Thesis XXIV

As regards extrinsic dissolubility or indissolubility, we teach first that consummated, ratified Christian marriage cannot be dissolved even extrinsically.

I. Now concerning extrinsic dissolubility or indissolubility. Extrinsic dissolubility is the dissolubility of marriage from the power of a superior. Moreover, the superior over marriage, or over the spouses, first is God, who instituted marriage and joins the spouses. But God can communicate his power to another bearing his place. Moreover, when it is asked whether marriage is extrinsically dissoluble, account is not taken merely of this power existing in God, or it is not asked whether it can be dissolved by God; for concerning this there is no room for doubt. Rather, account is taken of the exercise of this divine power and of the communication of the same made to someone; or it is asked whether in some case God dissolves marriage and whether he has communicated to some man the power of dissolving the conjugal bond. We propose the question in this way, reducing all things to the power of God exercising itself or communicating itself, because whatever power is asserted for others cannot exist except from the positive concession of God. For since by the law of institution, which is not only natural but also positive, and which has force for any natural marriage whatever, and by the Christian law, which has force for any sacramental marriage whatever, God has sanctioned that marriage be indissoluble, and has declared universally, What God has joined together, let not man separate, and since an inferior can do nothing against the law of a superior, no man could dissolve the bond unless he were supported by divine power. And indeed that there is no human power which can dissolve the bond is clear from those words of Christ, What God has joined together, let not man separate, in which man is opposed to God. Therefore the man who acts by his own authority, not God's, is excluded. Moreover, these words are universal and exclude from the power of making total divorce not only the spouses but any man whatever. And in these words Christ expressed the first institution, for he gathered that sentence from the first institution. Then it is established from the other words of Christ, which certainly have the force of law: Everyone who shall put away his wife and marry another commits adultery; and he who marries her that is put away commits adultery. In these words, indeed, an exception can rightly be understood: unless God the legislator shall have permitted otherwise in certain cases, which exception coheres intrinsically with the very power of making law. But it is not lawful to add other exceptions; otherwise the words of Christ would become false. For the sentence of Christ is: everyone who shall put away, etc., unless I dispense, is an adulterer; but this would be false if, apart from God's dispensation, another wife were validly married after the former wife had been dismissed. Therefore. But for the moment it must be supposed, what we shall demonstrate in its own place, that no power over Christian marriage belongs to the civil authority.

Therefore, with the question proposed in this way, we say, 1. that consummated Christian marriage is not only intrinsically, as has thus far been proved, but also extrinsically indissoluble. Concerning this matter there can be sought both the reason demonstrating that it is so, and the reason why it is so. That the matter is so is easily proved. If consummated Christian marriage could be dissolved extrinsically, the Church surely would know either that God dissolves it in certain cases, or that she has from God the power of dissolving it, or at least she would not deny that she has this power. But the Church is ignorant of both, indeed denies both, simply denying that consummated Christian marriage can ever be dissolved for any cause whatever, or that she has power to dissolve it. Cf. cc. Verum and Ex publico, de Convers. Coniugatorum; therefore.

Theologians dispute what the reason is for this indissolubility in every way (cf. Sanchez, l. II, d. 13; Bellarmine, c. 4). And indeed it is certain that, insofar as it is also extrinsically indissoluble, the ultimate reason is that God so willed. But the reason is sought why God so willed, which is a reason of congruence. Therefore we say that such an adequate reason of this matter cannot be sought from the law of nature; for the law of nature does not prohibit all dissolubility and divorce, as we have seen, and moreover if the law of nature were the reason, the consummated marriage of unbelievers would not at some time be dissolved, which nevertheless happens. Therefore neither is the ultimate reason the mutual handing over of bodies by which the contract is perfected; for this too has place in the marriage of unbelievers. Nor can that reason be sought from the dignity of the sacrament, if only that which is essential to the sacrament is regarded; for ratified marriage too is a sacrament no less than consummated marriage, and yet, as we shall say, it can be dissolved. Nor is Hincmar of Rheims to be heard in this matter; he, in epistle 22 concerning the incestuous nuptials of a certain Stephen, recounting the words of Leo to the Bishop of Narbonne, and also employing the authority of Augustine, denies that nuptials have in themselves the sacrament of Christ and the Church if commingling of the sexes does not follow them. Likewise he denies that that woman pertains to marriage with whom it is taught that there was no commingling of the sexes, just as, he says, there is no doubt that that woman does not pertain to marriage in whom it is taught that there was no nuptial mystery. This indeed he does not prove well by the words adduced from Leo, who says: "since the society of nuptials was so constituted from the beginning that, besides the conjunction of the sexes, it had in itself the sacrament of Christ and the Church." For from these words it is rather evident that the sacrament of Christ and the Church is distinguished by Leo from the conjunction of the sexes. And certainly this sacrament, or that which represents the union of Christ and the Church, is situated in the indissoluble union of one man with one woman, and therefore in a union between free and equal persons, because this union alone was held by Leo to be indissoluble and truly conjugal. But Leo is not solicitous concerning the commingling of the sexes, which has place even outside nuptials. Cf. Thesis XV, n. IX, and what we shall say concerning those words of Leo in the Appendix.

Therefore it remains that the reason for this indissolubility in every way is indeed the dignity of the sacrament, but, so to speak, considered integrally, namely joined with the actual mutual handing over of bodies, and therefore with the signification of the indissoluble union of Christ with the Church through the flesh assumed. That it is the dignity of the sacrament is clear, because for this reason the marriage of unbelievers can be dissolved, because it is not ratified (c. Quanto, de Divortiis); but that this alone does not suffice, we have already proved. Therefore, in order that the other element which we add may be understood, it must be observed: 1. that the consummation of marriage pertains not indeed to its essence, but to its integrity; and this integrity is attended not according to first perfection, which consists in the very being of the thing, but according to second perfection, which consists in operation (1a p., q. LXXIII, a. 1); 2. that by the actual handing over the contract is perfected, and it appears unbecoming by a special reason that he who has been commingled with one should become another's, or that what has been totally given should be demanded back; 3. that sacramental marriage, and that consummated, signifies completely in second act the union of Christ with the Church through the flesh assumed. For man and woman become actually one flesh through the conjugal act; but marriage which is indeed sacramental, yet not consummated, signifies the same union in first act, for man and woman have the power of the conjugal act. It is commonly said that ratified marriage signifies the union of God with the soul through grace, but consummated marriage signifies the union of Christ with the Church through the flesh assumed; and therefore the former is dissoluble, just as the union of God with the soul can be dissolved, but the latter is not, for the contrary reason. But although it is not lawful for us to reprove this declaration, nevertheless it is lawful to interpret it. Namely, we judge that this doctrine, rather than being the reason for the dissolubility or indissolubility of marriage, is an explanation devised after the dissolubility of ratified marriage is already known from elsewhere, so that the matter might be declared by a certain example. For if ratified marriage really signifies only that, why can it not be dissolved for many other causes, and indeed even by the private power of the spouses, just as the union of the soul with God? For the rest, Paul affirms of every Christian marriage that it signifies the union of Christ with the Church. The difference, therefore, will be in the mode of representing, but the thing represented is the same. Moreover, since the indissolubility of marriage depends especially on the thing signified, it was fitting that that marriage be altogether indissoluble even extrinsically which represents in a perfect mode the indissoluble union of Christ with the Church through the flesh assumed. But such is consummated sacramental marriage. Therefore by reason of the thing to be signified, since some marriage ought to be altogether indissoluble, just as the union of Christ with the Church is altogether indissoluble, such is consummated Christian marriage, insofar as it most fitly conduces to signifying that thing (cf. c. Debitum, De Bigamis, and St. Thomas, q. LXI, a. 2, ad 1).