of the Church in the time of the New Law.... Thus therefore it is clear that men are bound to the payment of tithes, partly indeed from natural law, but partly also from the institution of the Church, which nevertheless, the circumstances of times and persons being considered, could determine another part to be paid.... Ministers of the Church ought to have a greater care for promoting spiritual goods among the people than for collecting temporal goods; and therefore... they laudably do not demand tithes of the Church where they could not be demanded without scandal, because of desuetude or because of some other cause. Nor, however, are those in a state of damnation who do not pay in those places in which the Church does not ask, unless perhaps, on account of obstinacy of mind, they have the will not to pay even if they were asked. "But the root of the payment of tithes is a debt, by which carnal things are owed to those sowing spiritual things, according to that saying of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 9:11: If we have sown spiritual things among you, is it a great thing if we reap your carnal things?... For upon this debt the Church founded the determination of the payment of tithes. But all things whatsoever a man possesses are contained under carnal things, and therefore tithes are to be paid from all things possessed.... And therefore in the New Law men are bound to personal tithes, according to the custom of the country and the need of ministers. But the right of receiving tithes is spiritual, for it follows that debt by which expenses are owed to ministers of the altar from the ministry, and by which temporal things are owed to those sowing spiritual things; this pertains only to clerics having the right of souls. Tithes are owed by the faithful to clerics insofar as they are ministers of the altar sowing spiritual things among the people. Whence such clerics, insofar as they have ecclesiastical possessions, are not bound to pay tithes; but from another cause, namely because they possess by their own right, or by succession from parents, or in any other way of this sort, they are obliged to pay tithes. Clerics are bound to give a tithe to the Supreme Pontiff if he should require it. For natural reason dictates that provision be made from all goods for him who has care for the common state of the multitude, whence he can execute those things which pertain to the common salvation." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 87.

Vol. I, On the Second Precept of t…, V. On Adjuration

n. 632.

What is adjuration? - Adjuration is: an appeal made through God, the Saints, or a sacred thing, to induce an intellectual nature to do or omit something. An appeal, that is, an invocation of the name of God, etc. Through God, etc., indicates the motive, for love, reverence, or fear of which the one adjuring intends to induce another to do or omit something. Made to induce: superiors indeed by entreating, inferiors by commanding. Yet no obligation is induced by force of the adjuration, but the obligation is only by force of command, which receives greater force from adjuration. An intellectual nature, namely God, Angels, men, demons. "Yet we use adjuration in one way toward man and in another way toward God. For by adjuring man we intend to change his will through reverence for the sacred thing; which indeed we do not intend concerning God, whose will is immutable. But that we obtain something from God through his eternal will is not from our merits, but from his goodness." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 90, a. 1. And thus God can be adjured through himself and through his attributes. Therefore irrational creatures are not properly and directly adjured, but only indirectly, namely by adjuring God or the Saints that their use may help us, or demons that through them they may cease to harm. 1 Thess. 5:27; L. 1, 2, 3; Bouquillon, de Virt. relig., l. 2, p. 4.

n. 633.

Of how many kinds is adjuration? - One adjuration is solemn or private, according as it is made by ministers of the Church and in the manner determined by her, or is destitute of solemnities; another is deprecative or imperative, according as it is made through prayers or through command. L. 1, 3; Struggl 37 seqq.

n. 634.

What things are required for the liceity of adjuration? - That adjuration be licit, three things are required, as in an oath, namely: 1. Truth, that is, that the one adjuring truly intend to attain what he asks, and that the cause for which he asks be true. But lack of this truth will rarely be more than venial, since God is not in reality invoked as witness of the false. Hence a beggar who pretends that he is poor and asks through Jesus Christ sins against religion; nevertheless his sin is venial. 2. Justice, from the lack of which one asking for a gravely evil thing certainly sins gravely. But if someone asks for a lightly evil thing, some hold that it is mortal, others venial. Yet if someone deliberately adjured God himself or the Saints to furnish him help for a thing even lightly illicit, he would sin mortally, because such adjuration would be directly against the holiness of God. 3. Judgment, that is, due discretion; and therefore both that a sufficient cause of adjuring be present, and that due submission and resignation to the divine will be present. Lack of this judgment certainly is only venial. L. 2.

n. 635.

Is adjuration against demons licit? - Private adjuration against demons is indeed licit to all. But solemn adjuration through exorcisms belongs only to ministers duly ordained in the Church, namely exorcists; for it is an act of order. But in the present discipline of the Church, at least from introduced custom, it cannot be done except with the express license of the Bishop, without which it is prohibited under grave obligation. Cf. C. Benedict XIV, Magno cum animi, 2 Jun. 1751, § 34; and the Exorcisms published by order of Leo XIII, to which indulgences are attached even for private recitation. S. C. de Pr. F., 18 May 1890.

Adjuration against demons must not be made in a deprecative mode, but only in an imperative mode. For the former mode of adjuring seems to pertain to a certain benevolence or friendship, which it is not licit to use with demons. The latter mode is licit, because although the acts of demons are not subject to our disposition, nevertheless they are subject to the divine disposition and to that of the holy angels. Therefore by adjuring demons through the power of the divine name we can command them and compel them not to harm us spiritually or corporally. Such adjuration of a demon can in no way be made so that he furnish help, because this would pertain to having some fellowship with them, unless perhaps from a special impulse or divine revelation adjuration were made to obtain something through them. But it must be made only to remove harms and the vexation of one possessed. The reason is that power has not been given to us by God for invoking demons, but only for putting them to flight, as the most hostile enemies of God and of souls. Luke 9:1; 10:19; Mark 16:17; Roman Ritual, de Exorc. obsess. Exorcisms always obtain some effect, at least by weakening the powers of demons for harming, although they do not always have the infallible effect of expelling them, as is clear from experience and is plain from Matt. 17:18, 19. Struggl 42, 43; L. 4, 5; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 90, a. 2.

n. 636.

Does he sin who mixes conversations with a demon? - The doctors commonly say that he who had many useless conversations with a possessing demon cannot be excused from grave sin. Pallavicini affirms that to ask from a demon one or another curious thing is mortal; but St. Alphonsus more probably says that it is venial, if the adjuration is truly made in an imperative mode. At least it is venial, because this would pertain to vanity and curiosity. But it is licit for exorcists to interrogate a demon about all things which conduce to his expulsion, for example, about the number and names of those who dwell in the possessed person, so that the adjuration may be directed to them, from what time and for what cause, so that it may be removed, about the sign of departure, etc. L. 5.

n. 637.

Is it licit to ask imperatively from a demon the manifestation of some truth? - R. Negatively, because ministers do not seem to have any power except only of interrogating about those things which contribute to expelling him. And this besides seems to pertain to a certain fellowship with the demon. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 90, a. 2 ad 3. But it would be licit if this conduced to divine glory. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 95, a. 4 ad 1; L. 5.

Vol. I, On the Third Precept of th…, II. On the Prohibition of Servile Works

n. 653.

You will resolve: It is licit on a feast day not only to write, but also to transcribe, even if this is done for wages, and whether someone writes with a pen or with the American machine commonly in use. It is probably also licit on a feast day for printers to arrange type, because the work seems to pertain to the mind in the same way as the preceding writing, although it is done with greater bodily fatigue. But if it is exercised in a public workshop by many, by reason of the base apparatus and common estimation, it is held as servile work. Moreover, scandal can easily also be present. But the printing of books is altogether illicit, as being a work altogether servile. L. 278, 279, 292; Struggl 8; Laymann 3.

It is sufficiently probable that it is licit on a feast day to paint, and much more to draw, yet excluding great apparatus and labor, for example, mixing colors, planing boards, etc. For if the action is not liberal, it certainly is a middle action, and common to servants and free persons, while we often commonly observe noble men not blushing to learn and exercise this art of painting. Hence girls are also excused who with a needle reproduce images on cloth; and likewise those exercising the photographic art, unless it is done with base apparatus. But to sculpt, says St. Alphonsus, is commonly, at least in the estimation of men, numbered among the mechanical arts. "Yet Sporer excepts when goldsmiths sculpt very delicate things in moderate matter, in which almost no labor of the body, but the whole labor of mind and skill, intervenes." Struggl 8; L. 280, 283; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 212, a. 4 ad 3. "It is licit on a feast day to hunt, to catch birds, and to fish, without great apparatus and for the sake of recreation. The reason is that similar things, with greater apparatus and labor set aside, are not servile works, but common to masters and servants. Indeed similar things, if they are done without great apparatus, are also licit from custom, even if they are done for the sake of gain. But if they are done with great apparatus and labor, they are servile and illicit." Struggl 8; L. 283.

It is licit on a feast day to make a journey on foot, by bicycle, horse, carriage, automobile, ship, litter, railway, airplane, dirigible, etc. The reason for this is that making a journey is not a servile work, but natural and common to all men. Thus the doctors commonly; and besides, universal custom so has it. Moreover, by this very fact that it is licit to make a journey on a feast day in the aforesaid ways, it is also licit to perform the works which are necessary and conducive to this, as for example, to prepare horses, to join a carriage, to carry a litter, and to draw oars in water. The reason is that the accessory follows the nature of its principal. Struggl 8; L. 275.

Sanchez grants that it is licit to grind on feasts "if it is a mill which is driven by water or wind; but not if it is driven by beasts, and in which great labor and occupation is required. From which doctrine Tamburini, n. 14, and La-Croix, n. 578, sufficiently probably infer that when the cooperation and application of man is moderate, it is not illicit, at least gravely, even to grind with beasts." L. 277. Likewise distillation is licit if, without base apparatus and not in a public workshop, it is done for physical experiment, or without fatigue of the body. L. 328.

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 4 passages

Vol. II, On the Virtue of Religion …, On Religion in General

n. 851.

On the Virtue of Religion. — Preliminary Remarks on Religion in General.

1. Notion. The theological virtues, of which we have treated, intimately and directly unite us to God; nevertheless, because we remain distinct from God and dependent upon Him, it is necessary that we acknowledge His infinite excellence by a special worship. Now the supernatural virtue by which the will is inclined to render to God the worship due to Him on account of His infinite excellence is called religion.²

¹ In this treatise we shall set forth the first three precepts of the Decalogue: the first, namely: "I am the Lord thy God... Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me. Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything that is in heaven above or in the earth beneath... Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them"; the second: "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain"; the third: "Remember that thou keep holy the sabbath day" (Exod. 20:2-8).

² Worship in general is an act by which we venerate someone on account of his excellence; it is also called veneration, and is rendered to any person truly excellent. But the worship which is rendered to God, on account of His infinite excellence, is called the worship of latria or adoration, while the worship rendered to the saints retains the name of dulia or veneration. Formerly, however, these words were predicated indiscriminately of God and creatures. Cf. De Incarnatione, n. 255-256.

n. 852.

1. Principal acts. Considered psychologically, religion embraces manifold acts. (a) First, when we consider the divine excellence, we cannot but admire His infinite perfections and supereminent goodness. (b) This admiration, moreover, soon begets love: for the will is drawn affectively toward the infinite goodness which we have perceived with the mind. (c) Yet reverential fear is joined to love: for while we think of the divine majesty and holiness, we clearly behold our own littleness and imperfection, and we appear before God only with fear. (d) Thence arises the religious sense, or veneration and adoration, by which, with love and fear together, we worship God as first principle and supreme Lord, and subject our whole being to Him. Moreover the habitual will of promptly handing over and devoting oneself to divine worship is called devotion.³ (e) But because we know that all the goods which are in us, both natural and supernatural, have been conferred gratuitously by God, we acknowledge Him as a distinguished benefactor, and offer Him acts of thanksgiving. (f) But, since daily we need new benefits and new graces, which we are able to obtain only from God, we have recourse to Him by prayer, that we may obtain them. (g) Sometimes also it happens that, because of our frailty, we commit sin and inflict upon God an offense which ought to be repaired: thence arises a sense of penance, by which we strive to compensate the injury inflicted upon the Supreme Deity. (h) Among the various acts which are able to express the aforesaid dispositions, sacrifice certainly stands forth, or the offering and immolation of a victim publicly made, in the name of the whole community, in order to acknowledge the supreme dominion of God.⁴

³ Devotion, when it is exercised, becomes an act; but generally it is taken as a habitual disposition.

⁴ The acts of religion are enumerated somewhat differently by St. Thomas (Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 82-91) according to the ontological order: a) interior acts, which are the more principal, namely devotion and prayer; b) exterior acts, by which some exterior things are offered to God, namely sacrifices, offerings, first-fruits, and tithes; or by which something is promised to God, as vows; or by which something divine is assumed, namely an oath and the assumption of the divine name.

These indeed are the principal acts of the virtue of religion. Others are less principal, as oath and vow; others, from positive law, are ordered to the sanctification of certain days, as cessation from servile work and assistance at the sacrifice of the Mass.

n. 853.

1. Place among the virtues. From this it follows that the virtue of religion is a special virtue, not properly theological, but the most excellent among the moral virtues.

(a) The virtue of religion is a special virtue, or one distinct from others. For it pursues a special good, namely the worship due to God, and indeed on account of a special motive, namely His supreme and singular excellence. Now where a particular object and motive are present, there is a distinct virtue.

(b) Theologians unanimously teach that this virtue is not properly theological: for while a theological virtue immediately regards God Himself, religion of itself directly regards the worship due to God. Nevertheless supernatural religion, of which we are here treating, supposes the theological virtues, and cannot be perfect unless in its own sphere it embraces certain acts of these virtues. Thus only by faith do we know the supernatural excellence of God, which we worship by religion; when we pray, we must elicit an act of hope; true devotion, by which we hand ourselves and our goods over to God, involves an act of charity.⁵

⁵ Some spiritual authors, especially of the school of the seventeenth century in France, take the virtue of interior religion as a complex of the theological virtues by which we perfectly worship God through Christ, the perfect adorer of the Father. Thus Olier, Introduction a la vie et aux vertus chretiennes, ch. I, where, among other things, he writes: "Finally Our Lord, in order to expand His holy religion toward God, and to multiply it in our souls, comes into us and leaves Himself on earth in the hands of priests as a host of praise, in order to communicate to us His spirit of a host... He pours Himself out in us, He insinuates Himself into us, He perfumes our soul and fills it with the interior dispositions of His religious spirit."

(c) Wherefore religion far surpasses the other moral virtues. For virtues are more perfect insofar as they are nearer to the last end; and therefore the theological virtues are better than the rest, because they immediately attain God, the last end. But among the moral virtues religion stands forth: for it approaches God more nearly, because it is ordered directly to divine honor and worship, while the other moral virtues tend only indirectly to the honor of God, by prescribing duties toward the neighbor and ourselves.

n. 854.

1. Division of the treatise. Treating of the acts of the virtue of religion, and treating of the vices opposed to the same, we shall speak:

I. Of the more principal acts, adoration and prayer;

II. Of the secondary acts, oath and vow;

III. Of the social act, or the sanctification of Sunday and feasts.

And thus we shall set forth the first three precepts of the Decalogue.

Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 3 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. II, Bk. II, Tr. II, Ch. II, Appendix: On Adjuration

n. 206.

What it is. Adjuration is an imperative or deprecative demand, made by interposing the name of God, of the saints, or of a sacred thing (2, 2, q. 90). Toward superiors or equals it is made only deprecatively; toward inferiors it is made also imperatively; indeed, toward the demon it cannot be made except imperatively, and that he may not harm, not however that he may teach or that we may obtain a good from him. - The adjuration of an irrational creature is directed to him by whom they are moved: deprecatively to God, imperatively to the demon.

n. 207.

What sort is licit. Private adjuration can be made by anyone, and it is licitly made as an argument of an honorable petition. A false pauper who asks alms in the name of God does not sin on this head except venially.

Solemn adjuration is had chiefly in exorcism properly so called. It, without the special and express license of the Ordinary, is forbidden to be made ¹; and the license is to be committed only to a most approved priest. Exorcisms, however, can be made upon non-Catholics themselves or excommunicates. Concerning true possession by the demon, it must prudently be established (cf. cc. 1151-1153). The Roman Ritual must be observed. An exorcist sins only venially who during the exorcism asks a few things out of curiosity but imperatively.

Nevertheless the use of the exorcism of Leo XIII is permitted to all (cf. Rituale, appendix).

¹ At least publicly, says Prummer, Manuale, q. 352, nota.

n. 208.

Summary

I. Oath. 1. An oath "is the invocation of the divine Name as witness of truth" (c. 1316). That is, the one swearing, so far as is in him, invites God that, before His infinite knowledge and veracity, He may will to confirm his statements. But because a religious man is not judged to will to derogate from divine reverence, nor a prudent man to expose himself to divine punishments, therefore he himself confirms his statements before men by oath.

The invocation of God can be explicit or tacit. No one swears before men unless he manifests by suitable signs the intention (which suffices for you to swear before God). And usage can make unsuitable a formula sufficient of itself. He does not swear who is judged merely, with great force, for example by the species of imprecation against himself, or by using comparative words, to affirm certain things.

It is distinguished, from the exterior form, as verbal, real, mixed; - from the force of the formula, as invocatory or contestatory, and execratory or imprecatory; - from the object, as assertory and promissory, which can be absolute or conditioned, and to which the comminatory oath is referred; - from the rite, as simple and solemn. Thus it is essential in the canonical rite that one swear personally (c. 1316, § 2).
Of defined faith is the honesty of an oath clothed with due conditions; and it is demonstrated by the fact that it encloses in itself a religious profession of divine truth and Providence. The conditions, however, are: a) truth, that the one swearing be truthful, and therefore that the things which he affirms be established for him by such certitude as, for the circumstances, is reasonably expected: in an oath, insofar as it is assertory, this condition is always required under grave sin; b) judgment, that a discreet use be made of an oath, and therefore that one swear only because of sufficient utility, which every serious cause supplies. This condition is of itself demanded under venial sin; c) justice, which, properly pertaining to a promissory oath, forbids promising those things which are forbidden to be done: and this must be avoided at least in a grave matter under mortal sin. In an assertory oath, this condition is judged to have been lacking if someone narrated what he is prohibited from reporting, at least under oath: this of itself is venial.
A promissory oath affirms a present intention of fulfilling the things promised; and thus it is assertory; and further it supplies a certain security of that execution, because of reverence toward God, so that it introduces a peculiar obligation of religion of fulfilling what has been promised. It almost always accedes to a promise, either to increase the obligation, in which case it does not oblige except as much and insofar as the promise obliges; or to remove the nullity of the act or promise, and then, unless that confirmation itself is illicit or, from positive law, impossible, there arises an obligation which, of itself, is of religion alone; by accident, because of harmful circumstances or positive law, it can also be of justice. An obligation of religion alone can, unless an acquired right stands in the way, be removed by dispensation. A dispensation requires a just cause in order to be valid. A just cause is had if the oath has been extorted by force or fear. But if the obligation of religion confirms a right acquired by another from an accepted promise, then dispensation from the oath is said to injure that right, insofar as it removes a certain security. In the same way in which a promise not sworn is to be explained, a promissory oath is to be explained; and therefore strictly, according to law and the intention of the one swearing.

If the one swearing acted fraudulently, c. 1321 wills, at least in the external forum, that the oath be explained according to the intention of him to whom it is sworn.

To swear feignedly will then only be licit when it is done without a lie, and with grave cause.

Neither a feigned nor an invalid oath obliges as such. The obligation ceases by remission, by substantial change of the thing, by failure of the final cause or condition, by irritation, dispensation, commutation; but by whatever power you can use over vows, by the same you can use over oaths, from c. 1320.

Adjuration, or an imperative or deprecative demand, which is made by interposing the name of God, of the Saints, or of a sacred thing, can be made privately by anyone; public adjuration is permitted only according to the norms of the law which was passed chiefly concerning exorcism. Toward Superiors or equals it is made only by deprecation; toward inferiors it is made also imperatively; toward the demon it cannot be made except imperatively. The exorcism published by Leo XIII can be used by every priest, from the appendix of the Ritual itself.

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Clement Marc, C.SS.R. — 85 passages

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Treatise I: On the First Precept of the Decalogue

Thou shalt not have strange gods before me...
(Exod. 20:3).

n. ¶529.

The first precept, by forbidding that a false deity be worshiped, prescribes the worship which is owed to the true God. This precept is so general that it already includes the two following in itself. Yet these were proposed explicitly because, for the gravity of the matter, the sanctification of the divine Name and the appointing of a day singularly consecrated to divine worship demanded a special promulgation for themselves (Cat. Rom., on the 1st and 3rd precept, n. 1).

But here there comes to be treated: 1. the virtue of religion in general; 2. the acts of religion commanded by the first precept; 3. the sins opposed to the same precept.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. I, Chapter I: On the Virtue of Religion

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 81; St. Alphonsus, III, tr. 1; ed. G., p. 370; Suarez, de Virt. Relig.; Lessius, de Just., P. 2, c. 34; Aertnys, l. III, tr. 1; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 459; Noldin, II, n. 131; Piscetta, II, tr. 2; Berardi, tr. 2, n. 312; Huby, Manuel d'Hist. des Relig.

n. ¶530.

NOTION. RELIGION, as it is taken here, is defined: A moral virtue inclining man to the due worship to be exhibited to God as the first Principle of all things and the supreme Lord.

The MATERIAL object of religion is worship owed to God. - The FORMAL object is the special honesty which is apprehended in that worship, on account, namely, of the supreme excellence of God.

The virtue of religion holds the first place among the moral virtues, because, after the theological virtues, it approaches more closely to God. By the bond of religion man is united with God, but not in the same way as in the theological virtues, insofar as man, by exercising acts of religion, first proclaims himself to be distinct from God and subject to God the Creator.

The virtue of religion is specifically one. It indeed has various offices, contains eminently piety, observance, and gratitude, and also has various acts, as to vow, to pray, etc.; but it produces all these things from one formal motive of worshiping God (Lessius, de Just., l. 2, c. 36, n. 14).

These things having been premised, we shall speak: 1. of the notion of worship; 2. of the species of sacred worship; 3. of the distinction of acts of religion, by which due worship is exhibited to God.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. I, Ch. I, Article I: On the Notion of Worship

n. ¶531.

DEFINITION. Worship, in general, is honor furnished with submission. And since honor is a sign of our estimation concerning another's excellence, worship can be defined: testimony of another's excellence and of one's own submission (Polm., 2.2, n. 780 and 781). - HONOR is exhibited not only to Superiors, but also to equals, indeed to inferiors, according to that saying of the Apostle (Rom. 12:10): With honor preventing one another. And God himself furnishes honor to his Saints. - But worship is attributed to Superiors alone, because it includes fitting submission of oneself to another's excellence. Cf. n. 554.

DIVISION. 1. By reason of the object which is worshiped, worship is civil or religious, according as it regards natural or supernatural excellence.

Civil worship is called filial, if it regards parents; political, if it regards persons constituted in dignity. Religious worship is called such simply, if it regards the supernatural excellence of a man still a wayfarer, for example of a priest, Bishop, or also of one demonstrating singular sanctity. But it is called SACRED worship (in the stricter sense), if it regards divine excellence, whether in itself or inseparably communicated, as is that of the blessed who are indivisibly joined with God.

By reason of the intended end, worship is: absolute, if it is attributed to someone on account of excellence inhering in him, for example to God, or to the Saints on account of their dignity; respective or relative, if it is attributed either to a person or to an inanimate thing on account of the relation which it has with some person worthy of honor, for example to a servant in view of the master; to a statue or image in view of the prototype.
By reason of the mode in which it is attributed, worship is internal or external, insofar as it is exhibited either by internal powers of the soul, or by external acts of the body.

But external worship is either public or private. a) PUBLIC, or liturgical, is that which is exhibited in the name and by the authority of the Church, and in the form prescribed by her. b) PRIVATE, that to which one of these conditions is lacking. Thus,

for example, a layman reciting the divine Office exhibits only private worship: because, although he observes the form prescribed by the Church, nevertheless he does not act in the name and by the authority of the Church. Nor does worship cease to be private if all the laymen of some parish, jointly in the sacred building, recite prayers approved by the Church: because they do not act in the name of the Church. On the contrary, it is public, although a subdeacon privately pays the divine Office: because here he acts in the name of the Church and in the form prescribed by her (Kon., n. 322).

Note. The form prescribed by the Church comprehends two things: 1. WORDS, which are either from God or from the Church; 2. RITE, or liturgical action, which again is either from Christ the Lord, as the essential rite of the sacrifice of the Mass and the matter of the sacraments; or from the Church, as the various gestures, inclinations of the head, etc. Each is to be sought from the liturgical books and from decrees of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, and the vulgar tongue is never to be employed. See n. 1742.¹

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. I, Ch. I, Article II: On the Species of Sacred Worship

n. ¶532.

We distinguish a twofold species of sacred worship, namely of latria and of dulia, according to the uncreated or created excellence which it regards. Wherefore we shall treat: 1. of the worship of latria; 2. of the worship of dulia (Salmant., tr. 21, c. 10).

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. I, Ch. I, Art. II, § 1. On the Worship of Latria

DEFINITION. The worship of LATRIA (or adoration) is honor exhibited to God on account of his supreme excellence, superior to all things, with a protestation of our every-kind submission toward him.

n. ¶533.

PRINCIPLES. I. God alone is to be worshiped with the worship of latria. It is established 1. from Matt. 4:10: The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and him only shalt thou serve; 2. by reason, because God, and he alone, has supreme and infinite excellence, communicable to no creature.

II. The most holy humanity of Christ the Lord, considered as joined to the Word, is to be worshiped with the worship of latria, absolute indeed, but simultaneous with the Word. The same is to be said concerning the species of bread and wine in the Eucharist, which, as sacramentally united to Christ the Lord, are co-adored. See the dogmatic theologians.

III. The most holy Name of Christ, drops of the most holy Blood left behind, the Cross and other instruments of the Passion are also to be adored with the worship of latria, but respective: with the worship of latria, because they represent Christ, or were in some way joined to him; respective, because they have only extrinsic excellence.

The same holds concerning sacred vessels and ornaments, churches, and other things or places specially deputed to the worship of God. "Their worship is reduced to the worship of latria by reason of the sacrifice to which they are ordered" (III, 132).

n. ¶534.

Let the following be noted FOR PRACTICE:

I. The most holy Blood which is preserved in certain churches as an eminent relic is not worshiped with absolute adoration, because in fact it does not retain the hypostatic union (S. R. C., n. 2660; Collius, de Sang. Christi, l. V, disp. 8, c. 6).

II. The true Cross is adored by a twofold title: 1. as an eminent relic of Christ, even if divided into the smallest parts; 2. as an image representing Christ crucified. Other crosses made in likeness of the true Cross are to be adored by reason of representation only (Salmant., tr. 21, c. 10, n. 24).

As regards specifically a particle from the wood of the most holy CROSS, these things are to be adverted to: 1. If it has been exposed in the principal place over the altar, those passing before it ought to bend one knee, and Mass before it is to be celebrated as before the enclosed Sacrament. But if it is put away in a case, those passing before it should incline the head. 2. Where immemorial usage carries this, it can be carried processionally under a canopy, with two thurifers incensing and with head uncovered. 3. After the procession or exposition, before it is put away, the officiant, standing, incenses it with three swings; then, having assumed the humeral veil and made one genuflection, he blesses the people with it, saying nothing (Kon., n. 327). 4. It is not licit on Friday in Parasceve after the ceremonies to expose a relic of the Holy Cross so that it remains exposed until the function of the next day (S. R. C., n. 2740).

n. ¶535.

III. Sacred things, in the broad sense, are called all things pertaining to the worship of God, although they have not been blessed, but insofar as they have been withdrawn from the profane commerce of men and dedicated to the service of God. Of this kind are candlesticks, lamps, canopy, cruets, vessel for holy water, etc.

STRICTLY SACRED THINGS are those which, through a special blessing (namely constitutive), or consecration (in which an anointing intervenes), are destined for the worship of God. Of this kind are blessed churches or chapels (sacred places), altars, chalices, corporals, priestly vestments, etc. Likewise sacred bibles, missals, and similar things, which of themselves, without blessing, are sacred (III, 40). See below n. 1444.

Sacred things of whatever kind must be treated reverently. Therefore: a) let them serve neither superstitious nor indecent uses; b) let them be consonant with liturgical prescriptions, at least decent and clean. See n. 1630 seqq.
Strictly sacred things must be treated with special reverence; nor can they be applied to profane uses, even honorable ones. "What has once been dedicated to God is not thereafter to be transferred to human uses" (Rule of Law in 6). See n. 583.

This rule ceases: a) If it is a question of things not strictly sacred, for example candles, branches, water, incense, the Paschal lamb, and similar blessed things, which are licitly applied to profane use; provided that you do not always and indifferently use them thus. b) If a strictly sacred thing is totally changed, so that it returns to common matter, for example if a chalice by fire or iron is reduced to a common mass of silver (III, 40, 41; VI, 94, 371). Cf. Gennari, Consult. mor. can., n. 33.

Those things which can no longer serve the use for which they have been destined are to be withdrawn from the same in a decent manner, and indeed: a) Ruined churches, no longer repairable, can be converted indeed into profane uses, but not sordid ones; yet with a cross erected there, as Trent prescribes (Sess. 21, c. 7), unless sacrilege is feared; in which case at least a commemorative inscription is to be placed. b) The sacred oils are to be burned each year (and the ashes thrown into the sacrarium); likewise vestments, after they have been worn out, unless perhaps they are applied to making or repairing others. 3. Baptismal water, on Holy Saturday and on the vigil of Pentecost, after the new water has been blessed, is to be poured into the sacrarium.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. I, Ch. I, Art. II, § 2. On the Worship of Dulia

n. ¶536.

DEFINITION. The worship of dulia (or veneration) signifies the worship by which we attest our reverence and submission toward holy creatures, on account of the supernatural excellence of grace and glory intrinsic to them (St. Alph., on Trent, Sess. 25, de Invoc. SS.).

Note. To HOLY PERSONS a twofold reverence indeed belongs: 1. of respective latria, on account of their extrinsic excellence, because they represent and contain divine excellence (better than sacred things or places); 2. of absolute dulia, on account of their intrinsic excellence. Yet in practice, on account of danger of error, neither the Saints, nor the Blessed Virgin herself, are adored, at least explicitly, with the respective worship of latria (St. Thom., III, q. 25, a. 5). Nevertheless irreverence toward them, and especially blasphemy, redounds to God himself, whose servants, friends, sons, etc., they are (cf. n. 596). Similarly, veneration exhibited to the Saints implicitly and virtually honors God; and thus it pertains, broadly speaking, to the virtue of religion.

DIVISION. By reason of the degree of participated excellence, dulia is distinguished in two ways. There is simple dulia, which regards created supernatural excellence common as it were to all Saints. There is hyperdulia, which regards excellence created indeed and finite, but singular and very eminent.

n. ¶537.

PRINCIPLES. I. The most blessed Virgin Mary is to be venerated with the absolute worship of hyperdulia. It is the common opinion of Catholics. For the Blessed Virgin Mary has a singular and altogether ineffable eminence of dignity and sanctity, "which, besides God, no one can reach by thinking" (Bull Ineffabilis of Pius IX). Whence the Church beseeches the Blessed Virgin Mary more frequently, more insistently, and with greater solemnity than the Saints and angels. Cf. Muller, l. 2, § 46.

n. ¶538.

II. Saints and angels are to be venerated with the worship of dulia simply so called. For it is defined of faith by the Second Council of Nicaea and by Trent that all the Saints are to be honored with some veneration.

Yet some difference is present in the worship which is attributed to them (cf. n. 531). And indeed:

To CANONIZED Saints sacred and public worship is owed; because, through the infallible testimony of the Church, we are now made certain that they reign with Christ in the heavens; and therefore we must honor their souls and bodies as truly and properly sacred.
To the BEATIFIED the same sacred and public worship is exhibited, but more limited, namely such as is determined either by custom, if their worship is immemorial, or by Pontifical Indult, if the ordinary way is proceeded by. But if someone, in other churches or places not designated by the Supreme Pontiff, were to celebrate concerning a Blessed, he would sin gravely, because change of place is a transgression of the decree in a grave matter (Bened. XIV, de Beatif., l. I, c. 39, n. 12).
To men or women dead with an opinion of sanctity, but not yet beatified, it is licit to exhibit no public worship; yet private religious worship is licitly deferred to them. "Images of the same (authentic Decrees, n. 3835) ... can neither in any way be placed on altars nor outside altars be painted with aureoles, rays, and other signs of sanctity; yet their images or deeds and facts can be exhibited on the walls of a Church, or in colored glass, provided those images bear before themselves neither any indication of worship or sanctity, nor anything profane or alien from the custom of the Church." Besides, from the new decree of Aug. 13, 1913, only after the heroic nature of the virtues has been recognized is a Servant of God to be adorned with the title Venerable. But prayers in honor of a Servant of God always need the approval of the Ordinary (A. A. S., VI, p. 192).

III. Relics, statues, etc., of the Saints are to be honored with the same veneration as the persons whose relics, etc., they are, but with respective worship. It is established from Trent, Sess. 25, where, for the rest, it is added: "Let the Bishops diligently teach ... that great fruit is perceived from all sacred images."

For practice, let the following be noted:

n. ¶539.

I. On Holy Relics. 1. RELICS of the Saints are: a) In the stricter sense, their bodies and parts of the body, even the smallest; likewise oil or another liquid sometimes flowing from them; b) more broadly, all things which the Saints used in life, as garments, books, instruments of punishments and mortifications; c) most broadly, all things which have touched either the body, or the sepulcher, or other relics of a Saint; and likewise oil from a lamp hung before the sepulcher, and dust from the place where they are preserved.

Eminent relics of Saints are, besides the whole body, the head, the anterior part or the upper part of the arm; or the heart, tongue, hand, if they are preserved intact from a miracle, the leg (not the bones of the thigh), or that part of the body in which a martyr suffered, provided it is whole and not small (S. R. C., n. 430, 555, 4041).
Relics of the Saints are to be venerated not only with religious but also with sacred worship; not, however, public worship unless their authenticity has been approved by the Ordinary of the place where they are to be honored, and this even if they have already been recognized at Rome or by another Bishop.²
Relics are to be preserved only in a church, yet never in the tabernacle. If it is a question of small relics enclosed in cases, the use is commonly conceded today even to private persons.
Relics can be exposed for the veneration of the faithful. But they are not to be placed: a) above the tabernacle in which the most holy Sacrament is preserved, so that the tabernacle serves as a base for them; b) before the little door of the same tabernacle, or in another way by which simple persons could be led to adore the relics as the most holy Sacrament; c) with the Most Holy when it is exposed on the same altar. If they are exposed, let two lights burn continually on the altar. The one exposing and replacing should be vested in surplice, and also in humeral veil, if he blesses the people with the relics. But the blessing must be made without chant, without a formula of blessing, the relics having been incensed with unblessed incense, with two swings.
In processions, relics of canonized Saints can be carried; but: a) not under a canopy; b) with head uncovered (a Bishop, however, with miter); c) not in a procession of the most holy Sacrament, unless by force of indult or custom.
Concerning a Saint of whom an eminent relic is certainly possessed, the Office can be made and Mass celebrated, provided he is found in the Roman Martyrology.

n. ¶540.

II. On Holy Images. 1. Among holy images, these can be specially honored: a) blessed images; b) those which are at the same time relics, as an image of the Blessed Virgin Mary which is said to have been painted by St. Luke; c) those which are renowned for miracles, and copies of them.

In churches it is not licit to expose images deformed from the sense and decrees of the Church (Bened. XIV, Const. Sollicitudini). Images furnishing to the rude an occasion of dangerous error are opposed to the sense of the Church, such as, however, generally are not images of the Most Holy Trinity; likewise images in which something profane or dishonorable appears.
That these laws may be observed more efficaciously, the Council of Trent (Sess. 25) established that no unusual image can be exposed unless it has been approved by the Bishop. And Leo XIII, Const. Officiorum (tit. 1, c. VI, n. 15), declared these things concerning any images whatsoever, even those serving only private devotion: "Images in whatever way printed of Our Lord Jesus Christ, of the Blessed Virgin Mary, of the Angels and Saints, or of other Servants of God, deformed from the sense and decrees of the Church, are altogether forbidden. But new images, whether they have prayers annexed or are published without them, are not to be published without license of ecclesiastical power." But if new images are printed without this law having been observed, the publisher indeed sins, but the faithful are not prohibited from their use.
Holy Images are honored in the same way as relics, except that with them a blessing is not given; nor concerning them, unless it has been specially conceded, is the Office made or Mass celebrated. In a procession with the most holy Sacrament, outside the case of indult or custom, they are not to be carried (Salmant., tr. 21, c. 10, n. 81).

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. I, Ch. I, Article III: On the Distinction of Acts of Religion

Religious acts are either elicited by the virtue of religion, or commanded by it.

n. ¶541.

I. The ELICITED or proper acts of religion are: devotion, prayer, adoration, sacrifice, offerings, first-fruits, tithes, vow, oath, adjuration, praise of God (2.2, q. 82 seqq.; q. 87, a. 1, ad 5).

For those things which belong to man (goods of body and soul, external goods) and those things which belong to God (authority, fidelity, and infinite perfection of God) are suitably assumed for the worship of God. Cf. Grassi, de Virt. Relig.

II. COMMANDED acts of religion are all acts which are elicited by another virtue and at the same time are performed from the motive of religion. Thus, for example, fasts undertaken in honor of God or of the Saints, or ordered by the Church in preparation for solemnities, are acts elicited by temperance, but commanded by religion.

To commanded acts of religion can also be referred acts elicited by FAITH, HOPE, and CHARITY; for religion can rightly direct to the worship of God acts which already of themselves tend to this end, according to that saying of St. Augustine (Enchir., c. 3, n. 1): "God is worshiped by faith, hope, and charity."

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. I, Chapter II: On the Acts of Religion Commanded by the First Precept

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 82; St. Alphonsus, H. Ap., App. 4; work On the Great Means of Prayer (ed. Walter, II, p. 633); St. Francis de Sales, Philothea; Polman, 2.2, n. 815; Herrmann, Inst. dogm., 942, 1226; Tanquerey, I, n. 862 seqq.; Vermeersch, Quaest. de Virt. Relig., n. 9 seqq.

n. ¶542.

To the first precept of the Decalogue pertain those acts of religion by which FIDELITY is furnished to God (n. 528), or by which we profess the supreme dominion of God over us and our every-kind dependence upon him, by subjecting to him the soul, body, and external goods. Now we subject the soul to God through DEVOTION and PRAYER, the body through ADORATION, the remaining goods through SACRIFICE, OFFERINGS, FIRST-FRUITS, and TITHES. Concerning sacrifice we shall speak elsewhere. Wherefore we shall treat: 1. of devotion; 2. of prayer; 3. of adoration and also of offerings, first-fruits, and tithes.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. I, Ch. II, Article I: On Devotion

n. ¶543.

DEVOTION is taken in a twofold sense: 1. for the general condition of all acts of religion, and thus it is readiness of the will to draw itself to the service of God; 2. for a special act, and thus it is internal offering and handing over of oneself to the service of God. For to devote is the same as to consecrate or offer, and to make oneself over to another.

The obligation of the act of devotion sometimes urges of itself; but the frequency of the acts can be determined with great difficulty, since no time has been assigned for its obligation. - This obligation urges per accidens: 1. when there is grave danger of the opposed vice, namely sloth in spiritual things; 2. when we are bound to elicit other acts of virtues, for the eliciting of which devotion itself is necessary, as are acts of faith or adoration, hearing Mass, etc. (Salmant., tr. 21, c. 9, n. 7).

n. ¶544.

The source of devotion, on our part, is meditation: a) On the divine Goodness: for from this consideration love is excited, which is the proximate cause of readiness of the will. b) On our misery, which, if we consider it, we break forth into fervent and efficacious prayer, all the more because consideration of this kind excludes presumption.

n. ¶545.

The effect of devotion is twofold. The first is spiritual joy, from consideration of the divine Goodness and of his benefits; according to that saying (Ps. 76:4): I remembered God, and was delighted. The other effect is a certain salutary sadness according to God, from consideration of our misery (2.2, q. 82, a. 4).

Note. Substantial and intellectual joy (delight) is always present in every fervid act of devotion. But sensible and accidental joy is often lacking. "He would act badly," says St. Alphonsus (Prat. d'amar G. C., c. 17, § 2), "who would reject spiritual consolations (sensible joy); as certain pseudomystics taught that this was to be done." Cf. St. Francis de Sales, Philot., P. IV, c. 13.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. I, Ch. II, Article II: On Prayer

n. ¶546.

DEFINITION. Prayer, taken broadly, insofar as it also comprehends meditation, praise, thanksgiving, etc., is the elevation of the mind to God (IV, 117; Polm., 2.2, n. 819).

Taken strictly, or PETITION, it is "a request for fitting things from God" (St. John Damascene, de Fide orth., l. 3, c. 21; Billuart, de Relig., d. 2, a. 2). Request, that is, the explanation of desire for obtaining something; of fitting things, that is, of things which are honorable, and which it befits God to bestow on us; from God, either immediately, or mediately, namely when our prayer is directed to the Saints. Therefore petition is commanded by hope, elicited by the virtue of religion.

DIVISION. Prayer is distinguished: 1. by reason of mode, into mental and vocal: the former is made by mind alone; the latter is performed by mind and words: for if it is made by words alone, it is not prayer; 2. by reason of the one praying, into public and private: public prayer is that which is made in the name of the Church, for the salvation of the people, by a minister deputed for this; private prayer is that which is made by each one separately, whether for himself or for another (cf. 531, 3).

n. ¶547.

PRINCIPLES. I. Prayer (as petition) is necessary for all adults by necessity of precept, indeed also by necessity of means. 1. BY NECESSITY OF PRECEPT. It is established from innumerable places of Sacred Scripture, for example (Mark 14:38): Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation; and (Luke 18:1): It is necessary always to pray and not to faint. Nature itself teaches us to pray when we are in necessity; and therefore he who never prays to God sins against natural law. 2. BY NECESSITY OF MEANS. For, without prayer, according to the ordering of divine Providence, salvation cannot be obtained. For, on the one hand, we can do nothing in the order toward salvation without the help of grace, the Lord saying (John 15:5): Without me you can do nothing; on the other hand, God bestows his graces only when asked, according to that saying (John 16:24): Ask, and you shall receive; and (James 4:2): You have not, because you ask not (Gran mezzo, c. 1 and 3, § 3).

Behold therefore the law and economy OF OUR SALVATION. The first graces (as are the grace of vocation to true faith, the grace of conversion, and the grace itself of praying) are often given without previous petition; but further graces, by which the more difficult precepts of God can be observed and grave temptations overcome, and especially those efficacious helps upon which our final perseverance depends, are conceded only to those praying, and indeed assiduously, perseveringly, and trustingly.

Therefore they err who, with the favorers of Americanism, place all confidence in the virtues which they call active, and despise the passive virtues (prayer, humility, patience, meekness). Cf. Nouv. Rev. Theol., 1899, p. 165.

n. ¶548.

II. Prayer, endowed with the due conditions, has infallible efficacy, from the promise of God. The words of the Lord are clear: Ask, and you shall receive (John 16:24). And similar things occur everywhere. Nor does it matter whether the one praying is just or a sinner: For every one that asketh, receiveth (Luke 11:10). Therefore when sinners are not heard, this happens because they pray badly, that is, with the due conditions passed over. Whence St. James (4:3): You ask, and receive not: because you ask amiss.

But the CONDITIONS required on the part of the one praying are four:¹

That he ask for himself; for the Lord says: he will give to you; and the reason is that one praying for himself, by that very fact that he prays well, is already disposed to receiving grace. This cannot always be said concerning neighbor, for whom someone prays. Thus St. Thomas (2.2, q. 83, a. 7, ad 2). Yet many Doctors judge that prayer, even by force of the divine promise, is infallibly efficacious, even if made for sinners, provided they are not so obstinate that they intend to live in sin until death.
That he ask things conducive to salvation. For the Lord says: If you shall ask the Father anything in my name... (John 16:23). Moreover, according to St. Augustine (tr. 102 on John, beginning): "Whatever is asked contrary to the account of salvation is not asked in the name of the Savior." It is indeed licit to ask for and desire temporal goods, but conditionally, namely on the supposition that they are salutary for us.²
That he ask piously, that is, with humility and confidence. For it is written (James 4:6): God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to the humble. And (Ecclus. 2:11): No one hath hoped in the Lord, and been confounded. Whence St. Thomas says: Prayer has the force of meriting from charity, but the efficacy of obtaining from faith and confidence (l. c., a. 15, ad 2).
That he ask perseveringly; according to that saying (Luke 18:1): It is necessary always to pray and not to faint. And in c. 11:9 we are taught that one must not only ask, but also seek and knock until it is opened. Whence St. Thomas says: "The effect of prayer can be impeded if someone does not persevere in asking" (ibid., ad 2). - Significantly, for obtaining FINAL PERSEVERANCE, perseverance in praying is necessary; because to the chain of graces by which God wills us to become saved, there must respond on our part a chain of petitions.

Two things are to be noted: a) Although fervent prayer is required for obtaining efficacious grace, nevertheless by tepid prayer we obtain the spirit of more fervent prayer (Verita della fede, P. II, c. 17, n. 19). b) A special efficacy is promised to public prayer; for it is said (Matt. 18:20): Where there are two or three gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.

n. ¶549.

IT IS ASKED. When does the precept of praying oblige?

Resp. Prayer can be considered as an act of a virtue excellent in itself. Yet more often it is considered as an act of a virtue which, in relation to the goods of salvation, is a means constituted by God. Whence we say: 1. It obliges OF ITSELF: a) at the beginning of the use of reason; b) in the article of death; c) more often in the year, indeed frequently; whence St. Alphonsus with Suarez and Lessius estimates that it is a sin grave of itself if someone for a notable time, that is, for one month, or certainly for two months, omits to commend himself to God (Inst. cat., P. I, c. 1, n. 32; Gran mezzo, P. I, c. 3, § 3).

It obliges PER ACCIDENS: a) in the state of mortal sin, for obtaining the grace of repenting as one ought; b) when grave temptation rises up, which cannot otherwise be conquered; or if some precept urges, for fulfilling which prayer is necessary; c) in a great calamity of neighbor or of the people (III, in princ.).

Hence it is clear that the omission of morning and evening prayers constitutes no sin of itself, although from the very beginning of the Church this most holy custom of praying has become widespread. Yet pastors of souls ought to confer great diligence upon this, that the Christian faithful be most tenacious of this custom. For unless it is holily retained, it will shortly happen that the soul, destitute of the special help of God, enters the way of perdition. Indeed it would not be free from fault if someone should determine by set purpose to pray neither morning nor evening. For when will such a man pray? Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 484.

Let the following be noted: 1. The words of the Lord: IT IS NECESSARY ALWAYS TO PRAY, signify that one must pray frequently, at a suitable time, and never cease from dejection of soul; or also, that our actions generally are to be directed to God (cf. n. 307).

One voluntarily distracted in prayer sins of himself venially, unless perhaps a just cause excuses. For he conducts himself irreverently toward God (Elbel, de Orat., n. 419). But "there is no sin if someone does not so much intend to pray as to occupy himself in a pious exercise by reciting the words of prayers; because he prays not formally, but only materially: for example, when someone working with his hands recites or sings psalms or other prayers, not with the soul of praying, but of avoiding vain thoughts, or of recreating himself" (V, 84). Nevertheless, since prayer thus made is also a certain exercise of religion, it is clear that it is not destitute of all merit.
Besides God, we can pray to the Saints, and very probably privately invoke the souls which are expiated in the flames of Purgatory; for it can piously be believed that our prayers are manifested to them. And likewise baptized infants can be invoked, who, before the use of reason, migrated to the blessed Fatherland (Gran mezzo, P. I, c. 1; work on Trent, Sess. 25, n. 32).
Invocation of the Saints is of precept with respect to the community (or the Church), since it is commanded in the public Office and in the Mass. But by no positive law is it prescribed to individual faithful. Yet it is not improbable that it is prescribed by natural or divine law: "because by natural law we are bound to observe that order which God has instituted; but God has constituted that inferiors reach salvation by imploring the help of superiors" (Gran mezzo, l. c.).
Invocation of the Blessed Virgin MARY in particular is necessary for each person, not indeed absolutely, but morally, for salvation; because such is the will of God, "who willed that we have all things through Mary" (cf. Glorie di Maria, c. V). St. Alphonsus teaches besides that "it is morally impossible that a soul should progress much in perfection without some particular and tender devotion toward the most holy Mother of God" (H. Ap., App. I, at the end).
One must pray, of itself from charity, for all who can be helped by prayer, and whom we are commanded to love (cf. n. 476). Therefore we ought to pray also for the souls which are expiated in the fire of Purgatory. - This obligation is satisfied by praying privately. - As regards public prayer, see the things to be said n. 1600 seqq.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. I, Ch. II, Art. III, First-Fruits, and Tithes

n. ¶550.

I. ADORATION, taken generically, sounds almost the same as WORSHIP itself, and is divided as above, n. 531. In the stricter sense (as often in catechisms), it is used for the worship of latria alone. In the proper sense, it is a special act of religion, whether internal or external, by which the worship of latria is exhibited to God (2.2, q. 84, a. 2).

We offer to God a twofold adoration, namely spiritual, which consists in the interior devotion of the mind, and corporal, which consists in the exterior humiliation of the body.

External signs of adoration are not of such a kind that they necessarily signify the worship of latria; wherefore, from the intention of the one adoring, they must be determined to the worship of latria, or hyperdulia, or dulia. Moreover, such an intention together with the external act, for example genuflection, can be prescribed. Yet one thing, namely sacrifice, is a sign which is proper to the adoration of latria.

n. ¶551.

II. OFFERINGS, in the broad sense, are everything which is offered to the Church; in which sense first-fruits and tithes are also comprehended. - Taken strictly, they are things which the faithful, in view of religion, immediately offer to God, so that they may yield to the use of the Church or of the ministers of the Church.

a) These offerings are voluntary by their nature, according to that saying of Exodus 25:2: Of every man that offereth of his own accord, you shall receive them. b) They can become obligatory: either from promise or vow; or from the indigence of the ministers of the Church; or from legitimate custom; or from prescription, as if a parish priest for a long time (suppose ten years) in good faith demanded offerings of this kind as owed to himself, the parishioners not protesting. c) A Bishop can under grave obligation drive parish priests to collecting, whether by themselves or by others, the offerings of the faithful, indeed punish the disobedient and remove them from the parish. S. C. Cons., Apr. 22, 1911 (A. A. S., III, p. 277). Cf. Ami du Clerge, 1911, p. 690; 1913, p. 166; Nouv. Rev. Theol., 1912, p. 36. See other things below, n. 1642, 20.

Note. In order to know to whom offerings belong, one must attend to the usage of places, and especially to the intention of those offering.

n. ¶552.

III. FIRST-FRUITS are the first fruits, coming from lands newly cultivated, to be offered only once to God as giver of all goods and to the ministers of his Church.

Formerly they were to be paid from the precept of ecclesiastical law, as is established from canon Praeter, dist. 32; but today they have grown obsolete almost everywhere.

n. ¶553.

IV. TITHES are the tenth or another quota part of fruits and revenues justly acquired, owed to God in testimony of his supreme dominion, and to be paid to the ministers of the Church.

In the new law, tithes, regarded as to substance, that is, insofar as they are the necessary stipend of the ministers of the Church, are owed by natural and divine right, according to that saying (Luke 10:7): For the laborer is worthy of his hire; but regarded as to the determination of quantity, they are only of ecclesiastical right (St. Alph., de Privil., n. 87-84).
Payment of tithes, insofar as it is made on account of the worship of God and as a sign of his supreme dominion, is an act of religion. But insofar as it is regarded as owed to the ministers of the Church, who furnish spiritual things to us, it is an act of justice (Council of Trent, Sess. 25, c. 12, de Ref.). - Hence those who defraud tithes (or pensions assigned by governments in place of tithes) sin both against religion and against justice, even if they are not sacrilegious (III, 31, q. 4).
The obligation of tithes can cease: a) By privilege of the Pontiff exempting some persons. b) By legitimate custom; provided that otherwise a congruent portion is given, which is owed by the right of nature. c) By remission made by him to whom they are owed, provided he is able to renounce. d) By transaction, or pontifical composition, for future tithes.
In most regions, the obligation of paying predial tithes has in fact CEASED, either by custom or by composition, whether with private persons or with governments, for example through concordats, with the burden of suitably sustaining the clergy imposed. In Italy, the support which the government furnishes is tolerated as retribution for personal labor, but not as compensation for usurpation already carried out.
In place of personal tithes, which long ago became obsolete, there now prevail STOLE FEES, for example the funeral fourth (cf. n. 2279).

Note. Comparable to tithes is the tax of worship which today in France is imposed upon the faithful. Cf. A. S. S., vol. 41, p. 39; Ami du Clerge, 1909, p. 254, 631, 1150.

In the United States of North America it is prohibited to receive money at the doors of the church from those entering, in the manner of a tax (Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, n. 397; Nouv. Rev. Theol., 1912, p. 36).

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. I, Chapter III: On Sins Opposed to the First Precept

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 92 seqq.; St. Alphonsus, III, n. 1-29; ed. G., I, p. 370; Salmanticenses, tr. 21, c. 11; Billuart, Diss. VII, VIII; Aertnys, l. 3, n. 7; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 488; Tanquerey, I, n. 894; Ami du Cl., Study on Demonism, 1902, 1904; Walter, Der Aberglaube; Linz. Quart. Schr., 1907, p. 517; Schneider, Der neuere Geisterglaube.

n. ¶2.

Just as through the first precept acts are prescribed by which we subject to God soul, body, and goods as to the supreme Lord, so through it, on the contrary side, there are PROHIBITED both acts by which the honor of principality is carried to another or becomes excessive, as happens through various superstitions, and those acts of irreligiosity by which such honor owed to God simply fails. - Whence let us treat: 1. of superstition; 2. of irreligiosity.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. I, Ch. III, Article I: On Superstition

n. ¶554.

NOTIONS. Superstition is defined: Vain or false religion, exhibiting to God undue worship. - It is opposed to religion by excess, "not because it exhibits more divine worship than true religion, but because it exhibits divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in that mode in which it ought not" (2.2, q. 92, a. 1). Thus worship can exceed both on the part of the mode and on the part of the object; whence a twofold superstition is distinguished, namely: 1. superstition of undue worship; 2. superstition of the thing worshiped (III, 2).

I. Superstition of UNDUE worship is worship which is indeed exhibited to the true God, but in an incongruous mode; because, namely, the worship which is offered is either false or superfluous.

False worship is that which has a false signification, as if someone should worship God through the ceremonies of the old Law, for example circumcision, immolation of the lamb, etc., because these signify Christ as still about to come and not yet having come; or if someone, for increasing the devotion of the people, should narrate false miracles, or propose false relics. - Worship of this kind is a sin grave of itself, because it founds religion upon lies, indeed exposes true miracles, etc., to doubt.

But superfluous worship is that by which God is worshiped in a mode not approved by the Church, or plainly alien from her practice. Thus, for example, if you were unwilling to pray or hear Mass before sunrise; or if in Mass or in the canonical Office you added something not prescribed by the rubrics; or if candles had to be arranged in a certain order; or if you fasted on Sunday when you do not fast on other days, or abstained from certain indifferent works on Saturday, etc. Such superfluous worship, scandal, contempt, or vain observance being excluded, does not exceed venial fault, because the matter is light, and those actions are not evil in themselves.

n. ¶555.

II. Superstition of the THING WORSHIPED, or worship of a false deity, is had when worship owed to God is offered to a false god or to creatures.

This superstition, according to the diverse ends of divine worship, is subdivided into diverse species. For since, according to St. Thomas (2.2, q. 92, a. 2), divine worship looks to this, that man practically acknowledge the excellence, knowledge, and auxiliary intervention of God, that threefold end can be perverted by a threefold species of superstition, namely: 1. idolatry, when reverence of excellence owed to God alone is exhibited to a creature; 2. divination, when knowledge is investigated from the demon; 3. vain observance, when, for the sake of help, recourse is had to the same demon. And since recourse can also be had to him for inflicting harm on neighbor, hence, on account of the malice of injustice joined to it, there is had: 4. malefice.

Now discourse must be instituted concerning each.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. I, Ch. III, Art. I, § 1. On Idolatry

n. ¶556.

DEFINITION. Idolatry is superstition by which honor is attributed to a creature as to God.

But this is done by any sign of honor by which someone intends to submit himself to a creature as to God, for example by genuflection, incense-burning, uncovering of the head before an idol. Thus the idolatry of the Gentiles was the worship of demons, as is said (Ps. 95:5): All the gods of the Gentiles are demons.

DIVISION. Idolatry, by reason of affection, is twofold: one MATERIAL or simulated, as when someone, without internal affection, from fear of death, exhibits worship to an idol; the other FORMAL and proper, and this is either perfect, as when someone adores an idol which from infidelity he thinks to be God; or imperfect, when someone, either from hatred of God, or from affection for obtaining something from a demon or another creature, offers worship to it as if to God.

Hence you will deduce: 1. Idolatry, even material and feigned, is a grave and mortal sin; because it is a pernicious lie, and against religion, and often also against the precept of externally professing the faith (cf. n. 429). 2. Imperfect idolatry, on account of malice of the will, is a graver sin than perfect idolatry (III, 12, 13).

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. I, Ch. III, Art. I, § 2. On Divination

n. ¶557.

DEFINITION. Divination is a species of superstition by which someone invokes the knowledge of the demon, so that he may know contingent and freely future things, or things otherwise hidden, accessible to God alone.

But since divination (as worship of the demon) proceeds from a certain express or tacit pact with demons, it will be worth the work to discuss: 1. the pact of man with the demon; 2. the various divinations in particular. Cf. 2.2, q. 95, a. 2 ad 2, and a. 3.

Vol. II, Tr. XI, Sect. II, Question I. On the Virtue of Religion (or on the First Three Precepts of the Decalogue) · Vol. II, Tr. XI, Sect. II, Q. I, Chapter I. On the Nature of Religion · Vol. II, Tr. XI, Sect. II, Q. I, Chapter II. On the Acts of the Virtue of Religion

1. On the Pact of Man with the Demon

A pact with the demon is a convention, or everything by which someone uses something for the worship of demons, that is, for acknowledging their excellence and his own submission.

n. ¶558.

PRINCIPLES. I. Man can do more with the help of the demon than by his own powers alone. For angels are more excellent than men, both in the faculty of knowing and in the power of working; and angelic nature in demons was indeed depraved through sin, but was not taken away or diminished (1, q. 64, a. 1). Yet that which is obtained with the help of the demon is only preternatural.

Hence: 1. As regards KNOWLEDGE, demons easily call past things back into the mind of man; they manifest present hidden things which have been outwardly disclosed, even things much distant; indeed, they foreknow innumerable future things, both by conjecture and also with certainty from natural causes. Yet they do not know the secret and hidden thoughts and volitions of the soul, nor the mysteries of grace (1.2, q. 57, a. 5; Muller, l. 2, § 69, 4).

As regards OPERATION, they can move bodies; assume bodies to themselves, either formed from air and vapors, or even true bodies, which indeed they do not formally vivify, but manage as movers. They can excite the imaginative power of man, or the sensitive appetitive power, and thus stir men to hatred or lust; indeed, they can change our senses, for example the eyes, so that something is seen otherwise than it is. In one word, they can effect innumerable things for the deception and destruction of men (1.2, q. 80, a. 2). Yet St. Augustine says: "Nor do demons do anything unless he has permitted it, whose judgments are hidden, many, unjust, none" (de Civit. Dei, l. 18, c. 18, n. 2).

n. ¶559.

II. Preternatural effects are accustomed to be obtained through a pact with the demon. A pact with the demon can be: 1. explicit, when someone invokes him by words, or by deed usurps something through which he knows or thinks that the demon cooperates; 2. implicit or tacit, when someone uses vain and naturally disproportionate means for knowing or effecting something.

"Nor is it required that the demon should at some time have made a pact that he would concur at the application of such a vain means; for by this very fact, that someone uses those vanities, the demon mixes himself in, although it is beyond the intention of the one using to invoke him" (III, 8).

n. ¶560.

III. Every pact with the demon is, of itself, a most grave sin. For in it there is participation or commerce with the sworn enemy of God, and divine honor is attributed to a creature, because that is expected from the creature which ought to be expected from God alone. Yet it can happen that an implicit pact does not exceed venial fault; namely if simplicity, ignorance (yet not crass or affected), defect of certain faith, absence of serious intention are present, for example when, by way of joke, public diviners are consulted on feast days and market days. In these matters generally the imperfection of the act excuses (III, 5, 7).

LET IT BE NOTED: 1. An implicit and explicit pact probably do not differ in species; yet per accidens there is often an obligation of explaining in confession whether the pact is explicit, because express invocation of the demon often has other sins joined to itself, for example heresy, idolatry, etc., and because it does not admit smallness of matter.

In doubt whether some effect proceeds from a natural cause or from superstition, it is presumed rather to proceed from a natural cause.¹ Thus the Doctors commonly teach with St. Thomas (2.2, q. 60, a. 4): "Where certain manifest indications concerning someone's malice do not appear, we ought to hold it as good, by interpreting what is doubtful toward the better part." Yet the Doctors rightly counsel that then a protestation be premised against the effect, if any superstition underlies it. The Holy Office also declared the same on July 26, 1899, as regards doubtful experiments of hypnotism (n. 570 bis).
If it is certainly or probably established that the effect does not proceed from a natural cause, in doubt whence it proceeds, it is judged rather to proceed from the demon than from God, since there is no divine promise about it (III, 20).

…and 45 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 7 passages

Vol. II, Tr. XI, Sect. II, Question I. On the Virtue of Religion (or on the First Three Precepts of the Decalogue)

n. ¶54.

Literature. St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 81-100; Suarez, De virtute religionis; Billuart, Tract. de religione et vitiis oppositis; Bouquillon, De virtute religionis (Bruges, 1880); John Baptist Wirthmüller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion (Freiburg, 1881); Tanquerey, Theol. mor. de virtute religionis.

We shall treat: 1. the nature of religion; 2. the diverse acts of religion; 3. the vices opposed to religion.

Vol. II, Tr. XI, Sect. II, Q. I, Chapter I. On the Nature of Religion

n. 323.

323. Name. It is obscure whence the name religion was taken. There are four principal etymological explanations: 1. Religion is derived from relegere, to read again. Thus Cicero.³ For we ought frequently to read again or revolve those things which pertain to divine worship. 2. The name religion is derived from reeligere, to choose again. Thus St. Augustine.⁴ For man ought to choose again the God whom he lost by sinning. 3. The name religion is taken from religare, to bind. Thus Lactantius.⁵ For through religion man is most greatly bound and fastened to God. 4. The name religion is derived from relinquere, to leave apart. Thus Massurius Sabinus.⁶ For those things which pertain to religion ought to be left apart or separated from profane things. Concerning these etymologies St. Thomas observes:⁷ "Whether religion is so called from frequent reading, or from the repeated choice of that which has been negligently lost, or from rebinding, religion properly imports an order to God. For he is the one to whom principally we ought to be bound as to an unfailing principle; to whom our choice also ought continually to be directed as to the ultimate end; whom we also lose negligently by sinning, and whom we ought to recover by believing and professing the faith."

³ De nat. deorum l. 2, c. 28.

⁴ De civ. Dei 10, 3.

⁵ Instit. 4, 28. The definition of Lactantius is more pleasing to Cajetan, Comm. in 2, 2, q. 81, a. 1.

⁶ In Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 4, 9.

⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 81, a. 1.

n. 324.

324. Diverse acceptations. There are very many diverse acceptations of religion, especially among non-Catholics. Thus, e.g., Schleiermacher, Jacobi, and many modern non-Catholics place religion in some sensation or affection of subjection toward some infinite Universe.⁸ The so-called "Societies of Ethical Culture" teach that religion is identified with natural morality, so that all religion consists in a good moral life, abstracting from every religious worship.⁹ Pantheists, Deists, and all who deny the existence of a personal God necessarily also deny true religion, so that Feuerbach did not blush to call religion a certain disease of man. Omitting all these false acceptations, concerning which apologists treat more broadly,¹⁰ Catholic authors employ the word religion principally in four ways:

In the objective sense, for a determinate manner of believing in or worshiping the Deity. Thus, e.g., we speak of the Mohammedan religion, the Jewish religion, pagan religions, etc., and the history of religions.
For the whole moral life. In this sense St. James says:¹¹ "Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world." In this sense we also call an upright and pious man religious.
For a special state of men, namely, those who by the public profession of the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience have been perpetually deputed to divine worship. Thus we speak of the religious institute of the Dominicans, the Franciscans, etc., or also of the religious state and religious profession.
For a special moral virtue, by which, namely, we offer to God the worship and service due to him.¹² We shall treat here only of this last acceptation, and thus religion can be defined:

⁸ Subjective feeling of dependence; feeling of the vigor of the divine life-impulse and source of will manifesting itself in man (Subjektives Abhängigkeitsgefühl; Gefühl von der Kräftigkeit des sich auswirkenden göttlichen Lebenstriebes und Willensquells im Menschen). Cf. A. Weiß, Die religiöse Gefahr (1904), part II, n. 39.

⁹ Cf. Weiß, l.c., part IV, n. 22.

¹⁰ Especially to be consulted is A. Weiß in the work cited, where nearly all false acceptations of religion are enumerated and refuted, especially part IV, n. 58ff.

¹¹ James 1:27.

¹² In the Greek language it is called eusebeia (εὐσέβεια), and in the German language, the virtue of the veneration or service of God (die Tugend der Gottesverehrung oder des Gottesdienstes), or more briefly, religiosity (die Religiosität).

n. 325.

325. Real definition. Religion is a moral virtue inclining us to offer due worship to God as our creator and governor, or as our supreme principle.

This definition is explained. It is said, 1. a moral virtue. For religion is neither a theological nor an intellectual virtue. And indeed: a) It is not a theological virtue, which has God himself directly as its formal object quod and quo. Thus, e.g., I believe the Trinity because of divine revelation; I love God because of the supreme divine goodness. But the direct object of religion is not God himself, but something created, namely, the worship to be offered to God. For the material object of the virtue of religion consists in those actions, whether internal or external, by which God is worshiped, i.e., by which we profess the divine excellence and our subjection; e.g., inclinations, genuflections, prayers, sacrifices, etc. The formal object quod is "at least an imperfect equality, which man establishes between himself and God through worship, or through actions by which he worships and reveres him as the first principle and supreme lord."¹³ For man, acknowledging that he is a creature made by the supreme and most excellent God, is bound to worship this God insofar as this is possible for him: that worship as due and proportioned to human powers is the formal object in the virtue of religion. Finally, the formal object sub quo, or the motive on account of which religion worships God, is the natural moral rectitude which is found in divine worship and which consists in this, that the creature reveres the divine excellence and manifests his subjection toward God.¹⁴ The special relation and difference between the virtues of religion and charity will be discussed below, n. 328. b) That the virtue of religion differs from the intellectual virtues of wisdom, understanding, knowledge, etc., is nearly evident of itself. For these virtues are only virtues in the broader sense and reside in the intellect, while the virtue of religion is a most excellent moral virtue and resides in the will. Although religion is not a theological virtue, it is very closely allied to the theological virtues; for it attains God mediately and offers him due worship because of the supreme divine excellence. Moreover, religion is a certain profession of our faith, hope, and charity; indeed, it sometimes commands even the acts of the theological virtues themselves in order to honor God. Hence it follows: a) that religion excels among the other moral virtues, because it approaches God more nearly than the other moral virtues;¹⁵ b) that sins which are directly opposed to the virtue of religion, such as blasphemy, perjury, etc., are worse than sins against the other moral virtues.

It is said, 2. inclining us to offer due worship to God; because due divine worship is the material object of the virtue of religion, as was said above.

It is said, 3. to God as our creator and governor, or as our supreme principle. Hence the Angelic Doctor says: "It belongs to religion to offer reverence to the one God according to one aspect, insofar, namely, as he is the first principle of the creation and government of things.... To these two belong all the acts which are attributed to religion; because through them all man professes the divine excellence and his own subjection to God, either by offering something to him [e.g., in sacrifices], or also by assuming something divine" [e.g., the invocation of the divine name in an oath].¹⁶

¹³ Billuart, De relig. diss. 1, a. 2.

¹⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 81, a. 5.

¹⁵ Cf. ibid., a. 6.

¹⁶ Cf. ibid., a. 3, corp. and ad 2.

n. 326.

326. Subject of the virtue of religion. A twofold subject is distinguished: remote and proximate. The remote subject of some virtue is those persons or beings in which the virtue is found; but the proximate subject is that power of the soul in which the virtue resides.

a) The remote subject of the virtue of religion cannot be: 1. animals and other irrational beings. The reason is that they do not know the divine excellence. But if in Sacred Scripture they are sometimes invited to worship God, e.g., in the Canticle of the Three Children, "All ye fowls of heaven, bless the Lord," these expressions are merely metaphorical, signifying the overflowing fervor of the man praying and praising God. 2. The devil and the damned; for they indeed know the excellence of God, but they hate it and are unwilling to submit themselves to God. 3. All sinners who remain in the formal sin of irreligion. For irreligion is a vice directly opposed to religion. But it is impossible for a virtue and its opposite vice to be simultaneously in the same subject.

All other men, however, and the angels and the souls in purgatory can be the subject of religion. Even Christ as true man had and exercised the virtue of religion throughout his whole life, but especially in the sacrifice of the cross.

b) The proximate subject of the virtue of religion is neither the intellect, nor the concupiscible part, nor the irascible part, but the will. The reason is: a) because the object of religion is not the true, nor the moderation of the passions, but a spiritual good; b) because the two principal acts of the virtue of religion, namely, to revere the excellence of God and to subject oneself to the dominion of God, are acts elicited by the will, which nevertheless presuppose a twofold knowledge, namely, of the most excellent divine majesty and of our lowliness. Religion, although it resides in the will, nevertheless often commands acts of other powers and virtues, e.g., the act of the intellect in prayer, the acts of the bodily powers in genuflection and other external acts of divine veneration, the act of fasting, which belongs to the virtue of temperance, for worshiping God, etc.¹⁷

¹⁷ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 81, a. 4. Concerning the response to objection 2 of this article Cajetan subtly notes: "Therefore many external acts, such as sacrifices and ceremonies, and internal acts of other powers, such as prayer, are proper, immediate, and elicited acts of religion, although they are only commanded acts of the will, in which religion exists subjectively."

n. 327.

327. The necessity of religion arises from both natural law and positive divine law. And first, indeed, from natural law; for by the very fact that man knows the personal God, the most excellent Lord of heaven and earth, and his own dependence upon this God, he is impelled to worship him. Therefore St. Thomas rightly teaches: "It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that man should do certain things for divine reverence."¹⁸ Hence religion is found everywhere on earth among all peoples, even among those destitute of so-called civilization. The positive divine law of both the Old and the New Testament prescribes the worship of God in many places. Through the ceremonial precepts in the Old Testament, the worship of God was most precisely ordered; but in the New Testament the sacrifice of the Mass was instituted as the principal manner of worshiping God. Likewise, the sacraments instituted by Christ are referred to the worship of God.

Extent of religion. Religion demands the worship of God both internal and external and sometimes public.

Internal worship is owed to God, because the homage of the soul is the chief thing, and without it all other things are of no avail. Therefore Christ says: "God is a spirit; and they that adore him must adore him in spirit and in truth."¹⁹
External worship is owed to God, because the whole man, i.e., consisting of body and soul, depends upon God the creator and governor; and consequently the whole man also, according to body and mind, ought to revere God. Moreover, there is so close a connection between body and soul that the internal affections of the soul spontaneously overflow into bodily actions, and conversely, internal affections are excited and fostered by external signs and actions.²⁰ For daily experience proves that, when religious ceremonies are worthily performed, Christian men are powerfully stirred to internal religious affections. Therefore external rites are employed in all religions, and Innocent XI rightly condemned the delusion of Michael Molinos and the Quietists, who taught: "Everything sensible which we experience in the spiritual life is abominable, filthy, and unclean."²¹
Public worship of God, i.e., that which is performed in the name of the Church by persons legitimately deputed for this and through acts determined by the Church,²² is also sometimes necessary, because man is a social animal and because the Church was founded as a visible society. But a visible society cannot persist unless it sometimes exercises its acts in public or in common. Therefore public divine worship arises from human nature itself and from the institution of the Church, and it greatly fosters the fervor of each Christian.

¹⁸ S. theol., l.c., a. 2 ad 3.

¹⁹ John 4:24.

²⁰ Cf. S. theol., l.c., a. 7.

²¹ Condemned proposition 30 (Denz. n. 1250). The necessity of external worship is denied not only by the Quietists, but also by nearly all those who place the whole of religion in a pure feeling of subjection. They are accustomed to call external worship vain formalities (eitlen Formelkram).

²² Cf. Code of Canon Law, canon 1256.

Vol. II, Tr. XI, Sect. II, Q. I, Chapter II. On the Acts of the Virtue of Religion

n. ¶55.

The principal acts of religion are devotion, prayer, adoration, sacrifice, the use of the sacraments, a vow, an oath, adjuration, and the sanctification of certain days. Sacrifice and the sacraments will be discussed in the special treatise on the sacraments. The remaining acts must now be treated.

Konings, Theologia Moralis

Anthony Konings, C.SS.R. — 275 passages

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE

As the Symbol is the epitome of things to be believed, so the Decalogue is the epitome of things to be done. For it comprehends the ten precepts handed down by God to Moses on Mount Sinai, in which all the duties of man which the natural law prescribes are contained more or less openly. The first three immediately regard God, the remaining ones are referred to the neighbor.

n. ¶2.

ON THE FIRST PRECEPT OF THE DECALOGUE.

I am the Lord thy God.... Thou shalt not have strange gods.¹

This precept, insofar as it is affirmative, prescribes in the first place the acts of Religion, by which the worship owed to the Divinity is rendered; insofar as it is negative, it prohibits vices opposed to Religion.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. I, Art. I, OR ON WORSHIP

n. ¶322.

- Acts of the virtue of religion come under the general name of worship.

But worship is defined: the complex of those acts by which we bear witness to the infinite excellence of God, and show service to Him.

Division. - A. By reason of mode: 1) it is internal or external, insofar as it is shown either by internal powers of the soul or by external powers of the body. Writers of Speculative Theology show that both are owed to God.

External worship is either private or public, according as it is shown in the name and authority of the Church and in the form prescribed by her, or not. Therefore that worship will be private to which one of these conditions is lacking. Thus, for example, a layman reciting the Divine Office shows only private worship, because, although he observes the form prescribed by the Church, nevertheless he does not act in the name and authority of the Church; nor will it cease to be private, although all the laymen of some whole parish publicly in the church commonly recite prayers approved by the Church. On the contrary, it will be public, although a subdeacon recites the Divine Office privately; for the former do not act in the name of the Church, although they act publicly; but the latter acts both in the name of the Church and in the form prescribed by her, although he acts privately. - Public worship is also, and indeed properly, called liturgical.

n. ¶323.

- The form prescribed by the Church:

Comprehends two things, namely words (for example, of prayers) by which, and rite (for example, extension of the hands) by which worship is to be shown.
It has either a natural or a symbolic sense. Thus, for example, the corporal and pall, according to the Pontifical de Consec. corporal., symbolically signify the clean linen cloth concerning which in Matthew.
It must not be posited as merely external, or outside every connection with internal worship.
It is worthy of the highest veneration.²
It must be sought from the liturgical books and from the decrees of the Sacred Congregation of Rites.

n. ¶324.

- Liturgical words 1) are either from God, as the forms of the Sacraments, the most holy Name of Jesus, Lessons from Sacred Scripture in the Breviary and Mass, Psalms and Canticles; - or from the Church, as Collects, Hymns, the Doxology, Lessons of the Breviary, shorter Prayers.

They must not be pronounced in the vernacular tongue.¹
They must be pronounced and sung in the mode prescribed by the Church.²

A liturgical action or rite, like words, is either from Christ the Lord, as the essential rite of the Sacrifice of the Mass - which action must be called by excellence - and the proximate matter of the Sacraments; or from the Church, as the Sign of the Cross; the use of candles, incense, blessed water; various gestures, as genuflection, inclination of the head, etc.

n. ¶325.

- B. By reason of the object which is worshiped, worship is 1) of latria or of dulia; 2) direct or relative.

The worship of latria is the same as adoration strictly taken (worship), or honor shown to God because of His highest excellence and supreme dominion. The worship of dulia (veneration) is shown to Saints and Angels. This again is distinguished as twofold, namely hyperdulia, which is rendered to the Blessed Virgin Mary alone, and simple dulia, which is rendered to other Saints and Angels.

Note. - Among the Saints, Cornelius a Lapide³ contends not undeservedly that the worship of dulia, highest after the Blessed Virgin Mary, is owed to St. Joseph; and 150 of the Fathers of the Vatican Council requested from the Sacred Congregation of Rites that this be decreed for the Spouse of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Thus far, however, it has not been decreed.

Direct worship, which is also called absolute, is that which is shown to someone because of the gifts with which he is endowed; such is rendered not only to God, but also to the Saints. For these truly possess excellent gifts on account of which they are to be honored. Relative worship is rendered to certain things because of the relation which they have to God or to the Saints; thus the cross, the image of Christ, the images and relics of the Saints are worshiped.

n. ¶326.

- Concerning the worship of the Saints these things are to be held.

I. By divine law only acts of dulia are to be shown to them.

II. By ecclesiastical law these acts are to be shown according to the laws of the Church, the principal of which are the following.

A. Let public worship not be shown to them before it is established by the judgment of the Church that such worship can be shown to them, or before they have been beatified or canonized by her. That this would thereafter be done by the Supreme Pontiff alone was established by Alexander III in the twelfth century; but Urban VIII prescribed the rules according to which it ought to be done today. The sum of these rules is this. Men who depart from this life with a reputation of sanctity are called Servants of God, and without any permission of ecclesiastical power they can be called so. Private worship can be shown to these. The Ordinaries of those dioceses in which the Servant of God dwelt longer, or did greater things for God, inquire into the reputation of sanctity. When this inquiry, which comes under the name of the Ordinary Process, has been duly performed, the cause is referred to the Holy See; if it is admitted by the latter, the Apostolic Process is said to be introduced, and from then the title Venerable Servant of God is assigned to the Servant of God. The principal end of the Apostolic Process is to inquire whether it is established concerning the theological and cardinal virtues, and the virtues annexed to them, of the Venerable Servant of God N. N. in a heroic degree, and concerning two miracles; if these are established, Beatification follows through the Supreme Pontiff himself. Public worship can be shown to those beatified, yet restricted, both as to the kingdoms, provinces, dioceses, or Orders in which, and as to the mode in which, it is permitted by decrees, whether general - especially those of Alexander VII, dated 27 Sept. 1659 - or special. Beatification, after two other miracles have been approved, if nothing stands in the way, is followed by Canonization, by which the restrictions placed upon the public worship of those Beatified are removed. The Process described thus far is called formal; but equivalent is that by which the worship shown to some Servant of God from immemorial time is confirmed by the Holy See.

n. ¶327.

- B. Concerning the public worship of Relics these things especially are to be noted.

By Relics of Saints and Blessed are understood: a) in the stricter sense, their bodies and even the smallest parts of the body, likewise oil or another liquid sometimes flowing from them; b) in the broader sense, all things which the Saints used in life, as garments, books, etc.; likewise instruments of punishments and mortifications; c) in the broadest sense, all things which have touched either the body, or the sepulcher, or other Relics of a Saint; likewise oil from a lamp hung before the sepulcher, and dust from the place where they are preserved.
From the Relics of Saints the Relics of the Lord must be carefully distinguished, that is, drops of the Blood of Christ; instruments of His passion, as thorns from the Crown, nails, lance, etc. To these, as to Relics of the Most Holy Cross, at least more distinguished worship must be shown. As specifically regards a particle from the wood of the Most Holy Cross, these things are to be observed: a) The practice of separating it from Relics of Saints is right.¹ b) If it has been exposed in the principal place above the altar, those passing before it ought to bend one knee before it, and Mass before it is to be celebrated as before the enclosed Sacrament; but if it is enclosed in a case, those passing before it incline the head.² c) Where immemorial usage carries this, it can be carried processionally under a baldachin, with two thurifers incensing, and with head uncovered; and d) after the procession or exposition, before it is placed away, the Officiant standing incenses it with three swings; then, having assumed the humeral veil and made a genuflection of one knee, he blesses the people with it, saying nothing.³
Distinguished Relics of Saints are the whole body of a Saint or a great part of the same, namely the head, arm, or leg, but these whole, that is, consisting of the two principal bones (not, however, the bones of the thigh),⁴ or that part of the body in which a Martyr suffered, provided it is whole and not small.⁵
Relics of Saints are to be venerated not only with religious worship, or worship commanded by the virtue of religion - as are the bodies of those dying in communion with the Church - but also with sacred worship;⁶ yet not public worship, unless their authenticity has been approved by the Ordinary of the place where they are to be worshiped,⁷ and this although they have already been recognized at Rome or by another Bishop; for it belongs to the Ordinary to see that no fraud creeps in and to inspect whether they have truly been approved at Rome.⁸
Relics must be preserved: a) any Relics whatever outside the tabernacle; b) distinguished Relics near the high altar or in another conspicuous place of the church, but not in private houses or among laymen, unless there is question of great princes or principal prelates of the Church.
Relics are not to be exposed: a) above the tabernacle in which the most august Sacrament is preserved, in such a way that the tabernacle serves as a base for them;¹ b) before the little door of the same tabernacle, or in another manner by which simple persons can be induced to adore Relics for the Blessed Sacrament; c) outside a case, unless, beyond the lamp, two lights continually burn on the altar;² d) unless the one exposing them (and replacing them) is vested with surplice and also stole,³ and, if he blesses the people with the relics, also with the humeral veil. But the blessing must be done without chant, saying nothing, after the Relics have been incensed with a double swing, with incense not blessed; e) with the Blessed Sacrament on the same altar.
In processions the relics of canonized Saints can be carried, but a) not under a baldachin; b) with head uncovered (yet the Bishop with miter); c) not in the procession of the Blessed Sacrament, unless by force of an Indult or custom.
Of a Saint whose distinguished Relic is had, the Office can be made and Mass celebrated, provided he is found in the Roman Martyrology.

n. ¶328.

- C. Concerning the worship of images hold these things.

Among images representing the same object, some can be worshiped more specially: a) those blessed; b) those which at the same time are Relics, as the image of the Blessed Virgin Mary which is said to have been painted by St. Luke; c) those illustrious by miracles,⁴ and copies of them, as is clear from the practice of the Church.
It is not licit to expose in churches images: a) of Servants of God not yet canonized or beatified, especially with rays or signs of sanctity.⁵ But Beatified persons are to be painted with rays only; canonized persons, however, with a diadem around the head; b) furnishing occasion of false dogma and of error dangerous to the uneducated, of which sort, nevertheless, the images of the Most Holy Trinity generally are not;¹ c) unusual ones, unless they have been approved by the Bishop; d) painted or adorned with provocative beauty, or in which something profane or immodest appears; e) unless every superstition, base gain, and whatever is disordered or accommodated perversely and tumultuously is avoided.²
Images are worshiped in the same way as Relics, except that a blessing is not given with them, nor is an Office made or Mass celebrated of them, unless they have been specially conceded. They are not carried in a procession with the Blessed Sacrament, outside the case of an Indult or custom.

n. ¶329.

On veneration owed to places and things, whether sacred or religious.

Principles. - I. Places and things become sacred either by consecration, or by a blessing not simply invocative, but constitutive or consecrative, concerning which n. 1247, I. What places and things are to be consecrated or blessed, and by what reason they are polluted or execrated, see ibid., V, and n. 1329, q. 4°, q. 5°.

II. They ought to be 1) agreeable to liturgical prescriptions; 2) if it can be done, precious; or 3) at least decent and clean.

III. They are to be treated reverently, in a sense both negative and positive. 1) Negatively, so that they serve neither for superstitious, nor for indecent, nor, if there is question of things sacred by blessing, as above, for profane uses.³

a) Hence it is not licit in churches, after they have been consecrated or even only blessed, to conduct secular judgments, secular⁴ or political⁵ meetings, or, among us, for laymen⁶ to speak to the people without permission of the Ordinary; to have rooms above their lateral chapels, in which daily celebration occurs, for living or sleeping; indeed private oratories also ought to be free from all domestic uses.

b) Those things which can no longer serve the use for which they are destined must be withdrawn from it in a decent manner. Thus 1° the place of a ruined church which can in no way be repaired can be converted to profane, indeed, but not sordid uses; yet with a cross erected there,¹ which erection of a cross, if it cannot be done without danger of sacrilege, almost to be feared among non-Catholics among us, is to be omitted; 2° each year the Sacred Oils are to be burned (and the ashes thrown into the sacrarium); likewise vestments after they have been worn out, unless nevertheless they are used for making or repairing other things;² 3° baptismal water on Holy Saturday and on the Vigil of Pentecost, after new water has been blessed, is to be poured into the sacrarium; 4° chalice and paten can be newly gilded and repaired by laymen without permission of the Bishop.³

Positively, or holy things in a holy manner; concerning which in their places.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. I, ARTICLE II: ON THE ACTS OF THE VIRTUE OF RELIGION IN SPECIES

The principal acts of Religion are adoration, prayer, sacrifice, vow, oath, and the sanctification of certain days.... Of the last three there will be discussion under the second and third precepts. Of sacrifice, in the Treatise on the Eucharist. Of adoration, there was discussion in the article immediately preceding, I. Therefore here there is treatment only:

n. ¶2.

On Prayer.

n. ¶330.

Definition. - Prayer, taken more broadly, is the elevation of the mind to God, or any pious affection of the soul toward God and supernatural things. But in the stricter sense it is the petition of becoming things from God. - St. Thom.⁴

Division. It is 1° mental or vocal, according as it is performed by the mind alone, or the concepts of the mind are also expressed by the mouth; - 2° private or public, according as it is made by a private person and in a private name, or in community or by the authority and name of the Church. Yet that which is made in community is not by this very fact and in this sense public, so that it can be called liturgical (n. 322).

Principles. - I. Prayer is necessary for all adults by necessity of precept, indeed also by necessity of means. - 1° This is evinced from innumerable places of Sacred Scripture, for example, "Watch ye and pray."¹ - "It is necessary always to pray and not to faint."² - 2° Because prayer is the ordinary means established by God for obtaining necessary graces: "Ask, and you shall receive."³ - St. Alph.⁴

II. The precept of praying obliges frequently, as is clear from the cited texts, yet not without interruption, which is impossible to human weakness. - Therefore the words, "It is necessary always to pray," according to the common interpretation of Doctors, signify that one must pray frequently at an opportune time, and never cease from weariness, torpor, or dejection of soul; or also that our actions are generally to be directed to God.

III. Prayer which someone performs for himself, or, according to many,⁵ for others not placing an obstacle, endowed with the due conditions, has infallible efficacy from the promise of Christ. "Every one that asketh receiveth,"⁶ etc. - "If you ask the Father anything in my name, he will give it you."⁷

But the necessary conditions are that it be made: 1° piously, devoutly, and attentively; - 2° with perseverance; - 3° with humility and confidence; - 4° about things necessary or useful.

Temporal things ought not to be asked except with a condition, at least implicit, namely insofar as they can contribute to the salvation of the soul.

n. ¶331.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° When does the necessity of prayer urge?

Resp. 1° It urges of itself frequently, so that it cannot be omitted for a notable time without grave sin; the time of one or certainly of two months is reputed notable. - Suarez, Lessius, etc. 2° At the instant of the use of reason. 3° At the article of death. Besides, the confessor, as Doctors hold, ought to be more solicitous in inculcating the necessity of praying frequently than in determining the grave fault of omitted prayer.

Resp. 2° It urges by accident: 1° in grave temptation which cannot easily be repelled in another way; 2° in public calamities; 3° as often as another precept is to be fulfilled for which prayer is necessary, for example if Sacraments are to be received; 4° as often as some special divine help seems necessary to us.

n. ¶332.

- Quaer. 2° Does he sin who omits morning or evening prayers?

Resp. Negatively, precisely of itself, if they are omitted only sometimes. The reason is that there is no law which prescribes determined prayers on individual days and at certain hours. Yet some observe that rarely is some fault of negligence and sloth absent.

Besides, in practice those who rather often omit those prayers cannot be excused altogether from some fault, both because perhaps they in no way pray at another time or in another mode, and thus they will sometimes be lacking to the precept of prayer; and because, on account of the dangers which occur daily, when prayer is neglected, they fall into many sins.

Quaer. 3° In what way does one distracted voluntarily in prayer sin?

Resp. Of itself he sins venially as often as he is voluntarily distracted without a just reason, and this holds even if the prayer is made without obligation; because he inflicts some irreverence on God. - Elbel.¹

n. ¶333.

- Quaer. 4° For whom must one pray?

Resp. 1° For ourselves; 2° for all men, wayfarers, even infidels; 3° for souls detained in purgatory. This is derived 1° from the general law of Charity; 2° from the words of St. Paul:² "I desire therefore, first of all, that supplications, prayers, intercessions, thanksgivings be made for all men, for kings," etc.; ... nor are enemies to be excepted, as is clear from the words of Christ:³ "Pray for them that persecute and calumniate you."

Quaer. 5° Whom besides God can we pray to?

Resp. The Blessed Virgin Mary, as our mediatrix; the Angels, as guardians of men; all the Saints and friends of God, as our intercessors before Him. Privately, baptized infants and those dead before the use of reason can also be invoked; and the same must more probably be said of souls detained in purgatory.

But the invocation of Saints is of counsel, not of precept, since Trent¹ only says that it is good and useful to invoke them. Yet he will seem very careless of his salvation who never invokes the Blessed Virgin Mary, since by a peculiar and wonderful providence she has been constituted our mediatrix.

Note. - On 16 June 1880 "the Sacred Congregation of Rites considered it of its office to warn the Most Reverend Ordinaries of places that they not allow other Litanies to be recited publicly except" those of the Most Holy Name, those of the Blessed Virgin Mary called the Lauretane, and those of the Saints, "or others, if any have been recognized and approved by the Sacred Roman and Universal Inquisition; and at the same time they should beware" (be cautious) "of subjoining their approbation for printing to those books in which Litanies are found lacking apostolic sanction." - According to the periodical of Innsbruck "fur kath. Theol." for 1881, p. 573, the Sacred Congregation responded to some Bishops of Germany inquiring about the sense of this Monitum, that it had wished to keep Litanies not approved by the Holy See away only from Liturgical offices, not, however, to prohibit their approbation by Bishops, nor the custom of some places of reciting publicly (that is, commonly indeed in church, yet outside Liturgical offices) Litanies approved by the Ordinaries.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, CHAPTER II: ON VICES OPPOSED TO RELIGION

The vices opposed to Religion are: 1° superstition by excess; 2° irreligiosity by defect.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. II, ARTICLE I: ON SUPERSTITION

"Superstition," says St. Thomas,² "is a vice opposed to religion according to excess; not because it shows more in divine worship than true religion, but because it shows divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in the manner in which it ought not."

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. II, Art. I, § I. On Idolatry

n. ¶334.

- Idolatry is an action by which worship owed to God alone is rendered to a creature; and this happens not only by sacrifice, but by any sign of honor by which someone intends to submit himself to a creature as to God, for example by genuflection.

Idolatry is distinguished as twofold, namely: 1° Material or simulated, when someone without internal affection, from grave fear, shows worship to an idol. It would also be called material if it proceeded from invincible error, for example if someone, falsely thinking a host to be consecrated, were to adore it. - In the first case it would be a mortal sin; in the second, none, as is clear.

2° Formal and proper, which is done 1° by adoring a creature as God; 2° by showing worship to a demon or another creature as if to God, or at least from the mind of obtaining something from such a creature which can be asked from God alone.³

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. II, Art. I, § II. On Vain Observance

n. ¶335.

- Vain observance is superstition which employs means neither proportioned nor instituted by God for obtaining a certain effect.

It is of three kinds, namely: 1° Notory art, or the art of acquiring knowledge without labor. 2° Art of healings, or the art of healing by various signs or sacred things. 3° Observance of events, by which from consideration of some fortuitous event it is conjectured that something favorable or unfavorable will be in the future.¹

Principles. - I. Vain observance is a grave sin, because it attributes divine honor to a creature, while it expects from it what must be expected from God alone; and because it rests upon an implicit pact with a demon. Yet it can often be venial from imperfection of the act, from simplicity, from some ignorance, or from timidity, as happens especially among the uneducated in the observance of events.²

II. Vain observance is discerned especially: 1° from the insufficiency of the cause for naturally producing the effect; 2° from the joining of a vain or false circumstance as if necessarily required; 3° from the infallibility which is attributed to means in no way infallible.³

III. In doubt whether effects proceed from a natural cause or from a demon, they can be attributed to the powers of nature; and therefore it is licit to procure them, because it is not established that the thing is evil. Yet Doctors counsel a previous protestation against any intervention of a demon. - But in doubt whether effects are produced by a demon or by God, if there is present a certain probability that they cannot proceed from a natural cause, they are to be attributed to the demon, unless the sanctity of the one working or other clear signs persuade the contrary, because it is rash to think that miracles are always occurring. Hence it is not then licit to try whether the effect is going to follow or not. - St. Alph.,¹ St. Thom.,² and others commonly.

n. ¶336.

You will resolve. - 1° Those are guilty of superstition who wear ligatures marked with certain characters; who invoke certain unknown names, or employ a certain number of crosses or prayers for healing wounds, for rendering themselves invulnerable, ... etc.²

2° Likewise those who wear certain prayers, expecting an effect altogether infallible from them. - Yet those are not to be blamed, indeed are very much to be praised, who wear pious medals, sacred images, or Relics of Saints, hoping that they will specially obtain divine help for themselves.³

3° Likewise those are guilty of superstition who regard certain days as favorable and others as unfavorable, so that they direct their actions from this; or who for expelling diseases require herbs gathered on such a feast, ... etc.⁴

4° But it is not superstitious to observe the moon or times more suitable for gathering herbs, cutting trees, etc.; ... nor to wear sacred things or words of Sacred Scripture for the honor of God or the Saints and for imploring their help. Likewise neither to recite a certain number of prayers, nor to do all those things which can increase devotion, provided that an infallible power is not attributed to them.⁵

5° Nor is it in any way superstitious, indeed it is very religious and pious, to recite novena prayers, or to repeat prayers so many times in worship of Our Lord, or of the Blessed Virgin, or of some Saint, provided that an infallible power is not attached to such a number, to a certain day, or to a fixed time.⁷

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. II, Art. I, § III. On Divination

n. ¶337.

Definition. - Divination is the inquiry of hidden things by the help of a demon.

Division. It is 1° express, if it is done through the express invocation of a demon; 2° tacit, if that invocation is only in disproportionate means.

Various kinds of divination are distinguished, of which sort are especially: 1° Judicial Astrology from the stars; 2° Augury from the song or flight of birds; - 3° Auspice from the song of birds; - 4° Haruspicy from the entrails of animals; - 5° Chiromancy from the lines of the hand; - 6° Geomancy from signs in the earth; - 7° Omen from a fortuitous event; - 8° Necromancy from invocation of a dead person; - 9° Oneiromancy from dreams; - 10° Sortilege from lots; - 11° Oracle from idols; - 12° Vaticination from prophets or cards.¹

n. ¶338.

Principles. - I. Whatever of hidden things is known in another way than by revelation or by natural means must be attributed to divination; for no other means is given for investigating hidden things. - But in doubt whether knowledge arises from natural means or not, whether from a good or from a bad spirit, the rules set forth above concerning vain observance must be applied (n. 335, II).

II. Express divination can never be excused from mortal sin, not even through ignorance; for it is clear that a pact with a demon, or to invoke him, even without a pact, is something most gravely illicit.

This is clearly established from Sacred Scripture, Deut. 18. 10; Lev. 20. 6.

III. But tacit divination can sometimes be excused from mortal sin because of simplicity or ignorance, or because of defect of certain faith.²

n. ¶339.

You will resolve. - 1° He is not free from grave fault who, using disproportionate means for some knowledge, protests that he intends no commerce with a demon; for he acts against his protestation, and implicitly invokes the demon, since neither God nor the Angels mix themselves with such things. - Yet otherwise in doubt whether the effect is had from a natural cause, as was said concerning vain observance³ (n. 335, II).

2° Natural effects must be carefully distinguished from free effects; for the former can often be conjectured, as, for example, from the song and flight of birds, or from the aspect of the stars, one conjectures storm, rain, or serenity of the sky, etc.; for by experience it is established that there is a natural connection among these things. But one must speak otherwise of the latter.

3° Character or state of soul can sometimes in some way be conjectured from the color of the face or other external signs, although in practice for the most part one must abstain from such conjectures because of the danger of rash judgment. But free acts, whether past or future, can never be known with certainty.

4° Those sin gravely who inquire from diviners about their future fortune or life (in English: to consult fortune-tellers; card-cutting); unless they act from simplicity, jest, or from cause of curiosity, without giving faith to the things said.¹ - Yet if the diviner does this seriously, they can with difficulty be excused from gravely culpable cooperation.

n. ¶340.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is the use of lots ever licit?

Resp. 1° Dividing lots, by which it is discerned what is to be assigned to each in settling lawsuits or in distributing things, are certainly licit, since they are entirely free from all superstition.

Resp. 2° Consultory lots, by which the divine will is investigated so that it may be known what is to be done, are not licit unless they are made by a special impulse of God, or there is question of a grave affair in which another counsel is lacking. The reason is that, according to ordinary providence, God does not will that inquiry be made in this way about His will, but recourse must be had to prudent men or ecclesiastical Superiors.

Resp. 3° Divinatory lots, by which the manifestation of a hidden thing is sought, for example from the casting of dice, etc., ... are always gravely illicit, as containing at least tacit invocation of a demon. Superstition of this sort is properly called sortilege, by which name also other kinds of superstitions commonly come.²

n. ¶341.

- Quaer. 2° Is it licit to conjecture future things from dreams?

Resp. Negatively, ordinarily, because dreams almost always proceed from natural causes, for example from the stirring of humors, etc. ... Besides, dreams sent by God are very rare, and are joined with signs through which they can be certainly discerned from natural or diabolical dreams.³

Quaer. 3° Is the use of a divining rod licit?

Resp. 1° Certainly it is to be condemned as often as the rod is moved or not moved according to the mere intention of him who holds it in his hand, and is not moved in the presence of another thing not sought, although of the same nature. For there is no proportion between a natural thing and the intention of man. Hence those sin gravely who use a rod for seeking a thief, or for detecting the stone marking the boundary of a field.¹

Resp. 2° To some the use of the rod for detecting waters or metals does not seem certainly to be condemned, if the rod is moved over these things in every case equally, whether they are sought or not. Yet a protestation against diabolical operation, which perhaps can be present, will prudently be made, and every superstitious spirit must be excluded.³

n. ¶342.

- Quaer. 4° Is Magnetism licit?

Preliminary note. A threefold principal effect or degree is attributed to Magnetism: a) the state of sleep, by which the senses are lulled, as in natural sleep, but often so that "neither the greatest crash reaches the ears of the one lulled, nor can any violence of iron or fire excite him." Thus the Postulate of the Bishop of Lausanne, 19 May 1841; b) the state of somnambulism, in which someone, although he is altogether destitute of the use of the senses, nevertheless sees, hears, speaks, and responds to all things about which he is interrogated; c) the state of clear intuition, or wonderful knowledge of one's own or another's state, and of remedies suitable to illnesses, as well as vision of the actions of other men, even far distant, and of all things which are done both near and far.

Resp. Theologians formerly went off into three opinions, of which the first ascribes all, the second none, the third some of its effects to the devil. This third opinion can no longer be approved practically, and the first seems altogether to have to be admitted. For the simple will, or intention of the magnetizer, or even the consent of the magnetized person joined to this will, is declared to be either the sole or certainly the primary cause of all and individual of these three effects; but this cause is altogether disproportionate to individual effects. For that cause cannot be called proportionate: 1) the will with its immanent acts, because the whole power of an immanent act is consumed in the will itself, and does not pass over to an effect extrinsic to itself; nor 2) the will using the ministry of another power, because thus it is circumscribed by the faculty of that other power, so that the effect cannot exceed the faculty itself of this other power. (In what way, for example, will a Magnetizer who endeavors to know some matter which he is ignorant of be able to transmit knowledge of this thing into the magnetized person?) - nor 3) a fluid, because between a spiritual and a material substance there is no medium. Therefore these words of the Encyclical of the Holy Congregation of the Inquisition, dated 4 Aug. 1856 (see p. XLIX), can be applied to each degree: "In all these things, whatever art or illusion" (namely the magnetizers) "may use, since physical means are ordered to non-natural effects" (of which sort is also sleep, as described above), "there is found deception altogether illicit and heretical, and" (which ordinarily is present in the manner of magnetizing) "scandal against uprightness of morals." Wherefore we think that one must altogether subscribe to these words of the illustrious Perrone:¹ "Although not a few Catholics have judged and still judge that in general the use itself of magnetism was proscribed and eliminated by the Church, yet there are not lacking those, and learned and pious ones, who deny this. Nevertheless we are persuaded that, if not theoretically, yet practically, magnetism of this sort was and is disapproved by the same Apostolic See."

Nor does the declaration of the same Sacred Congregation of the Inquisition, 28 July 1847, stand in the way: "With every error, sortilege, explicit or implicit invocation of a demon removed, the use of Magnetism, namely the mere act of employing physical means otherwise licit, is not morally forbidden." For the Sacred Congregation, as consultants of the same Holy Congregation have often holily testified, never instituted any examination about the physical question of this magnetism.

Hence precisely it will not be licit to consult magnetizers even about the nature of illnesses, so that it may be discerned what cure is to be applied to them. For unless, as we saw in n. 335. III, there is present a certain probability that certain effects proceed from a natural cause, it is not licit, not even with protestation against any intervention of a demon, to employ means even only doubtfully superstitious; but the effects of magnetism, far from being certainly or probably to be said to proceed from a natural cause, rather are to be attributed to a demon according to things commonly happening. Therefore practically, etc. - It is added that, as will soon be said, it cannot be asked from a magician that he remove a spell unless it can reasonably be presumed that he knows natural means for this. Therefore likewise remedies for illness must not be sought from magnetism unless it can reasonably be presumed that they are to be known in a natural way; but certainly the contrary must be presumed. Therefore. Cf. Capellm. p. 37 sqq.

Quaer. 5° What about Spiritism?

Resp. It is certain today that turning or knocking tables and the other means which Spiritism uses are partly deceitful tricks, partly diabolical superstitions,¹ and therefore that it is illicit either to try the operations of Spiritism, or to approve them, or to favor them in any way, for example by being present.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. II, Art. I, § IV. On Magic And Malefice

n. ¶343.

I. - Magic, taken broadly, or natural or artificial magic, which is called white magic, is the art of doing wonderful things, at least apparently, through natural causes or the industry of man, without any ministry of a demon.

Magic, strictly said, is the art of doing wonderful things which, although they are not supernatural, nevertheless surpass the powers of man, and therefore can happen by the help of a demon alone, explicitly or implicitly invoked.

II. Malefice is the art of harming with the intervention of a demon. It is distinguished as twofold, namely amatory and venomous. Amatory malefice, or a love potion, is a diabolical art by which lubricous love or hatred in some person toward another is vehemently excited, by changing the imagination and exciting it more vividly, by showing more beautiful appearances, and by moving libidinous humors. Venomous malefice is precisely the art of harming the neighbor by the help of a demon, and this in various ways, for example by illnesses, stupidity, etc.²

Malefice is commonly called sortilege, because through it an evil lot is cast upon those against whom vengeance is exercised through diabolical operation. Hence in Canon Law and in ecclesiastical history magicians and witches are called male and female sorcerers.

n. ¶344.

You will resolve. - 1° Magic does not differ from vain observance except in that its effects are more wonderful, for example the changing of bodies, etc. But in moral species it differs neither from vain observance nor from divination; because it matters little whether knowledge of hidden things or wonderful effects are sought from a demon.

2° But malefice differs in species from other superstitions, because beyond the sin opposed to Religion it adds damage to the neighbor.

3° Amatory malefice does not induce one necessarily to perpetrating a sin of luxury, because it does not remove liberty, but only vehemently excites to lust toward some determined person, by changing the imagination and exciting it more vividly, by presenting more beautiful appearances, and by moving libidinous humors.¹

Quaer. Can it be asked from a magician that he remove a malefice?

Resp. Negatively, unless it can reasonably be presumed that he knows natural means for this. - Thus commonly Theologians.² Cf. n. 319.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. II, ARTICLE II: ON IRRELIGIOSITY

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Fifth Part: On the Virtues…, Section A: On Religion Acc…, Question One: On the Essence of Religion · Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Fifth Part: On the Virtues…, Section A: On Religion Acc…, Question Two: On the Object of Religion or Divine Worship

Irreligiosity is special irreverence which is inflicted on God, either immediately in Himself, or mediately in persons or sacred things. Its principal species are tempting God, sacrilege, simony, blasphemy, and perjury. Of the two last there will be discussion in the second precept.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. II, Art. II, § I. On Temptation Of God

n. ¶345.

- Temptation of God is a word or deed for taking an experiment about God through an extraordinary effect rashly expected from Him. - Thus the common doctrine with St. Thom.³

But it proceeds from a twofold vice, namely either from infidelity, when someone doubting about some perfection of God says or does something with the mind of obtaining from God a manifestation of that perfection, and this is called formal or express; or from mere presumption, when someone, doubting nothing about the perfections of God, without necessity wills to obtain either the manifestation of the divine will or special help of God through wonders, and this is called implicit or interpretative.

It is certain that formal or express temptation of God is always a mortal sin against Religion. - But if it is only implicit, often because of ignorance or inadvertence it can be venial, although of itself it is more probably mortal.¹

You will resolve. - 1° Those formerly sinned gravely against Religion who demanded that their innocence be proved by duel, by burning iron, etc., or who without a just cause freely offered themselves to martyrdom, unless they were excused by good faith or divine inspiration. - Nevertheless it is licit to ask from God a miracle under the condition, if it has pleased Him, as often as there is a grave cause for our own or others' salvation, or for fulfilling the divine will, or, as St. Thom.² says, when there underlies a just necessity or pious utility and the other things which ought to concur for this. For then it is not to tempt God, but to request the help of God at an opportune time.

2° Likewise he sins gravely who, without a just cause, exposes himself to danger of death because he expects divine help; but if he acts only rashly, without certainly trusting in divine Providence, he does not sin against Religion, but only against the fifth precept of the Decalogue.

3° He sins only lightly who in a light illness, with remedies rejected, hopes for health from God; because there is not a grave disorder there. Indeed he is excused from all fault if he hopes that he will be freed naturally from such an illness with God's help.³

4° Likewise he sins of himself venially who from negligence approaches unprepared to preaching the word of God, hoping for special help from God.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. II, Art. II, § II. On Sacrilege

n. ¶346.

- Sacrilege is the violation or unworthy treatment of sacred things. It is distinguished as threefold: 1° personal; 2° local; 3° real.

Principles. - I. Sacred here is called whatever is deputed to divine worship from divine or ecclesiastical institution, and therefore deserves special reverence. - St. Thomas.¹

Hence 1° Sacred persons are those who are deputed to divine worship through Sacred Tonsure, or through religious vows, or more probably also through any vow of chastity.

2° Sacred places are those which by the authority of the Church are dedicated to worship, as temples and public chapels (not private ones), yet consecrated or blessed; likewise blessed cemeteries. L. IV. 460.

3° Sacred things are those which pertain to divine worship or are proximately referred to it, as Sacraments, consecrated vessels, Relics or images of Saints; likewise those things which pertain to the adornment of the Church or of ministers; finally ecclesiastical goods, even movable ones. - St. Thom.²

II. Sacrilege is a mortal sin from its genus, because it is opposed to the most excellent moral virtue, namely Religion, and for the most part regards grave matter. - Yet it can become light by reason of smallness of matter or imperfection of the act.³

III. Sacrilege differs in species according as it affects a person, place, or sacred thing; hence in confession those circumstances must be explained. - St. Alph.⁴ St. Thom.⁵

n. ¶347.

You will resolve. - 1° Personal sacrilege is committed: 1) by inflicting violent hands on a Cleric or Religious; 2) by any sin of luxury perpetrated by or with a person bound by a vow of chastity; 3) by violation of personal immunity. - But it will not be sacrilege to detract from a priest, because his person alone is sacred, but not his reputation.⁶

2° Local sacrilege is committed: 1) by all sins by which a Church is polluted by Law, namely by illicit shedding of human blood or seed, homicide, or burial of an excommunicated person or infidel in the Church; 2) by all sins which are done against the immunity and sanctity of a sacred place, as breaking in, despoiling, theft, quarrels, and similar things; 3) by actions unbecoming the sanctity of the place, as are markets, assemblies, and the din of judgments, unless a grave cause excuses.¹

3° Real sacrilege is committed: 1) by unworthy administration or reception of the Sacraments; 2) by unworthy treatment of sacred Relics, images, etc.; 3) by profanation of sacred vessels, instruments, or ornaments; 4) by theft of a thing pertaining to divine worship or to the Church; 5) by abuse of Scripture, for example by twisting its words to vain things, etc.; 6) by neglect of sacred vessels, corporals, etc., in those who ought to care for these things religiously.²

n. ¶348.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is violation of a person bound by a simple vow of chastity outside Religion sacrilege?

Resp. It is controverted. The more probable opinion of St. Alph.³ affirms, because through any vow of chastity man is truly consecrated to God. For one's own will suffices for consecrating one's own acts to God, while for public consecration public authority is required.⁴ See p. LXXXIX. 7.

Besides, whoever is bound by a vow of chastity, as often as he violates this, certainly commits a twofold sin: namely one against chastity, and the other against Religion. - Lacroix.⁵

Quaer. 2° Are all sins of luxury committed in a Church or cemetery sacrileges?

Resp. 1° Merely internal sins are not to be held as sacrileges, because they do not seem specially to affect the sacred place, unless there is a desire of sinning externally in the sacred place itself. - Thus commonly.⁶

Resp. 2° As to external sins, it is certain that sacrilege is committed through consummated acts, namely through voluntary pollution, fornication, etc. This is openly clear from Canon Law. But whether it is also committed through other grave external sins, for example gravely impure touches, is controverted. St. Alph.,⁷ Collet, etc., more probably affirm.

Quaer. 3° Is every theft in a Church sacrilege?

Resp. 1° It is established that every theft of a sacred thing is sacrilege, and also theft of a non-sacred thing nevertheless committed to the custody of a sacred place, as is clear from Canon Law.¹

Resp. 2° As to things which by chance or by accident are found in the Church, as purses, a watch, etc., it is probably controverted on both sides.

n. ¶349.

- Quaer. 4° Does the injury of any goods whatever belonging to Clerics constitute sacrilege?

Resp. Negatively, but only injury of goods which Clerics possess not in their own name but in the name of the Church, and of which they cannot dispose, and of those which pertain to the adornment of the church, because these alone are sacred.² (II) p. 479.

Quaer. 5° To whom is it licit to touch sacred vessels?

Resp. If they actually contain the Blessed Sacrament, outside a case of necessity or danger of profanation, it is licit for no one, without grave sin, to touch them, even mediately, except for a priest or deacon; otherwise, for all Clerics without special permission. The same is licit for sacristans, whether regular laymen, or oblates of secular congregations, or nuns; likewise for those who in clerical dress serve churches. For other laymen it is prohibited under venial sin to touch them immediately, unless a reasonable cause excuses.³

But it is licit for all to touch other sacred things, of which sort are, for example, Agnus Dei, at least from modern custom, Relics of Saints, sacred ornaments, except those which immediately touch the holy Eucharist, as, for example, corporals, palls, purificators after use and before washing. But the first washing of these must be performed by a cleric in sacred orders, yet probably it can also be performed by a tonsured cleric; but it cannot be done without venial sin by a layman, or even by a nun or pious women living a common life under rule;⁴ but the second and third washing, although more suitably done by a cleric, can nevertheless be done without sin even by a layman. It would also be venial not to throw the water of the washing into the sacrarium.⁵

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. II, Art. II, § III. On Simony

n. ¶350.

Definition. - Simony, so called from Simon Magus, is the studied will of selling or buying for a temporal price something spiritual, or something annexed to the spiritual. It is said studied will, not only because, no differently from other sins, it demands deliberation, but also because for its essential malice it is not required that the pact be completed by mutual consent or in reality; but the interior affection even of one suffices, namely the simoniacal will of making a pact or of obligating.

A temporal price is distinguished in Canon Law¹ as of three kinds: 1° a gift from the hand, or recompense of any temporal thing estimable by price; 2° a gift from the tongue, or patronage, under which name come praises, commendations, prayers, etc., to be interposed from pact in favor of the one conferring the spiritual thing; 3° a gift from service, or any servitude, or offices furnished to another, for example servitude or any similar office.

n. ¶351.

- Likewise, the temporal thing annexed to the spiritual is threefold: 1° antecedently, to which the spiritual thing accedes, as the right of patronage inhering in land; 2° consequently, which depends on the spiritual, as the fruits of a benefice or office; 3° concomitantly, as labor in sacred functions. But labor of this sort is annexed to the spiritual thing either intrinsically or extrinsically. It is called intrinsically annexed if it is not easily separable from the thing itself; otherwise it is called extrinsically annexed. Thus celebration of Mass is labor intrinsically annexed to a spiritual thing; but extraordinary fatigue, as singing, delay until midday, a long or difficult journey to be undertaken for celebrating, and other similar things pertain to labor extrinsically annexed.

Division. Simony is distinguished as:

1° Mental, if it is done merely internally or without pact, as if someone recommends a son to the collator of a vacant parish, and meanwhile under the appearance of a liberal gift sends silver vessels to him with this internal intention, that he move and oblige him to nominate his son.

2° Conventional, if a pact indeed intervenes, but is in no way carried into execution, at least by both parties.

3° Real, if the pact is fulfilled by each party, at least inchoatively.

To this is added confidential Simony, which is done by any pact, or confidence, in election or presentation to benefices, or in resigning them, etc.¹

Simony is also distinguished as of divine or natural law, and of ecclesiastical law. The former is had if the thing simoniacally exchanged is spiritual from its nature, as are indulgences, Sacraments, etc.; but the latter, if something is done against some law which has been made by the Church because of either the danger or the appearance of simony.

n. ¶352.

Principles. - I. For Simony it is required that the temporal thing be given or accepted, either formally or virtually, for the spiritual thing itself and in exchange for it, so that an equating of the spiritual thing with the temporal thing is made, or a commutation, from the primary motive of having one thing for the other as a price or just compensation. The reason is clear from the very definition of Simony. Hence if some honest motive intervenes, by force of which the temporal thing is given, and in turn the spiritual, one would no longer be the motive of the other, but only its impelling cause, and therefore it would not be Simony.

I said: 1° formally, that is, that someone directly intends to receive the spiritual in place of the temporal thing and because of its estimation.

I said: 2° virtually, namely that someone wills to obtain the spiritual thing proximately and immediately through the temporal thing, and no other true and honest motive intervenes. For in this will there is virtually included the intention of commuting one thing with the other.

II. It is licit to give for a price the temporal thing annexed to the spiritual antecedently and concomitantly extrinsically, provided the price is not increased because of the spiritual thing annexed. But in no way is it licit to give for a price what is annexed to the spiritual concomitantly intrinsically, or inseparably, nor what is annexed consequently.

The first reason is because the thing and the labor of the action are truly estimable in themselves by price. Yet by Canon Law the sale of balsam which is contained in Chrism is prohibited, although it preexists the consecration; because since it is of small price, the Bishop would seem to sell Sacraments.²

Nevertheless, as to blessed Oil or Sacred Chrism, Scavini observes that in some cathedral Churches the use has prevailed that something is accepted from particular Churches for compensating the expenses made in obtaining the matter.

The second reason is because what is intrinsically annexed to the spiritual is inseparable from it; hence the thing itself or the action would be judged to be sold. Yet, even apart from extrinsic labor, something can licitly be accepted for sacred ministry by reason of a stipend or support, as is established from the practice of the Church. For natural equity demands that honest support be granted to those who are vacant for the utility of others. Hence Christ:¹ The laborer is worthy of his hire. And the Apostle:² Know you not that they who work in the holy place eat the things that are of the holy place; and they who serve the altar partake with the altar? So also the Lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel.

The third reason is because that which is consequent is judged spiritual, or bound to the spiritual. It is also derived from a special disposition of Canon Law.

III. Simony is a most grave sin; and if it is of divine and natural law, it does not admit smallness of matter. But if the Simony is of ecclesiastical law, there can be smallness of matter in it according to St. Alph.³ - The reason is that any spiritual thing, from comparison with a temporal thing, is treated as vile with great injury against God Himself. This is established also from the words of St. Peter to Simon Magus:⁴ Thy money perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be possessed with money.

n. ¶353.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it Simony to give principally indeed a temporal thing for a spiritual, but not uniquely?

Resp. Affirmatively. The reason is that even thus there is present a comparison of the temporal thing with the spiritual. For the motive which is added, however honest it may be, does not destroy the malice and impiety of the prior motive because of which the temporal thing is principally given. This is established also from propositions 45 and 46 condemned by Innocent XI (p. XVI).

Quaer. 2° Is it Simony to give or procure for a Superior a temporal thing for conciliating him to oneself with a view to obtaining a benefice or office?

Resp. Negatively, if the primary intention is of giving the temporal thing gratuitously; because then the immediate comparison is made of a temporal thing with a temporal thing, namely the benevolence of the Superior. But otherwise if the spiritual thing is intended as a due recompense, not, however, as the effect of gratitude of soul. This intention, unless the opposite either is established or can be gathered from adjuncts, for example from the smallness of the gift, etc., is to be presumed to exist virtually, if another title is lacking, for example of removing an unjust vexation, etc.¹

Quaer. 3° Is it Simony to perform sacred functions principally because of a stipend, or to receive something for sacred doctrine?

Resp. to the first. Negatively, at least more probably, because the stipend is not received as the price of the sacred thing, but as something owed to the person who is occupied for the sake of the neighbor. - Lacroix and others commonly,² against some. Therefore if some inordinate affection intervenes (for there will be no fault if need or another honest cause impels one to seeking stipends of this sort), it will not be the vice of Simony, but of avarice.

Resp. to the second. Affirmatively, if the instruction tends to the spiritual good of others, because it is a spiritual thing, unless nevertheless it is accepted by title of stipend or support. But otherwise if the instruction is merely temporal, for example in handing on an explanation of Sacred Letters or Theology.³

n. ¶354.

- Quaer. 4° Is it Simony to redeem oneself with money from unjust vexation concerning benefices, or another spiritual good, for example Sacraments, etc.?

Resp. Negatively, at least more probably, because liberation from vexation, which alone is directly intended, is something temporal. - Hence you can give money to your enemy if he tries through fraud to impede the collator from favoring you. - St. Alph.⁴ and others commonly. Indeed Doctors agree in the same, even if he wishes to impede by prayers alone. But you cannot give money to those who can harm or benefit by electing or presenting to a benefice or by conferring it; for to offer money to them lest they harm would be the same as to offer it so that they benefit, that is, so that they not deny consent.⁵

Quaer. 5° Is it Simony to give or accept something for entrance into Religion?

Resp. 1° It is certain that it is not licit to give or accept something for entrance alone; because this would be a commutation of a sacred thing, of which sort Religion is, with a temporal thing.

2° It is certain also that it is licit for a poor monastery to exact something for the support of the one entering, because then the spiritual thing is not commuted with the temporal; and otherwise equity demands that something be received, lest the monastery fall burdened by expenses.

3° It is likewise certain that it is licit for a monastery to exact something for the support of Novices, because since they do not yet pertain to Religion, and can depart at will, and often in reality do depart, it is not equitable for the monastery to undergo so grave a burden for them. Yet the Religion of Friars Minor can receive nothing from a special decree.

4° But if there is question of a wealthy monastery, it is controverted. St. Alph.¹ denies, unless the one to be received is old or infirm. Besides, now all doubt vanishes because of the difficulty of the times. For no monasteries are found so wealthily founded that they need no alien help at all for the present and the future. Besides, as is established from several decrees, Nuns always can exact the established dowry, and for choir nuns they ought to [n. 1188. II. 3)].

…and 235 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 43 passages

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Fifth Part: On the Virtues…, Section A: On Religion Acc…, Question One: On the Essence of Religion

S. Th. II-II, q. 81, a. 1-6; q. 84, a. 1, ad 1.

645. Religion, according to Lactantius, is said etymologically from re-binding (re-ligando), because it repeatedly binds men to God by knowledge and love, to whom they are already bound through dependence; but according to Cicero from re-reading (relegendo), because the religious man frequently meditates, treats again, and mentally reads again those things which pertain to God and His worship, because we are accustomed especially to treat again those things which more deserve veneration and fear. We pass over the opinion of St. Augustine, who says that religion is from re-choosing (reelegendo) that which we have lost by sinning, because this etymology does not seem possible.¹ But whether you choose the one or the other etymology, always "religion properly imports order, namely, a moral ordination, to God," upon whom we depend or to whom we owe veneration. St. Thomas aptly says, q. 81, a. 1:

¹ The other two are possible and are still proposed today by the learned. Thus Reville explains the word as Lactantius does; Max Muller holds with Cicero.

"Whether religion is said from frequent re-reading, or from the repeated choice of that which was negligently lost, or whether it is said from re-binding, religion properly imports order to God. For He is the one to whom we principally ought to be bound as to an unfailing principle; to whom also our choice ought assiduously to be directed as to the ultimate end; whom also by neglecting through sinning we lose, and by believing and by professing faith we ought to recover."

Hence a) most broadly, it is taken objectively for the complex of all our offices toward God, whether of the intellect, or of the will, or of the executive powers, and consequently of all dogmas, laws, and institutes by which men are obligated to God; and subjectively for the fulfillment of all offices toward God (Jas. I, 26, 27);

b) Most strictly, it is taken for the supreme worship which we owe to God alone (godsdienst) and for the virtue which inclines us to this (godsdienstigheid);

c) By excellence, it is said of the institute or state of those who, through the evangelical counsels, perfectly dedicate their whole life to divine worship.

646. The virtue of religion is defined: a virtue inclining man to exhibit due worship to God as the first principle of all things.

It is a virtue, because it renders due worship to God; but to render to someone what is owed to him is good and best; therefore religion renders man perfect, and therefore it is a virtue.

It is one virtue, because it has one object: for it exhibits honor to God according to one account, insofar as He is the first principle of the creation and governance of things.

It is a special virtue, because it has a special object; for to God, on account of His singular excellence, insofar as He transcends all things infinitely according to every manner of excess, there is owed a special honor, which is called the supreme worship or worship of latria, distinct from dulia, which is rendered to the saints or to those more worthy on account of their own excellence.²

² On the virtue of religion, these can usefully be consulted: St. Thomas, q. 81-100 with the commentaries of Cajetan and Billuart; Suarez, De Virtute Religionis; Dignant, De Virtute Religionis; Tanquerey and Prummer in their manuals; Monsabre, La Priere; Janvier, Conf. de N. D.: La Justice envers Dieu; Gardeil, L'education personnelle et surnaturelle de soi-meme par la vertu de religion, in Rev. Thomiste, 1919-20; Dom Lottin, L'Ame du culte: la vertu de religion.

647. Religion is not a theological virtue but a moral virtue, because it does not attain God Himself, the ultimate end, but is concerned with the means to the end, namely, with our acts, which are something created: for it does not have God as its immediate object, whether material or formal. But it is a moral virtue, whose:

Material object, or that which it intends to exhibit, is divine worship: worship is a certain testimony of submission unto the acknowledgment of the excellence of another; and therefore divine worship consists in acts by which man protests the divine excellence and his own subjection to God, and thus honors God as first principle and supreme lord;

Primary material object (others say the formal quod), which religion principally, per se, and by reason of itself intends to exhibit by divine worship, is a certain due equality between the worship exhibited and God's right to it, by which equality the worship exhibited is proportioned to the right which God has to it: not an absolute equality, but an imperfect and relative one, by which we render worship to God as much as is possible according to the consideration of human faculty and divine acceptance;³

³ St. Thomas, a. 5, ad 3.

Formal object, or the immediate and proximate motive on account of which we exhibit due worship to God, is the special honesty of the said equality: for man wills to render due worship to God and thus preserve equality between himself and God, because this is good and is owed.

God, insofar as by reason of excellence He has a right to man's worship and holds man obligated to worship, is not the object which religion immediately attains, but only mediately the end to whom the debt is rendered. In the same way, the person to whom we render what is owed to him is not the object of justice, but only the end to whom that which is just is rendered.

648. Corollaries. From the aforesaid doctrine it follows:

That divine excellence is not the formal object or proximate motive of religion, but only the remote foundation on account of which God has a right to worship and worship is owed to Him.

The debt which religion attends to is strict or legal, indeed most strict, because God has the supreme right that worship be exhibited to Him. Yet we are not able to render that debt to equality (a. 5, ad 3), both because we do not render all that we have received, for example, being itself; and because we do not render as much as we owe, since we always receive new benefits; and because we do not pay from our own things but from the goods of God Himself. Hence even by payment the debt increases, since through it a new benefit is conferred upon man. Namely, we confer no utility upon God, but we perfect ourselves, "because by this, that we revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; and in this its perfection consists" (a. 7).

Religion is not justice strictly so called, both a) because it does not render to God to equality, as has been said, and b) because it is not toward another perfectly distinct: for insofar as we are creatures and servants of God, to whom as supreme lord of all we are subjected, we are something of God; hence religion, which acknowledges that subjection, supposes a certain special conjunction of Creator and creature, whereas strict justice rests upon perfect distinction. Hence religion falls short of perfect justice and is a potential part of it.

Since religion is a moral virtue, it is in the mean: for although under one respect there cannot be excess in its matter, insofar as the worship rendered to God cannot be excessive in quantity, nevertheless according to other circumstances excess is found, for example, because worship is exhibited to one to whom it ought not be exhibited, or when or how it ought not be exhibited (a. 5, ad 3).

Fidelity, observance, and gratitude toward God are not virtues distinct from religion, because by them God is worshiped under the same account, as creator and governor (a. 3, ad 1).

Religion differs from piety toward God: for the former is the virtue by which we worship God as creator and lord; the latter is the gift of the Holy Spirit by which we venerate God as father.

It differs also from obedience and humility: from obedience, because this of itself is not ordered to testifying to divine excellence, but inclines to observing the precept of any superior, because it has been commanded by him; from humility, which does not directly testify to submission to another, but represses the appetite lest it tend toward lofty things beyond the limits of its condition which it has received from God, because this is fitting to our lowliness, and therefore it submits itself to the divine rule, not indeed to honor the majesty of God (as religion does) but to confess our own nothingness. Yet these virtues have their ultimate foundation, principle, and root in reverence toward the supreme authority of God and thus in religion, to which they are akin.

It differs also from the theological virtues, which are not ordered to the formal testification of divine excellence, nor do they formally regard debt. But they are the foundation of infused supernatural religion, as the end is with respect to means: for by them we immediately adhere to God Himself, the ultimate end; but religion orders our acts as due means unto reverence, love, and glory of God (a. 5, ad 1). And similarly one must speak of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are connected with the theological virtues. Hence St. Thomas, a. 2, ad 1: "To revere God is an act of the gift of fear. But it belongs to religion to do certain things on account of reverence for God. Hence it does not follow that religion is the same as the gift of fear, but that it is ordered to it as to something more principal: for the gifts are more principal than the moral virtues."

It differs especially from charity, which loves the goodness of God in itself as communicated to us. Namely, religion precisely worships the excellence of God which transcends all things and cannot be communicated; hence in the same way as justice rests upon every manner of distinction from another, so also religion rests upon a certain distinction (imperfect) from God. "The object of love is the good; but the object of honor and reverence is something excellent. Now the goodness of God is communicated to the creature, but not the excellence of His goodness. And therefore charity, by which God is loved, is not a virtue distinct from charity by which neighbor is loved. But religion, by which God is honored, is distinguished from the virtues by which neighbor is honored" (a. 4, ad 3; cf. q. 82, a. 2, ad 1).

Religion is more excellent than all the moral virtues, because it approaches more nearly to the ultimate end, God: for it performs those things which are directly and immediately ordered to divine honor.

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Fifth Part: On the Virtues…, Section A: On Religion Acc…, Question Two: On the Object of Religion or Divine Worship

S. Th. II-II, q. 81, a. 1, ad 1; a. 3, ad 2 and 3; a. 4, ad 1 and 2; a. 7 and 8; q. 83, a. 12.

n. 649.

649. Worship is honor with submission and acknowledgment of dependence exhibited to someone on account of his excellence; namely, it is honor exhibited to someone superior and more excellent: for a superior exhibits honor to an inferior, not worship; for example, God honors the saints, a master honors disciples, but does not worship them. Now honor is a testification or protestation concerning the excellence of another's goodness, a sign of esteem which we exhibit to another on account of his excellence. Therefore divine worship is honor with submission and acknowledgment of dependence exhibited to God on account of His excellence. In other words: it is a certain testification and mark of submission to the acknowledged excellence of the first principle, God; a sign which signifies submission toward God, the supreme Lord (a. 3, ad 2; a. 4 and 6).

650. There is a natural and divine precept of worshiping God. It is proved:

a) From reason: 1. For God, because He is the first exemplary and efficient principle, and creator, is supreme Lord, and indeed Lord as regards our being and as regards all things which pertain to us; but a servant ought to acknowledge and worship his lord; therefore man too ought to acknowledge his dependence upon God and worship Him.

Similarly God, the first principle acting freely, is our distinguished benefactor, from whom we have received all things gratuitously from mere goodness; but to a benefactor there is owed the worship of gratitude.

Likewise God is the first final principle or ultimate end, upon whom all things specially depend, insofar as they ought through their whole existence to tend toward Him and glorify Him above all things; therefore man ought to acknowledge this dependence and procure that highest honor for Him.

b) From Scripture, Exod. XX, 2...: "I am the Lord thy God... Thou shalt not have strange gods before me... Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing... thou shalt not adore them nor worship them... Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain... Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day... the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God"; in which words are contained the three offices of fidelity, observance or reverence, and service toward God, according to which it is owed that we order our acts with respect to God.

n. 651.

651. Elicited and commanded acts pertain to divine worship. For divine worship is constituted by our acts. Now the acts by which we worship are some elicited by religion, others only commanded. Elicited acts are those which, not through the mediation of another habit but immediately, are produced by religion and according to their own nature directly pertain to the worship of God, such as prayer, genuflection, adoration, etc. Commanded acts are those which it produces through the mediation of another habit or virtue by which they are immediately elicited and to which by their nature they pertain: thus fasting or almsgiving, which are elicited by temperance and mercy, if they are ordered to divine worship, are commanded by religion. For just as the will moves other powers to the end, so one virtue moves others to its own end: religion often uses acts of other virtues insofar as they are suitable for worshiping God, and thus directs them to its own end (a. 1, ad 1; and a. 8).

652. Worship is internal and external. Elicited acts are some principal and internal, namely, devotion and internal prayer; others secondary, destined to the internal acts, and external, such as vocal prayer, sacrifice, etc.

Now not only is internal worship commanded, as is clear from John IV, 23-24, and was demonstrated, n. 650; but also external worship, which is the sensible expression of internal worship, accomplished by various external acts of the body, must necessarily be exhibited:

By reason of itself, because man consists of soul and body, and because each depends upon God; therefore he ought to worship God with both soul and body;

By reason of internal worship, both a) because it is its natural effect by which it is manifested, for man naturally manifests internal affections; and b) because it is the means by which it is aroused and fostered: for man needs sensible things in order to be aroused to spiritual things (a. 7; q. 83, a. 12; q. 84, a. 2);

By reason of social worship, because not only the individual man, but also natural society as such, since it is from God and has received benefits from Him, ought to revere Him and acknowledge dependence, which surely cannot be done except by external acts. Worship exhibited by society is called public.

n. 653.

653. Worship is absolute or relative. Absolute worship is that which is owed to someone on account of proper and inherent excellence: such worship is owed to God, that is, either to the divinity abstracting from the persons, or to the three persons together, or to one of the three, to the humanity of Christ, and to the Holy Eucharist; relative worship is that which is rendered to someone on account of an extrinsic excellence which is not in him, but which is in another with whom he has a relation of representation or connection: in this way the name and images of God, the cross of Christ, the instruments of the Passion, and relics are worshiped (a. 3, ad 3).

…and 3 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Aloysius Sabetti, S.J., and Timothy Barrett, S.J. — 1 passage

Vol. I, Tr. VI, On the First Precept of th…, Chapter I. On the Acts of the Virtue of Religion

The chief acts of religion are adoration, prayer, sacrifice, vow, oath, and sanctification of certain days. Concerning the last three there will be discussion in the 2nd and 3rd precept; but concerning sacrifice in the tract on the Eucharist. Here therefore only concerning adoration and prayer.

Concina, Compendium

Daniele Concina, O.P. — 1 passage

Bk. III, Diss. V, Chapter I — The nature and acts of Religion, which the first commandment of the Decalogue prescribes

Tr. III, Prologue · Tr. III, Disputation I: On Religion in General · Tr. III, Disputation I: On Religion…, Question I: What the virtue of religion is · Tr. III, Disputation I: On Religion…, Question II: Whether religion is a virtue · Tr. III, Disputation I: On Religion…, Question III: Whether latria, or religion, is a special virtue · Tr. III, Disputation I: On Religion…, Question IV: Whether religion is a cardinal virtue

II. Question I. What is Religion? Answer. The common definition of Religion is this: Religion is a virtue which renders to God the worship due to him as the first principle of all things. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 81, art. 1, derives the etymology of Religion from re-reading [relegendo] those things that pertain to divine worship, because such things must frequently be turned over again in the heart. Religion is not a theological virtue, because it does not regard God proximately, but a moral virtue — and indeed the chief among these virtues, whose object is the worship to be shown to God, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, II-II, q. 81, art. 5.

Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V

Gaudentius Bontempi of Brescia, O.F.M. Cap. — 70 passages

Tr. III, Prologue

Since hitherto I have discussed the matters that concern mutual Justice among men; now I judge it opportune to run briefly through that supreme bond by which we are bound to God, rendering Him the worship due to Him, both internal and external. This is the scope and end of all Theory, and of Theology, that knowing God as to be worshipped, we may actually worship Him in act, and strive that our speculations, however lofty, be surpassed by a lowlier worship and a more ardent love of God; for it was a monstrous crime of the ancient Philosophers, because, when they had known God, they did not glorify Him as God, as D. Paul notes, Romans 2. Nor does any man grow so dull that the light of nature does not show him and judge that God's truth must by no means be held captive in the idle knowledge of injustice, but be seriously committed to devout practice. That we may accomplish this, however, we are not sufficient of ourselves; but Divine Wisdom, which illuminates the minds of men with its rays, also instructs their wills with an inclination that draws them readily to piety, and sets before them the norm which, if followed, amid so many disparities of cults and the counterfeit titles of Religion, we shall securely attain the principles, the means, and the end of true veneration. Now this norm is that RELIGION which is the firstborn offspring of orthodox faith. Of it we shall treat here, insofar as it is reduced to Justice, in whose elucidation we still persevere, as the Seraphic Doctor notes, Part 3 of the Centiloquium, section 44. For it renders to God what is His own; therefore S. Paul (loc. cit.) ascribes to it the opposite vice of injustice, saying: the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all impiety and injustice of those men who detain the truth of God in injustice. Furthermore, RELIGION can be considered as it is a Virtue, or as it is a State: under the former consideration it belongs to the whole body of the faithful; under the latter it is proper to those who, by the emission of Religious profession, devote themselves wholly to God. Yet since the Religious state was instituted precisely so that Religion, which is a virtue, might be exercised with more exact observance, I shall treat of it first in general; then, descending to its individual acts, I shall institute individual disputations concerning them; soon I shall also set down whatever opposes Religion or promotes its exercise. In the other treatise, God willing, after I have said something about vows, I shall embrace the Religious state.

Tr. III, Disputation I: On Religion in General

Since whatever can proceed from man must first be conceived in the heart, then be brought forth by the mouth, and finally be consummated in deed, RELIGION occupies in every way these three receptacles of human acts, so that the whole man may be able to devote himself to God, from whom he is wholly derived. Thus the whole heart of man is consecrated to God, while by Faith, Hope, and Charity it conceives the honor due to Him. Likewise man makes progress with the mouth in the offering of divine worship, while by adoring, praising, blessing, and giving thanks, he openly acknowledges that all honor is owed to God. Finally, while by deed he completes what he conceived in mind and uttered with tongue, by offering, burning incense, and kneeling, he brings Religion to completion. The Seraphic Doctor (loc. cit. above) thus divides its offices and acts into three parts, whereby he moreover appends to it certain considerations, such as repenting of a crime committed, weighing the vicissitudes of things and times, and holding light the instability of temporal goods, also emulating truth, just as committing oneself wholly to God. Thus in few words the Saintly Doctor surveys the whole compass of Religion, ubi supra. But since certain Scholastic difficulties occur in this matter, I shall examine them more strictly, after I have premised a brief explanation of this name.

Tr. III, Disputation I: On Religion…, Question I: What the virtue of religion is

RELIGION is defined by D. Bonaventure at the place alleged above: Religion is the virtue that brings to God the worship due to Him. The same definition he gives in book 5 of the Compendium of Theology, chapter 37. It is however drawn from Tully, book 3 de Inventione: Religion is the virtue which brings care and ceremonial to a certain superior nature, which they call divine. It is defined in nearly the same way by D. Augustine, book 10 de Civitate Dei, chapters 1 and 4, as cited by D. Bonaventure in 3 Sent., distinction 9, article 2, question 3.

RELIGION is said to be derived from religando, from D. Isidore, book 8 of the Etymologies, chapter 2; because by it we rebind our souls to the one God for divine worship with the bond of servitude. That D. Augustine also felt the same, de vera Religione, chapter 55, as cited by D. Bonaventure, book 4 of the Pharetra, chapter 19; and Boverius, Demonstration 1 of the Symbol, article 1; Valentina, distinction 6, question 1, with Lactantius, book 4 of the Divine Institutes, chapter 28; or with Isidore, book 10 of the Etymologies, chapter 17, from Reeligendo, that is, from the frequent choosing of those things that pertain to the worship of God; whence Cicero, book 2 de Natura Deorum, denominates one religious. Or from Reeligendo God Himself, from whom one had fallen away, according to D. Augustine, book 10 de Civitate, chapter 4. Or again from religando God to oneself by reconciliation, according to the same D. Augustine, chapter 26 de Quantitate Animae, and book 1 Retractationum, chapter 13, as cited by D. Bonaventure at the place cited in the Pharetra.

Tr. III, Disputation I: On Religion…, Question II: Whether religion is a virtue

THAT we may investigate its essence¹: the Seraphic Doctor indicates its origin here and in the places to be cited below. It slipped down from heaven, whither we raise our countenance from its rising, says Lactantius, de Falsa Sapientia, chapter 10; Marsilius Ficinus, de Christiana Religione, chapter 1; Plutarch deduces it from the laws of nature in his work Against Colotes; for everywhere on earth the nations, however savage, worship sacred things, offer sacrifices, erect altars, build temples, and worship some god. Therefore even the founders of laws, who by the teaching of eternal wisdom decree just things, as you have in Proverbs 8, make provision for these. That also the ancient legislators, providing for it, albeit declining into superstition, bore witness. ¹ N. Editor's note: the print reads 'venemur', not a Latin word; rendered as 'venerate' (veneremur), which the religious context requires.

THAT light indeed flashed divinely upon the human intellect, which they call the judgment-chamber of nature; concerning which Psalm 4: The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us, as D. Bonaventure warns, 2 dist. 24, part 1, art. 2, q. 3, and in 4 dist. 6, part 1, q. 1, and de Tribus Ternariis, chapter 8, and de Septem Itineribus Aeternitatis, journey 6 especially; and Boverius notes it, Demonstration 1 of the Symbol, article 2; and I showed it at length, p.p. tract. 1, disp. 1 and 11. We bear the image of God, by whom we were created.

n. 3.

HENCE we shall find the scope of Religion: for since man is ordained to God as to his first principle and last end, as is said in Apocalypse 1, and D. Bonaventure often observes, he ought, with grateful recognition, to direct himself and his own to Him from whom he receives all good things, and not be ungrateful. This he carries out through the acts of Religion, as I shall show, and D. Bonaventure pursues at length passim, especially 3 part. Centil. sect. 44, de Sex Alis Seraphim, chapter 8, the Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, the Soliloquies, the Itineraries, the Aeternal Incendium Amoris (Eternal Kindling of Love), the Stimulus, and other opuscula.

n. 4.

The Saintly Doctor instituted the title of this question concerning Latria, which is first taken for the reverence shown to God, and it is an internal act of Religion, to be shown to God alone. Therefore Christ answered Satan severely, when he tempted Him, Matthew 4, citing Deuteronomy 6: It is written: The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and him only shalt thou serve — where, although He did not say, "thy God only shalt thou adore," so as to show that some adoration may be shown to a creature, as when Abraham adored the people of the land, Genesis 23, as D. Augustine observes, question 61 on Genesis; nevertheless the worship of Latria at least, which is called servitude, is to be shown to God alone, as S. Augustine explains, book 1 de Trinitate, chapter 6.

n. 5.

From here indeed proceeds the external act of the worship of God, which is called Latria: Matthew 4, the Magi falling down adored him; and John 9, Celidonius, cured of blindness, falling down adored him. Of this external act I shall treat in disputation 4; now I shall discuss its habit and its internal act.

n. 6.

I assert that Latria, or Religion, is a Virtue.

n. 7.

It is proved first from D. Bonaventure and D. Thomas: That is a virtue which makes its possessor good and renders his work good; but such is Religion; therefore. The minor is proved: To render to each what is due is a good act, and renders the one rendering good; but Religion does this; therefore. The major is proved: for while what is due is rendered to each, it establishes order in a manner fitting toward the other; but order is good, as also mode and species, as D. Augustine says in the book de Natura Boni, chapter 55; therefore. The minor is proved from Plato in the Phaedo, where he brings forward the example of the workhouse.

n. 8.

It is proved secondly from the Saintly Doctor: Virtue consists in laudable and arduous works, from Aristotle, 2 Ethics, chapter 3; but to worship God is an act of this kind; therefore.

n. 9.

It is proved thirdly from the Saintly Doctor: virtue is especially necessary concerning meritorious works of eternal life; but to worship and adore God is meritorious of eternal life; therefore.

n. 10.

It is proved fourthly from the Saintly Doctor: That which is commanded by God pertains to virtue; but to worship God is commanded by God; therefore. The same arguments he resumes in the corpus.

n. 11.

You will object first: Every virtue is free; but Latria is servitude, from D. Augustine, book 10 de Civitate, chapter 1, and book 5, chapter 15, and book 6, chapter 1; therefore.

n. 12.

The holy Doctors answer that Latria is a servitude merely voluntary, by which man of his own accord subjects himself to God, which rather makes him more free from sin and establishes him in a lofty state; for to serve God is to reign. And thence you have in what way Religion, which is joined with the fear of God, is free.

n. 13.

You will object secondly: Religion is worship exhibited to God; but worship is not a habit, but an act.

n. 14.

The Saintly Doctor answers first that habits are often made known through acts; and therefore, although Latria or Religion is defined through worship, it does not follow that it is an act.

n. 15.

He answers secondly that Latria is sometimes taken for an act, sometimes for a habit, as frequently happens in the acts of the soul, which have one common name. Whence Aristotle, 1 and 2 Posterior Analytics and 3 de Anima, and the Commentator on 3 de Anima, com. 20, sometimes takes the name Intellect for an act, sometimes for a potency; in the same way D. Anselm speaks of the Will, book de Incarnatione, chapter 10. Similarly D. Augustine, book 10 de Civ., chapter 1, and others.

n. 16.

You will object thirdly: Latria is the same as Piety, as D. Augustine says, book 10 de Civitate, chapter 2; for it is called Theosebia, Piety regarding the worship of God; but piety is not a virtue, but a gift; therefore.

n. 17.

The Saintly Doctor answers from D. Augustine, book 10 (12) de Civitate, cited, that Piety is taken in three ways. In one way for the same thing as Theosebia; and thus it is the same as the worship of God. Secondly Piety is called the duty owed to parents. Thirdly piety is called mercy, which is shown to neighbors in works; it is also the gift of Piety. But principally Piety is called the Virtue by which God is worshipped.

n. 18.

You will object fourthly: To revere God belongs to Fear; therefore Religion is superfluous.

n. 19.

The Saintly Doctor answers that reverence is found both in fear and in honor: for in fear there is a breaking-back upon one's own utility; but in honor there is the witnessing or exhibition of something witnessing to and professing His majesty. But the reverence that belongs to latria is rather of honor than of fear; and it has more the character of virtue, since it consists in the action of exhibiting worship to God, while fear consists in a passion; and this is one difference between the Virtues and the gifts.

Tr. III, Disputation I: On Religion…, Question III: Whether latria, or religion, is a special virtue

I assert that Religion is a special Virtue.

It is proved first from the Saintly Doctor: That habit which has a special object is special; but Religion has a special object, namely the worship of God, which is a special good; therefore. D. Thomas uses the same argument.

n. 3.

Secondly. That habit which has in its object a special difficulty is special; such is Religion; therefore.

n. 4.

Thirdly. That habit to which a special vice is opposed is special; but Idolatry is opposed to Religion; therefore.

n. 5.

You will object first: The virtue by which God is worshipped is Faith, Hope, and Charity, from D. Augustine, book 19 de Civitate Dei, chapter 6.

n. 6.

It is answered that there worship of God is taken generally for the obedience rendered to God; but not as signifying a special servitude owed to God on account of His excellence, which servitude is called by us Religion and Latria.

n. 7.

You will object secondly from D. Augustine, book 10 de Civitate, chapter 6: True sacrifice is every work done so that we may be joined to God in holy fellowship; but sacrifice pertains to Religion, as S. Augustine says there; therefore every good work pertains to Religion.

n. 8.

The Saintly Doctor answers that just as the worship of God is said in many ways, so also Sacrifice: for there is the Sacrifice of good operation, and the Sacrifice of devout prayer, and the Sacrifice of immolation. The first is of all the virtues. The second is of the Theological virtues. The third pertains to Latria, whose office it is to immolate to God, to whom alone Sacrifice is due, as D. Augustine says at the place cited; and this is the elicited act, which nevertheless the virtue also commands the other sacrifices recounted above, as D. Thomas also notes.

n. 9.

You will object thirdly: Everyone who obeys God serves Him; but this servitude is Latria, and a general virtue which complies with all the Divine Laws.

n. 10.

The Saintly Doctor answers that Latria is not the general virtue of obedience, which contains also subjection to men, acting as God's vicars, but a special obedience rendered to God alone by reason of His excellence; and this is Religion.

n. 11.

You will object fourthly: Directing all one's works to the glory of God, one acts according to His worship; but this comprehends all works; for the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 10: Do all to the glory of God.

n. 12.

It is answered that to act from Religion is to direct in a singular manner to the glory of God by a special motive, as I said; but Religion commands all good works that are done for the glory of God, as D. Thomas also says.

Tr. III, Disputation I: On Religion…, Question IV: Whether religion is a cardinal virtue

Note first, from D. Bonaventure, in corpore and ad 6, that the formal reason of Virtue is to be taken from the formal object; but the formal object of Religion is not God, but the worship exhibited to God, in such a way that this worship is the formal object, Quod; and God the object and end, Cui; from which it follows that Religion is not a Theological virtue: for these regard God immediately, as true and good, and indeed regard uncreated good and truth under the uncreated aspects, which are the supreme Truth and supreme Goodness of God. Therefore Religion is the internal worship due to God, which afterwards is exhibited outwardly in many ways by Latria. Moreover, Latria is taken for internal worship insofar as it is ordered to the external worship of God. Therefore he says that the exhibition of the worship due to God Himself, and consequently it pertains to Justice, as its potential part; but it is not subjective, because neither is an equal rendered to what is due, nor are the other conditions proper to Justice found; on which matter I have treated sufficiently, p.p. Tract. 1, disp. 19, q. 1.

Diss. I, Chapter I — What adoration is; its division, and the precept, are explained · Diss. I, Chapter II — The worship of latria is owed to God alone, one and triune, and to Christ the Lord · Diss. I, Chapter III — On the worship of the Cross, and whether the other instruments of Christ's most sacred Passion can be worshipped, and with the worship of latria

The Saintly Doctor also observes the doctrine of D. Augustine, book 10 de Civit., cap. 1, that the worship due to God is called by four names: two among the Greeks, and twins among the Latins. Among the Greeks indeed it is called Latria and Eusebeia, or Eusebia. Among the Latins the two corresponding names are Pietas, corresponding to Eusebia; and Religio, corresponding to Latria; although Religion extends more widely than Latria, and Pietas than Eusebia; for the latter signifies internal worship, which regards God directly through the Theological virtues; but Latria, the external servitude, insofar as it proceeds from the special internal, regarding the worship owed to God on account of His excellence; and this is relative, and pertaining to Justice. Nevertheless the Saintly Doctor grants that Latria also signifies the internal worship due to God under the aspect of what is due on account of the Divine Excellence, so that it regards the worship as Quod, and God as Cui.

n. 3.

I assert therefore that Religion is a virtue, not Theological, but Cardinal.

n. 4.

It is proved first from the Saintly Doctor from Tully, 3 de Inventione, where he says that Religion is a species of Justice.

n. 5.

The reason of the holy Doctors, moreover, is that alleged above: because the Theological virtues regard God immediately, either as true or as good, through Faith, Hope, and Charity; but Religion does not regard God immediately, but the worship due to God; therefore.

…and 30 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Concina, Theologia Christiana III

Daniele Concina, O.P. — 21 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Diss. I, Chapter I — What adoration is; its division, and the precept, are explained

n. I.

I. Adoration, taken generally, is an act by which someone subjects himself to another in testimony of that other's excellence. The chief reason of adoration is the excellence, or dignity, of the person adored. There are, then, as many adorations as there are kinds of dignity. There are, moreover, two dignities: one uncreated, the other created. Adoration, then, is divided, first, into that which is owed to uncreated majesty, or to God, and is called latria; and into that which is shown to creatures on account of the excellence of the supernatural order participated from God, of grace, of sanctity, of beatitude, by which the Saints and the blessed spirits are honored; and this is called dulia. But because the Blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of Christ the Lord, is wonderfully eminent above all the Saints, and heavenly spirits, she is therefore adored with a peculiar worship, which is called hyperdulia — that is, above the worship of dulia to be shown to the Saints, and below the worship of latria owed to God.

II. Adoration, again, is distinguished into internal and external. The former is an interior act by which the spirit subjects itself to God, as the supreme founder of all things. By this reasoning, Angels, and blessed souls, adore God. This bursts forth outwardly, and manifests itself by external signs, such as the bowing of the head, the prostration of the body, kisses, genuflections, and similar signs of this kind. Internal adoration can exist without external; the reverse cannot. Indeed, exterior adoration, destitute of interior, is not adoration, but flattery, feigning, and mockery. We are bound to show both to God, as St. Thomas excellently teaches (II-II, q. 84, art. 2): "Since man is composed of a twofold nature, namely intellectual and sensible, we offer God a twofold adoration: namely, a spiritual one, which consists in the interior devotion of the mind; and a corporeal one, which consists in the exterior humiliation of the body. And because, in all acts of latria, that which is exterior is referred to that which is interior, as to what is principal, therefore the exterior adoration itself is done for the sake of the interior, so that, namely, by the perceptible humility which we show corporeally, our affection may be excited to subject itself to God: since it is connatural to us that we proceed through sensible things to intelligible ones."

n. III.

III. Adoration is divided, third, into absolute and relative. Absolute, say the theologians of Salamanca, with other more recent writers (tract. 21, ch. 1, punct. 1, n. 3), is that which is shown to creatures who are, of themselves, capable of excellence, and sanctity. Only rational creatures, however, are capable of this dignity, and sanctity; and therefore to them alone is absolute adoration owed. This description, according to the common mind of Theologians, can hold a sound sense; but, so that the calumny with which the heterodox reproach us may be entirely removed, it must be said that all religious worship regards God, is resolved into God, and rests, and finds quiet, in God. Wherefore, if we wish to speak exactly, only the adoration shown to God is absolute in every respect; but the worship which we offer to the Saints is referred to God as to the true and first principle: for we honor the Saints on account of God, on account of the dignity, grace, and sanctity intimately conjoined with, and participated from, God. Wherefore the worship of these always expresses a reference to God. It is called by Theologians, however, absolute adoration shown to the Saints, in relation to images, and relics, which, being inanimate things, are destitute of intimate excellence; and the worship which is offered to them regards the persons whom they represent: for this reason the worship shown to them is relative.

n. IV.

IV. Adoration which is shown to creatures on account of natural gifts and dignities is customarily called reverence, and can be made by the same external signs by which God is worshipped. For external bodily actions are indifferent, and can be employed both for worshipping God, and for honoring men. By genuflection, by prostration of the body, God is adored; and yet by these same signs Judith, seeing Holofernes, adored him, prostrating herself upon the ground (ch. 10). By genuflection too we adore Supreme Pontiffs. We stretch out our hands to heaven, so that we may adore God: "I spread out my hands to the Lord my God" (Esdras 1:9); and the Royal Prophet says: "The lifting up of my hands as evening sacrifice." And yet we also use this sign to implore men's aid. The striking of the breast is likewise, of itself, indifferent; although, according to common use, it is more properly determined for obtaining pardon of sins from God, nothing nonetheless prevents us from using the same sign to appease a man whom we have offended, and to ask forgiveness for the offense inflicted. But this sign pertains more to the virtue of penance than to that of religion. Private external adoration, then, unless it is made divine by the intention of the one adoring, depends on that intention, unless some peculiar law, use, or custom has already destined it to divine worship. Hence it is that, while private persons perform such external actions publicly, it does not suffice for them to have a good intention; but the circumstances of place, time, persons, and custom must be observed. Of all these kinds of external actions, the most excellent, and which is owed to God alone, is sacrifice, by which God is proper to himself owed.

n. V.

V. Question I. Is there a divine and natural precept of worshipping God by both internal and external acts? Response: The affirmative conclusion is certain, of faith. That there is a divine precept is established from several texts of Scripture, chiefly from Exodus 20, and Deuteronomy 5: "I am the Lord thy God.... Thou shalt not have strange gods before me. Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing." This commandment is affirmative, insofar as it prescribes worship; and negative, insofar as it forbids the worship of other gods. It is more congruently expressed in negative words, because man, by natural instinct, is so borne toward the worship of God, that he needs rather the rein of prohibition, to restrain him lest he slip into superstition, than to be urged by goads, that he might adore his Creator. That this precept, moreover, is natural, is likewise clear. For what is more implanted in us by nature than to venerate him from whom we have received all things? Since, moreover, we have received a twofold nature from God, spiritual and corporeal, it follows that he ought to be worshipped by us with the acts of both natures, or by internal adoration, or by internal and external mixed together. All of which are more certain than to need proof.

n. VI.

VI. Question II. When does this precept, of itself, oblige? Response: This precept, insofar as it is negative, obliges always, and for always, as do all negative precepts, which forbid actions evil by their own nature; but, insofar as it is affirmative, it obliges at fixed times. Certain more recent Probabilist writers — Fr. Thomas Tamburini (Bk. II, on the Decalogue, ch. 4, §2, n. 4), Fagundez (Bk. I, on the Decalogue, ch. 32), Bassaeus (Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 5, dub. 2), and others whom Roccaberti, whom Leander cites, teach that this precept, of itself, at no time imposes adoration directly, and per se; but only presupposes it. This lax opinion is not worthwhile to expound in words; I will only say that it betrays laxity, and horror. The common opinion of Theologians teaches that this precept, of itself, and directly, imposes adoration. At what time, and how often it must be exercised, see what has been said concerning the acts of faith, hope, and charity: for the reasoning of both precepts is the same. For we have been brought into the light for this reason: that we might worship our God by faith, hope, charity, and acts of religion; and thus our moral, and Christian, life ought to live by these actions. We ought, then, to repeat these offices of religion with such frequency as suffices to nourish and foster our moral and Christian life. Besides the natural and divine precept, there is likewise given an ecclesiastical mandate, on feast days, by which we are bidden to worship God with all our resources. For all feasts regard this worship of God, and all the faithful, on these days, together with the Priest, offer sacrifice to God.

n. VII.

VII. Question III. Is there a determined place in which God must be worshipped? Response: If the discourse concerns a place prescribed by natural or divine right, it is certain that no place is designated; but, since God is present everywhere, we can, and ought to, adore him everywhere. The Church, however, God himself so prescribing, has erected temples, in which sacrifices, and the solemn rites of divine worship, might be celebrated. The Angelic Doctor adduces three congruent reasons, by which he establishes the fitting and becoming institution of temples (II-II, q. 84, art. 3, ad 2): "A determined place is chosen for praying, not on account of God who is adored, as though he were enclosed in a place, but on account of the ones adoring; and this for a threefold reason. First, indeed, on account of a special consecration of the place, from which those praying conceive special devotion, so that they may be better heard, as is clear from the adoration of Solomon (3 Kings 8). Second, on account of the sacred mysteries, and other signs of sanctity which are contained there. Third, on account of the concourse of many adoring, from which prayer is made more likely to be heard." He adds, in the same place, ad 3: "It is more fitting for us to adore God with the temple's face turned toward the east, both on account of Christ, who is the light of the world, and is called the East; and on account of paradise, established in the east — as though, wishing to return to paradise, we, while we pray, turn ourselves in that direction."

Diss. I, Chapter II — The worship of latria is owed to God alone, one and triune, and to Christ the Lord

n. I.

I. God alone is of infinite dignity, which can be communicated to no creature. This infinite dignity, moreover, is common to all three Persons; therefore the worship of latria is owed to God alone, one and triune, according to that saying (Matthew 4): "The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and him only shalt thou serve." For latria is the servitude which we are bound to show to God alone. Hence it follows that the individual Persons can be adored separately by the worship of latria, since each individually is God; provided, however, that none is explicitly excluded — for each can be conceived without the other. Wherefore the Church has dedicated to each individually a feast day, so that we might adore them distinctly.

II. Since, however, external adoration, generally considered, is indifferent, it is necessary to designate some sign by which we manifest the worship owed to God alone. This, moreover, is sacrifice, which it is unlawful, without superstition, to offer to any creature, however excellent. For, as the Angelic Doctor says (II-II, q. 84, art. 1): "No one ever thought to sacrifice, except to him whom he either worshipped, or thought, or feigned, as God" — which Augustine had already taught (Bk. X, On the City of God, ch. 4). It is certain, then, among all, that both the one God, and the three Persons individually, can, and ought, to be adored by us both jointly, and separately.

n. III.

III. Question I. Can Christ the Lord, as man, be adored with the adoration of latria? Response: That Christ, as the second Person of the Trinity, ought to be worshipped with the worship of latria, is established from what has been said. This alone is brought into controversy: whether, as man, he ought to be adored with the same worship. All Theologians, with St. Thomas (Part III, q. 25, art. 1), affirm this, and give this reason: "Since in Christ there is only one divine person, and the human nature is also one hypostasis, and one supposit, there is indeed one adoration of him, and one honor, on the part of him who is adored; but on the part of the cause by which he is honored, several adorations can be said to exist, so that, namely, he is honored by one honor on account of his uncreated wisdom, and by another on account of his created wisdom. Christ, taking specifically both his divine nature, and..." his human nature, comprehends both; therefore in him shines infinite dignity, by which he claims for himself the worship of latria. For, that we may adore some whole, and its parts constituting that whole, it is not necessary that the reason of adoration be present in each and every part; but it is enough that the reason of adoration reside in some part. We adore the Eucharist with the worship of latria, because there is found there the flesh, which is the reason of adoration. And, while we worship some holy person, we venerate all his parts with the worship of latria, although the sanctity which is the cause of adoration is not present in all of them. Therefore, that we may adore Christ with the adoration of latria, even considered specifically as man, it suffices that his humanity be terminated by a divine subsistence, which is the formal reason of adoration.

n. IV.

IV. Question III. Is the humanity of Christ, considered as abstracted from the Word, to be adored with the worship of latria? Response: Theologians deny this, with the same St. Thomas — since humanity, considered as precisely abstracted from the Word, betrays only a created, and limited, dignity. Therefore, according to this reasoning, not the worship of latria, but of dulia, is owed to it. Here are the words of the Angelic Doctor (III Part, q. 25, art. 2): "The proper adoration of latria is owed to the hypostasis of infinite dignity; but the reason of honor can be that which does not subsist, on account of which the subsisting person is honored. Adoration of Christ's humanity, then, can be understood in a twofold way. In one way, so that it is the adoration of that which is adored, and thus to adore the flesh of Christ is nothing other than to adore the incarnate Word of God — just as to adore the King's garment is nothing other than to adore the clothed King; and according to this, the adoration of Christ's humanity is the adoration of latria. In another way, the adoration of Christ's humanity can be understood, so that the perfection of Christ's humanity itself is the reason for which Christ is adored, and thus the adoration of Christ's humanity is not the adoration of latria, but of dulia."

n. V.

V. Question III (bis). Is it lawful in practice to adore the humanity of Christ with the worship of dulia, on account of the created perfections with which it shines? Response: Several deny this, such as Vázquez, Sylvius, and others. The contrary opinion affirms this, resting on the authority of St. Thomas, who says that the same person of Christ is adored with the worship of latria on account of his divinity, and with the worship of dulia on account of the perfection of his humanity (loc. cit.). That such a twofold adoration can be shown to Christ the Lord on account of the two natures is already established from what has been said. But whether they can, and ought, really to be offered separately in practice is not a question of such great moment as to need a more severe discussion. While we adore Christ with the worship of latria, we honor, by a supreme and more excellent worship, both his divinity, and the humanity conjoined to it. If someone wished to meditate separately on Christ's humanity, and to worship it with a peculiar veneration on account of its created perfections, he would perform a true office of religion. Nonetheless, as it seems to me, it is better, these distinctions set aside, to adore Christ the Lord with the worship of latria according to the common, and obvious, manner.

n. VI.

VI. Question IV. Was the body of Christ, during the three days of his death, to be adored with the worship of latria? Response: The common opinion affirms this, because it was united to the divine Word. The same must be asserted of the natural blood shed in his passion, since this was never separated from the Word. The same, too, must be said of the sacrament of the Eucharist, in which the body of Christ is coupled, in an ineffable manner, to the divine person by hypostatic union. And this the Council of Trent defined, against Luther and Calvin.

n. VII.

VII. Question V. Is the host to be adored by the Priest, elevated in the Mass, absolutely, or under an added condition? Response: This is St. Thomas's own response: "It must be said that one who adores a non-consecrated host can adore it under a condition, namely, if it is consecrated. It is not, however, necessary that this condition always be actually explicit; but it suffices that he hold it habitually. Whence one adoring it does not sin, because he does not adore a mere creature, but Christ according to his intention. The priest, however, so far as it is in him, makes the people commit idolatry, because he offers them a mere creature." It is not necessary that this condition be expressly added; but it suffices that it be present habitually, and implicitly. It is absolutely lawful to adore it, since no prudent reason of suspicion occurs that the Priest failed to consecrate it. It suffices that he be so disposed, as a Catholic, that, if he knew it was not consecrated, he would abstain from adoration. He, however, who adores a host really not consecrated, does not exercise an act of the virtue of religion, but an act of idolatry, which is not imputed to him as fault, on account of invincible error.

n. VIII.

VIII. Question VI. Is the flesh, or blood, which sometimes appears in a consecrated host by miracle, to be adored with the worship of latria? Response: The common opinion affirms this. Because that flesh, or blood, either is Christ's, or is something divinely produced referring to Christ. No one doubts that the former is to be adored with the worship of latria; if it is something divinely produced, it represents Christ himself. Now every image of Christ is to be adored, if it truly is one, with the reverence of latria. And in all these apparitions which are narrated to be made divinely, Christ the Lord is represented; indeed they are instituted for the purpose of representing him, so that faith and devotion may be wondrously increased. To this opinion St. Thomas accedes (III Part, q. 76, art. 8), where he asks whether, when flesh, or a child, miraculously appears in the Eucharist, the body of Christ is truly there. To this question he responds thus: "But on the contrary is this, that by such an apparition made, the same reverence is shown to that which appears as was shown before — which indeed would not happen, if Christ were not truly there, to whom we show the reverence of latria." If all confess that the consecrated host, under the species of bread, presented to us, is to be adored with the worship of latria, by a stronger right we owe such worship to it once the miraculous apparition has occurred. Would God, then, work a notable prodigy so as to diminish the worship due to the most august sacrament? For we suppose the apparition to be wrought by divine power, for the greater glory of God, the confirmation of faith, and the devotion of the people.

Diss. I, Chapter III — On the worship of the Cross, and whether the other instruments of Christ's most sacred Passion can be worshipped, and with the worship of latria

All Catholics affirm it.

n. I.

I. Question I. Is the Cross of Christ to be adored? Response: All Catholics affirm this. For the Cross of Christ is an image of Christ. But the image of Christ is worshipped with the same worship as Christ himself. That the Cross is a special sign, or symbol referring to the person of Christ, is clear from that text of Matthew 24: then shall appear the sign of the Son of Man — from which text all the commentators teach that the Cross of Christ is meant. The Angelic Doctor explains this matter excellently. He says: it must be said that no reverence is shown to the image of Christ insofar as it is a mere thing (say, a carved or painted sign); for reverence is owed only to a rational nature. It remains, then, that reverence is shown to it only insofar as it is an image; and thus it follows that the same reverence is shown to the image of Christ as to Christ himself. Since, therefore, Christ is adored with the adoration of latria, it follows that his image is to be adored with the adoration of latria (III Part., q. 25, art. 3).

It should be added that the Cross to which the incarnate Word was affixed must be adored not only because it is an image of Christ himself, but also on account of its physical contact with his members, and on account of that precious blood with which it was sprinkled, as the same Angelic Doctor teaches in the place cited, art. 4. If, then, we speak of that very Cross on which Christ was crucified, it is to be venerated by us in two respects: in one respect insofar as it represents to us the figure of Christ, which is present in it; in another respect from its contact with the members of Christ, and from the fact that it was drenched with his blood. Hence in both respects it is adored with the same adoration as Christ, namely the adoration of latria.