Question One: On the Essence of Religion

S. Th. II-II, q. 81, a. 1-6; q. 84, a. 1, ad 1.

645. Religion, according to Lactantius, is said etymologically from re-binding (re-ligando), because it repeatedly binds men to God by knowledge and love, to whom they are already bound through dependence; but according to Cicero from re-reading (relegendo), because the religious man frequently meditates, treats again, and mentally reads again those things which pertain to God and His worship, because we are accustomed especially to treat again those things which more deserve veneration and fear. We pass over the opinion of St. Augustine, who says that religion is from re-choosing (reelegendo) that which we have lost by sinning, because this etymology does not seem possible.¹ But whether you choose the one or the other etymology, always "religion properly imports order, namely, a moral ordination, to God," upon whom we depend or to whom we owe veneration. St. Thomas aptly says, q. 81, a. 1:

¹ The other two are possible and are still proposed today by the learned. Thus Reville explains the word as Lactantius does; Max Muller holds with Cicero.

"Whether religion is said from frequent re-reading, or from the repeated choice of that which was negligently lost, or whether it is said from re-binding, religion properly imports order to God. For He is the one to whom we principally ought to be bound as to an unfailing principle; to whom also our choice ought assiduously to be directed as to the ultimate end; whom also by neglecting through sinning we lose, and by believing and by professing faith we ought to recover."

Hence a) most broadly, it is taken objectively for the complex of all our offices toward God, whether of the intellect, or of the will, or of the executive powers, and consequently of all dogmas, laws, and institutes by which men are obligated to God; and subjectively for the fulfillment of all offices toward God (Jas. I, 26, 27);

b) Most strictly, it is taken for the supreme worship which we owe to God alone (godsdienst) and for the virtue which inclines us to this (godsdienstigheid);

c) By excellence, it is said of the institute or state of those who, through the evangelical counsels, perfectly dedicate their whole life to divine worship.

646. The virtue of religion is defined: a virtue inclining man to exhibit due worship to God as the first principle of all things.

It is a virtue, because it renders due worship to God; but to render to someone what is owed to him is good and best; therefore religion renders man perfect, and therefore it is a virtue.

It is one virtue, because it has one object: for it exhibits honor to God according to one account, insofar as He is the first principle of the creation and governance of things.

It is a special virtue, because it has a special object; for to God, on account of His singular excellence, insofar as He transcends all things infinitely according to every manner of excess, there is owed a special honor, which is called the supreme worship or worship of latria, distinct from dulia, which is rendered to the saints or to those more worthy on account of their own excellence.²

² On the virtue of religion, these can usefully be consulted: St. Thomas, q. 81-100 with the commentaries of Cajetan and Billuart; Suarez, De Virtute Religionis; Dignant, De Virtute Religionis; Tanquerey and Prummer in their manuals; Monsabre, La Priere; Janvier, Conf. de N. D.: La Justice envers Dieu; Gardeil, L'education personnelle et surnaturelle de soi-meme par la vertu de religion, in Rev. Thomiste, 1919-20; Dom Lottin, L'Ame du culte: la vertu de religion.

647. Religion is not a theological virtue but a moral virtue, because it does not attain God Himself, the ultimate end, but is concerned with the means to the end, namely, with our acts, which are something created: for it does not have God as its immediate object, whether material or formal. But it is a moral virtue, whose:

1. Material object, or that which it intends to exhibit, is divine worship: worship is a certain testimony of submission unto the acknowledgment of the excellence of another; and therefore divine worship consists in acts by which man protests the divine excellence and his own subjection to God, and thus honors God as first principle and supreme lord;

2. Primary material object (others say the formal quod), which religion principally, per se, and by reason of itself intends to exhibit by divine worship, is a certain due equality between the worship exhibited and God's right to it, by which equality the worship exhibited is proportioned to the right which God has to it: not an absolute equality, but an imperfect and relative one, by which we render worship to God as much as is possible according to the consideration of human faculty and divine acceptance;³

³ St. Thomas, a. 5, ad 3.

3. Formal object, or the immediate and proximate motive on account of which we exhibit due worship to God, is the special honesty of the said equality: for man wills to render due worship to God and thus preserve equality between himself and God, because this is good and is owed.

God, insofar as by reason of excellence He has a right to man's worship and holds man obligated to worship, is not the object which religion immediately attains, but only mediately the end to whom the debt is rendered. In the same way, the person to whom we render what is owed to him is not the object of justice, but only the end to whom that which is just is rendered.

648. Corollaries. From the aforesaid doctrine it follows:

1. That divine excellence is not the formal object or proximate motive of religion, but only the remote foundation on account of which God has a right to worship and worship is owed to Him.

2. The debt which religion attends to is strict or legal, indeed most strict, because God has the supreme right that worship be exhibited to Him. Yet we are not able to render that debt to equality (a. 5, ad 3), both because we do not render all that we have received, for example, being itself; and because we do not render as much as we owe, since we always receive new benefits; and because we do not pay from our own things but from the goods of God Himself. Hence even by payment the debt increases, since through it a new benefit is conferred upon man. Namely, we confer no utility upon God, but we perfect ourselves, "because by this, that we revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; and in this its perfection consists" (a. 7).

3. Religion is not justice strictly so called, both a) because it does not render to God to equality, as has been said, and b) because it is not toward another perfectly distinct: for insofar as we are creatures and servants of God, to whom as supreme lord of all we are subjected, we are something of God; hence religion, which acknowledges that subjection, supposes a certain special conjunction of Creator and creature, whereas strict justice rests upon perfect distinction. Hence religion falls short of perfect justice and is a potential part of it.

4. Since religion is a moral virtue, it is in the mean: for although under one respect there cannot be excess in its matter, insofar as the worship rendered to God cannot be excessive in quantity, nevertheless according to other circumstances excess is found, for example, because worship is exhibited to one to whom it ought not be exhibited, or when or how it ought not be exhibited (a. 5, ad 3).

5. Fidelity, observance, and gratitude toward God are not virtues distinct from religion, because by them God is worshiped under the same account, as creator and governor (a. 3, ad 1).

6. Religion differs from piety toward God: for the former is the virtue by which we worship God as creator and lord; the latter is the gift of the Holy Spirit by which we venerate God as father.

7. It differs also from obedience and humility: from obedience, because this of itself is not ordered to testifying to divine excellence, but inclines to observing the precept of any superior, because it has been commanded by him; from humility, which does not directly testify to submission to another, but represses the appetite lest it tend toward lofty things beyond the limits of its condition which it has received from God, because this is fitting to our lowliness, and therefore it submits itself to the divine rule, not indeed to honor the majesty of God (as religion does) but to confess our own nothingness. Yet these virtues have their ultimate foundation, principle, and root in reverence toward the supreme authority of God and thus in religion, to which they are akin.

8. It differs also from the theological virtues, which are not ordered to the formal testification of divine excellence, nor do they formally regard debt. But they are the foundation of infused supernatural religion, as the end is with respect to means: for by them we immediately adhere to God Himself, the ultimate end; but religion orders our acts as due means unto reverence, love, and glory of God (a. 5, ad 1). And similarly one must speak of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are connected with the theological virtues. Hence St. Thomas, a. 2, ad 1: "To revere God is an act of the gift of fear. But it belongs to religion to do certain things on account of reverence for God. Hence it does not follow that religion is the same as the gift of fear, but that it is ordered to it as to something more principal: for the gifts are more principal than the moral virtues."

9. It differs especially from charity, which loves the goodness of God in itself as communicated to us. Namely, religion precisely worships the excellence of God which transcends all things and cannot be communicated; hence in the same way as justice rests upon every manner of distinction from another, so also religion rests upon a certain distinction (imperfect) from God. "The object of love is the good; but the object of honor and reverence is something excellent. Now the goodness of God is communicated to the creature, but not the excellence of His goodness. And therefore charity, by which God is loved, is not a virtue distinct from charity by which neighbor is loved. But religion, by which God is honored, is distinguished from the virtues by which neighbor is honored" (a. 4, ad 3; cf. q. 82, a. 2, ad 1).

10. Religion is more excellent than all the moral virtues, because it approaches more nearly to the ultimate end, God: for it performs those things which are directly and immediately ordered to divine honor.