Thesis XXI

From the words of Mark and Luke, and from the words of Matthew V, 31, 32, and XIX, 3 seq., we certainly gather Christ's doctrine concerning the indissolubility of the conjugal bond even in the case of adultery.

I. Therefore the doctrine of Christ is reported by Matthew in two places: V, 31, 32. It has been said: Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a bill of divorce. But I say to you, that everyone who shall put away his wife, except for the cause of fornication, makes her commit adultery, and he who shall marry her that is put away commits adultery. XIX, 3 seq. And the Pharisees came to him, tempting him, and saying: Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for any cause whatever? Who answering said to them: Have you not read that he who made man from the beginning made them male and female? And he said: For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh. Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh. What therefore God has joined together, let not man separate. They say to him: Why then did Moses command to give a bill of divorce and to put away? He says to them: Because Moses, by reason of the hardness of your heart, permitted you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so. But I say to you, that whosoever shall put away his wife, except for fornication, and shall marry another, commits adultery; and he who shall marry her that is put away commits adultery. Mark X, 2 reports the same disputation of Christ with the Pharisees, and this is the final sentence of Christ: Whosoever shall put away his wife and marry another commits adultery against her; and if the woman shall put away her husband and marry another, she commits adultery. Luke, moreover, has these words XVI, 18: Everyone who puts away his wife and marries another commits adultery; and he who marries her that has been put away by her husband commits adultery.

II. Concerning the signification of the noun dismissal and of the verb to dismiss, these things may be observed. Dismissal, ἀπόλυσις, in itself can be perfect and imperfect. Perfect dismissal is that by which spouses are separated in such a way that the bond also is dissolved; imperfect dismissal is that by which they are separated as to bed and board, while the bond nevertheless remains. For there to be dismissal, the separation must be effected or procured by either spouse. The Jews had the former in mind, and perhaps knew no other; the Apostle indicated the latter, 1 Cor. VII, 10, 11 (cf. preceding Thesis). For the rest, from the very words of Christ it will be gathered which dismissal is permitted.

Which of the two dismissals is to be understood in any discourse, if the term dismissal is employed, must be gathered from the adjuncts of the discourse which circumscribe and determine it. Therefore, and this must be noted, if someone wishes to signify that he permits indeed, at least in some case, an imperfect dismissal, but prohibits a perfect dismissal, he will signify his sentence excellently if he says that dismissal is indeed at times lawful, yet in such a way that another marriage cannot be entered without adultery. For perfect dismissal, or complete divorce, comprises two elements: separation and the dissolution of the bond; and these two elements can be so disjoined that one may be valid without the other. Therefore, when the former is granted and the latter denied, it is clearly expressed which dismissal is lawful and which is not lawful for spouses.

III. In Matthew XIX, 3, the question of the Pharisees, to which perhaps the disagreement between the two schools of Scammai and Hillel gave occasion, namely, whether it is lawful for a man to dismiss his wife for any cause whatever, is a modal proposition; and the chief inquiry seems to be whether it is lawful to dismiss for any cause. But of what dismissal were the Pharisees speaking? Since Christ's very answer to this question predicates the unity of the two and the conjunction which God himself makes, which is the unity of the bond; and since the Pharisees must be judged to speak of that dismissal about which there was a question in the schools of the Jews, and which was by the repudiation of the wife, and which was known and in use among the Jews, it must be said that the question was raised by the Pharisees concerning perfect dismissal. And thus Christ, answering the objection of the Pharisees, uses the word to dismiss according to its perfect signification: Moses, by reason of the hardness of your heart, permitted you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so. But the question proposed by the Pharisees shows that here the discourse is about a wife, and that the causes on account of which a wife can or cannot be dismissed are causes which pertain to the wife, and therefore have place in that marriage concerning which it is asked whether it can be dissolved or not.

IV. These things being laid down, let us first consider the words of Mark and Luke. The proposition is universal: whosoever, everyone; therefore it holds for any man dismissing his wife and marrying another. But among these is comprehended also he who dismisses her because of the wife's adultery and marries another. Therefore even this man commits adultery; therefore the former bond has not been dissolved. But although the Evangelists do not commemorate all the circumstances of the matter or of the discourse, nevertheless they cannot omit those circumstances by whose omission the history or sentence would become false. Now if it were true that Christ made an exception and permitted a man because of the adultery of his spouse to marry another, then what Mark and Luke report would be false. For on that hypothesis this would be the true sentence of Christ: not everyone who dismisses his wife and marries another commits adultery. Yet that is contradictory to the proposition of Mark and Luke. Therefore that was not the sentence of Christ, if we believe Mark and Luke. "Who are we to say: there is a man who commits adultery by marrying another after his wife has been dismissed, and there is a man who, doing this, does not commit adultery, when the Gospel says that everyone commits adultery who does this?" says Augustine (de Adult. coniug. L. I, c. 9). Therefore the sentence of Christ is sufficiently clear. Cf., however, what we shall say concerning the same matter when explaining the words of Matthew XIX.

V. With regard to Matthew's words, since there is a twofold testimony, we wish first to demonstrate the Catholic doctrine from the former, that is, from chapter V, 31, 32, by an argument already foreshown by St. Basil. Certainly Christ speaks there only of him who dismisses his wife, not of him who in addition marries another. But Christ says that the man dismissing his wife, except for the cause of fornication, makes her commit adultery. The fornication of a wife is adultery. Cf. what must be said in nn. IX and X. Moreover, the sentence expressed by the verb makes is not that the man compels the woman to commit adultery; for the woman is always free. Nor is it that adultery of the dismissed woman always follows upon dismissal; for why would this always follow if there is no necessity of the act? Nor is the sense only that an occasion of committing adultery is furnished to the wife; for the word makes indicates, furthermore, that the author of this occasion is the man who dismisses her. But since the matter here concerns the doctrine of morals which Christ hands down, he is truly said to be the author of the occasion of sinning, of whom the discourse treats, to whom, as to a cause, the sin which follows can morally be imputed. Therefore the sense of Christ's words is: he who dismisses his wife without the cause of fornication is the author of the wife's adultery, if it afterward follows, for instance if she herself marries another; and the sin of the wife will be imputed to him as to an author, that is, as to one giving, without cause, the occasion and exposing his wife to danger. But he who dismisses his wife in the case of fornication is not the author of her adultery, if afterward she commits adultery, nor will the sin of the wife be imputed to him, since he has a legitimate cause for dismissing his wife. Now this sentence of Christ manifestly supposes that the dismissed wife can commit adultery, and that she always commits adultery whenever she is united to another man. For if you remove this, how does the one dismissing her furnish an occasion for adultery, which is no longer possible? But adultery cannot be conceived in this dismissed wife unless the former bond remains. Therefore Christ signifies that he supposes, and holds as certain, that the former bond endures, and that the dismissed woman still remains the wife of the man dismissing her. Thus the whole difference between one dismissing with cause and one dismissing without the cause of fornication is in this: that the ensuing adultery of the wife is not imputed to the former, but is imputed to the other. Accordingly, the doctrine of Christ is that not even through the fornication of the wife is the bond of marriage dissolved. Certainly, he who marries her that is dismissed commits adultery; therefore the woman dismissed is still a wife. You will say that the Jews did not have a notion of this dismissal by which separation indeed would be effected, but the bond would not be broken. I answer: if they lacked this notion, Christ now supplied it to them; for by teaching that the wife can be dismissed for a certain cause, and nevertheless that the same woman remains still a wife, he necessarily introduced the notion of that dismissal which is only separation of common life. For the rest, Christ indeed addressed the Jews, but chiefly he was speaking for his Church and for his faithful. Moreover, the Apostle manifestly understood and taught the same circumscribed dismissal, 1 Cor. VII, 10, 11, commanding that a wife who departs from her husband for a just cause either remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband.

Will you contend that the exceptive phrase, except for the cause of fornication, must also be supplied in the last clause: and he who marries her that is put away commits adultery? Thus, therefore, he would be an adulterer who marries her that is put away, unless nevertheless she was put away because of fornication; for on this hypothesis the one marrying her would not be an adulterer, but her legitimate husband. That is to say, Christ, who here expressly commends the sanctity of marriage, would confer a privilege upon an adulteress, before an innocent wife who has been dismissed, so that the former could, while her own husband is still living, contract valid nuptials even with the adulterer himself, but the latter, who is free from that crime and is dismissed for other causes, could not. What is more absurd than this? Therefore the sentence of Christ is: a wife is licitly dismissed on account of the cause of fornication, illicitly on account of other causes; but he who marries a dismissed woman, whether licitly or illicitly dismissed, for Christ has spoken of both dismissals, is an adulterer. Provided that you weigh the true argument of Basil from his canon 48, cited in Thesis XVIII, it will be evident that this argument was already foreshown by him. You see that here we are supposing the common interpretation of the words except for the cause of fornication; and that this interpretation, at least as regards the force of the demonstration to be drawn from this text, is sufficiently certain, will presently be evident.

VI. Now let us come to chapter XIX, 3 seq. There is not one interpretation. Not a few Protestants wish that the indissolubility of marriage is indeed sanctioned there by Christ, yet with a certain exception, namely, that of the wife's adultery. But among those who deny that Christ permitted repudiation in any hypothesis, there is no agreement concerning the interpretation itself. Some note that πορνεία is not adultery, but simple fornication; and therefore by these words a crime committed by the wife after the marriage has been contracted is not indicated. But they are divided into two classes. For some take it as if it is fornication which, before the marriage, the woman who has been married committed with another; in which case they wish Christ to have said that the rescission of the contract is lawful, as the due condition intended by the man is lacking. Others think that those exceptive words give this sense: unless the union of the man and woman is fornicary, on which hypothesis not only is it lawful, but it is necessary, to dismiss the woman. Finally, others judge that πορνεία is there the adultery of the wife; and these again are divided. For some, especially among more recent authors, state that the words παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας have the force of: the cause of fornication being set aside, or the discourse, λόγος, concerning fornication being set aside, that is, I do not wish to speak of this. But others reject this evasion.

VII. Now the first interpretation, which does not state simply that Christ in this discourse sets aside the hypothesis of the wife's fornication, but contends that Christ in that hypothesis permits the dissolution of the bond, inasmuch as he denies indeed that it is lawful to dismiss a wife, yet excepts the cause of fornication, that is, when this cause exists, dismissal is lawful; this interpretation, I say, cannot be admitted. Rather, it must be held that Christ denied this by his answer.

Certainly Christ, 1. immediately from the beginning of his answer, signifies that he wishes to answer with regard taken only to the primitive institution, and to take from it the norm of his doctrine: Have you not read that he who made man from the beginning, etc., v. 4. Moreover, from the institution he gathers not only unity, but indissolubility: What therefore God has joined together, let not man separate, v. 6. This law, laid down in the very institution of marriage from the beginning for the whole human race, plainly holds for every marriage in every hypothesis; and therefore in these words is contained the contradictory of Hillel's sentence, namely, that for no cause is it lawful for a man to dismiss, by that dismissal by which the bond is dissolved, his wife.

2. Christ refers the permission of dismissing and repudiating the wife, a permission, I say, taken universally as it occurs in the law of Moses, wholly to the hardness of the human heart, and consequently exhibits it as foreign to the institution and to that antecedent divine will by which the properties of marriage were established: from the beginning it was not so, v. 8. Therefore, just as Christ, saying, What therefore God has joined together, let not man separate, recalls the law of the primitive institution, so also he must be said to abolish the Mosaic permission. In these things there is no exception: the faculty of dissolving the marriage, that marriage which God has joined, is withdrawn from the spouse; therefore man cannot dissolve any marriage; therefore not for any cause either. But the power of dissolving which is denied to man is not denied to God; rather it is reserved to him who joined, and, under God, to those to whom God has willed to entrust it.

3. The disciples are astonished at Christ's doctrine and judge the condition made for man by this law difficult, so that it is not expedient to marry. Such difficulty chiefly appears when an unfaithful woman gives access to herself to another. Therefore the Apostles understood something new, which was not contained in the law of Moses; nor does Christ deny it, but from the astonishment of the Apostles and from their opinion that it is not expedient to marry in this way, he takes occasion to praise and commend virginity, vv. 10-12.

From these things, the following are certainly established. 1. It is altogether false that Christ answers the Pharisees according to the Mosaic law; for he answers according to the law of the primitive institution, to which he opposes the permission made by Moses. 2. Christ brings forth something new to those accustomed to the Mosaic law, the novelty of which might seem to demonstrate that it is not expedient to marry. 3. Christ simply recalls the primitive institution, so that it is unlawful for man to separate what God has joined. Therefore no marital conjunction can be separated by man; therefore neither in the hypothesis of adultery can the wife be dismissed with the bond dissolved, for in that way very many conjunctions made by God would be separated by man. Nevertheless a difficulty occurs in the very words of Christ:

But I say to you, that whosoever shall put away his wife except for fornication and shall marry another, commits adultery, etc. For he seems from the universal law prohibiting and making void the dissolution of the bond which is effected by man to except the hypothesis that the wife herself is dismissed because of her fornication. This exception, in whichever way it is read, is too constant to be rejected (preceding Thesis, n. IV).

Nevertheless there is already a prejudice against this interpretation, and indeed a twofold one. For 1. this exception does not cohere with the primitive institution; and it is remarkable that, after the first institution has been recalled and it has been absolutely affirmed and established that what God has joined together, let not man separate, an exception of the greatest moment is not added here, but in the answer to the subsumed question of the Pharisees; and if that question had been lacking, the doctrine previously handed down would have turned out incomplete and in part false. 2. If a man can dissolve the bond with a wife who commits fornication, but not for other causes, it follows that the condition of the adulteress is made better by Christ than that of the innocent woman. For the woman who has not broken faith by adultery, when dismissed, remains bound, so that she can neither enjoy her husband, because she has been dismissed, nor marry another, because she remains the wife of the former husband; but the adulteress when dismissed can be freed from obligation toward her husband, and marry another, even the adulterer himself. Is it lawful to expect these things from Christ, who so greatly commended chastity and willed to bind more closely the conjugal bond? "For no one is so absurd as to deny that he is an adulterer who marries her whom her husband has cast off because of fornication, when he says that he is an adulterer who marries her who has been cast off apart from the cause of fornication." Augustine, de Adult. coniug. L. I, c. 9. Yet those whom we oppose impose this absurdity upon Christ.

Again, the words of Christ, and shall marry another, accomplish the same. These words, as we have already warned, are commended more than sufficiently by critical testimonies (preceding Thesis, III). Therefore the man who, after his wife has been dismissed because of fornication, marries another, is an adulterer; therefore the wife dismissed even because of fornication remains the wife of the man dismissing her; therefore the bond is not dissolved.

Therefore rightly do we deny that in Christ's answer to the Pharisees there is contained a permission made to a man of dismissing a fornicating wife in such a way that the conjugal bond is dissolved. Cf. Knabenbauer on Matthew, in this place.

VIII. How therefore are these exceptive words of Christ to be taken? Of the interpretations of Catholics brought forward above (VI), the first rests upon the proper signification of the word πορνεία, especially since Christ himself here distinguishes it from μοιχεία, which is adultery; therefore πορνεία is not adultery, or does not signify a crime committed by her who is truly a wife. In this explanation of the words of Christ it is supposed that these words, except for fornication, are a continuation of the discourse and cohere with the words immediately preceding, whosoever shall put away his wife, so that their sense is: unless he shall dismiss because of fornication. This is rightly supposed, as the very structure of the words and the common interpretation of the ancients shows. Now, however, when the word πορνεία is so taken, there is a twofold explanation of Christ's sentence; the former, which also pleased certain Protestants, while it removes one difficulty, introduces another. For since here Christ establishes a law that will hold for the Church (preceding Thesis, part II), it would follow that now, after marriage has been entered, it is lawful for a man to repudiate a wife whom he has not found to be a virgin; and indeed, unless on the hypothesis that the man wished to contract under this definite condition, who would admit this?

IX. But the other explanation, namely, unless the man dismisses the woman because their union is fornicary, although it is new, has seemed worthy to some that account be taken of it. The distinguished Father Patrizi proposed it (de Interp. Script. L. I, n. 281), and he testifies that he received it from another whose name he leaves unspoken. The distinguished Father Perrone sharply attacked the same (de Matrim. L. III, c. 2, a. 2). Against it the first difficulty is that it is a new interpretation, and they say that in a matter of faith and morals it is an interpretation of Scripture contrary to the unanimous consent of the Fathers, which is not lawful according to Trent. But as regards this criticism, first there must be distinguished a twofold interpretation of the Fathers, against which this new interpretation is said to go. One is concerning the principal object of Christ's discourse; the other is concerning an incidental object. The former affirms that Christ here teaches that the bond of marriage is intrinsically indissoluble in any case whatever; the latter affirms that Christ teaches that it is lawful, on account of adultery, to make a separation while the bond nevertheless remains. Now if account is taken of the former interpretation of the Fathers, we concede that the unanimous consent of the Fathers conspires into it, but we deny that this new interpretation is opposed to the same. For a twofold opposition must be distinguished: namely, either concerning the thing or doctrine which the unanimous consent of the Fathers teaches to be contained in the words of Scripture, or concerning the manner of interpreting or drawing the same thing from the words of Scripture. But only the former opposition is reprobated by Trent as contrary to the unanimous consent of the Fathers. For this is the decree of Trent (Sess. IV): "let no one, in matters of faith and morals, twisting Sacred Scripture to his own senses ... dare to interpret contrary to the unanimous consent of the Fathers." It is, that is, an opposition as to the sense. Therefore at that time there is an interpretation of Scripture in a matter of faith and morals contrary to the unanimous consent of the Fathers, when from the testimony of Scripture a sentence pertaining to faith or morals is forced out, contrary to that which the Fathers teach to underlie Scripture. But the doctrine which the consent of the Fathers teaches to be contained in this place is this: that the marriage bond can never be dissolved, not even through adultery. But the second interpretation both holds this and shows it more clearly. Therefore the opposition is not in the sense of Scripture, or in the thing itself which is to be understood from the words of Scripture, but in the method of interpreting; and who would deny that there can be progress in this? Wherefore he who receives this interpretation can also affirm that he is carrying out what he promises in the Pian Profession of Faith: namely, that he interprets this Scripture according to the unanimous consent of the Fathers.

If account is taken of the other interpretation of the Fathers which is objected, this difficulty occurs: that if we receive this new interpretation, then it must be denied that from those words of Christ it is proved that on account of the adultery of a spouse it is lawful to make a separation as to domestic life; for Christ is not treating of the adultery of a spouse. But this is both inconvenient and is opposed to the Church and to the Fathers, who commonly prove that from those words. Nor can it be demonstrated from Matthew, chapter V. For the foundation of this new interpretation is that πορνεία is not adultery; therefore also in chapter V, since the same phrase occurs and likewise the discourse is about dismissal, it will have to be taken of a fornicary wife. There is indeed some difference between the sentence of chapter V and the sentence of chapter XIX; but one of two things follows: either it is contended that the word πορνείαν in a discourse where the dismissal of a wife is treated, and where the word μοιχεία or μοιχεύειν or μοιχᾶσθαι occurs, signifies only fornication, or it is conceded that it can signify adultery. If the first, you will not be able from any of these places to force out that it is lawful for the innocent spouse to separate himself from the adulterer. If the second, you destroy the foundation of your interpretation. The distinguished Perrone indeed, who urges this kind of argument from the sense of the Church, demonstrates that the Church, in establishing that practice, rests upon these words of Christ, adducing canons from the Decree and the Decretals. But, to confess the truth, from the Decree, to whose canons that authority is left which they have from their origin, besides some particular council, canons are cited almost from Augustine alone; but from the Decretals nothing properly is brought forward which directly pertains here. What of the fact that, if we wish to rest upon these words of Christ for the sentence of the Church that separation of spouses is at times lawful, a difficulty is at hand: why, since Christ made mention only of fornication, does the Church admit many other causes besides? For this cause alone would seem from Christ's words to have to be excepted. On the contrary, could not the Church have learned that cause from the same source whence she learned the other causes? Certainly the Tridentine Synod, Sess. XIV, c. 8, abstained from citing these testimonies of Matthew. Nevertheless, if we consult the ancients, not a few could be cited who take this exception in this way; and one may compare them in Thesis XIX. To these may be added generally the scholastic doctors and the interpreters of canon law, who agree upon the words of Christ in Matthew for establishing this doctrine. "This doctrine is certain," says Sanchez (L. X, de Divortio, disp. 3), "from chapters V and XIX of Matthew and from chapter Significasti; and thus this conclusion is of faith." Augustine, however, did not hold this interpretation as certain; for although he used it repeatedly, nevertheless he devised another, namely, that by those words, except for fornication, the case of fornication is excluded from the object of the discourse (de Adult. coniug. L. II, c. 9). But although there is not a unanimous consent of the Fathers and Doctors, nevertheless so great is this consent in taking πορνεία for the fornication of the wife, that is, for adultery, and hence in proving the lawfulness of separation because of the adultery of a spouse, that we do not dare to depart from this common interpretation. This is especially so since the reason which is produced is surely of no moment. For although πορνεία is not of itself μοιχεία, nevertheless the πορνεία of a wife is adultery; but here the discourse is about the πορνεία of a wife. Moreover, the reason why Christ in the second place uses the term to commit adultery is not in order to institute any opposition, but because this was necessary to declare expressly that the bond between the one dismissing and the one dismissed remains. For the rest, adultery is frequently signified by the name of fornication also in Sacred Letters. Therefore there remains the common interpretation, which in the words for fornication understands the adultery of the wife. This understanding is further required by the very question proposed by the Pharisees, to whom assuredly it mattered nothing to hear anything about a concubine woman. Then, if the word fornication must be taken properly, the word wife, which is understood in that exceptive formula, must be taken improperly: whosoever shall put away his wife, unless he shall put away his wife for fornication; but she with whom a fornicary commerce is had is not a wife. Therefore one or the other term would have to be taken less properly. But why rather wife, which represents that about which the question is, than fornication? This, indeed, is an argument ad hominem; for, as we have said, here there is no place for improper terms. For when fornication is said of a wife, it is drawn over to signify the species of adultery.

X. But although this interpretation of the word fornication is admitted, there is still, as we have said, a twofold interpretation of the whole clause: except for the cause of fornication. Is that one to be approved which takes it thus: the cause of the wife's adultery being set aside, concerning which matter I do not wish now to speak?

The following observations forbid us to receive this interpretation. 1. No suitable reason appears why Christ would have wished to set aside this hypothesis. He had already appealed to the primitive institution, which, as the adversaries concede, comprised also that hypothesis. The Pharisees, in asking, had excepted nothing. Moreover, the case of adultery could be the principal reason for doubting. Christ here speaks as Teacher and proposes a new law before the Mosaic law. Therefore no prudence, unless you invent a human prudence from which Christ is most foreign, advised that this hypothesis be set aside. 2. In Mark and Luke, Christ is exhibited as handing down an absolute and universal doctrine. How can it be that Matthew represents him speaking defectively and abstracting from the more important hypothesis? 3. The connection of the discourse excludes that explanation, since already in the preceding words Christ had implicitly denied that even in the case of adultery the dissolution of the bond is lawful, and Christ had completed his answer. Therefore now he cannot say that he prescinds from that hypothesis.

Nor should you say that it satisfied the Jews, even with this set aside, to know the other things, especially since an adulteress wife was by law subject to death. For Christ speaks not for the Jews alone, but, as the Apostles themselves understood, for his future Church, promulgating a new law (cf. preceding Thesis), in which Church, moreover, what is lawful for the husband is also lawful for the wife.

XI. Yet there remains to be resolved a difficulty of no small weight placed in the words of Christ, Matthew XIX, arising not from the exception added alone (except for fornication), but from the fact that this exception is placed there where the subject of the discourse is not only he who dismisses, as in chapter V, but he who dismisses and marries another. For this seems to follow from that sentence: therefore he who, because of the cause of fornication, dismisses his wife and marries another, does not commit adultery. It is lawful for a legislator, who wishes to except some case from a law, first to enact the law in most universal terms and afterwards to add the exception for that case. This, they say, Christ now seems to have done. That is, after Christ had uttered the universal law, he was expecting an objection to be proposed to him by the hearers, so that he might indicate the exception which would exclude universality; which does not seem sufficiently congruous. But let us hear the argument. Namely, here surely one case seems to be excepted. For the Pharisees speak of perfect dismissal, and the proposition of Christ is exceptive and returns to this: Everyone who shall dismiss his wife and marry another, except him who shall dismiss her because of fornication, commits adultery. But an exceptive proposition is that which excludes one thing or several things, which are contained in the extension of the subject, from participation in the predicate. It is expounded, like an exclusive proposition, by a copulative proposition consisting of two exponents, one affirming, the other denying. Therefore the proposition of Christ seems to have to be expounded thus: he who dismisses his wife because of fornication and marries another is not an adulterer; the others who dismiss and marry another are adulterers. Namely, it is lawful to argue from the contrary: if they are adulterers who dismiss a wife and marry another without the cause of fornication, therefore when this cause exists they are not adulterers. For it seems that if Christ had wished to except this case from the law of indissolubility, he could not have spoken more clearly than in this way: he who shall dismiss, except for the cause of fornication, and shall marry another, commits adultery. For the words except for the cause of fornication would not have had to be placed after those words, and shall marry another; for the fornication of the wife is not the cause why another is married, but only why the former wife is dismissed, and after this dismissal has been accomplished, another is married. Therefore, on the hypothesis that because of the adultery of the wife it would be lawful for the man to dissolve the marriage, the matter would stand thus: the man because of fornication would dismiss the wife, and thus would marry another. Therefore, he who, establishing the law of indissolubility, wishes to except only this case, speaks most rightly thus: he who shall dismiss his wife except for the cause of fornication and shall marry another, commits adultery; that is, he who does not dismiss his wife in the case of fornication and marries another is an adulterer; he who dismisses in the case of fornication, if he marries another, is not an adulterer.

XIII. Theologians labor to free themselves from these bonds. Omitting less apt responses, we observe that the words except for fornication pertain only to the dismissal, with which they are immediately connected, not to the following words, and shall marry another; nor was it without cause that the Lord did not add them after the completed subject, after the words and shall marry another. Therefore those words are indeed to be taken exceptively, but not by an exception by which something contained in the extension of the subject is excluded from participation in the predicate posited in the proposition, which is to commit adultery, but by one by which something contained in the extension of the subject is excluded from participation in another predicate understood in the proposition itself, namely, that it is not lawful to dismiss; so that the sense may be: everyone who dismisses, because dismissal is not lawful for anyone except one having an adulterous wife, in which proposition he who has an adulterous wife is excluded from the predicate, that he cannot dismiss. But that predicate is understood in the whole proposition itself, in which the power of dismissing is denied; and it is a certain elliptical form of speaking, so that those words, except for fornication, constitute an incidental proposition and are to be pronounced as by a certain parenthesis; and this is the sentence: whosoever shall dismiss, which indeed is not lawful except for fornication, and shall marry another, commits adultery. Therefore it would be a certain incidental proposition by which it would be taught when simple dismissal is lawful.

Thus indeed what Bellarmine answers rather obscurely can be proved (de Matrim. L. I, c. 17): "Christ, that is, when he grants dismissal in the case of fornication, does not speak of dismissal as to the bond, but only as to bed and habitation. But the Pharisees asked about dismissal as to the bond; therefore the Lord also answered concerning the same. I concede that the Pharisees asked about dismissal as to the bond, but I deny that the Lord answered about the same when he grants dismissal in the case of fornication. Therefore, says the adversary, the Lord did not satisfy the proposed question. The consequence must be denied. For since in perfect dismissal, which is as to the bond, two things are contained, the dismissal of one and the power of marrying another, the Lord separated these two, and granted one, namely dismissal with restriction because of the cause of fornication, but wholly removed the other. And this is the cause why almost always the Lord placed those two distinctly: whosoever shall put away, and shall marry another, namely, in order to explain the repudiation permitted in the law, and partly to approve it, partly to disapprove it." Cf. n. II of this Thesis. Nor does it matter that the Pharisees had knowledge only of perfect dismissal; for Christ here, as also in the sermon on the mount, chapter V (cf. here n. V), teaches them both, and nothing else can be required from one answering.

This special interpretation of this testimony is required, 1. by the very interpretation which Paul, as we have seen, applies to the precept of the Lord. For the precept of the Lord is that a woman departing from her husband for a just cause either be reconciled to her husband or remain unmarried; and what holds in the woman as to this holds also in the man. Therefore the exception of fornication employed by Christ will indeed have this bearing, that it declares dismissal lawful, but not that it attributes a right to other nuptials; otherwise Paul would have to be said not to have understood well the precept of the Lord.

This interpretation is commended, 2. by the manner of speaking of men, by whom it is not foreign to use this elliptical form. Certainly one can speak thus: A priest using his wife, unless he is a Greek, and ministering at the altar, commits a disgraceful act. He who says this does not wish to say that a Greek priest using his wife and ministering at the altar does not sin; this indeed is false, for neither is the use of marriage permitted even to Greek priests when they serve at the altar; nor do I think that a Greek hearing this proposition would so take it as to apply the exception to the whole subject of the proposition. But the sense is: a priest using his wife, which indeed is not lawful except for a Greek, and furthermore ministering at the altar, commits a disgraceful act; and this is true whether he is Greek or Latin. Likewise, let this other proposition be: every soul, except the brute soul, when sinning merits punishment. That exception cannot be applied to the whole subject of the proposition, as if the speaker wished to say that it could happen that a brute soul sins and, sinning, does not merit punishment; but it must be applied only to the former part of the subject. Whoever attends a little will find propositions of this sort not infrequent; for they return to a certain elliptical manner of speaking. From these things we conclude that it is not altogether contrary to reason that we interpret that exception in this way; and indeed we demonstrate by other arguments that this interpretation is demanded by the words of Christ.

XII. Therefore the certainty of the interpretation handed down of the words of Christ, Matthew XIX, 3 seq., remains whole; by this interpretation it is established that Christ denies to the man the power of dissolving the conjugal bond for any cause whatever. Consequently, the falsity of the first interpretation, from those which we have mentioned, the one which pleased the Protestants, is evident.