Question — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Question First. On the Nature of Religion
131. Notion. Religion is defined: a moral virtue inclining the will to exhibiting to God the worship owed to Him as the supreme principle of all things.
a. Religion is said in a threefold sense: a. it signifies the whole relation of man to God, which embraces the truths declaring this relation and the duties which are derived from it; b. it signifies the special virtue by which we render to God the worship owed; c. it signifies the state of those who are perpetually deputed to divine worship through profession of the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. Ethics and apologetics treat of religion taken in the first sense; dogmatic and moral theology treat of religion taken in the second sense; canon law treats of religion taken in the third sense.
b. Worship is to be distinguished from honor: honor is an external signification of the excellence of another; worship is an external signification of excellence with submission toward him who is worshiped. Hence worship cannot be exhibited except to a superior in some kind of excellence, but honor can be exhibited even to an equal and inferior. The excellence on account of which worship is owed to God is this: that He is the supreme principle of all things.
1 St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 81-100; Suarez, De virtute religionis, tr. 1-6; Laymann, Theologia moralis, bk. 4, De virtute religionis; Castropalao, Operis moralis, pars II-III, De virtute religionis et ei annexis; Bouquillon, De virtute religionis, Bruges: Steyaert, 1880; J. B. Wirthmuller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion, Freiburg: Herder, 1881.
132. Object of religion. The material object of religion is the worship itself to be exhibited to God, or those actions by which God is worshiped and His excellence is signified, such as praises, prayers, inclinations, genuflections, sacrifices, etc. The formal object is not divine excellence, but the natural moral goodness which is found in divine worship: for to exhibit a sign of divine excellence and of our subjection is fitting to rational nature and owed to God. But the reason on account of which worship is morally good and owed to God is His infinite excellence. Therefore, although divine excellence is not the formal object of religion, nevertheless it is the reason why God is to be worshiped, and therefore the foundation of religion or its remote formal object.
133. Religion a moral virtue. Religion is a moral virtue, not a theological one; nevertheless among the moral virtues it is the most excellent. Therefore sins opposed to religion are the gravest after sins against the theological virtues.
a. Moral: For theological virtues immediately attain God Himself as their proper object, both material and formal; but the object of religion is not God. For religion is not immediately occupied with God, but with actions, whether internal or external, by which God is worshiped; and its formal object is the aspect of debt and fittingness which is derived from the relation of creature to Creator. Therefore the proximate and immediate object of religion is not God but the worship of God, just as the immediate object of justice is not the neighbor, but the thing owed to the neighbor; but the end and term of religion is God, just as the term of justice is the neighbor.1
b. Most excellent: because it rightly disposes man toward God Himself, not toward himself or toward other men, and because therefore the term and object to which worship is exhibited is God Himself on account of His excellence. Hence it is not strange that Christ the Lord especially gave men the most excellent example of this virtue.2
1 Cf. Lessius, De iustitia et iure, bk. 2, c. 36, n. 7 ff.
2 Cf. Heb. 10:7; Luke 23:46; and very many testimonies in which He is read to have prayed to God the Father and to have given thanks to Him.
134. Acts of the virtue of religion. a. The proper acts of the virtue of religion suppose an act of the intellect by which the highest excellence of God and our entire subjection and dependence are known; and the same acts contain an act of the will by which it intends to exhibit to God the worship and honor owed, and therefore commands certain acts, whether internal or external, by which that worship is actually exhibited.
b. The act of religion immediately elicited is devotion, or the prompt will and intention of worshiping God: for devotion is defined as a prompt will of doing those things which pertain to the worship of God. The acts of religion mediately elicited and commanded by devotion are all those acts, whether internal or external, by which the worship owed to God is exhibited; but they are chiefly six: adoration, prayer, sacrifice, vow, oath, and the sanctification of certain days.
Of these acts, those by which religion is principally exercised (adoration, prayer, sacrifice) pertain to the first precept; those by which it is secondarily exercised (vow, oath) pertain to the second; finally that act by which public and common worship is exhibited to God (sanctification of days) pertains to the third precept. From these things it is clear that the first three precepts of the first table prescribe acts of the virtue of religion.
c. Besides elicited acts of religion, which properly and of themselves are referred to this virtue, other acts can pertain to religion accidentally, namely acts of other virtues which are commanded by religion, because they are exercised from the motive of religion or are directed to the worship and honor of God, for example fasting undertaken in honor of God or of some saint.