Title II: On Constitutions

Latin source headnote: The statutes of canon law bind everyone, and judicial proceedings, both in pronouncing and in deciding judgments, are to be regulated according to their tenor.

From the Council of Meaux.

The statutes of the canons are to be observed by everyone [without prejudice], and no one in ecclesiastical actions or judgments is to be guided by his own judgment, but by their authority.

Latin source headnote: A constitution has regard to future matters, and not to past ones.

Gregory, in the Register.

Recognizing [what zeal for Christian slaves, whom the Jews buy from the regions of Gaul, has inflamed your fraternity, we indicate that your solicitude has so pleased us that our deliberation also judged that they should be restrained from trade of this kind. But, when Basil the Hebrew came with other Jews, we learned that the purchase of these slaves is imposed upon them by various judges of the commonwealth, and that it happens that pagans and Christians alike are purchased. Hence it was necessary so to dispose the matter by a careful ordinance that neither those issuing the mandates should be frustrated nor those who say that they obey against their will should unjustly sustain any losses. Accordingly, let your fraternity provide with vigilant solicitude that this be observed and maintained: when they return from the aforesaid province, any Christian slaves whom they happen to bring are either to be delivered to those who commissioned them or certainly sold to Christian purchasers within the fortieth day; and, when this number of days has elapsed, none is to remain with them in any manner. But if some of those same slaves should perhaps incur such illness that they cannot be sold within the appointed days, solicitude must be employed so that, when they have been restored to their former health, they are likewise disposed of by every means, because] it is not fitting that a matter which is free from fault be made the occasion of loss. Whenever something new is established, it is customary for it to impose a rule upon future matters in such a way that it does not consign the past to numerous losses. [If any slaves from purchases of the past year have remained with them, or have recently been taken from them by you, while they are in your keeping, let them have permission to alienate them,] lest, before the prohibition, they be able in ignorance to incur a loss which, after they have been prohibited, it is fitting for them to sustain. [It has been reported, etc.]

Latin source headnote: The authority to make and to change canons belongs to the vicar of Christ; and what is established concerning one of two things that are connected is to be extended also to the other.

Augustine, on the Epistle to the Hebrews.

“When the priesthood has been transferred, it is necessary that a transfer of the law also take place.” For, since both were given at the same time, by the same one, and under the same pledge, it is necessary that what is said of the one be understood of the other.

Latin source headnote: Everything prohibited by law is a sin, as is everything that follows from it. This is what it says.

The same, on the Epistle to the Romans.

“For I did not know concupiscence, etc.” The Apostle chose this as a general matter from which all evils arise. The law, therefore, which, while prohibiting this, prohibits all evils, is good.

Latin source headnote: Decretal constitutions are to be preferred to the judgments of individuals.

Jerome, on Proverbs.

“Do not lean upon your own prudence.” He leans upon his own prudence who prefers to the decrees of the Fathers those things which seem to him ought to be done or said.

Latin source headnote: A constitution of a college made to the detriment of some and the advantage of others is not valid when a reasonable cause is lacking. Or thus: Without a reasonable cause, the greater part of a chapter cannot abolish a custom by fostering its private advantage.

Innocent III to the Archbishop of Sens and the Bishop of Troyes.

Since we are all one body in Christ, while individually we are members one of another, the greater ought not to envy the lesser, nor the elder the younger; rather, all who serve the one Lord in one church should rejoice in equal liberty, since weight and weight, measure and measure, are both abominable before God, and the householder of the Gospel rewarded with equal pay the first laborers in his vineyard and the last.

But it has come to our hearing that our beloved sons, the canons of Troyes, intent upon their own advantages and envious of the advancement of others, have made a new constitution in the church of Troyes: that, while they themselves are to receive their revenues in full both when present and when absent, those who were instituted in the same church after that constitution, or who will be instituted in the future, are not to receive revenues from it in their absence, but only when they have been resident there—even though, according to the custom of the church of Troyes, all have customarily been equal in this matter. They also established that, although vineyards are annexed to the individual prebends, with the canons themselves possessing their own vineyards while they live, the vineyards of those who die are not to pass to their successors, but their proceeds are to be divided among the individual canons.

Since, therefore, each person ought himself to use that rule of law which he establishes for another, and the authority of the wise man says, “Submit to the law which you yourself have enacted,” by apostolic writings we command your fraternity to make the older canons equal to the younger, and the younger equal to the older, in the receipt of the fruits both of the prebends and of the vineyards, according to the former custom observed until the time of the aforesaid constitution, or according to a reasonable institution to be observed in the future; striking with ecclesiastical constraint any who decide to resist. [No letters, etc. Given, etc. 1198.]

Latin source headnote: A constitution of laymen does not bind a church or its goods.

The same to the Bishop of Trent.

Things attempted to the prejudice of churches and ecclesiastical men ought not to acquire firmness; rather, they ought to be invalidated for the indemnity of the churches.

Indeed, it has come to our hearing that the citizens of Treviso and Conegliano, rashly usurping for themselves—and would that it were for themselves alone—the jurisdiction of making constitutions, cloak impiety under the name of piety; and, while they strive to show favor to certain persons out of another’s property, they are burdensome to churches and ecclesiastical men. For, as we have learned, they established that if anyone credibly alleges that he is tending toward poverty, he is to have free power to alienate a fief which he holds from a church or from others, through officials appointed for this purpose by the citizens of Treviso and Conegliano; nor is the purchaser bound to answer to the former lord except only for a sixth part of the price, which he will tender to him if he wishes to receive it. By this the rights of the Church are injured not a little.

Wishing, therefore, to take thought for the indemnity of churches and to make provision against burdens of this kind, by the authority of the present writings we quash both this constitution and the sales of ecclesiastical fiefs made without the lawful assent of ecclesiastical persons on the occasion of this constitution—or, more truly, this destitution or destruction—and decree that they have no force. [Let no one therefore, etc. Given at the Lateran, on the tenth day before the Kalends of April, 1199.]

Latin source headnote: A dignity removed from a church by a statute of the chapter confirmed by the Pope is not thereafter deemed vacant unless the statute has been revoked by a contrary act.

The same.

When our beloved sons, the archdeacon of Toul and G., proctor of the chapter of Toul, had approached the Apostolic See, we granted them our venerable brother Hugh, Bishop of Ostia, as auditor. In his presence the aforesaid archdeacon proposed that, when formerly certain canons of Toul had intimated to our ears that the offices of primicerius and scholasticus in the church of Toul had been vacant for so long that the grant of those offices had devolved upon us, we commanded our beloved sons, the abbots of Haute-Seille and Beaupré and the dean of the monastery of La Colombe, to inquire into the truth of the matter; and, if it were established that those offices had been vacant for so long that, according to the statutes of the Lateran Council, the grant of them had devolved upon us, they were in our stead to institute suitable persons from the church of Toul or elsewhere in those offices and cause them to possess the same peaceably.

[Those judges, executing the apostolic mandate, cited the parties to their presence. On the appointed day, when the said Master W. and F. appeared before them, John the priest presented himself in their sight with letters of the chapter of Toul, in which that chapter offered as its excuse that, because of the Duke of Lorraine, who had declared himself their enemy, they could not approach the place appointed by those judges without danger to property and persons. The said priest, wishing to confirm this very thing by his own oath, requested a place to which the canons of Toul could safely come. After the said master and priest had litigated over this for some time, that priest, when required to take the oath which he had earlier offered, refused; and, uttering a declaration of appeal, he presented letters of the chapter in which he had been appointed proctor solely for the purpose of appealing.

But the aforesaid judges, regarding both the excuses proposed by that priest and the appeal interposed as dilatory, on the advice of prudent men received the witnesses whom the said master and F. wished to introduce, and appointed another day for the often-mentioned chapter at Saint-Evre. When they did not take care to appear in judgment on that day either, the judges solemnly published the depositions; and, since it was established before them that the office of primicerius in the church of Toul had been vacant for so long that the grant of it pertained to us, in our stead they conferred it upon the aforesaid S., the archdeacon. The same archdeacon asked that this grant be confirmed by apostolic authority.

The said G., proctor of the chapter, answered to the contrary that this grant and the proceedings of the aforesaid judges deserved to be rescinded, inasmuch as those judges had proceeded after an appeal to us had lawfully been interposed on account of various grievances. For in the first citation they had summoned the chapter itself by a peremptory edict; and, although the chapter thereafter sent its own messenger to their presence, and although that messenger diligently requested that a safe place be assigned to the parties, alleging that because of dangers on the roads and deadly ambushes the chapter could not come to the place appointed or send sufficient representatives, nevertheless the said judges disdained to admit this excuse. For that reason the messenger, as he had been commanded, had recourse to the protection of an appeal.

The said proctor added that the proceedings of those judges were to be adjudged invalid for this reason also: they proceeded to the reckoning of the sentence although the issue had by no means been joined. On the part of the archdeacon it was replied against this that no deference at all was owed to this appeal, since it had not been made for lawful reasons but only for delay. For, although the chapter had been summoned by lawful citations, it sent a mere messenger, not a suitable representative. After he alleged the chapter’s excuse and offered his own oath concerning it, when required he later refused to take it. Since, therefore, the excuse proposed by that messenger rightly seemed deceptive, the appeal interposed upon it was rightly to be rejected, especially since the messenger presented letters of the chapter in which it was expressly contained that he had been sent solely to make an appeal.

The same party answered that neither could it prejudice the matter that the said judges proceeded when the issue had not been joined, since they had been commissioned not to adjudicate a cause but only to investigate the truth; for this reason the solemnity of judicial procedure was not to be observed in the investigation itself. To this the chapter’s party answered that, although the full solemnity of law is not observed in certain investigations, nevertheless the order of law ought to have been observed in an investigation of this kind, since certain persons are peaceable possessors of the possessions and revenues which formerly pertained to the office of primicerius, and they ought not and could not have been despoiled of them without the order of law. Moreover, even if the said judges could have proceeded without adjudicating the cause, they nevertheless chose instead to adjudicate it solemnly, summoning the canons of Toul as a party to their judgment.]

It was further alleged on behalf of the chapter that the rescript obtained for the aforesaid judges had been obtained by a false suggestion. For by the common assent and unanimous will of the canons of Toul it had been established that the dignity of primicerius should no longer exist in the aforesaid church, the proceeds and possessions of that office having been distributed among the canons themselves; and that institution had thereafter been confirmed by Pope Alexander, our predecessor of good memory. For this reason it plainly appears that the office of primicerius had not been vacant for so long, as had been suggested to us by a false representation.

[Against this the archdeacon’s party answered thus: because that dignity had been instituted there for the public and common honor of the church of Toul, it could not be abolished in that church without the authority of the Apostolic See. Nor could the confirmation obtained for so unlawful a constitution give firmness to what was invalid by law itself. Moreover, after all these things the same canons jointly elected Archdeacon Terricus as primicerius, and he was thereafter confirmed by apostolic authority; for this reason they appear not only tacitly to have renounced the confirmation they had obtained but also to have revoked their own institution. But to this the chapter’s party replied that what was done concerning T. could not prejudice them, since he usurped the office of primicerius for himself not through canonical election but rather through intrusion.]

Therefore, by apostolic writings we command your discretion, after a more diligent inquiry into the truth, that if it is established before you that the canons of Toul jointly decreed that the office of primicerius should no longer exist in the church of Toul, and that the statute itself was thereafter confirmed, as is said, by authority of the Apostolic See, you are to cause it to remain in its force, unless the said canons afterward acted contrary to it, namely by electing someone as primicerius. [But if it has been customary, etc. Given at Rome, at Saint Peter’s, on the Kalends of February, in the ninth year, 1207.]

Latin source headnote: Notwithstanding a fixed number of canons, even one confirmed by the Pope, provision is to be made from the surplus revenues for those received beyond that number, especially if they were received voluntarily by the canons.

The same to the Bishop of Chioggia.

When Martin, canon of Ferrara, and F., W., B., and G., proctors of the canons of Ferrara, and Master G., proctor of the chapter of Ferrara, had approached the Apostolic See concerning the dispute which they had with one another over prebends and revenues, we granted them our beloved son, the cardinal-deacon of Santa Maria in Cosmedin, as auditor. Before him the said M., for himself and his four associates, proposed that the canons of Ferrara, so that their revenues might be increased the more as the proceeds of the church which had customarily been divided among many should fall to the use of a few, established in the same church, against ancient custom, only fourteen prebends, apart from what they assigned to the common table. Later, however, voluntarily acting contrary to that very constitution, they received the said five as canons, assigning them no prebends. And although their revenues had been increased not a little, they had not yet been willing to make provision for them from the surplus revenues.

But on the opposing side it was proposed that, long ago, with the common will both of the canons and of the then Bishop of Ferrara, the number of fourteen prebends was instituted in the church of Ferrara after provident deliberation and strengthened by the protection of the Apostolic See. [At length], when one prebend in the same church had become vacant, at the great insistence of certain persons they received two men to it, and later, at the prayers of our venerable brother the Bishop of Ferrara, they received the said M. and another man as canons without prejudice to the said constitution, on the condition that these canons should receive nothing from the canonry until the first two had fully obtained prebends. And when, through the industry of the canons, it had been procured that greater revenues be paid to them from possessions which the [same] church had possessed for a long time, they jointly assigned the surplus revenues to the common table, which had been insufficient. The said five later asked that those revenues be assigned to them as a benefice, contrary to the constitution of the chapter. Because, as that cardinal asserted, full certainty concerning these matters could not be furnished to us, we considered that the cause itself should be committed to your examination.

We command you, therefore, since in the aforesaid constitution and confirmation of the Apostolic See there either was, or ought to have been, as is customary, the express clause, “unless the resources of the church should increase to such an extent that they could competently suffice for more persons,” and since the same canons, in derogation of their own constitution, received four beyond the established number for prebends that would become vacant, while the older canons were receiving their customary prebends in full, that, appeal being removed, you cause the surplus revenues to be assigned to the aforesaid canons. This is nevertheless to be done so that, if from those revenues they can obtain prebends equal to the others, what remains over is to be converted to the common uses of the canons, as they had earlier established, or otherwise, as may seem better; all things whatsoever that, after the dispute was initiated before the Bishop of Ferrara, were altered by either party to the prejudice of the other concerning the prebends or possessions being revoked as void. [No letters, etc. Given at Rome, at Saint Peter’s, on the twelfth day before the Kalends of May, 1198.]

Latin source headnote: A general statute of laymen does not extend to churches or ecclesiastical persons, or to their goods, to their prejudice; nor does a special statute, even if it concerns their advantage and favor. This states the point so far as its meaning is concerned. Abbas Siculus.

The same to the Abbot and Convent of Saint Sylvester.

In the time of the said senator B. Carosomi, the church of Santa Maria in Via Lata brought a claim before Judge L. against I. de Atteia, who was said to be detaining certain of its possessions contrary to justice. In that proceeding the syndic of your monastery stood with the aforesaid I. de Atteia, and certain monks were produced by him as witnesses. But the judge, having heard the arguments of the parties, pronounced a sentence of absolution for the same John; from his sentence the other party issued a declaration of appeal.

When a dispute arose over this, the victorious party proposed that an appeal could not have been taken, since the said L. had been chosen not as a judge but as an arbitrator. The defeated party, on the contrary, asserted that, since the arbitration—which binds the parties only through fear of a penalty, and no penalty had been included in the aforesaid arbitration—had been repudiated, an appeal could rightly have been taken, and all the more so if it had been a judicial proceeding. When the dispute concerning this was therefore brought before the already-mentioned B. Carosomi, he delegated the cause of the appeal to S., the chief of the judges. In his presence, with the parties appearing, the said John de Atteia proposed that he ought not to be sued, since he did not possess what the other party was seeking; rather, the monastery of Saint Sylvester possessed the thing claimed.

Now the said B. Carosomi had issued a certain statute, alike approved and accepted by the Roman people, providing that, if anyone transferred to another a thing claimed from him after joinder of issue, possession was to be given to the claimant, and the other party was to become a claimant instead of a possessor. Since the same I., after joinder of issue, had presumed to transfer the thing itself to the monastery, B. assigned possession of the thing claimed to the aforesaid church. But because the said I. had rendered an annual rent to the monastery of Saint Sylvester from those possessions, B. added that the same was to be done by the church of Santa Maria until the ownership of the estate should be adjudicated; yet the payment which was made [of the rent] was to prejudice in no respect the right of the church of Santa Maria in Via Lata.

[The church of Santa Maria possessed this property undisturbed until the time of John Pierleoni, senator of the City. He graciously admitted the petition of your monastery and committed the same cause to Judge R., who, having heard the matters proposed on either side, pronounced sentence for the monastery itself, renewing what the aforesaid B. Carosomi had decreed against it. Because the church of Santa Maria complained that it had been gravely injured by this sentence, it too petitioned the aforesaid senator, who committed the cause to Judge R. for adjudication. And because the senator’s jurisdiction was shortly to expire, his successors, the senators already elected, were petitioned concerning the same cause, and the cause itself was delegated by them to the same judge. The judge, adjudicating by delegation both from the former senator and from the new senators, approved what had been decreed by the already-mentioned B. and restored the aforesaid possession to the church of Santa Maria.

And although the senate had nine councillors, the sentence was entrusted for execution to eight of them. But one of them, who was also the nephew of the abbot of Saint Sylvester, supported by the favor of certain senators, took the possession violently from the church of Santa Maria and gave it to the aforesaid monastery. From this, as the quarrel increased, matters proceeded as far as the clash of arms. Lest something worse occur, Pope C., our predecessor of good memory, recalled the entire affair to his own solicitude. And because the time for gathering the fruits was imminent, he ordered the fruits to be placed in sequestration with the tenants, so that if either party presumed to inflict any violence concerning them, it would suffer loss in its cause. He committed the same cause to our venerable brothers G., Bishop of Porto, and I., now Bishop of Albano but then Bishop of Tusculum of the title of Saint Clement, and to our beloved son G., cardinal-deacon of Sant’Angelo.

When the parties appeared before them, it was objected on behalf of the church of Santa Maria against your monastery that your party had committed violence with respect to the fruits to be sequestered. And when witnesses had been produced by both sides concerning this, because the violence was not clearly proved and was said to have been committed with respect to half a ruglus of barley, and because the abbot had nevertheless forbidden that the wrong of an individual should redound to the detriment of the church, after restitution of the barley it was provided that the cause should proceed to the question of possession. This question was disputed for a considerable time before those same men, after witnesses had been produced and the depositions published.

Thereafter, following the death of our aforesaid predecessor, with the parties appearing in our presence, the church, etc. (compare chapter 4, On a Suit Pending, II.16.) And because in the course of time some of the senators had confirmed the sentence for the monastery and others the one rendered for the church, we, etc. (compare chapter 4 cited above.) Since, therefore, it was established before us, and we gathered from the parties’ own confession, that one of the councillors, acting contrary in fact—because he could not do so in law—to the sentence entrusted for execution by the will of eight, violently despoiled the church itself of its possession, and considering nevertheless that even an unjust possessor who has been violently ejected is to be aided by the remedy of restitution, we decreed that the despoiled church was to be restored to the state in which it had been at the time the violence was perpetrated. But because (etc.; compare chapter 4 cited above.)]

And because your often-mentioned monastery complained that it had been despoiled contrary to justice by the aforesaid B. Carosomi, and humbly requested to be restored through our office, it asserted on many grounds that his statute was of no validity.

[For, since the often-mentioned B. had intruded himself into the senatorial dignity and had not had the favor of the Apostolic See, to which the institution of senators belongs, he could not issue a statute that would be valid. Even if he had been lawfully instituted, his statute, although it would bind those subject to him, would nevertheless in no way bind churches, especially since it was contrary to the civil law. That law establishes that another penalty is to be imposed upon those who transfer things in litigation, making this distinction between contracting parties: if anyone, knowingly, has entered into donations, sales, or other contracts, he is compelled not only to redeem the thing but also loses its price—not so that it should fall as profit to the alienator, by whom another equal amount must also be paid to the treasury. But if anyone has purchased a thing in litigation in ignorance, or has received it through another kind of contract, then, when the alienation of the thing has been made void, he will receive its price with an additional third part; and instruments drawn up concerning contracts of this kind are also to have no force. The same constitution, however, expressly excepts from the aforesaid penalties those who have given or received things of this kind by way of dowry, antenuptial gift, transaction, or division of hereditary property, or by reason of a legacy or trust.

Even if the statute could bind churches, the monastery had by no means fallen within that constitution, since the aforesaid I. had transferred no possession at all to it. As a tenant he had held those lands and possessed them not in his own name but in the name of the monastery. Even if he had made such a transfer, because he had first been sued by the monastery before being sued by the church, and because he restored the aforesaid things both through arbitration and likewise by right of a transaction—by which, after joinder of issue, a thing may be transferred to another without the penalty attaching to a contract concerning a matter in litigation—he would in no way have fallen within the aforesaid statute. Indeed, even if he had acted contrary to that statute, because the monastery had been despoiled of its possession although it had neither been sued nor confessed in court nor been convicted, it insistently sought its restitution, since the other party detained it without cause, or at least without a just cause.

The administrator of Santa Maria strove to undermine these arguments in many ways. For, although the said B. had not had the favor of the Apostolic See around the beginning of his prelacy, nevertheless, because he was subsequently received by it and ratification relates back, he was to be regarded just as if he had been lawfully instituted from the beginning. He could not be avoided by the monastery as an extraneous judge, since it is neither new nor unusual that, when clergy are plaintiff and defendant, civil causes in the City are prosecuted before judges instituted by the Apostolic See by delegation of senators who have jurisdiction from it. Hence they are understood to litigate not in another’s forum but in the proper forum of the Roman Pontiff, by whose authority the things decreed by senators or judges of this kind appear to obtain effect.

Even if the senatorial forum had been wholly foreign to the monastery, nevertheless, because the administrator of the said monastery, before Judge L.—delegated by the aforesaid B. in the dispute between the church of Santa Maria and the said I. de Atteia—stood with I. himself and defended him at law, the monastery could no longer decline that judge’s jurisdiction. The statute of B. himself, of which mention has so often been made, was not contrary to law but rather consonant with it (since it is also provided in canon law that a thing placed in litigation is not to be transferred to another person). It ought to extend not only to possessors but also to those who could be sued by virtue at least of their detention of any thing, such as even temporary tenants are known to be. For perpetual tenants, having at least beneficial possession, can both be sued and transfer to another what they have, as the aforesaid I. had done. Neither the aforesaid arbitration nor the transaction could excuse his act, since they had been undertaken with guile and fraud. For the arbitrator to whom the matter was committed by the parties was said to have been a kinsman of I. himself and a feudal tenant of the monastery, and to have done nothing in public but everything in secret, although arbitrations were introduced after the pattern of judicial proceedings. He also compelled the parties to make a settlement, as appears from the rescript of settlement. And since the parties had not submitted the matter of a settlement to arbitration—a settlement being a matter not of necessity but rather of free will—the administrator asserted that, guile having now been proved as though from manifest contrivances, the settlement was wholly ineffective.

The church also said that the monastery’s petition was to be repelled for this reason: because the church had obtained the possession itself by the authority of the praetor without guile or fault of its own, and through this a right had been acquired by it, your monastery ought no longer to be heard concerning the possessory action, while the church was prepared to answer it in the petitory action.]

These and similar matters having therefore been prudently alleged by the parties in the presence of us and our brothers, we, considering that no authority over churches and ecclesiastical persons has been attributed to laymen, even religious ones—whom there awaits the necessity of obeying, not authority to command—and that, if anything is established by them on their own initiative which even has regard to the advantage and favor of churches, it possesses no firmness unless it has been approved by the Church; whence the statute of Basil concerning the non-alienation of the rural or urban estates, vessels, and ornaments of churches was rejected especially for this reason, that it was not strengthened by the authority of the Roman Pontiff; lest it pass into a precedent for presuming similar things, we wholly revoke as void what had been done by the senator to the prejudice of the monastery, although the monastery had neither been sued, nor had confessed, nor even been convicted, and by definitive sentence determine that the same possessions are to be restored to it, and that the possessions themselves, etc. [Compare chapter 3, On a Suit Pending, II.16. Given at the Lateran, on the fifth day before the Kalends of December, 1199.]

Latin source headnote: A penalty imposed simply for contumacy is, in a doubtful case, understood to be temporary and not perpetual.

The same to all the Doctors residing at Paris.

We have learned from the letters of your devotion that, when certain modern doctors of the liberal arts departed from the footsteps of their predecessors especially in three matters—namely, in dishonorable dress, in the order of lectures and disputations not being observed, and in the pious custom of celebrating the obsequies of deceased clerics now being almost wholly omitted through negligence—you, wishing to take thought for your own honor, unanimously chose eight sworn men from among yourselves for this purpose: that, concerning the said matters, on the advice of prudent men they should in good faith establish what would be expedient and honorable, binding you all by an intervening oath to observe it thereafter. The sole exception was Master G., who, refusing and fearing to swear, offered only a surety bond for himself.

Furthermore, as a precaution, after faith had been pledged by you, it was immediately established that if any of the masters decided to resist the others and, after being admonished a first, second, or third time, disdained within three days to obey the community of masters, he should from then on be deprived of the benefit of their fellowship in academic functions. Some of you acknowledge that they understood this last provision without qualification; others, “unless he made satisfaction”; and some, “unless he obtained through us that he be admitted by the others.”

But when the aforesaid Master G., after being required, did not obey the community within three days, in accordance with your agreement he was from that time regarded by you as excluded. After he later offered to make fitting satisfaction, by an intervening oath he submitted the matter to four of you, promising that for the good of peace he would alike hold their determination pleasing and ratified. They, having employed the counsel of wise men, jointly promulgated their determination: by virtue of the oath taken, they prohibited the aforesaid master from thereafter resisting the community of masters in lawful matters, and enjoined him to remain in the state in which he then was until, either by himself or through his proctor, he obtained from the Apostolic See that he could be admitted by the other masters, with honor safeguarded in all things.

Hence you humbly petitioned us that, out of the benignity of the Apostolic See, we should cause the same master—a provident and honorable man, who, as a son of obedience, humbly accepted and patiently observes what the aforesaid four enjoined upon him—to be restored to the fellowship of the masters. From the foregoing we therefore understand that the same master was commanded to remain in the state in which he then was until he should be restored to the fellowship of the masters by mandate of the Apostolic See, and that he is prepared to furnish fitting satisfaction concerning the foregoing matters.

Although it was established by you after faith had been pledged that, if any of the masters decided to resist the ordinance of their community and, after being admonished a first, second, or third time, disdained within three days to obey the community of masters, he should from then on be deprived of the benefit of their fellowship in academic functions—and for this reason Master G. was deprived of their fellowship—nevertheless, because it was not established that a deprivation of this kind should endure in perpetuity, and because it is the rule both of canon law and of our custom that one who is deprived of fellowship on account of contumacy obtains restoration when he furnishes fitting satisfaction, by the authority of the present writings we command your community to admit the aforesaid master, who now takes care humbly to obey your statutes, to the association of your fellowship in academic functions.

Latin source headnote (Abbas Siculus): Canons cannot without cause restrict the number of canons or prebends.

Honorius III to the Bishop and Cantor of Chalon.

It was proposed before us on behalf of our venerable brother the Bishop of Autun that the canons of Autun, intent upon their own advantages, have restricted the number of prebends established from ancient times in the church of Autun, although its revenues have not been diminished, so that they may thus abound more in temporal things, while under such a pretext they strive to turn to the increase of the prebends those things from which the customary number of canons can be sustained. And, in protection of their act, they are said to have obtained from us letters of confirmation concerning this in the common form.

§1. Therefore, not wishing divine worship to be diminished in that church by an occasion of this kind, but rather to be increased, we command your discretion that, if the truth supports the foregoing statements, you cause the ancient number to be observed by our authority. Notwithstanding any constitution made concerning this by the canons themselves, or any confirmation obtained by those same canons from us, you are, after removing the obstacle of appeal, to confer upon suitable persons, with the counsel of the same bishop, the prebends which you find to have become vacant in the aforesaid church since the time of the last statute.

Latin source headnote: A constitution has regard to future matters and not to past ones, unless provision is made in it concerning the past.

Gregory IX to the Archpriest of Santa Maria Maggiore in the City.

Because a constitution of the Apostolic See binds everyone and ought to contain nothing obscure or ambiguous, we declare that the constitution which we recently issued concerning the greater [members] being preferred in the receipt of a portion, and customary services being rendered by the lesser [members], extends not to past matters but only to future ones, since it is certain that laws and constitutions give a rule to future transactions and are not drawn back to past acts, unless provision is expressly made in them concerning the past.