Thesis II

There are several goods of Marriage, and they are intrinsic to it; each of these also, taken separately, can be an end why marriage is contracted, although one among them is the primary end.

I. Since we have received the definition of marriage from the common concept of men, it was lawful for us to state it without a clear and distinct knowledge of its end or ends; nevertheless this knowledge is necessary so that the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, the "what-it-was-to-be," of Marriage may be perceived more fully and more evidently. Therefore here we shall discuss the ends of marriage.

II. By the end of marriage we understand the end of the work, to which in itself it is ordered and which by its very constitution it can produce; and if this is intended by the one positing the work, it will also be the end of the worker, although this latter has a wider extension. But since only that which is good has the account of an end, the end of Marriage will be a certain good which marriage itself is naturally fitted to produce in itself and to procure for those entering it. Now that good which first strikes the eyes of all is offspring, by which the continuation and propagation of the human family is obtained, and the suitable education of that same offspring; this indeed must be added, for offspring alone is also the effect of a fornicatory union. In this matter it must be observed, first, that the generation of offspring is indeed an end of marriage appointed by nature, yet to be obtained through marital copulation, which is always free to the spouses and is not always efficacious; second, that the proper act of marriage is that very carnal copulation for which power is obtained through marriage, whether offspring follows from it or not. This we have already suggested (Th. I, III), and below it will be declared more fully; for the present we anticipate it lest false concepts creep upon the incautious reader. Third, in order that offspring be rightly received and further educated, the copulation must be between persons mutually obligated, that is, spouses. This for the present we can suppose, since we shall demonstrate it afterward (Th. VI).

Offspring, however, is not the only good of marriage. "Offspring," says Augustine, On the Good of Marriage, chapter 1, "is one honorable fruit, not of the conjunction of male and female," that is, not of marriage, "but of lying together. For there could have been in each sex, even without such mingling, a certain friendly and genuine conjunction, one ruling, the other obeying." And indeed, besides the good of offspring, another good is found in the marital bond itself and is proper to it. This is the very union of the two, man and woman, namely friendship, communication of works, and mutual service and help. This friendship is not that which can also be had among the rest, but is proper to marriage; for it is founded on mutual power over the body of the other, by which it comes about, therefore, that it is also closer and more enduring. "It is asked why marriage is a good," Augustine says in the same place, chapter 3. He answers: "because it seems to me to be so not on account of the procreation of children alone, but also on account of the natural society itself in the diverse sex. Otherwise it would no longer be called marriage among the aged, especially if they had either lost children or had by no means begotten them." From these words, as we now observe, you understand that when Augustine says that marriages are to be entered into for the sake of procreating alone, as in Against Faustus, book XV, chapter 7, he has directly before his eyes the use of marriage and a marriage entered into with the intention of carnal copulation; he excludes, namely, an end situated in the fulfilling of lust, which indeed is an end different from the remedy of concupiscence, of which presently, the intention of which is at least implicitly joined with the intention of offspring. And indeed this friendship, or, as St. Thomas says, the indivisible conjunction of souls between spouses who from obligation preserve faith with one another, is that good which the definition of marriage handed down in law chiefly commends, making explicit mention of it alone. For this reason the same Augustine, in the same work, chapter 9, distinguishes both certain goods to be sought in themselves, such as wisdom, health, and friendship, and goods to be sought on account of another, such as learning on account of wisdom, food and drink on account of health, marriage and lying together on account of friendship; although, as the same author observes, friendship toward others is also obtained in another way, and indeed can also be more perfect without Marriage.

These two goods of marriage would have had place not only in the present state of fallen nature, but also in the state of integral nature; for they are absolute, supposing only the essence of marriage and its legitimate use. But, once the infirmity of vitiated nature through concupiscence is supposed, or the state of pure nature is supposed, another good arises for those contracting marriage from that mutual obligation and power over the body of the other. There arises, namely, the moral good which is the restraining of concupiscence within the limits of honesty. This restraining is situated in this: that concupiscence is indeed indulged, but only with that person who has power over the body of the other, to whom fidelity is owed in marriage, and in that manner which is proportioned to generation; so that the act is legitimate and even owed. From this it comes about that, the ardor of concupiscence being calmed, the soul does not run out toward illicit things and sin is avoided. "Marriages also have this good," Augustine says in the same place, chapters 3 and 5, "that carnal or youthful incontinence, even if it is vicious, is reduced to the honesty of propagating offspring (cf. Treatise on God the Creator, etc., Thesis XLIV), so that conjugal copulation makes something good out of the evil of lust... For this reason there are nuptials, that that concupiscence, reduced to a lawful bond, might not float about deformed and dissolved, having from itself the unrestrainable infirmity of the flesh, but from nuptials the indissoluble society of fidelity." "Nuptials are good," says Gennadius, On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, chapter 53, "but for the sake of children and under the pretext of restraining fornication." The Apostle teaches that this is a good of marriage, 1 Cor. VII, 2: "Let those who do not contain themselves," that is, who cannot contain themselves, "marry. On account of fornication," namely to be avoided, "let each man have his own wife and each woman her own husband."

Isidore embraces these ends when he says, Etymologies, book IX, chapter 7: "A wife is taken for three causes: the first is for the sake of offspring, concerning which see Genesis I, 28; the second for the sake of help, concerning which see Genesis II, 18; the third for the sake of incontinence; whence the Apostle says that he who does not contain himself should marry."

Besides these, Augustine enumerates another good, which is Sacrament: under this name a twofold thing is understood, namely cause and effect. The cause is the very character of sacrament situated in the signification of a certain mystery and in the efficacy of grace, as will be demonstrated in its own place; the effect is the indissolubility of the bond. "Whom does it not make attentive," says Augustine, "what so great a firmness of the conjugal bond means? I think it could by no means have had such force unless a certain sacrament of some greater reality from this weak mortality of men were applied, which, even when men desert it and desire to dissolve it, remains unshaken for them unto punishment... Nor, nevertheless, except in the city of our God, on his holy mountain, is there such a case with a wife," ibid., chapter 7. That Augustine distinguishes the effect, that is, indissolubility, from the cause of sacrament is clear both from these words themselves and from the fact that, although he has said that the sacrament exists only in the Church of Christ, nevertheless he also finds the indissolubility of the bond before the law of Christ and places sacrament there, as in the marriage of the Blessed Virgin and St. Joseph. "For every good of nuptials was fulfilled in those parents of Christ. We recognize offspring, Jesus Christ; fidelity, because there was no adultery; sacrament, because there was no divorce," On Nuptials and Concupiscence, book I, chapter 11. The very indissolubility of the bond, namely, is called sacrament by Augustine, because in the New Law it is chiefly from the sacrament; and that this is a good, namely a perfection of the conjugal bond, is evident.

III. All the goods of marriage enumerated thus far can be brought back to those three which Augustine frequently proclaims, and with him the whole School: offspring, fidelity, sacrament. Concerning offspring there is nothing further we need say. Fidelity formally embraces the second of those mentioned in the preceding number, and the third at least causally; for fidelity, both in habit and in act, is the very friendly society of the spouses, the communication of works, and mutual service and help. But fidelity, situated in the rendering of the debt, furnishes a remedy for the concupiscence of each or of either, so that by the very fact that fidelity is furnished, the remedy is applied. Sacrament says the indissoluble unity of the two, besides sanctifying grace.

IV. Since these are the goods of Marriage, they will also be the ends on account of which marriage can be entered into. Concerning these goods, now setting aside sacramental sanctification, observe that each separately is sought according to the ordination of nature. And indeed with regard to offspring there is no difficulty, since it is a good, and the natural distinction and conjunction of the sexes itself is ordered to the procreation of offspring. But familiar friendship itself, or the society of man and woman through marriage, even when abstraction is made from the obtaining of offspring, is a good which is sought according to the ordination of nature. For that must be said to be sought according to the ordination of nature whose principles are all in nature itself, and the use of whose principles has an end which the natural law itself most highly approves. But the principles of the mutual obligation and power of man and woman over the body of the other, by which marriage is constituted, are certainly in nature itself. From the very institution of nature, the capacity for certain duties and offices which are useful, or even necessary, for human living together is different in each sex. The use of these principles, that is, the mutual obligation and power over the body of the other contracted by man and woman, and the communication of works resting on this obligation and power, begets a special stable friendship and security of mutual service and help. Natural law most highly approves this end, for, while it approves friendship generally among men, it distributes diverse offices useful to both for the fostering of friendship between man and woman. But once these are posited, the essence of marriage is had, whose essence consists "in a certain indivisible conjunction of souls, by which one of the spouses is bound indivisibly to preserve fidelity to the other" (III, q. XXIX, a. 2).

The third good also, that is, the remedy of concupiscence, is sought separately in marriage according to the ordination of nature. For he acts according to the ordination of nature who, for attaining that which the natural law itself approves, uses that which from nature itself has the account of a means to this end. But the natural law approves the restraining of concupiscence; and marriage, conferring the right of using and imposing the duty of rendering, is by this very fact, and therefore from the very institution of nature, a suitable means to this end. Therefore.

V. You will say that each argument supposes that nature, making man and woman suitable for marital union, has not necessarily and uniquely ordered that union to the procreation of offspring, or has not commanded that marriage be entered into with this intention alone. Yet this supposition would have to be demonstrated in order to prove that one or the other of these two latter ends can be sought while abstraction is made from the first.

I answer that this supposition is not hard to demonstrate. And as regards the third end, which is the remedy of concupiscence, it is certain that when some thing or some work can conduce to several honorable ends, in order that you may honestly employ it according to natural law itself, it is not necessary that you intend all the ends, or the primary one if there is such among them, but it is enough that you intend some one of these ends and do nothing against the others; for thus your action will be good from its object and end. Cf. the moral theologians. But if this is not necessary, natural law being considered, it is certain that the same is not prescribed by nature. Thus, for example, there can be a manifold end of fasting: the honor of God, the expiation of your sins, the obtaining of some spiritual or temporal benefit for yourself or for others; by whichever of these ends you act, you act rightly, while the others follow in themselves, if they are intrinsic ends. In the same way, you contract Marriage on account of the remedy of concupiscence and intend this in its use; nevertheless you do not impede generation, and you receive the offspring which God may have given. And observe that the mingling of the sexes in itself is not evil, since it is from the very institution of nature; but wandering mingling among the unmarried is evil, and much more with those persons who are obligated to another. Therefore, in order that this evil, into which man would be borne because of concupiscence, may be avoided, that state is chosen in which the mingling of flesh is lawful and honorable.

As regards the second end which we have mentioned, besides the principle just brought forward, which is valid here also, it is certain further that when by nature itself or by law you have a right to some act without which the right can exist, it is lawful for you, while retaining the right, always to omit the act, and indeed, after acquiring that right, to obligate yourself to the omission of the act, especially if this omission induces greater moral perfection; and finally, you can undertake the very obligation of omitting the act when you acquire the right, if that right, even with the omission of that act, can be useful for other uses and ends. For then that obligation excludes not the right, but only some exercise of it. Thus, therefore, they act who enter marriage only on account of domestic society, not wishing to mingle carnally; and therefore, just as it is lawful after marriage has been entered for spouses to agree upon perpetual continence, so also it is lawful before, without this agreement harming the truth of the power handed over, since this power also generates other rights and obligations, whose use will be available. But since this power mutually handed over, or this conjugal bond, is one indivisible thing, although several rights and offices sprout forth from it, if it can remain for producing some effect, it must remain whole. But concerning this matter, in which the difficulty is not slight, we shall treat expressly in the following thesis.

You will say: if there were no procreation of offspring, marriage would not have been instituted. I answer: if only the actual procreation of offspring were not had, I deny; if it were not possible, I distinguish. If it were not possible only from some positive law of God not willing to form the organism of offspring in the womb of the woman or to create souls, again I deny. If the procreation of offspring were not possible because it were impossible in itself that offspring be generated from the mingling of flesh, let it pass. I say, let it pass; for, once this hypothesis were made, we would be living in an altogether different order, nor would there be, I think, a distinction between male and female, who are the subject of marriage. But even if, unless the procreation of offspring were possible in itself, marriage would not have been instituted, it is not rightly gathered that now it is to be entered into on account of the procreation of children alone. For it not rarely happens that something which would not have been instituted unless some determinate end existed, nevertheless, after it has been instituted, since it can conduce also to other ends or produce other goods, can be employed on account of them, with those alone directly intended, provided nothing is done against that end which would be primary. On this matter consult the moral theologians. For example, if society did not exist, social authority would not have been instituted; nevertheless, once this authority has been instituted, if it conduces the one holding it to other honorable ends, it can be sought on account of those ends, provided the good of society is not excluded.

VI. Here, however, the question offers itself whether among the ends enumerated there is one that is primary. Before the answer, the notion of primary end - we are speaking of the end of the work - must be held. For we do not call that end primary apart from whose intention the means cannot be employed; this is not really a primary end, but the only end. But a primary end allows other ends with itself. The primary end of nature is that for the attaining of which some work is adapted by nature before her other works; therefore it is not the same as the immediate end, or that which necessarily follows from the thing or work. For it suffices, when all the ends of the thing or work are compared together, that one be before the others, on account of which the work is chiefly instituted by nature, so that it may be called the primary end. This indeed does not prevent another end from being honestly intended primarily by the intention of the worker, provided that nothing is done against that first end. Now, if you consider the use of marriage in conjugal copulation, its primary end, intended by nature, is certainly the procreation of offspring; for this copulation itself is the means, and the only means, although from several contingent causes it is not always efficacious. But also if marriage itself is considered in itself, although domestic society with all the goods accompanying it is something more necessary and immediately consequent upon it, nevertheless this could in itself also be obtained without the matrimonial bond. But the remedy of concupiscence cannot be the primary end, unless by the intention of the worker, since marriage and its use could perfectly have been had without it, as would have happened in the state of innocence. You will say: the primary end can never be excluded; but, as will be proved in the following thesis, the procreation of offspring can be excluded; therefore. I answer: it can never be excluded by the agent, that is, in the very use of the thing which is destined by nature to that end, I concede; it cannot be excluded when the very use of the thing is excluded, I distinguish: if that is the only and necessary end, I concede; if it is not such, I deny.

It remains, therefore, that the goods enumerated are both ends on account of which it is lawful to enter marriage, and that each separately enjoys this prerogative of an end. Cf. Sanchez, On Marriage, book II, disputation XXIX.

VII. You will ask whether the good of sacrament can be the final cause of contracting marriage. I do not see why this should be denied, since it is some good in itself, of the kind that all sacraments are, and is the more excellent good in marriage; but every good in itself can be an end. Nevertheless one may doubt whether he would act prudently who, led by love of the sacrament alone, wished to enter marriage. For if he neither needs the remedy of concupiscence nor domestic friendship and the assistance of the other sex, nor cares to have offspring, it is not clear why he should not rather choose celibacy and the state of virginity; for although he will not gain the good of sacramental grace, he will gain more abundant grace from the work of the worker and will please God more.

VIII. From what has been said it becomes sufficiently manifest that goods of this kind, of which we have spoken thus far, are goods intrinsic to marriage: either from the nature of the thing, as the first three are, and also sacrament insofar as it says indissoluble unity; or from the institution of God, as sacrament properly so called, whose account will be declared in the following Chapter. That those former goods are intrinsic to marriage is evident; for they either constitute its essence, or are its natural end, or are a property especially fitting to its nature.

From this two things follow. First, since all the constitutive elements of marriage are good, and the last, which is sacrament, is also a cause of supernatural sanctity, it is evident that marriage is an honorable and holy state, and that those who undertake that state act honorably and holily in itself.

Second, by the aforesaid goods marriage is made honorable not extrinsically, as if by an honorableness acceding from without, as if marriage itself in itself were either evil or indifferent; on the contrary, since it is intrinsically constituted by these goods, it is intrinsically good and holy.

It is also customary to say that Marriage is excused by the same goods. This indeed is to be understood not of Marriage itself, but of its act, which is carnal mingling. Namely, in the conjugal act there occurs the loss of some good: namely the loss of virginity, and a certain clouding of reason because of the vehemence of passion, by which reason is in some manner absorbed; also the tribulation of the flesh, which spouses must sustain. But no wise and prudent man would incur the loss of some good except with some compensation of another good; and this good, and indeed a manifold good, although in another order, obtains in marriage. But the act of mingling is again excused not by something extrinsic, but intrinsic; for it is intrinsic to that act that it is owed from the fidelity given to the other, and therefore is an act of justice; that it brings a remedy of concupiscence and receives offspring. For this reason marriage "does not need these goods as certain exterior things for making it honorable, but as causing in it the honorableness which belongs to it according to itself" (In IV, dist. XXXI, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2).

IX. St. Thomas asks (ibid., a. 3, ql. 1) which of the three goods, which are fidelity, offspring, and sacrament, is more principal. Now the holy Doctor observes that something is called more principal in two ways: either because it is more essential, or because it is more worthy. If what is more worthy is sought, then in every way Sacrament is more principal, because it pertains to marriage insofar as this looks to the order of grace, while the others look to marriage insofar as it is a certain office of nature. But if what is more essential is sought, then a distinction must be made; because fidelity and offspring can be considered in two ways. In one way, in themselves, that is, in act, and thus they pertain to the use of marriage, through which both offspring is produced and the conjugal agreement is preserved. But the indivisibility which Sacrament imports pertains to marriage itself according to itself; because from the very fact that through the conjugal agreement the spouses hand over to one another power over themselves in perpetuity, it follows that they cannot be separated; and thence it is that marriage is never found without inseparability, but is found without fidelity and offspring, because the being of a thing does not depend upon its use. And according to this, Sacrament, that is, the indissolubility of the bond, is more essential to marriage than fidelity and offspring. In another way, fidelity and offspring can be considered according as they are in their principles, so that for offspring the intention of offspring is taken, and for fidelity the duty of preserving fidelity; without these, marriage also cannot exist, because these are caused in marriage from the conjugal agreement itself, so that if anything contrary to them were expressed in the consent, it would not be true marriage. And taking fidelity and offspring in this way, it is clear that offspring is the most essential thing in marriage, fidelity second, and Sacrament third; just as also for man the being of nature is more essential than the being of grace, although the being of grace is more worthy.

As regards the last part of St. Thomas's discussion, namely that offspring is that which is most essential in marriage, observe that this is exactly the same as what we have said here in n. VI. For the holy Doctor has regard to intention, "so that for offspring the intention of offspring is taken." Moreover, if the intention of nature is considered, this is more essential, because it is the primary end; if the intention of the one contracting marriage is considered, note that St. Thomas considers marriage with its use, or with copulation. For the contrary to offspring which is expressed in consent, from which St. Thomas draws his argument, is not a lack of intention of having offspring, but is the intention of avoiding offspring through abuse of the conjugal act (Th. following). But again, as we have said, in the use of marriage the primary end is offspring.