Point I. On Religion

I. Notion of Religion. Religion, since it is more probably derived from the word religare, by the force of the word indicates the bond by which man is bound with God. Taken in a broader sense, it indicates the complex of all acts by which man is perfectly ordered to God; therefore it includes not only the act of worshiping God, but also the act of obeying laws, whether natural or positive. But taken in the proper sense, insofar as it is a special virtue, it can be defined: a moral virtue inclining man to render to God, as First Principle and Supreme Lord, the worship owed to Him (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 81, aa. 1 and 2). It is said:

1. As First Principle and Supreme Lord. This signifies the cause of the special worship.

2. Worship, namely testimony by which God's excellence and our subjection to Him are indicated.

3. Owed. By this word the obligation of this worship is not set forth, but its specification; therefore it denotes worship which corresponds to God's supreme excellence and our complete subjection.

II. Object of Religion. 1. The remote material object is the very worship owed to God; the proximate material object is all acts, whether internal or external, by which God's supreme excellence and our complete submission are signified.

2. The remote formal object is the supreme excellence of God, on account of which worship is owed to Him, insofar as He is the first principle of all things, the supreme Lord of all, and the end of all; the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in showing due worship to infinite Excellence.

From what has been said it follows:

1. That the virtue of religion differs from the theological virtues. For these regard God immediately as formal and material object; religion, on the contrary, is occupied immediately around the worship owed to God and all those things which we offer to God in worshiping Him, and does so on account of moral goodness. Therefore God is not immediately its object, neither formal nor material (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 81, a. 5; De virtutibus, a. 12, ad 11).¹

2. That the virtue of religion is a species distinct from the other virtues, since in it there is a special reason of moral good, namely honor and service owed on account of the excellence of God, which is plainly special and singular (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 81, a. 4).

3. That religion is the most excellent of all purely moral virtues. For those things which are ordered to an end obtain goodness from their order to the end; and therefore the nearer they are to the end, the better they are (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 81, a. 6). Now among purely moral virtues religion "comes nearer to God, insofar as it works those things which are directly and immediately ordered to divine honor" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 81, a. 6).

4. That religion, although it falls short of the perfect reason of justice because it does not render an equal thing, nevertheless surpasses justice both by reason of being toward another, because it is toward God, and by reason of debt, because the debt owed to God is greater than the debt owed to man, and by reason of the object, which comes nearer to our end, that is, to God. And therefore religion is simply a more perfect virtue than justice itself, although justice surpasses it in a certain respect, that is, by reason of equality.

¹ Cf. Gonet, d. 3, a. 1, nn. 1-3 inclusive; Salmanticenses, Arb. praed., n. 60 (t. 6, p. 450); Lessius, De iure et iustitia, book 2, c. 3, De religione, d. 2, n. 10.

III. Acts of Religion. The acts of religion are distinguished into internal and external acts. The internal acts are devotion and prayer. External acts are those by which we worship God either through one's own body, and this is adoration; or by offering to God some external thing, and these are sacrifice, oblation, and vow; or by assuming something pertaining to God, namely either the Sacraments or the name of God, which can be assumed either by invocation, or by oath, or by adjuration (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 84, Preface). Concerning each of these, discussion will be had in Book II.

IV. Sins Opposed to Religion. Sins opposed to religion can be distinguished into negative and positive sins. Sins negatively opposed to religion consist in the omission of acts here and now prescribed by religion; sins positively opposed consist not in the omission of prescribed acts but in the placing of contrary acts. And because religion, as a moral virtue, of itself has its being in a mean, acts positively opposed to it can be contrary to it in two ways: either by excess or by defect. Some act is contrary to religion by excess "not because it offers more in divine worship ... but because it offers divine worship either to one to whom it ought not, or in a way in which it ought not" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 92, a. 1). These sins are indicated by the name of superstition and irreligiosity. To superstition pertain idolatry and superstitious observance, as it is called. To irreligiosity pertain perjury, tempting God, blasphemy, vain usurpation of the divine name, sacrilege, and simony. Concerning these matters there will be discussion in Book II.