Chapter I: On Temperance

Notion of the virtue. Temperance, as a special cardinal virtue, is a virtue of the concupiscible appetite, moderating the delights of taste and touch. The concupiscible appetite is the common name of the passions which are concerned with delightful things.

Temperance is moderating. For, from common usage itself, temperance sounds as a certain moderation, a checking of natural appetency, by which excess is avoided. But in reality the passions by which we are borne toward delightful things, especially through their immoderation, easily are opposed to reason, to which they must be subjected. Wherefore chiefly as prosecutive they must be moderated by virtue.

But the cardinal virtue ought to moderate the more vehement concupiscences. Therefore Temperance is posited as moderating the delights of taste and touch, or of the flesh. (In antiquity venereal delights were called delights of touch.) Now, because generation provides for the necessary multiplication of men, but the use of food and drink provides for the necessary life of individual men, they are joined with delights which are restrained with the greatest difficulty. Yet this difference exists between each appetite, that the venereal appetite is accustomed to be strongest, although its satisfaction is not necessary to an individual man, while the appetite of food and drink is not such per se, except when necessity of life presses or on account of the vicious tyranny of custom.

Subjective parts or species of the virtue. Concerning delights of taste there are two virtues: abstinence and sobriety. This is not to be understood as though abstinence were concerned with food, and sobriety with drink. For abstinence moderates the delights of both food and drink, insofar as they are referred to the nourishment of the body, lest on account of their allurements or bodily necessity the mean of reason be exceeded. But drink, or another means, which intoxicates, in a peculiar mode disturbs the use of reason "insofar as it disturbs the brain by its vaporousness" (2, 2, q. 149 art. 2, c.). Wherefore for removing this a special virtue of sobriety is posited. We spoke of drunkenness in I, 473-484.

Concerning delights of the flesh there is chastity, which moderates the use of venereal things. It takes the name of modesty of purity insofar as it rules the surrounding delights in kisses, touches, and embraces, but of continence, insofar as it has to struggle with persevering difficulty. Concerning these things cf. IV, 17. 18.

Other delights of touch do not need a special virtue, because "the sensitive appetite, in which the passions are, is naturally subject to reason" (2, 2, q. 129 art. 2).

The potential parts of Temperance are various virtues which, like humility and mansuetude, restrain some propensity of appetite. Observe that it is by no means required that the potential parts of some virtue be in the same faculty in which the principal virtue has its seat. For there is question of the logical distribution of virtues, not of physical subordination.

Integral parts of the virtue. St. Thomas posits two: shamefacedness and honorableness. For the vice of intemperance, insofar as it detracts very greatly from man's excellence, is marked by a certain peculiar turpitude; while, on the contrary, a special comeliness belongs to the virtue of temperance. Now through shamefacedness, which rules fear of turpitude and reprehension, man flees from those things which are worthy of reproach, while by the name of honorableness is here designated the inclination toward following the comeliness of temperance. Does not the integral virtue abhor contrary acts and love and follow its own proper good?

Opposite vices. Men sin against temperance especially by excess. But this excess is generically called intemperance; but it is specially named gluttony when the appetite of food and drink is served too much. Yet one can also sin by defect. This defect is called insensibility, by which someone flees delight so much that he flees that very thing which is necessary for the conservation of nature (2, 2, q. 142 art. 1, c.).

I. Temperance is a virtue of the concupiscible appetite, which it moderates in seeking the delights of taste and touch.

Its subjective parts are abstinence and sobriety, chastity and modesty of purity. To this is referred continence, which, understood concerning the purpose of virtue persevering in the very rebellion of the passions, denies the facility which pertains to the nature of acquired virtue. Cf. 2, 2, q. 155 art. 1.

There are also other propensities to be moderated, which are not only in the concupiscible appetite. That moderation is ruled by special virtues which are assigned to Temperance as potential parts. Such are Humility and Mansuetude, concerning which we shall treat below.

II. Because generation provides for the necessary propagation of men, but the use of food and drink provides for the necessary life of individual men, therefore they are joined with delights which are restrained with the greatest difficulty. Yet this difference exists between each appetite, that the venereal appetite is generally strongest, while the appetite of food or drink is not such per se, except when necessity of life presses, or on account of the tyranny of vicious custom.

III. Moreover abstinence commonly rules the delights of food and drink, insofar as they have order to the sustenance or nourishment of the body; sobriety peculiarly prevents the disturbance of drunkenness.

Concerning chastity and modesty of purity there is speech in volume IV.

IV. But temperance is integrated from shamefacedness, which abhors the peculiar turpitude of intemperance; and from zeal for the comeliness of temperance, which is distinguished by the name of honorableness.

V. One sins against temperance especially by excess, which is generically called intemperance, but specially gluttony when there is question of the appetite of food and drink. One sins also by defect, to which is given the name of insensibility.