thesis — Palmieri, On Christian Marriage

Thesis XIII

¶306.

Simultaneous polygamy is unlawful by divine law and invalid for Christians.

XIII, I.

I. Now concerning simultaneous polygamy. Moreover, this is the doctrine of the Council of Trent, can. 2: If anyone shall say that it is lawful for Christians to have several wives at the same time, and that this is prohibited by no divine law, let him be anathema. And among the diriment impediments of marriage is the impediment of bond. Moreover, that the law is divine, and that it effects no marriage with another woman or another spouse while the prior spouse is living, is proved first from the words of Christ, Matt. XIX. 9: Whoever shall put away his wife, except for fornication, and shall marry another, commits adultery; and he who shall marry her who has been put away commits adultery. These words of Christ Innocent III explains thus, c. Gaudemus, de Divortiis: "If therefore, once a wife has been put away, another cannot be married by right, still more while she herself is retained; through which it clearly appears that plurality in either sex, since they are not judged by unequal standards, is to be reproved with regard to marriage." This principle must be held in the matter of marriage, which Innocent here reports, namely that the man and the wife are equal, not indeed in all things (cf. Thomas, q. LXIV, a. 5; q. LXII, a. 4), but with regard to power over the body of the other and the obligation corresponding to it, according to the words of Paul: the woman does not have power over her own body, but the man; likewise the man does not have power over his own body, but the woman, 1 Cor. VII. 4. And so, that we may return to the text of Matthew, lest we anticipate questions not necessary here, we note that a multiple interpretation of those words except for fornication has been devised: that is, unless it be a fornicatory union, not a true conjugal union; or unless on account of the adultery of the wife, with which posited it is lawful to dissolve the marriage; or unless on account of the adultery of the wife, on account of which at least it is lawful for the man to separate himself from the wife. Which of these is the true interpretation and consonant with the tradition of the Church we shall dispute afterwards. For now let it suffice to note that, with the first interpretation admitted, any bringing in of another woman in addition, even when the former one has been put away, is called adultery; but with the other interpretation admitted, to that extent adultery would not be had, insofar as the prior union had been dissolved, and thus there would be no place for polygamy; but with the third interpretation admitted, we can reason concerning the bond of marriage according to the sentence of Christ just as if those words did not exist, which is also valid in the first interpretation. Therefore Christ teaches that he who, having put away his wife, marries another, not only acts badly, but also acts invalidly; for he commits adultery. But adultery is not marriage; namely, the prior bond remains, which impedes a bond with another; otherwise it would not be adultery. But if he commits adultery who, the former wife having been put away, from whom separation can at times be lawful on account of some causes, marries another, therefore he will commit adultery, and much more, who, retaining the former wife, brings in another besides. But if that conjunction is adultery, then there is no conjugal bond, which is impeded only by the prior bond remaining. And indeed, if polygamy were lawful and valid, he who, having put away one, marries another could not be said to commit adultery; for the right which he previously had of marrying another would still remain; whence there would be no adultery. Wherefore by the law of Christ there is altogether no second marriage.

XIII, II.

II. Paul teaches the same thing, from whom we receive these two things: a) 1 Cor. VII. 4: The woman does not have power over her own body, but the man; and likewise the man does not have power over his own body, but the woman: namely that the power of each over the other is equal, and that each enjoys an equal right, as Innocent III in the chapter cited above admonished and Augustine declared, L. XXII, contra Faustum, c. 31: "For who does not know that a wife ought to serve her husband as lord? But as to the members of the body, by which sex itself is distinguished, the Apostle says: Likewise also the man does not have power over his own body but the woman; so that, although in the other acts pertaining to human peace the woman owes service to the man, in this matter, by which each sex is discerned by the lot of the flesh and is concerned in carnal commingling, the man over the wife and the wife over the man have in themselves a like power." Nazianzen teaches the same thing in the cited Orat. 37.

¶309.

b) Ibid. 10, 11: But to those who are joined in marriage I command, not I, but the Lord: that the wife not depart from the man (μὴ χωρισθῆναι); but if she has departed, that she remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband. And let not the man put away his wife. But Χωρισθῆναι, as is customary, has the active signification of departing; for the discourse is about the passive separation of the woman in the last words. And so divine law commands that the wife not depart from the man, and if she departs, that she remain unmarried and be joined to no one, unless she wishes again to return to the man. The discourse here is about a wife who of her own accord separates herself from the man; for one of this sort is properly she who departs. But she who is cast out by the man is called dismissed in the Scriptures, and besides the discourse concerning a woman dismissed by the man is in what follows.

¶310.

Moreover, this woman who departs from the man is she who has a just cause of departing, for example on account of the fault of the man. This is proved evidently. For if she departed without cause, Paul would not permit her the option either of remaining unmarried or of reconciling herself with the man, but would command her to be reconciled and to return to the man; for it is the law of the Lord, as the same Apostle says, that the wife not depart from the man, and since the man has power over the wife, he cannot without injustice be deprived of his right without cause. Therefore the discourse is about a woman who justly departs from the man. But no option of any other thing is left to her except these two: either let her remain unmarried, or let her be reconciled to the man. Other nuptials are altogether interdicted: let her remain unmarried. But the Apostle testifies that this is of divine law: I command, not I, but the Lord. Wherefore the woman, if she separates herself even justly from the man, must by divine law remain unmarried, that is, not marrying another. But the same must also be said of the man, that he must remain unmarried, that is, not marry another wife, if he separates himself from his wife. This indeed is clear both from what follows: And let not the man put away his wife, which words, immediately joined to the preceding, seem in a more contracted discourse to command the man that same thing which was commanded to the woman; and it is also clear from that principle established earlier, that there is an equal right and equal obligation of one to the other as regards power over the body. Therefore he also, even if he justly dismisses his wife, must by divine law marry no other; much less, therefore, must he do this when no reason for separation exists. And so a man can never marry another wife while the former is living. Moreover, a woman (Rom. VII. 3), while the man lives, shall be called an adulteress if she has been with another man: therefore divine law, prohibiting second nuptials for the woman while the former man exists, so prohibits them as to invalidate them; for an adulterous conjunction is no marriage, and therefore God does not join what man would wish to join. Therefore the man will be an adulterer if he has been with another wife, and this other conjunction, while the former exists, is invalid.

¶311.

Besides, when Paul makes mention of a man and wife, he always speaks of each in the singular: 1 Cor. VII. 2: let each man have his own wife, and let each woman have her own husband; 39: A woman is bound by law so long as her husband lives; but if her husband has fallen asleep, she is freed; Eph. V. 23: The man is the head of the woman, as Christ is the head

¶312.

of the Church; 28: he who loves his own wife loves himself; 33: Let each one love his wife as himself, but let the wife fear her husband.

XIII, III.

III. It is established secondly from Tradition, whose witnesses are Tertullian, in Apolog., n. 15, saying: "A Christian is born a male for his wife alone." Clement of Alexandria, Strom. l. III: "But the same man and Lord (Christ) no longer grants polygamy. For then (in the Old Law) God required that, when the people had to be increased and multiplied. But He introduces monogamy on account of the procreation of children and the care of the house to be borne, for which the woman was given as a helper." Ambrose, de Abraham l. 1, c. 7: "It is not lawful for you, while your wife is living, to marry a wife. For even to seek another, when you have your own, is a crime of adultery." Augustine, de Nupt. et Concup. l. I, c. 10: "This is preserved in Christ and in the Church, that the living one with the living one be separated by no divorce forever. The observance of this sacrament is so great ... in the Church of Christ ... that although women marry or wives are married for the sake of procreating children, it is not lawful to leave a sterile spouse so that another fertile one may be married. But if anyone has done this, not by the law of this world, where, with repudiation intervening, it is conceded without crime to join other marriages with others ... but by the law of the Gospel, he is guilty of adultery, as also she is if she has married another. And the rights of nuptials once entered upon remain between the living to such a degree that those who have been separated from each other are rather spouses between themselves than with those others to whom they have adhered. For with others they would not be adulterers unless they remained spouses with respect to one another." The Second Council of Milevis, can. 17: "It pleased us that, according to evangelical and apostolic discipline, no one dismissed by his wife, nor one dismissed by her husband, be joined to another, but that they so remain, or be reconciled to one another. But if they have contemned this, let them be reduced to penance." Therefore you have from the Fathers that second nuptials while the prior spouse is living are both prohibited by God and are adulteries, and therefore are no matrimonial conjunctions. The Roman Pontiffs teach the same thing: Innocent I, Epist. 4 to Exsuperius: "Those who, while the wife is living, although the conjugal union seems to have been dissociated, have hastened to another coupling, cannot be seen not to be adulterers." Nicholas I, to the responses of the Bulgarians, c. 51: "Neither does the very origin of the human condition admit having two wives at one time, nor does any law of Christians permit it." Cf. also in the Decretals the Title de Sponsa duorum.

XIII, IV.

IV. Nor in all antiquity is any document to be found by which simultaneous polygamy was not only approved, but even permitted.

¶315.

For this question must be distinguished from that one, whether on account of the adultery of the wife it is lawful to dissolve the conjugal union. Nor ought we to be troubled by the edict of the elder Emperor Valentinian, which Socrates reports, Hist. L. IV, c. 31, because it is not credible. For that abhorred the usage and law of Rome. Cf. the treatise of Barnabas Brissonius, de Iure connubiorum, in the Thesaurus Antiquitatum Romanarum of Joannes Georgius Graevius, Tom. VIII. There is reported there the saying of Plutarch (in the Comparison of Demetrius and Antony, n. 3), that "Antony had two wives at the same time, which no one of the Romans before had dared." But the same Brissonius disputes thus: "But whether a concubine (who nevertheless would be a true wife, although in second place) could be joined to a wife by Quiritary law, I know is doubted. Certainly Justinian writes that neither the ancient laws nor his own concede this (therefore Valentinian did not concede it), l. ult. c. Communia, de Manumissionibus. Ulpian also says, l. ult. at the end, ff. de Divortiis, that if a patron who had married a freedwoman had brought a concubine to her, from this the conjecture was to be taken that he did not wish to have her as married; since a concubine could not be had together with a wife. The constitution of Constantine the Great prohibited the very same thing, l. unica c. de Concubinis: 'Let license be granted to no one, while marriage stands, to have a concubine with himself.' Wherefore Gellius shows that she who was joined and accustomed with him in whose hand and mancipium another was by reason of marriage was held shameful by the law of Numa (N. A. l. 4, c. 3), and he reports in the same place that these women who mingled their body with him who had a wife were called concubines." Read the refutation of Socrates in Baronius at the year 370, who notes that Valerian and Gallienus had already prohibited having two wives (l. 18. C. ad legem Iuliam, de Adulteriis), and Diocletian and Maximian (l. 2. C. de Incestis Nuptiis), and then Theodosius the Great had prohibited the same thing to the Jews (l. 7. C. de Iudaeis).

XIII, V.

V. But what of the response of Gregory II to Boniface (epist. Desiderabilem): "For as to what you proposed, that if a woman, seized by infirmity (another reading: corrupted), should not be able to render the debt to the man, what shall her spouse do? It would be good if he so remained, so that he might be free for abstinence. But because this belongs to the great, let him who cannot contain himself rather marry; nevertheless let him not withdraw the works of support from her whom infirmity impedes and not detestable fault excludes." Sebastian Berardi (Gratiani Canones genuini, Tom. II, p. 2, c. 68) judges that Gregory was treating of marriages contracted by Germans before baptism in unbelief, which, as he himself believes, even after baptism do not become ratified, and that he answered, with the law of the Gospel set aside, according to the norm of natural honesty, which of itself did not prohibit that. This latter point indeed we cannot approve, since at the beginning of the epistle Gregory affirms that he will respond to Boniface's questions not from himself but "by His grace who opens the mouth of the mute and makes the tongues of infants eloquent," and that he will hand down "the doctrine of apostolic strength." Besides, we judge (cf. Appendix after Th. XI) that a marriage contracted in unbelief becomes ratified when baptism has been received. Nor did it befit the Apostolic See, questioned according to the prerogative of its magisterium, to respond according to the opinion of men, not according to the sentence of Christ. What then? Since we lack the epistle of Boniface asking the question, it is not permitted to bring forward an evident declaration of the matter. But from elsewhere the certain opinion of Gregory II is established: namely, that simultaneous polygamy is unlawful (in the Instruction given to his Legates in Bavaria); moreover, the Roman Church has always reproved the dissolution of a consummated marriage, as his successors bear witness. Therefore we answer that probably the matter concerned a marriage not yet consummated, which therefore was either null from impotence, as Celestine III seems to interpret this response of Gregory, c. Laudabilem, De Frigidis, or, since it was only ratified, the Roman Pontiff dissolved it by his power, and so permitted the man to enter other nuptials by right, yet advising him to take care of the one left behind, who was being separated without fault.

¶317.

Finally, it is permitted to add that, if it had once been believed that simultaneous polygamy was lawful, no reason would appear why a certain aversion and sure horror would have occupied many persons toward successive polygamy. This fact, namely, supposes that it was believed that one should be joined simultaneously only to one.

XIII, VI.

VI. It is established thirdly from the thing signified. For marriage is a sign of the union of Christ with the Church, so that the man ought to love his wife and adhere to her, just as Christ loved the Church and adhered to her; but Christ transferred His whole love to one Church, so that one should adhere to one; therefore in this way also the Christian man ought to love his wife so that he does not divide marital affection among several wives, but that one be joined to one. Namely, the likeness between Christian marriage and the conjugal union of Christ with the Church consists not only in this, that a man and a woman are united into one and become one flesh or one principle of generation, but also in the manner in which the man adheres to the wife, loving her as Christ loves the Church. But Christ so loved her that He loved her as one. This reason holds for any marriage, because this signification was instituted from the beginning. Cf. those things which we shall say in the following Thesis. But because actual signification is from the institution of God, nothing prevents God at some time, before the completed union of Christ with the Church through the incarnation, from having dispensed from the law of simultaneous monogamy, as we shall see hereafter.

XIII, VII.

VII. From the doctrine of Scripture and the Fathers you have that second simultaneous nuptials are condemned and declared invalid even in the hypothesis of separation or divorce; indeed these are chiefly and directly reproved, whence we have gathered that all are simply proscribed. Therefore those second nuptials which Christians contract after a divorce made by civil law, while the prior spouse is still living, are shameful concubinages.