Chapter III: On Mansuetude and Clemency

I. On Mansuetude. 1. Notion. Mansuetude is defined as a virtue moderating anger according to right reason. Because it is moderating, it is ascribed as a potential part to the virtue of Temperance. But once the nature of anger has been explained, almost the whole virtue has been explained.

2. Anger properly so called is the sensitive appetite of vengeance. Indeed it gave its name to the appetite in which it is, which is called irascible. But vengeance signifies an evil, after sin, inflicted upon one transgressing or sinning. This evil can be sought without a sensible movement of concupiscence or with sensible commotion. That commotion can be antecedent to the deliberation of the will, or follow such deliberation, and this either spontaneously, or from the very decree and action of the will.

3. The appetite of vengeance can be illicit from the object, from the intention or end, and from the mode or subjective commotion. From the object it is illicit if vengeance is sought without a sufficiently proved guilt or beyond the merit of the guilt. From the end it is illicit if it is exercised from hatred, or by resting in another's evil. But through vengeance a multiple good can be sought: the correction of the sinner; - his restraint; - the security and quiet of others; - the conservation of justice and the honor of God.

From the mode it is illicit insofar as too great an impulse of passion drags the will along with it. Yet just as, even in the right use of marriage, the mind suffers a certain captivity under sense which nevertheless is not sinful, so St. Thomas observes that anger is not to be morally reprehended because "in the very execution of the act it somewhat impedes the judgment of reason" (2, 2, q. 158, art. 1 ad 2), but that anger through zeal or voluntary anger, by which, according to the order of reason, the sensitive appetite is moved, is good and praiseworthy.

Yet because we are too prone to desiring vengeance for injuries, no virtue is named whose office is to excite anger according to right reason.

If anger is the appetite of vengeance, we have whence more greatly to detest and flee the easy angers which we experience on account of adverse things which occur not rarely, or in the smallest matters, without another's fault or the intervention of a free cause. For remotely and indirectly they prepare blasphemy, since no other free cause has efficacy in these things besides the divine will.

4. Function and merit of mansuetude. Mansuetude not only checks the anger of the sensitive appetite, but imposes a mode on every appetite of vengeance. Therefore it has the merit of checking passion and obeying justice. It makes man master of himself, so that he can freely judge and pursue truth.

II. On Clemency. This virtue, according to reason, remits something from punishments owed by common law. We say according to reason, because not every penal indulgence is worthy of praise. Too often today it is commanded by a motive that is not right, or the mode is exceeded in such a way that society is no longer sufficiently preserved from delicts. And even if, on account of the morbid propensities of the delinquent, punishments properly so called do not seem to be taken, nevertheless by a suitable method provision ought to be made for the common peace and quiet.

Clemency, because it remits punishments, is the proper virtue of him who has authority. But all of us can be merciful.

I. Mansuetude is a virtue moderating anger according to right reason. It is, on account of the mode which it preserves, a potential part of Temperance.

II. Anger is the appetite of vengeance: this can be desired well and badly. For vengeance, or evil imposed upon one sinning, if it is exercised from hatred, by resting in another's evil, is altogether illicit. But if through vengeance we seek some good: the correction of the sinner, his restraint and the quiet of others, the conservation of justice and the honor of God, then, the due mode being preserved, it is licit (2, 2, q. 108 art. 1).

Although in "the very execution of the act it somewhat impedes the judgment of reason" (2, 2, q. 158 art. 1, ad 2), consequent or voluntary anger, by which, according to the order of reason, the sensitive appetite is moved, or anger through zeal, is good and praiseworthy.

Yet because we are more prone to desiring vengeance for injuries, no virtue is named which is an exciter of anger according to right reason.

II. The merit and utility of the virtue is in this, that it makes man master of himself, and therefore able freely to judge and pursue truth.

III. Akin to mansuetude is clemency, which, according to reason, remits something from punishments owed by common law. Cf. 2, 2, q. 157.