Chapter I. On the Nature of Religion

323. Name. It is obscure whence the name religion was taken. There are four principal etymological explanations: 1. Religion is derived from relegere, to read again. Thus Cicero.³ For we ought frequently to read again or revolve those things which pertain to divine worship. 2. The name religion is derived from reeligere, to choose again. Thus St. Augustine.⁴ For man ought to choose again the God whom he lost by sinning. 3. The name religion is taken from religare, to bind. Thus Lactantius.⁵ For through religion man is most greatly bound and fastened to God. 4. The name religion is derived from relinquere, to leave apart. Thus Massurius Sabinus.⁶ For those things which pertain to religion ought to be left apart or separated from profane things. Concerning these etymologies St. Thomas observes:⁷ "Whether religion is so called from frequent reading, or from the repeated choice of that which has been negligently lost, or from rebinding, religion properly imports an order to God. For he is the one to whom principally we ought to be bound as to an unfailing principle; to whom our choice also ought continually to be directed as to the ultimate end; whom we also lose negligently by sinning, and whom we ought to recover by believing and professing the faith."

³ De nat. deorum l. 2, c. 28.

⁴ De civ. Dei 10, 3.

⁵ Instit. 4, 28. The definition of Lactantius is more pleasing to Cajetan, Comm. in 2, 2, q. 81, a. 1.

⁶ In Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 4, 9.

⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 81, a. 1.

324. Diverse acceptations. There are very many diverse acceptations of religion, especially among non-Catholics. Thus, e.g., Schleiermacher, Jacobi, and many modern non-Catholics place religion in some sensation or affection of subjection toward some infinite Universe.⁸ The so-called "Societies of Ethical Culture" teach that religion is identified with natural morality, so that all religion consists in a good moral life, abstracting from every religious worship.⁹ Pantheists, Deists, and all who deny the existence of a personal God necessarily also deny true religion, so that Feuerbach did not blush to call religion a certain disease of man. Omitting all these false acceptations, concerning which apologists treat more broadly,¹⁰ Catholic authors employ the word religion principally in four ways:

1. In the objective sense, for a determinate manner of believing in or worshiping the Deity. Thus, e.g., we speak of the Mohammedan religion, the Jewish religion, pagan religions, etc., and the history of religions.

2. For the whole moral life. In this sense St. James says:¹¹ "Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world." In this sense we also call an upright and pious man religious.

3. For a special state of men, namely, those who by the public profession of the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience have been perpetually deputed to divine worship. Thus we speak of the religious institute of the Dominicans, the Franciscans, etc., or also of the religious state and religious profession.

4. For a special moral virtue, by which, namely, we offer to God the worship and service due to him.¹² We shall treat here only of this last acceptation, and thus religion can be defined:

⁸ Subjective feeling of dependence; feeling of the vigor of the divine life-impulse and source of will manifesting itself in man (Subjektives Abhängigkeitsgefühl; Gefühl von der Kräftigkeit des sich auswirkenden göttlichen Lebenstriebes und Willensquells im Menschen). Cf. A. Weiß, Die religiöse Gefahr (1904), part II, n. 39.

⁹ Cf. Weiß, l.c., part IV, n. 22.

¹⁰ Especially to be consulted is A. Weiß in the work cited, where nearly all false acceptations of religion are enumerated and refuted, especially part IV, n. 58ff.

¹¹ James 1:27.

¹² In the Greek language it is called eusebeia (εὐσέβεια), and in the German language, the virtue of the veneration or service of God (die Tugend der Gottesverehrung oder des Gottesdienstes), or more briefly, religiosity (die Religiosität).

325. Real definition. Religion is a moral virtue inclining us to offer due worship to God as our creator and governor, or as our supreme principle.

This definition is explained. It is said, 1. a moral virtue. For religion is neither a theological nor an intellectual virtue. And indeed: a) It is not a theological virtue, which has God himself directly as its formal object quod and quo. Thus, e.g., I believe the Trinity because of divine revelation; I love God because of the supreme divine goodness. But the direct object of religion is not God himself, but something created, namely, the worship to be offered to God. For the material object of the virtue of religion consists in those actions, whether internal or external, by which God is worshiped, i.e., by which we profess the divine excellence and our subjection; e.g., inclinations, genuflections, prayers, sacrifices, etc. The formal object quod is "at least an imperfect equality, which man establishes between himself and God through worship, or through actions by which he worships and reveres him as the first principle and supreme lord."¹³ For man, acknowledging that he is a creature made by the supreme and most excellent God, is bound to worship this God insofar as this is possible for him: that worship as due and proportioned to human powers is the formal object in the virtue of religion. Finally, the formal object sub quo, or the motive on account of which religion worships God, is the natural moral rectitude which is found in divine worship and which consists in this, that the creature reveres the divine excellence and manifests his subjection toward God.¹⁴ The special relation and difference between the virtues of religion and charity will be discussed below, n. 328. b) That the virtue of religion differs from the intellectual virtues of wisdom, understanding, knowledge, etc., is nearly evident of itself. For these virtues are only virtues in the broader sense and reside in the intellect, while the virtue of religion is a most excellent moral virtue and resides in the will. Although religion is not a theological virtue, it is very closely allied to the theological virtues; for it attains God mediately and offers him due worship because of the supreme divine excellence. Moreover, religion is a certain profession of our faith, hope, and charity; indeed, it sometimes commands even the acts of the theological virtues themselves in order to honor God. Hence it follows: a) that religion excels among the other moral virtues, because it approaches God more nearly than the other moral virtues;¹⁵ b) that sins which are directly opposed to the virtue of religion, such as blasphemy, perjury, etc., are worse than sins against the other moral virtues.

It is said, 2. inclining us to offer due worship to God; because due divine worship is the material object of the virtue of religion, as was said above.

It is said, 3. to God as our creator and governor, or as our supreme principle. Hence the Angelic Doctor says: "It belongs to religion to offer reverence to the one God according to one aspect, insofar, namely, as he is the first principle of the creation and government of things.... To these two belong all the acts which are attributed to religion; because through them all man professes the divine excellence and his own subjection to God, either by offering something to him [e.g., in sacrifices], or also by assuming something divine" [e.g., the invocation of the divine name in an oath].¹⁶

¹³ Billuart, De relig. diss. 1, a. 2.

¹⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 81, a. 5.

¹⁵ Cf. ibid., a. 6.

¹⁶ Cf. ibid., a. 3, corp. and ad 2.

326. Subject of the virtue of religion. A twofold subject is distinguished: remote and proximate. The remote subject of some virtue is those persons or beings in which the virtue is found; but the proximate subject is that power of the soul in which the virtue resides.

a) The remote subject of the virtue of religion cannot be: 1. animals and other irrational beings. The reason is that they do not know the divine excellence. But if in Sacred Scripture they are sometimes invited to worship God, e.g., in the Canticle of the Three Children, "All ye fowls of heaven, bless the Lord," these expressions are merely metaphorical, signifying the overflowing fervor of the man praying and praising God. 2. The devil and the damned; for they indeed know the excellence of God, but they hate it and are unwilling to submit themselves to God. 3. All sinners who remain in the formal sin of irreligion. For irreligion is a vice directly opposed to religion. But it is impossible for a virtue and its opposite vice to be simultaneously in the same subject.

All other men, however, and the angels and the souls in purgatory can be the subject of religion. Even Christ as true man had and exercised the virtue of religion throughout his whole life, but especially in the sacrifice of the cross.

b) The proximate subject of the virtue of religion is neither the intellect, nor the concupiscible part, nor the irascible part, but the will. The reason is: a) because the object of religion is not the true, nor the moderation of the passions, but a spiritual good; b) because the two principal acts of the virtue of religion, namely, to revere the excellence of God and to subject oneself to the dominion of God, are acts elicited by the will, which nevertheless presuppose a twofold knowledge, namely, of the most excellent divine majesty and of our lowliness. Religion, although it resides in the will, nevertheless often commands acts of other powers and virtues, e.g., the act of the intellect in prayer, the acts of the bodily powers in genuflection and other external acts of divine veneration, the act of fasting, which belongs to the virtue of temperance, for worshiping God, etc.¹⁷

¹⁷ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 81, a. 4. Concerning the response to objection 2 of this article Cajetan subtly notes: "Therefore many external acts, such as sacrifices and ceremonies, and internal acts of other powers, such as prayer, are proper, immediate, and elicited acts of religion, although they are only commanded acts of the will, in which religion exists subjectively."

327. The necessity of religion arises from both natural law and positive divine law. And first, indeed, from natural law; for by the very fact that man knows the personal God, the most excellent Lord of heaven and earth, and his own dependence upon this God, he is impelled to worship him. Therefore St. Thomas rightly teaches: "It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that man should do certain things for divine reverence."¹⁸ Hence religion is found everywhere on earth among all peoples, even among those destitute of so-called civilization. The positive divine law of both the Old and the New Testament prescribes the worship of God in many places. Through the ceremonial precepts in the Old Testament, the worship of God was most precisely ordered; but in the New Testament the sacrifice of the Mass was instituted as the principal manner of worshiping God. Likewise, the sacraments instituted by Christ are referred to the worship of God.

Extent of religion. Religion demands the worship of God both internal and external and sometimes public.

1. Internal worship is owed to God, because the homage of the soul is the chief thing, and without it all other things are of no avail. Therefore Christ says: "God is a spirit; and they that adore him must adore him in spirit and in truth."¹⁹

2. External worship is owed to God, because the whole man, i.e., consisting of body and soul, depends upon God the creator and governor; and consequently the whole man also, according to body and mind, ought to revere God. Moreover, there is so close a connection between body and soul that the internal affections of the soul spontaneously overflow into bodily actions, and conversely, internal affections are excited and fostered by external signs and actions.²⁰ For daily experience proves that, when religious ceremonies are worthily performed, Christian men are powerfully stirred to internal religious affections. Therefore external rites are employed in all religions, and Innocent XI rightly condemned the delusion of Michael Molinos and the Quietists, who taught: "Everything sensible which we experience in the spiritual life is abominable, filthy, and unclean."²¹

3. Public worship of God, i.e., that which is performed in the name of the Church by persons legitimately deputed for this and through acts determined by the Church,²² is also sometimes necessary, because man is a social animal and because the Church was founded as a visible society. But a visible society cannot persist unless it sometimes exercises its acts in public or in common. Therefore public divine worship arises from human nature itself and from the institution of the Church, and it greatly fosters the fervor of each Christian.

¹⁸ S. theol., l.c., a. 2 ad 3.

¹⁹ John 4:24.

²⁰ Cf. S. theol., l.c., a. 7.

²¹ Condemned proposition 30 (Denz. n. 1250). The necessity of external worship is denied not only by the Quietists, but also by nearly all those who place the whole of religion in a pure feeling of subjection. They are accustomed to call external worship vain formalities (eitlen Formelkram).

²² Cf. Code of Canon Law, canon 1256.