§ II: The Manner Is Weighed in Which St. Alphonsus Is Everywhere Accustomed To Enunciate His Sentences

The other question now comes to be examined: namely, What is the true and proper sentence of St. Alphonsus, when he reports the diverse opinions of Authors, or sets forth several reasons, without declaring in express words what is to be held in practice?

Wherefore the Notice must be premised by which St. A. himself concludes the Preface of the Moral Theology: "I have taken care for the most part to set forth my sentence, by attributing the just weight of greater, or equal, or lesser probability to each sentence, as it seemed to my weakness, lest I leave the reader doubtful, after the manner of some who, by only reporting the sentences of others, make themselves not a little hateful to readers. But where I did not find a reason convincing for one side, I did not dare to condemn the opposite.... For the rest, kind reader, I wish you to be warned, lest you think that I approve those opinions from the fact that I do not reprove them; for sometimes I shall faithfully set them forth with their reasons and patrons, so that others, according to their prudence, may judge of what weight they are. - Then notice that when I call some opinion truer, then I do not hold the contrary as probable, although I do not expressly condemn it as improbable. Moreover, when I call one of the sentences more probable, no judgment having been given concerning the probability of the other, or I use this word - I do not dare to condemn; on that account I do not understand myself to say that it is probable, but to remit it to the judgment of the more prudent...."

The Holy Doctor confirms these things in nearly the same words, Book II, n. 76, at the end, when he says: "And here again I repeat that which I protested at the beginning, namely, that when I call some opinion only more probable, I do not on that account understand myself to say that the contrary is probable.

Likewise, when I say concerning some opinion: I do not dare to condemn, or to call it improbable, I do NOT on that account admit it as probable; but I doubt concerning its probability. Likewise, when I call some sentence truer, I understand that the opposite does not possess, for me, solid probability, although I do not altogether reprove it."

Now, from the aforesaid Notices of St. Alphonsus, the following principal rules can be determined:

1. Generally that opinion alone is probable for the Holy Doctor which he himself calls probable. - Wherefore attention must be paid to his manner of speaking. Namely, when he says: "The Authors say probably," then regularly he judges a sentence of this kind probable. But when he writes: "The Doctors say that it is probably lawful," from this it is not clear that this sentence is held by himself as probable; for by speaking thus, generally he merely reports the judgment of those Authors.

2. If, speaking of some opinion, he says: "it does not seem improbable," or: "it is said not improbably," then regularly he holds it as sufficiently probable, at least in the case in which he opposes to it nothing certainly or notably more probable. - But concerning sentences of this kind, it will be worth the labor to inspect other places of the Holy Doctor.

3. An opinion which he calls neither probable nor improbable he generally leaves to the judgment of others. - Yet one must see what he says either before or afterward; for if he opposes nothing at all, and the Author alleged is grave, regularly that opinion will have to be held as sufficiently probable; as, for example, when at the end of a question he adds: "Lugo adds, notices...."

4. If concerning some sentence he expressly says: "I do not dare to condemn," or: "I do not dare to call it improbable," by that very fact he declares that it is, in his judgment, doubtfully probable, or that he remits it to the judgment of the more prudent. - Yet one must see whether in another place or Work he puts forward his judgment concerning it, or not.

5. A sentence which he alone calls probable, opposing nothing to it (which case however rarely happens), ordinarily founds moral certitude for practice. See n. 68. 2°. 69. 2°.

6. When he calls some opinion truer, or much or absolutely more probable, or more probable and at the same time common or most common,¹ then he does not judge the opposite solidly probable, at least with respect to the other, even if he does not expressly reject it as improbable, or although perhaps he judges it probable in general, or in itself, before the weighing of each has been instituted.

7. The same also must be said when he names one of the sentences more probable or more common, no judgment having been given by him concerning the opposite; for by this manner of writing St. Alphonsus intends to signify that that opinion seems so much more probable to him that he does not acknowledge the opposite as truly probable.

8. A sentence which he simply calls common, no judgment having been borne concerning the opposite, must regularly be called his own.

Wherefore it will be useful to note that the words "common sentence," or "they commonly say," speaking in themselves, express more than these other words: "more common sentence," or "they more commonly say." For the word more common, since it is comparative, only denotes that more Authors stand for that sentence than for the other. On the contrary, the word common, as positive, declares that Authors generally stand for this sentence. - But when it is said: "it is the most common sentence," or: "they most commonly teach," by that very fact it is affirmed that the consensus of Authors is nearly unanimous. - Finally St. Alphonsus admonishes that one must diligently notice that the authority of Writers is to be estimated not from their multitude, but from their gravity, as is clear from the texts alleged in the preliminary Dissertation of the Vindiciae Alphonsianae,² where it is also shown that most at least of the sentences which the Holy Doctor holds have today become common, and that they, generally, from his pre-eminent authority, deservedly must be called probable, or even more probable.