Question One: On Temperance in Itself

S. Th. II-II, q. 141.

936. Temperance is a virtue because, by inclining toward the good of reason, it renders man perfect: for it places the moderation or tempering which reason makes, that is, the order of reason in the passions, and indeed in those which are more difficult to restrain; but it is the good of man that his appetite be subjected to reason, and that this be done in the more difficult matter is best (a. 1).

It is a special virtue, because it has a special object: the principal pleasures of touch to be moderated by reason, which most greatly entice man (a. 2). Yet it is not perfectly one, for it is divided into several species.

937. The object of temperance is the principal pleasures of touch - as to be moderated and regulated according to the order of reason toward the due end - under the account of honesty or special rectitude which shines forth in it. In this one object three things are distinguished:

1. The material object which temperance attains is the principal pleasures of touch, namely, the pleasures of food and drink for the preservation of the individual, and the pleasures of venereal things for the preservation of the human species.¹ This object can be distinguished as proximate and remote: the remote object is foods, drinks, venereal acts, to which the pleasures are referred; the proximate object is concupiscences of pleasures and the pleasures which follow operations more natural and more necessary, and therefore before others are most vehement.² Hence a special virtue is required for moderating them. But other pleasures of touch, or pleasures of the other senses, even of taste, which is nearer to touch, of themselves are the matter of virtues annexed to temperance, and do not pertain to temperance strictly so called, except insofar as they are ordained to those principal pleasures, both that the acts to which they are connected may be better known, and that they may be more pleasurable, for example, contact with soft and tender flesh, the beauty and adornment of a woman, a delectable taste in food and odor, etc.

¹ The pleasure of these things is according to the sense of touch, because their use is in touching.

² In the former, concerning food, there is greater necessity and lesser inclination; in the latter, venereal things, lesser necessity and greater inclination.

2. The primary material object which temperance principally and by reason of itself attains is precisely that these pleasures are to be moderated according to the order of reason, or regulated so that they may be done for the due end.

3. The formal object or proximate motive on account of which temperance exists is the special rectitude proper to this order toward the due end: for temperance moderates pleasures because this is right and honest (a. 4 and 5).

938. Fundamental principle. The due end according to which the pleasures of touch are to be regulated is the necessity of the present life, both absolute necessity, without which the individual or the species cannot be preserved, and necessity of fittingness, without which, all circumstances of person, body, health, office, dignity, wealth, honesty, received usage, fittingness of those with whom one must live, etc., being attended to, it cannot fittingly be done. St. Thomas shows this:

"The good of moral virtue chiefly consists in the order of reason... But the principal order of reason consists in this, that some things be ordered to an end: and in this order the good of reason chiefly consists; for good has the account of end, and the end itself is the rule of those things which are for the end. But all pleasurable things which come into the use of man are ordered to some necessity of this life as to an end. And therefore temperance takes the necessity of this life as the rule of the pleasurable things which it uses, namely, so that it uses them only as much as the necessity of this life requires" (a. 6).

"The necessity of human life can be attended to in two ways: in one way according as that is called necessary without which a thing can in no way exist, as food is necessary to an animal; in another way according as that is called necessary without which a thing cannot fittingly exist. But temperance attends not only to the first necessity, but also to the second... But other things which are not necessary for this can have themselves in two ways. For some are impediments to health or good disposition; and the temperate man in no way uses these: for this would be a sin against temperance. But some are not impediments to these; and he uses these moderately according to place and time and the fittingness of those with whom he lives..." (ad 2).

Therefore "temperance regards necessity with respect to the fittingness of life, which indeed is attended to not only according to the fittingness of the body, but also according to the fittingness of exterior things, for example, riches and offices, and much more according to the fittingness of honesty. And therefore the Philosopher... adds that in the pleasurable things which temperance uses, it considers not only that they not be impeditive of health and good bodily disposition, but also that they not be beyond the good, that is, against honesty, and that they not be above substance, that is, above the capacity of riches. And Augustine says... that the temperate man regards not only the necessity of this life, but also of offices" (ad 3).

Hence: 1) The proximate end of the pleasures of touch, and the proper rule of temperance, is taken from the necessities of this life. And because the end of venereal acts is one thing, and the end of foods and drinks another, so also the rule is diverse.

a) The rule of temperance, insofar as it is concerned with venereal things, is to abstain from them altogether outside marriage; but in marriage to use them only for the sake of an act which of itself is capable of generating offspring, because generation is the end of the use of venereal things.

b) But the rule of temperance, insofar as it is concerned with food and drink, is good bodily health and a suitable disposition of the mind for its functions, and therefore neither more nor less should be taken than for this end.

Hence it is against temperance a) positively: to place an impediment or to harm the end, namely, due generation of offspring and good health and the functions of the mind; b) negatively: to act for pleasure and delight alone exclusively, or principally on account of it, not on account of the honest good:³ pleasure is not a motive of itself conforming to reason and honest, but common to beasts; nor are food or venereal acts of themselves from their nature instituted for the sake of pleasure, but pleasure for the sake of them. We are not indeed forbidden to seek pleasure, but temperance demands that this be desired not for its own sake, but for the due end, and in the manner in which it ought, and consequently without any excess just as without defect (I, n. 158).

³ Hence Innocent XI condemned propositions under nn. 8 and 9: "To eat and drink even to satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health; because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its acts." - "The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is wholly without any fault and venial defect."

2. Yet the proximate end must be subordinated to the ultimate end, which in fact is supernatural, and the proper rule of temperance to higher rules, so that pleasures do not impede the spiritual and supernatural good of the soul, but so that one abstains from them as much as is necessary or useful for the supernatural end.

Thus, for example, for totally subjecting the body and vicious propensities, for better exercising Christian virtues, for greater conformity with Christ, for satisfying for sins, for more freely devoting oneself wholly to God and divine things, or for another supernatural end. Hence natural and infused temperance differ in species: for infused temperance has a higher end, a higher motive known by faith, or also a diverse mean, namely, conformity to the higher, divine rule; as was explained in the treatise on Virtues in general (I, n. 628).

939. Temperance is a cardinal virtue, because it is concerned with a principal and more difficult matter: concupiscences more difficult to moderate; yet it is not the greatest: for justice and fortitude directly pertain to the common good, temperance to the good of one; prudence to the good of all the virtues; the theological virtues to the divine good (a. 7 and 8; cf. treatise on Virtues I, n. 599 and 608).

940. Corollaries.* - 1. Merely spiritual pleasures⁴ are not the object of temperance, because they do not move the sensitive appetite so vehemently against reason; indeed of themselves they are according to reason, whence they are not to be restrained except accidentally, insofar as one withdraws from another which is more powerful and more due (a. 4, ad 4).

⁴ Decorum and beauty, although they agree with any virtue, are nevertheless excellently attributed to temperance: a) by reason of form, by force of the reason which is indicated by the name of temperance: for it makes a moderate and fitting proportion, in which beauty consists; b) by reason of matter: for it restrains those things which are lower in man, agreeing with him according to bestial nature, by which man is especially apt to be defiled; hence beauty is especially attributed to temperance, which chiefly removes the ugliness of man1 (a. 2, ad 3).

1. It is not, however, required that the honest end be explicitly intended, but it suffices implicitly and virtually in the object which appears honest: for he who wills an act which he knows to be conformable to reason thereby wills implicitly and virtually the honest good, the due end.

2. Merely spiritual, by reason of subject and object at once, so that they are in the mind and concerning a spiritual thing.

1. Cf. q. 145, a. 2.