III. On Oath

What is the nature of an oath? - An oath is: the tacit or express invocation of the Name of the Lord, as the first and infallible truth, as witness of some truth. Heb. 6:16; L. 133; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 1. Hence it is clear that an oath is an act of the virtue of religion, or of latria; because "in this very thing, that man swears by God, he professes God to be more powerful, as one whose truth is indefectible and knowledge universal, and thus in some way exhibits reverence to God... But to exhibit reverence to God pertains to religion, or latria." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 4; Bouquillon, de Virt. Rel., l. 2, p. 3.

Of how many kinds is an oath? - An oath is distinguished: 1. as assertory, according as God is invoked as witness of a past or present truth; and promissory, according as "divine testimony is brought in for confirming something future." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 1. The promissory oath is twofold, strictly or broadly such. The first is confirmatory of a promise either toward God, which is a sworn vow, or toward one's neighbor, which adds to the obligation of justice or fidelity arising from the promise an obligation from the virtue of religion. The second contains no promise toward another, but a mere purpose, to which is added an obligation from the virtue of religion, insofar as by oath God is brought forward as witness and as it were guarantor of fulfilling the purpose. But it is comminatory if the one swearing, under the attestation of the divine Name, threatens another with punishment; for example, I swear by God that unless you do this, you will pay the penalties.

2. Solemn or simple, according as it is made in the form required by law and with solemn ceremonies, for example, with Mass, with preceding Communion, or with these excluded. Laypersons swear in court by touching the Gospels; ecclesiastics swear with the Gospels only placed before them and the hand brought to the breast. C. Cum in 7, de Iur. cal. In court; for outside court, when clerics swear and make profession of faith, the custom is that they do it with the Gospels touched. Holy Office, 6 Aug. 1897, VIII. Clerics, especially priests, cannot interpose a solemn oath except by license of the Bishop, which is granted only for a grave cause, before a judge not their own, even if ecclesiastical; but before a layman they ought not furnish an oath. But Bishops need the license of the Supreme Pontiff. C. Inhaerentes 1, de Iur. cal.; C. Quoties 31, c. 22. But outside court, ecclesiastics do not need the Bishop's permission. C. Ex rescripto 9, de Iurei.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 10. Likewise clerics, unless they are vassals, are prohibited from furnishing an oath of fidelity to Princes. C. Nimis 30, de Iurei. Yet by Concordats it is permitted.

3. Explicit or implicit, according as God is expressly invoked as witness, or creatures are employed for testimony, in which the divine attributes specially shine forth. 4. There is also added the invocatory oath, by which God is simply invoked as witness; and the imprecatory oath, by which God is invoked at once as witness and as avenger of perjury or of broken faith. To this is referred the formula: So may God help me, and these holy Gospels of God. For just as he who pronounces these words prays good for himself if he speaks the truth, so he imprecates evil upon himself if he lies. Whence he who voluntarily perjures himself in this way, seriously wishing evil for himself, sins not only against religion, but also against charity toward himself. Struggl 3; L. 139-142; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 1 ad 3.

Doctrinal, political, and judicial oaths are also distinguished. Doctrinal oaths are assertory and promissory oaths concerning profession of some doctrine. Such are the oaths prescribed by the Supreme Pontiffs for heretics and schismatics returning to Catholic faith and unity, and most recently prescribed by Supreme Pontiff Pius X against the errors of the modernists. Political oaths are also assertory and promissory oaths concerning the observance of civil laws and the conservation of civil government. The licitness of this oath depends on its matter; if this is not licit, it is often permitted by the Holy See on account of grave causes, with restriction to passive subjection and obedience, and in those things which are not opposed to divine and ecclesiastical laws. S. Penit., 18 Dec. 1860; 1 Dec. 1866; A. S. S., v. 2, p. 676.

Judicial oaths are those which are emitted in a tribunal, so that truth may be known and justice rightly administered. And first there is the decisory oath, which is tendered by one of the litigants to the other, by authority of the judge, and carries with itself the decision of the suit. It is a certain species of transaction. Besides this there is the supplementary oath, which the judge tenders to one of the litigants because of defect of full proof, whence it is called supplementary. Third, there is the estimatory oath, or oath in the suit, when the harm inflicted is established, but because of defect of proofs its quantity cannot be determined; the oath is tendered by the judge, so that by it the value of the thing and the harm inflicted may be established. In addition, the oath of calumny is called the oath by which the litigating parties protest that they proceed not calumniously, but judge that they have a good cause and right. The oath of malice is called the oath by which protestation is made of not maliciously proposing exceptions, seeking delays, etc. Bouquillon, de Virt. Relig., l. 2, p. 3, c. 4; Sebastianelli, Prael. Iur. Can., p. 1, tit. 7, c. 2, a. 5; Schmalzgr., l. 2, tit. 24.

What are the requisites for the essence of an oath? - Two things are required for an oath: 1. the intention of swearing, at least virtual, because without such intention a formal oath cannot exist. 2. an oath-formula, either explicitly through God or implicitly through creatures, because God is given to another as witness, which cannot be done by the mind alone; and since God is invoked as witness, it is necessary that this be expressed in the oath. When there is doubt concerning the intention of the one swearing, judgment is usually made according to the common acceptance of the words which he used. But this intention contributes so much to the value of the oath that if someone uses words in no way importing an oath, yet thinks that they are oaths, he truly swears as to the internal forum; and on the contrary, that intention being lacking, the oath is null as to the internal forum, even if words truly oath-making are employed. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 98, a. 1; L. 134; Struggl 1.

The profession of faith having first been made, the following are bound to furnish the oath according to the prescribed formula: doctors in seminaries, at the beginning of the year; before they enter office, doctors or lecturers, likewise in religious orders; preachers, pastors, beneficiaries before entering possession of the benefice, canons; officials in episcopal curias and tribunals, not excepting the Vicar General and judges; officials in Roman congregations or tribunals; religious superiors; clerics to be initiated into major orders. To each of these an exemplar both of the profession of faith and of the formula of emitting the oath is to be handed over beforehand, so that they may know them accurately beforehand. But the formula of the oath is to be signed and preserved in the archive. Those are to be denounced to the Holy Office not only who violate the oath, but also who refuse to sign it. Pius X, Motu proprio Sacrorum antistitum, 1 Sept. 1910; S. C. Cons., 25 Sept., 25 Oct. 1910. Priests who profess sacred disciplines in civil universities are not bound by this oath. Pius X, Letter to Card. Fischer, 31 Dec. 1910. But the anti-Jansenistic oath was abrogated in Belgium and Holland. S. C. C., 22 Feb. 1912. A Bishop can grant the faculty of hearing Confessions for some more or less long space of time to an extra-diocesan Priest already approved by his own Ordinary, without being compelled to receive from him again the oath prescribed by the Motu proprio Sacrorum Antistitum. And by way of a passing act he can grant the same faculty to a Priest who has never furnished the aforesaid oath. S. C. Cons., 20 June 1913. It suffices that the oath to be furnished before the reception of sacred orders be furnished before entering the sacred order of subdiaconate, preserving the right of the Ordinary to require it again before conferral of each of the sacred orders, if from any cause he judges it necessary or useful. S. C. Cons., 24 March 1911. Alumni of the Urban College of Propaganda Fide, of North America, of Ireland, of Scotland, and of other Colleges according to the decision of S. C. Cons., 12 Nov. 1908, 25 July 1909, are also bound to furnish the oath according to the prescribed formulas; officials of the Roman Curia and ministers of any order in the Roman Curia; Consultors and Cardinals of the S. C. of the Holy Office, of the Index, of Consistorial affairs; Pius X, Const. Sapienti consilio, Ord. serv. in R. C., p. 1, c. 3, p. 2, c. 7, art. 2, n. 4, art. 7; examiners of books and writings of Servants of God; those to be named doctors in Sacred Scripture, Pius X, Motu proprio, 29 June 1910; synodal examiners and parochial consultors, S. C. Cons., 15 Feb. 1912. Missionaries are bound to furnish the oath by force of the Bulls Ex quo and Omnium sollicitudinum of Benedict XIV, not only European priests, but also indigenous presbyters. S. C. de P. F., 21 June 1895; E. M. 550, 551.

You will resolve: A fictitious oath, or one merely external, is not valid on account of defect of will or intention of swearing. But one swearing thus sins, yet only venially, if he says what is true, or has the mind of fulfilling what he promises, because he utters nothing except a lie with vain usurpation of the name of God; but mortally, if he says what is false, or does not have the mind of fulfilling the promise, or there is a precept of a superior, for example in judgments. For grave abuse and irreverence of the name of God for the deception of others would be present. Proposition 25 condemned by Innocent XI.

More probably a promissory oath made indeed with the mind of swearing, but not of obliging oneself from religion, is not valid, because it is nugatory. But an oath made with the mind indeed of swearing, but not of obliging oneself from justice or from fidelity, is valid. L. 172; H. A. 17.

A promissory oath made without the mind of fulfilling, but with the mind of swearing and obliging oneself, is valid. But he who swears thus sins mortally, because he invokes God as witness of a fictitious purpose or fictitious promise, and therefore swears against truth. For in a promissory oath God is assumed as witness of a present purpose or promise, and in some way as guarantor of future execution, insofar as this at least depends upon human will.

It is an oath to say: I swear by God; I call God to witness, etc. Likewise it is an oath to say: I swear by the Saints, the Church, the Gospel, the Catholic Faith; because then the very Author of the Faith, of the Gospel, of the Church, and of the Saints is judged to be brought in as witness. Likewise an oath is judged to be made by nobler creatures, since through them their Creator is then taken, who singularly resides and shines forth in them. Thus, for example, when one swears by heaven, its Dweller and Lord is understood; when by earth, He whose footstool it is; when by the temple, He who is worshiped there. Thus likewise several more probably judge it to be an oath if you say, by my soul, because God singularly shines forth in the soul, who then is judged to be brought in as witness. Yet it must be confessed that there is scarcely anyone who, while using these words, thinks of God; and therefore this formula too rarely contains an oath. But otherwise it would be if someone swore by creatures in which divine goodness or power does not specially shine forth, for example, by a beard, etc.

It is not an oath to say: God is truth, God lives, God knows, I speak before God, if these are uttered merely narratively to signify the serious and grave attention of the one speaking; but otherwise if invocatively, for calling God as witness of truth, which is discerned from the circumstances or intention of the speaker. Likewise to say: I swear it is so, is not truly an oath, because then divine testimony is invoked neither explicitly nor implicitly; unless nevertheless an interrogation concerning an oath preceded, because then through the preceding interrogation that "I swear" is sufficiently determined to a true oath. C. I. Proc. Poen. 229. In addition, these words: may I be killed if this is not so, and similar ones, although they are true oaths if they are said by way of execration, because God is considered to intervene specially in that killing, nevertheless commonly they contain only a certain pledge or obligation of penalty, and signify: if it is not so, I pledge my life. The same must be said concerning the other formula: may the devil seize me. But otherwise, if God is expressly named there by saying: may God destroy me if I lie, because then God is invoked as avenger of a lie, if perhaps one is uttered.

It is not an oath to say: truly, certainly, in truth, by the faith of a good man, of a Christian, of a priest, of a soldier, of a Prince, of a King; nor to say: by my conscience, because God is not brought in as witness. He does not swear who says: it is as true as the sun shines, as I sit here, walk, etc.; whence even if the comparison is false, it is only a lie, since no one is invoked as witness. Although to say: it is as true as God is; as Christ is in the venerable Sacrament; as the Gospel is true, etc., commonly seems to contain an oath with blasphemy, nevertheless this does not sufficiently appear, because no one is invoked as witness, nor does it seem to be blasphemy if it is true and the mind of the one uttering it is only to signify a likeness of truth, not equality of certitude. L. 134-143; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, aa. 1, 6; Suarez, de Rel., tr. 5, l. 1, c. 13; E. M. 551, 554.

Is an oath licit? - An oath clothed with due conditions is honorable and licit; and, if it is promissory, it obliges in conscience, unless a just cause stands in the way, or its obligation has legitimately ceased. This is established both from the definition of the Council of Constance, sess. 8, against Wyclif, and from proposition 101 condemned by Clement XI in the Bull Unigenitus, and from proposition 75 condemned by Pius VI in the Bull Auctorem fidei, and also from the universal practice of the Church and peoples, and from various places of Sacred Scripture. Deut. 6:13: You shall fear the Lord your God... and by his name you shall swear. And indeed God and his attributes are especially honored from this, that he is brought into the midst and invoked as the highest and infallible Truth in testimony of truth. C. Etsi 26, de Iurei.; L. 144 seqq.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, aa. 3, 4. From a grave cause, and with a protestation employed, an oath upon Protestant Bibles can be permitted, insofar namely as they contain the true word of God. E. M.

What are the requisites for the licitness of an oath? - A threefold condition is required, according to Jer. 4:2: You shall swear: The Lord lives, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice. The reason is that otherwise it cannot be furnished with due reverence to God.

Truth, that is, conformity of the assertion with the knowledge and intention of the one swearing. Therefore it excludes every lie, but not every error. In an assertory oath, truth regards the existence of the fact according to the mind, not also according to the truth of the thing; in a promissory oath, it regards the existence of the intention of obliging oneself and of furnishing what is promised.

Judgment, that is, that it be done with discretion, prudence, consideration, and reverence, and not without necessity or a grave cause. For since an oath is a most holy thing, it ought not be made without prudence, consideration, reverence, and rashly without any necessity and cause.

Justice, that is, that the oath be concerning a matter, whether promised or simply proposed, or concerning an assertion, just and honorable. Thus he would swear against justice who would oblige himself by oath to inflict harm unjustly upon a neighbor, or would affirm what he was prohibited from manifesting. Ecclus. 23:9, 12; L. 144; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, aa. 3, 5, 10; E. M.

What kind of sin is it to swear without truth, without judgment, without justice? - To swear without truth is always mortal, even in light matter, because to bring God into testimony of falsity is to will to destroy his infinitely perfect truthfulness. This is also established from proposition 24 condemned by Innocent XI; S. Th., Quodl. 1, a. 18. To swear without judgment, from lightness, for example from custom, without grave cause, or if someone swears before he has sufficiently investigated the truth, is venial per se, scandal and danger of perjury nevertheless being excluded, because it is only vain usurpation of the name of God. To swear without judgment from rashness, lest perhaps what is asserted is true, or what is promised can be fulfilled, is grave on account of the danger of perjury. To swear without justice is certainly mortal in a promissory oath if the matter concerns committing a grave sin, as is clear; indeed, according to St. Liguori, even if the matter concerns only a venial sin, at least more probably, because it seems grave irreverence to invoke God as witness or guarantor of any sin whatever to be committed. Yet Suarez with others says that the opposite opinion is common.

But in an assertory oath, more probably it is only venial per se, because the oath per se falls upon the assertion, not as evil but as true. Thus he who boasts by oath about fornication committed, although by this boasting he sins lethally, nevertheless by force of the oath per se he does not confirm the boasting, but only the truth of the fornication. Except unless the oath is assumed as an instrument or means of sinning, for example, for strengthening detraction. And this holds even if someone uses an oath as an instrument or means for consummating venial sin, because one swearing thus, as far as in him lies, makes God an accomplice of his sin. "If someone swears," says S. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7 ad 2, "that he will not do some better good which nevertheless he is not bound to do, (for example, not entering religion), he indeed sins by swearing, insofar as he places an obstacle to the Holy Spirit, who is the inspirer of a good purpose; nevertheless he does not sin by keeping the oath, but he would do much better if he did not keep it." But a sin of this sort, since the matter concerns only a counsel not to be embraced, is venial per se. L. 145, 147; Suarez, l. 3, c. 12; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7, a. 9 ad 3; q. 98, aa. 2, 3; Quodl. 1, a. 18; Struggl 5, 7, 9; E. M.; cf. here 582, 583. In public disturbances of civil society, the oath of passive obedience, as it is called, is permitted, namely that one will do nothing against the Government, and with the laws of God and the Church preserved. Pius VII, Instruction, year 1808; S. Penit., 18 Dec. 1860. Cf. here 549.

What is a sufficient cause for swearing? - Any honorable cause of some weight, for example, peace to be confirmed in families, greater security in contracts, etc. L., H. A. 14.

Is it permitted to swear with probability of truth? - "For swearing rightly absolute and altogether infallible certitude is not required, but some moral certitude suffices, or a certain probability which reaches a certain moral certitude. Thus Tamburini. Indeed Sanchez, Suarez, the Salmanticenses, Lessius, Bonacina, Azor, with the common opinion, say more expressly that in an oath, whether assertory or promissory, probability of the truth asserted or of the fulfillment of the promised thing to be executed suffices, provided that there is not a probable reason to the opposite. Hence they say that what has been heard from a person so worthy of faith that he makes us morally certain can indeed be affirmed with oath. Yet this does not run in judgment," L. 148, where the oath which is required is to be emitted from one's own certitude. Struggl 6. Therefore he sins gravely who swears in mere doubt of truth, because God, infallible truth, cannot be invoked except in testimony of a thing which seems at least morally certain. Struggl 6; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7 ad 1.

Is it permitted to swear with mental restriction? - R. Negative, if it is purely mental; and here, according to St. Alphonsus, pertain propositions 26, 27, 28 condemned by Innocent XI. Affirmative, if it is broadly mental, from a just cause. "It is certain," says St. Alphonsus, n. 151, "and common among all, that from a just cause it is permitted to use equivocation... and to confirm it by oath...

But a just cause can be any honorable end for preserving goods useful to spirit or body." And again: "For swearing thus, except in judgments and contracts, an absolutely grave cause is not required, but any reasonable cause suffices, for example, to free oneself from the troublesome and unjust interrogation of another." And Busembaum, n. 170, adds: "When there is a just cause of necessity or utility, one can use amphibologies in an oath, even if he spontaneously offers himself to the oath." Finally St. Alphonsus, n. 151, adds that, according to the more probable opinion, it is venial if he furnishes this without cause. "The reason is that in an oath of this sort truth and justice are already present, and only judgment or discretion is lacking; and the deficiency of this is only venial... Yet one must except, with the Salmanticenses and others commonly, unless this is done in judgment or in contracts." The reason of this exception as to the first is that we are bound from obedience to answer a superior legitimately interrogating according to the sense of the one interrogating; but as to the second, because then from justice we are bound to utter words according to the mind of the contracting party, lest he be deceived and suffer harm. Struggl 16 seqq.; Lugo, de Fid., d. 4, n. 67; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7 ad 4; E. M.

What is the obligation of a promissory oath? - Every promissory oath concerning a licit and honorable thing, besides the obligation of justice or fidelity which arises from a simple promise, also induces an obligation of religion. The reason is that a promise per se already obliges, and with divine testimony invoked it is confirmed and strengthened. "For someone is bound to make true what he swore; otherwise truth is lacking in the oath." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7. But an oath concerning an illicit or plainly useless thing by no means obliges, because an oath, as an act of religion, cannot be a bond of iniquity or of an idle thing. R. 58, de R. I. in 6. Oaths of this sort do not revive, even if the thing afterwards ceases to be idle or illicit according to R. I. 18 in 6: "That which by law does not subsist from the beginning is not strengthened by lapse of time."

Nor likewise does an oath impeding a greater good oblige, for example, of not entering religion or of marrying, unless someone swore in favor of another. For then, without injury to the other's right, he cannot embrace the evangelical counsels. Thus alumni of the College of the S. C. de P. F. cannot enter religion without permission of the Holy See, because of the oath by which they are bound. Struggl 24 seqq.; L. 172, 176; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, aa. 7, 8; Quodl. 5, a. 27; Scavini, ed. 12, Milan, 1874, v. 2, n. 229; v. 4, nn. 243, 244, 245; cf. here 554. Alumni of the Urban College of Propaganda Fide promise by oath the observance of the laws of the College, that they will not enter a religious order without special permission of the Holy See, that they will ascend to sacred orders up to the priesthood, and that they will return to their own diocese and there give perpetual work to the sacred ministry. S. C. Cons., 29 July 1909.

You will resolve: He who swore to an evil thing is never obligated by the oath; indeed he sins in two ways if he fulfills the oath, namely against religion and against the virtue to which the matter of the oath is opposed. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7. He who confirmed a prodigal promise by swearing is not obligated by the oath, because that promise is at least lightly evil. He does not sin against an oath who for the sake of courtesy swore that he would not sit, drink, enter the house, etc., before another, if, compelled by the other, he sits, drinks, or enters first; because for the most part an oath of this sort is null from defect of intention of swearing, or, if it is valid, it is relaxed by the other yielding his right.

Parents who do not fulfill an oath of punishing their children rarely sin, because for the most part the oath concerns a useless thing, or rather inordinate vengeance; add that often those delinquent either have already been corrected, or at least have promised amendment. Likewise merchants for the most part do not seem to be bound by an oath not to sell for less, or many persons not to buy; either because oaths of this sort generally concern a useless thing, or because these men do not have the mind of swearing, or certainly because there is present in the oath a tacit condition, unless things seem likely to turn out better otherwise. L. 176, 180, 185, 186; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7.

How is a promissory oath to be interpreted? - The obligation of an oath is to be interpreted strictly and according to the nature of the act or contract to which it is added, so that it follows all its conditions. The reason is that the one swearing is judged to have wished to oblige himself as little as he could, and otherwise the oath does not change the nature of the act, but superadds to it only the obligation of religion; and therefore it ought to have the same conditions and limitations. Hence he is not bound by oath who under oath promised marriage to a girl rich, healthy, virgin, of good reputation, if she has fallen into poverty, illness, infamy, fornication, because the simple promise then does not oblige. C. Quemadmodum 25, de Iurei. Likewise, if you promised and swore to Titia that you would marry her, you can, leaving her, enter religion, because this tacit condition is present in the promise of marriage: unless I enter religion. And this also holds if betrothals were confirmed by oath, unless the marriage were necessary for legitimating offspring, repairing scandal, or providing for the honor of the betrothed woman, if it could not be met in another way. He who reveals a sworn secret does not sin when the very law of secrecy ceases to oblige, because an oath, as we have said, follows the nature of the act to which it is joined. L. 180, 183, 727; l. 6, n. 870.

What are the tacit conditions included or understood in a promissory oath? - They are: 1. If I shall be able without grave harm, because no one is judged to oblige himself to a thing impossible both physically and morally. 2. If the thing has not been notably changed. 3. If the rights or will of a superior do not stand in the way. 4. If the other has preserved reciprocal fidelity. 5. Unless the other yields concerning his right. L. 180; Struggl 31. Cf. here 566.

Is smallness of matter given in transgression of a promissory oath? - The first opinion denies, because not only a simple promise is violated, but a sworn promise. Therefore in any matter a grave injury is inflicted upon God, whose testimony has been invoked in vain by the one swearing. And indeed God would be called either as guarantor, namely by his authority, or certainly as witness of falsity, if truth were not conformed to the thing promised. For in this oath God is invoked as witness of the present intention, and either as quasi-sponsor or also as witness of future execution. But God can in no way either fail faith or lie in any matter, even the smallest. "Whoever swears that he will do something is obligated to do it, so that truth may be fulfilled," on account of reverence for divine testimony. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, aa. 7, 8.

The second opinion affirms, because in a promissory oath God is not properly brought in as witness of the future execution of the thing promised, but only as witness of the actual promise, or of the true intention of executing the promise. Nor indeed is he brought in as guarantor of future execution, but merely as confirming, or furnishing authority to, the obligation which arises from the promise made before him, just as a Prince renders betrothals contracted before him firmer by his authority. Now as to the first, no irreverence is committed against God through transgression of a promissory oath, or God is not made witness of falsity, since we suppose that the promise and the intention of execution were sincere in the one swearing. But as to the other, by infidelity in the matter promised, to be fulfilled under divine authority, irreverence indeed is inflicted upon divine authority, but one which is neither direct and formal, since it is intended only indirectly in the very violation of the promise, nor greater; indeed, with S. Thomas as witness, 2. 2, q. 89, a. 8, per se it is less than the irreverence which is found in transgression of a vow. Since therefore in this, as also in any indirect irreverence against God, lightness of matter is admitted by all, it must also be admitted in that which transgression of a promissory oath inflicts. And indeed if the one swearing, in the act of the oath, had the will of fulfilling, and afterwards does not fulfill it, he does not commit a lie and perjury, but only infidelity, which, since the thing promised is not grave by hypothesis, will not be able to be extended to grave fault. Besides, in this oath God is brought in as witness of the contracted obligation, which consequently cannot be violated without irreverence toward God; but this indeed can be grave or light according to the nature of the matter. St. Liguori, n. 173, says that each opinion is probable; but he adheres more to the second opinion, and in H. A., n. 13, says: "If the thing promised is not grave, infidelity does not reach grave fault." Suarez, l. 3, c. 16, n. 9 seqq.; L. 172, 173, 178, 211.

Does a promissory oath emitted through error or deceit oblige? - R. Negative, if the error or deceit concerns the substance of the thing; but otherwise if it affects only its accidental adjuncts, because a simple contract would be invalid in the former case, but not in the latter. L. 175. Yet the same St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 187, warns that the opposite opinion is probable when the error or deceit concerns those circumstances which, although accidental, if they had been known from the beginning, would have deterred one from the oath and promise. Those things entering the quasi-substance of the contract are as a condition without which not. This warning of St. Alphonsus indeed ought to hold, as in vows, so in gratuitous contracts, but not in onerous contracts. Cf. 575.

Does a promissory oath extorted by grave and unjust fear oblige? - The first probable opinion affirms. For the general rule is that any oath is to be kept when it can be done without sin, lest God be brought in as witness of the false. The second opinion, also sufficiently probable, denies, because an oath follows the nature of the act to which it is added. But that promise by natural law is void, or at least rescindable by the very one who suffered fear, according as the promise is gratuitous or onerous, on account of the grave injury which it contains, which is not to be confirmed and continued by oath. Whence even the patrons of the first opinion warn that he who suffered fear can ask relaxation of the oath, so that he may be excused from the obligation of paying; but if he has already paid, he can seek in judgment what he gave, or secretly compensate himself. L. 174; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7 ad 3; q. 98, a. 3 ad 1; Ithur., Cas. 15, nn. 11, 18; Struggl 23, 29.

Must a promissory oath in favor of a third party always be fulfilled, as long as it can be fulfilled without sin? - R. Affirmative, if that third party already has a right acquired through an accepted promise, even if it is against the evangelical counsels, and even if the promise made is void by law in hatred of the creditor, as a promise of paying usuries and a promise of money made to a prostitute, although such an oath was illicit. Understand this if the prostitute, for example, has already furnished her work; otherwise, if not. Yet it must be said otherwise if the promise is void by law because it would be against the common good and concerning a prohibited thing. The reason is that in this second case the fulfillment itself would be illicit. Therefore an oath extorted by fear concerning religious profession, marriage, betrothals, etc., does not oblige. On the contrary, as to the first case, on account of reverence for the divine Name, the oath is to be observed whenever it can be observed licitly. Cf. 554, 558, 560, 566, 970; L. l. 6, n. 870.

How does the obligation of a promissory oath cease from within? - The obligation of an oath, namely a promissory oath, can cease both from within and from without. It ceases from within: 1. If what was good at the time of the oath afterwards becomes illicit on account of circumstances, or impedes a greater good, or is better omitted than fulfilled. For an oath is an act of religion, and God is not worshiped by an illicit thing, or by one which rather detracts from divine worship. 2. If you change the oath into some work plainly better and more pleasing to God; for each person can do this per se. Yet always except if you have sworn something for the advantage of a man; for God does not wish him to be defrauded. Cf. 568. 3.

If the state of the thing is notably changed, for such a change makes another object to which the intention of the one swearing does not extend. 4. If the thing sworn has become useless for the intent, especially if it is more destructive of it; for example, if correction of an impenitent son would be wholly useless, indeed he would become worse from it. 5. If those conditions so bear, which nature and the doctors teach are tacitly understood in any promissory oath. Cf. 561. 6. If its final cause ceases, for without the final cause the effect does not subsist; for example, you promised alms to a poor man, but he afterwards becomes rich. But otherwise, if only an impulsive cause ceases. L. 180, 187, 188; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, aa. 7, 9.

Is that change sufficient of itself, even if not notable, which nevertheless, if foreseen, one would not have emitted the oath? - The first opinion affirms from S. Thomas, 4 D. 38, q. 1 ad 1. The reason is that the intention of obliging oneself then is either lacking, or is so understood. The second opinion holds that it does not suffice, because the obligation is not to be taken from a promise which would not be made in the future, but from that which has already been made. Thus Suarez, Sanchez, Cajetan, etc. "Yet deservedly they say that the probability of the first opinion cannot be denied. Indeed they themselves, with the Salmanticenses, judge that change to be notable which, if it had been known from the beginning, the one swearing would not have promised, which certainly agrees with the first opinion." L. 187, 226; cf. 563, 564, 575, 597, 598.

How does the obligation of a promissory oath cease from without? - It ceases by annulment, dispensation, commutation, remission. Annulment is the nullification of an oath. Annulment is made by any superior having dominative power over the one swearing, concerning those things which are subject to his power, even if the matter concerns promises and contracts. For these oaths have an implicit condition: if the superior consents, if they are not revoked by him. The Supreme Pontiff has this dominative power as to ecclesiastical matters; a superior as to matters subject to his own power; a father, husband, tutor, master; and these can annul and nullify the oaths of their own in plainly the same way in which they can annul the vows of their own. Num. 30:4 seqq.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 9 ad 3. Cf. 599 seqq.

Dispensation is given by one having jurisdiction in the external forum; understand spiritual jurisdiction. Whoever has ordinary power of dispensing in vows can dispense in oaths and in vows, even if these are sworn. L. 189. "Dispensation which is made in an oath does not extend to this, that something be done against the oath; for this is impossible, since observance of an oath falls under a divine precept, which is indispensable. But dispensation of an oath extends to this, that what fell under the oath no longer falls under the oath, as though not existing as due matter of an oath; just as we said above concerning a vow, q. preceding, a. 10 ad 2... The matter of a promissory oath is something future, which can vary, namely in such a way that in some event it can be illicit or harmful, and consequently not be due matter of an oath; and therefore dispensation can be made in a promissory oath, because such dispensation regards the matter of the oath, and is not contrary to the divine precept concerning observance of an oath." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 9 ad 1. "Sometimes something is promised under oath concerning which it is doubtful whether it is licit or illicit, profitable or harmful, either simply or in some case; and in this any Bishop can dispense. But sometimes something is promised under oath which is manifestly licit and useful; and in such an oath dispensation or commutation does not seem to have place, unless something better occurs to be done for the common utility, which seems especially to pertain to the power of the Pope, who has care of the universal Church; or also absolute relaxation, which also pertains to the Pope generally in all things which pertain to the dispensation of ecclesiastical affairs, over which he has fullness of power." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 9 ad 3.

Commutation is reduced to dispensation, and is made, like it, by one having spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum. L. 191. Cf. here 566.

Remission is the relaxation of an oath made in favor of a man, by the same man, or by him to whom the one promising and the promised matter is subject. It must be noted: 1. That if a promise in favor of a man, confirmed by oath, has not yet been accepted, there is no obligation of fulfilling it, and it can be revoked; because the oath is then accessory and follows the nature of the promise. But otherwise, if the promise was principally made to God. 2. If such a promise has been accepted by the third party to whom it was made, and a right has been absolutely acquired by him, then without his consent it cannot be relaxed, not even by the Pontiff. But this latter is limited in three cases. The first is if the one swearing is a subject, and the oath concerns those things which are subject to the power of superiors. The other is if the oath cannot be kept without common harm, or is upon a contract forbidden by law. Such oaths more truly do not need relaxation, since of themselves they are null. The third is if the oath was extorted by deceit or fear; for then, even if it is valid, it can be relaxed. And this holds even if the promise is not undue, say concerning paying a true debt, but the oath was unjustly extorted; and even if the oath is extorted by light fear, at least for the internal forum, from C. Sollicite 2 and from C. Accepta 3, de Restit. spol., where only an altogether spontaneous oath cannot be relaxed. But not only the Pontiff can relax it, but also Bishops, chapters when Sees are vacant, and others having episcopal jurisdiction, and also Confessors having delegated faculty of dispensing in oaths.

3. It is certain that an oath in favor of a third party can be freely remitted by him, without relaxation of the Church, because each person can yield concerning his own right. For "from such a promise he to whom the promise was made can absolve; for it is understood that he has already paid the promise when he does concerning it according to his will." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 9 ad 2. L. 189-193.

Can one who has delegated faculty of dispensing in vows dispense in oaths? - These words are from Suarez, de Voto, l. 6, c. 14, n. 6: "It is sufficiently probable that power delegated simply for dispensing in vows extends to dispensing in pious oaths concerning the same matter, when they stand per se and produce their own sole obligation. This is the common opinion, and without doubt can be observed in practice." And n. 19: "Even if vow and oath immediately fall upon the same matter, and each obliges per se to the honor of God, by an absolute faculty of dispensing in vows, either the vow, or the oath, or both can be removed, at the judgment of the one dispensing. For this assertion we can allege all the authors of the first, namely the preceding, assertion..., and other moderns and learned men hold it." The intrinsic reason of this opinion is that oath and vow, on account of the affinity of obligation, are equated with each other.

But others deny, because the bond of a vow and of an oath is diverse. Thus Lessius, l. 2, c. 42, n. 60, who nevertheless admits the prior opinion when the oath is accessory to the vow. For indeed, when the vow is dispensed, the oath vanishes. But an oath by its nature is accessory to the promise to which it is added. St. Alphonsus, n. 160, holds each opinion as probable; nevertheless he says that the second must altogether be held: "for the obligation of an oath already contracted, since it is certain and possesses, cannot be removed by a dispensation that is only probably valid." But if the opposite opinion is probable, it is altogether safe in practice, since, that probability standing, the superior granting the first faculty is rightly judged also to grant the latter, unless he expressly limits it. Yet S. C. de P. F., 19 May 1845, decreed: "the faculty of dispensing from vows does not per se include the faculty of dispensing from an oath." And as to sworn vows the same S. C., 3 May 1828, left the matter doubtful. L. 189, 190, 192, 254; D'Annibale, ed. 4, p. 2, n. 431, note 36; Monitore Ecclesiastico, vol. 18, pp. 139, 140; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., nn. 2085, 2087; E. M. Regulars, from special privilege, can commute oaths and also dispense in them, unless they were in favor of a third party and accepted by him. L. de Privil., 108.