Thesis XXV

Ratified marriage is dissolved extrinsically by religious profession, and also can be dissolved by the authority of the Roman Pontiff.

I. The bond of ratified marriage can be dissolved, and first is dissolved by religious profession, by which, by the law itself, the preceding ratified marriage is severed. For it is not in the power of the spouse, once profession has been made, to dissolve or to preserve the conjugal bond; but it is in his power to place that by which, as by the condition having been placed, by divine law marriage is severed. That it has been believed in the Church for many centuries that ratified marriage is dissolved by religious profession is clear from the consent of theologians (cf. St. Thomas, q. LXI, a. 2), from the disposition of Canon Law, c. Verum, de Convers. coniug., and from the decree of the Council of Trent, de Matrim., can. 6: "If anyone shall say that ratified, non-consummated marriage is not severed by the solemn religious profession of either spouse, let him be anathema." That before the scholastic age also this was believed and brought into practice is evident both from the testimony of Innocent III, who in c. Ex parte, same title, establishes the same thing, wishing "not to depart from the footsteps of his predecessors, who, having been consulted, answered, etc.," from which it is evident that Alexander III was not the only one who taught this; and from the testimony of the same Alexander III in the said c. Verum, "just as certain saints also were called from marriages"; and also from history, which supplies some examples in this matter. We confess indeed that the historical demonstration is difficult; some things are produced, from which perhaps the first has bearing on the matter. Namely, from the seventh century Bede gives testimony of this matter, Hist. Angl., l. IV, c. 19, collated with Thomas of Ely in Wharton, Anglia Sacra, p. 1. For he writes that Aethelthryth, the wife (therefore she was already a spouse, not only betrothed) of King Ecgfrith, could never be induced to use the king's marriage, and at last entered a monastery. But the latter adds that, when the king had tried in vain to recover Aethelthryth, or, as he himself calls her, Etheldreda, he joined Ermenburga to himself in marriage. St. Gregory the Great, Dialogues, l. III, c. 14, relates of the virgin Gregoria: "when, in the time of her adolescence, her nuptials having already been arranged, she had fled into the Church and was seeking the manner of life of a holy woman ... she merited to have a spouse in heaven, who fled a spouse on earth." The same speaks in epistle 23, l. VII, of another woman first betrothed and afterward converted. And Gregory of Tours, On the Lives of the Fathers, last chapter, relates that Leobardus, after breaking the nuptial compact which he had contracted with an honorable girl, became a monk in the greater monastery at Tours. There is brought forward besides also the example of St. Alexius from the fourth century, who, after the nuptials had been celebrated, left his bride, intending to live for God alone; whose history, however, has long been uncertain for many critics (cf. Tillemont, H. E., tom. 10, in the notes to the life of St. Innocent, n. 8). There is also brought forward from the third century St. Cecilia, who, when the nuptials had been made, refused to give Valerian possession of herself, in order that she might preserve virginity for God; and from the first century St. Thecla, concerning whom Epiphanius (haer. 78) says that, when she had fallen in with Paul, she dissolved her contracted nuptials, although she had already been betrothed to a certain principal man of the whole city and one very rich and most noble. Cf. also Ambrose, On Virgins, l. II, c. 3. Here Suarez (de Religione, l. IX, c. 24) and others wrongly cite the decree of Pope Eusebius which is reported by Gratian (caus. XXVII, q. 2, c. 27): "a betrothed girl may not be handed over by her parents to another man; nevertheless it is permitted to her to choose a monastery for herself." For this decree cannot be held as genuine. For although in that age the use of solemnly professing chastity was already in force, nevertheless the custom of monasteries had not yet become so established that it was equivalent to say: to enter a monastery and to profess chastity. Yet the writer of this canon held these two things as equivalent; for which reason this canon, at least as regards its second part, must be referred to those times in which consecrated virgins were customarily enclosed in monasteries. For whether you understand by monastery, with Cassian (coll. XVIII, chap. 10), a cell in which a single person lives, or coenobia with Eugene II, who says in the Roman Synod, year 826, can. 27: "let such men be appointed abbots over coenobia, or, as they are called at this time, monasteries, etc.," it is certain that under the beginning of the fourth century it was not entirely the same thing for virgins to be solemnly consecrated to God and to profess virginity in monasteries. Besides, neither is it necessary to take that canon as concerning a wife, but simply as concerning a betrothed woman.

II. Moreover, from the cited and other not numerous examples, whose memory history has preserved, the doctrine which we defend cannot be immediately gathered with any certainty; since either it is not established whether nuptials had previously been contracted or not, indeed often only betrothals seem to have preceded, or whether nuptials, if they had been contracted, were dissolved or not by reason of baptism received, in favor of the faith; and whether the party left behind entered other nuptials or judged that he could; and besides, certain histories are rejected by critics, nor did all those whom we have produced profess religion. Nevertheless, from these taken together this is immediately gathered: that the ancients judged it lawful for a spouse, after nuptials had been contracted, sometimes perhaps also after they had been entered upon, before they came together, to leave the other for the sake of preserving the more perfect life in the state of virginity. But whether, after the nuptials themselves had been contracted, it was believed by the universal Church to be lawful, and how great this separation was, we know with certainty from the more explicit doctrine of the following centuries when it is compared, and it is established that it was that which we defend, the sense and practice of the Church guarding and propagating the ancient tradition.

III. Now the Tridentine canon is doctrinal; that is, it establishes the truth of doctrine. For it does not treat of an action opposed to law, but of an affirmation opposed to truth; but the truth which is defended by the Tridentine Fathers is not this, namely, that the Church has the power of establishing this, but simply that the thing is so: that by religious profession ratified marriage is severed. Therefore the truth itself is established and defined by this canon, and the Council pronounces anathema against one denying this truth. From this, however, many gather (cf. Sanchez, l. II, d. 19) that this severing of ratified marriage is of divine law, as Benedict XIV argues in Quaest. can. et mor., q. 540: "The indissolubility of ratified marriage ceases in the case in which one of the spouses emits religious profession, and this dissolubility has its origin from divine law ... and it is shown most clearly from can. 6, sess. XXIV, de Matrim., where an anathema is pronounced against those asserting that ratified marriage is not dissolved by religious profession: for if, after this Tridentine canon, it is of faith that a ratified marriage is dissolved by profession, the dissolubility must have been imposed by God alone, who was able to make it eternally true (of which sort is every truth of faith, which must always be believed in the Church)." I confess that I do not sufficiently grasp the force of the argument. Even if the authority of the Church alone had established that ratified marriage is severed by religious profession, it would be true that it is severed, and those who denied it, since they would contradict the ordinance and authority of the Church, would deservedly be punished with anathema. But there is no inconvenience if, with the law changed, the anathema ceases; just as the Church in the Council of Trent, sess. XXIV, de Reformation of Marriage, pronounced anathema against those who denied that marriages entered into with the parents dissenting were valid, without stripping herself of the faculty of thereafter placing this impediment also. Certainly, if such a force of profession were of faith, it could not be changed; but this is in reality what is asked: whether it is of faith, or, what here comes back to the same thing, of divine law, manifested through the Apostles to the Church. For the opinion is manifold. Some judge that it is of the law of nature, others of ecclesiastical law, others of divine law (cf. Sanchez, l. II, d. 20).

We grant that the opinion which asserts that this dissolution is made by the law of nature is less probable, on the ground that both religious profession is the more perfect state, to which by the law of nature it is lawful for anyone to pass, provided no injury is done to the other, and nevertheless that the same profession is repugnant to the bond of marriage, which therefore is dissolved. For 1. if profession is repugnant to the bond of marriage, it rather follows that, with that bond pre-existing, the profession itself, if only the law of nature is considered, is rather invalid; 2. nor by the law of nature alone do you prove that no injury is done to the other; for the spouse left behind is deprived of the right which he has over the body of the one professing, which seems an injury, whether this spouse can, or cannot (which indeed is not so easy for women), procure compensation for himself from elsewhere; 3. it is false that profession is repugnant to the bond of marriage in such a way that they cannot exist together, which is manifest in profession which is made after a consummated marriage, whose bond remains together with it; 4. it is false that there is for anyone from the law of nature a right to enter the more perfect state, when an obligation already undertaken is opposed to it; and indeed, although the Episcopate is a state more perfect than marriage, as being more perfect than the religious state itself, nevertheless it is not lawful to undertake it against the spouse's will, nor is ratified marriage dissolved by it; 5. what is supposed is false, namely, that in marriage merely ratified there is not yet a handing over of the thing, but a bare consent, as in the contract of sale according to Roman laws; for in the contract of marriage power over the body of the other is acquired, and thus each hands over his body to the other so that it may be the other's, and only the use of this right is still lacking (cf. Sanchez, de Matrim., l. II, d. 19; Suarez, l. c., c. 23).

IV. Therefore another cause is required, which can remove the foundation of the right of nature which the spouse enjoys, namely, can take away the mutual obligation, with which standing, by the law of nature every opposed promise is invalid, and thus can act not against the law of nature, but beside and above it on account of the excellence of a higher good. But this cause will be some authority of the divine order. And indeed, since it is established that God alone can dissolve the bond of marriage, it is necessary that the dissolubility of ratified marriage by religious profession be from God. Now either it is from God mediately, insofar as he has granted to someone the power of dissolving, or immediately, insofar as he himself established this privilege and commanded that this should be, that, with religious profession existing, the bond of ratified marriage should be dissolved, and manifested this to the Church through the Apostles. But that this dissolution is from God immediately, and therefore of divine law, which is the third opinion, is recommended by these arguments. 1. The beginning of this custom is not found in ecclesiastical law; therefore it must be referred back to divine law. 2. The Pontiffs, Alexander III, cc. 2 and 7, de Convers. coniugat., and Innocent III, c. 14, same title, acknowledge this custom in the Church, of which, nevertheless, they say neither they themselves nor their predecessors are the authors, but rather they derive it from divine revelation. 3. The dissolution of ratified marriage is a most certain thing; therefore it must be reduced to a certain cause; but it is most uncertain whether this sort of dissolution can be established by a general law of the Church; therefore. Cf. Sanchez, l. c.

V. Yet this opinion is subject to grave difficulties both on the part of the arguments by which it is supported and on the part of the thing itself affirmed. Indeed, as regards the arguments, the second would be the most important; but the divine revelation to which appeal is made is not that which was made to the Apostles for the universal Church, but a particular revelation made to certain saints, which comes back to a certain special illumination. Alexander III says, l. c., c. 2: After lawful consent de praesenti it is permitted for either one, even with the other resisting in this way, to choose a monastery, just as certain saints also, called from nuptials, did. Innocent III, c. 14, denying that marriage, even only ratified, can be dissolved at the decision of a spouse, adds: unless perhaps otherwise should be done by divine revelation, which surpasses every law, just as it is read to have been done by certain saints. From this, nevertheless, it is at least permissible to gather that the Pontiffs did not recognize any divine law prohibiting the dissolution of the bond on account of religious profession in ratified marriage, in the way in which they recognized it in consummated marriage; for otherwise they would not have referred certain acts of saints to a divine revelation made peculiarly to them, that is, to divine inspiration, but to aberrations of mind.

The difficulty on the part of the thing affirmed is this. The whole doctrine which the Church holds in this matter is that the bond of ratified marriage is dissolved by religious profession, but is not dissolved by a simple vow, even though religious. Therefore, if this doctrine is from Apostolic tradition, it was necessary that religious profession, or the solemnity of vows, and its distinction from simple vows even religious ones, be recognized in that age, and it was necessary that these things be handed down by the Apostles when they handed down that ratified marriage is dissolved by religious profession. But who will affirm with any certainty this historical fact, of which no memory exists? especially since Boniface VIII testifies that the solemnity of vows was devised by the Church, c. un. de Voto in 6°. Cf. Suarez, de Religione, l. IX, c. 23, who judges that this law was established by ecclesiastical law, which is the second opinion.

VI. Perhaps these things can be composed if we say that it was received by Apostolic tradition that Christian marriage, so long as it has not been consummated, does not, by the privilege of Christ, impede the assumption of the more perfect state placed in the obligation of observing the counsels. But because this observance can be manifold, first indeed it was introduced by the law or custom of the Church that monastic profession, in whatever way it was made, should sever ratified marriage; then, however, after a distinction had been made (which already appears in the age of Innocent I; cf. his testimony, Thesis XXIX, 11) between vows called solemn in professing religion and non-solemn vows, it was established that religious profession alone should enjoy the privilege of Christ; and although afterward it was discovered that by simple vows also, in an approved order, a man truly becomes religious, nevertheless the privilege was not extended to these vows. For this reason the privilege for religious profession would be partly from the concession of Christ, partly from the determination of the Church. Certainly Alexander III, canon 7, de Convers. coniug., in order to prove that it is lawful for a spouse after marriage only ratified to enter the religious state, and lawful in such a way that the other remains free in the world, appeals to the interpretation of the sacred word, by which it was established that the words of Christ, it is not lawful for a man to put away his wife except for the cause of fornication, are to be understood of those whose marriage has been consummated by carnal copula (cf. what was said, Thesis XVII, n. VI). Therefore there flourished in the Church knowledge of this interpretation, which permits the extrinsic dissolution of ratified marriage in a certain hypothesis, namely the one of which the Pontiff was speaking. But because such an interpretation would have no force unless it had proceeded from Apostolic tradition, it must be said that the privilege of Christ was propagated by Apostolic tradition.

You will say: if the determination of that to which the privilege of Christ is annexed depends on the Church, she could establish that even simple vows of religion should sever ratified marriage. I answer by conceding the consequent, since nothing seems to stand in the way; yet if this were done, already, I think, those vows would be judged solemn. Nevertheless, conversely, the Church could not take away the privilege of Christ from solemn religious profession, because if such a privilege belongs to anyone, it certainly belongs to solemn religious profession, which is the most perfect mode of professing the evangelical counsels ¹.

¹ Note that in the age of Boniface VIII the solemnity of vows was already in force, but that he, in c. un. de Voto in 6°, is not speaking of the dissolution of ratified marriage, but teaches which of the solemn vows (for there were several) sever a subsequent marriage, namely two, that is, in religious profession and in the reception of sacred order.

VII. The fittingness of this dissolution is both negative and positive. Negative, namely, no inconvenience exists in itself; for the marriage is not dissolved without reason, nor is a grave damage properly so called inflicted in itself on the spouse remaining in the world. For the one remaining in the world can marry another, and since the marriage is not consummated, the bride remains a virgin and can be taken by another without any disgrace. But if this or that party left behind undergoes some damage, that is compensated abundantly by the common good which comes to the Church from religious profession, which redounds to the honor of the Church and to the commendation of chastity, and to a common example, the more efficacious because the very right of nuptials is renounced. Nor, when God the author intervenes, can the loss of a right handed over to oneself and accepted be judged an injury, since the other spouse uses his own right which God concedes to him. The positive fittingness is that the religious state is more excellent than the state of marriage; but it was most fitting that in the Church of Christ the excellence of that state over this one not only be taught, but also be rendered, as it were, sensible by the fact, which indeed happens when the religious state has the efficacy of severing the conjugal bond. But consummated marriage could not be severed, because a stronger reason stands opposed on the other side; therefore it was fitting that ratified marriage be severed.

VIII. You will ask, why then is ratified marriage not dissolved by the reception of sacred order, in which a man enslaves himself to God? We answer, 1. the principal reason is the will of God, which sanctioned this for profession, not for sacred order. For we do not demonstrate the dissolution of ratified marriage by religious profession from the natures of things, but from these we gather only the fittingness; but we demonstrate it by Tradition, which makes known the will of God. Wherefore, even if no altogether certain reason of this fittingness could be brought forward, there would be nothing for us to fear. We answer, 2. that there certainly is some difference between religious profession and sacred order, if both are compared with marriage. For that opposition exists between profession and marriage which does not exist between sacred order and marriage. For religious profession is also formally the profession of perpetual continence, and through it a man becomes incapable of dominion over exterior goods, which nevertheless are necessary to matrimonial life, and he passes into the right of another, governing him and disposing of him in the name of God; which subjection is certainly able to impede the act of seeking and rendering the debt; and to all these things he is perpetually obliged at every instant of his life. Therefore the manner of living which is required from the essence of this state is directly opposed to the manner of living proper to marriage. Consequently from this opposition there could have been one of these outcomes: either that profession after ratified marriage should be rendered invalid, or that the marriage itself should be dissolved, or that, while the bond remained, the work of marriage should be prohibited. But Christ preferred the second, in favor of the state of perfection and for the advantage of the party left behind. But the repugnance of sacred order with marriage is not so great; for the manner of matrimonial life is not excluded by the essence of priesthood, but only by a certain degree of sanctity and decor owed to it and by the perfect execution of certain of its offices. Wherefore it was enough to establish that order should sever a subsequent marriage and prohibit the use of a preceding one. But the vow truly annexed to sacred order by the law of the Church is not of such a kind that it severs a preceding marriage, but follows the character of the principal thing.

IX. Ratified marriage can be severed by the authority of the Roman Pontiff. Concerning this matter there was once doubt. Ruard Tapper, On Marriage, art. 18, reprehends Cajetan because "against the common opinion of theologians and of St. Thomas he wrote that the Supreme Pontiff can dispense concerning a ratified marriage not yet consummated." But 1. that disagreement of theologians from the opinion of Cajetan, if you consider the older ones, is rather negative, inasmuch namely as they do not teach it, but, when speaking of the dissolubility of ratified marriage, they consider it only as it can depend on the act of one of the spouses, and therefore mention only religious profession dissolving it. But 2. on the contrary there is present the consent of the canonists, who in this matter certainly deserve to be heard; this consent was already common in the age of St. Antoninus (cf. the place cited below), and it certainly brought about this, that the doctrine of the theologians could not be called common in the Church. Now, however, 3. there is also the consent of theologians: "No question," says Benedict XIV (Quaest. Canon., q. 479), "can any longer be raised concerning the power of the Supreme Pontiff in that which pertains to dispensing concerning ratified and non-consummated marriage; since today the affirmative opinion is common among theologians and canonists and received in practice, as is notorious."

Accordingly it is certain that for many centuries several Roman Pontiffs have dispensed concerning ratified marriage. This is established of Martin V and Eugene IV from the testimony of St. Antoninus in Summ. Theol., p. III, tit. 1. It is established of Paul III and Pius IV by the testimony of Navarrus in Enchirid., c. 22, and then of others down to Pius IX (cf. Perrone, de Matrim., tom. III, p. 509, in note 115). Now 1. when so many Pontiffs did this, they certainly judged that they could do it, whether knowing this certainly from direct principles, or from the reflex principle, inasmuch as it was lawful for them to follow a probable opinion teaching this. But whichever you say, this certainly follows: therefore, from the judgment of so many Roman Pontiffs, it is at least probable that there exists no certain testimony from Scripture and Tradition which is opposed to this power. Moreover, 2. so continued an exercise of this power, in a matter of such moment, of which sort is a sacrament, by the Vicar of Christ, to whom the Holy Spirit assists in governing the Church, an exercise truly not disapproved by the Church, which certainly ought to have happened if you suppose that this does not agree with revealed doctrine and that therefore the Roman Pontiffs did not wish to settle the question concerning the moral rectitude of the matter, and for this reason an exercise finally equivalently approved by the universal Church, is a sufficient argument of the same power; for in the same way certain other rights of the primacy are customarily demonstrated. Indeed, if this power were lacking, by this sort of dissolution of ratified marriage the Church would be the cause that action was taken against what is morally right in itself, since those dissolved in this way contract other nuptials, which in reality would be nothing but concubinage. But although God can permit this or that Pontiff, acting according to his private opinion, to admit something less morally right in his governance, nevertheless he cannot permit the universal Church, or the Pontiff acting according to the sense of the Church, to be the promoter of these disgraces; therefore.

You will say: Alexander III, c. Licet, de Sponsa duorum, when he taught that betrothals de praesenti are not dissolved by a subsequent consummated marriage, which on the contrary is invalid, affirms that some of his predecessors judged otherwise; therefore Roman Pontiffs can err in particular judgments of this sort. I answer, 1. here there is no question of some Pontiffs, but of several granting this in a continued series of many centuries, with the Church not judging otherwise, so that it can truly be said that this is the judgment of the Church, not only of this or that Pontiff acting according to his own private opinion. But 2. what prevents us from judging in this way that those predecessors of Alexander III acted as they did because they judged that the authority of dispensing concerning ratified marriage was inherent in themselves, so that by their power they could validly decree that the second marriage was valid? Nor is there need to affirm that they followed the opinion of certain persons who judged that in reality the preceding ratified marriage is dissolved by a subsequent consummated marriage. In this way examples would be had of this power exercised by the Roman See before Martin V. Alexander III says that a fact of this sort by his predecessors does not stand in the way of his response, in which indeed he treats only of the intrinsic dissolubility of marriage, which he denies. You will say: if the matter stood thus, those predecessors in reality did not judge otherwise than Alexander III, as he himself says, since they were treating of an entirely different matter, and there was no opposition between them. Observe, 1. that this is said incidentally by the Pontiff, and the understanding of his words could be determined by the letter of the Bishop of Salerno, to whom he writes back; wherefore there was no need for him to declare more broadly in what respect he himself dissented from his predecessors. Observe, 2. that the words of the Pontiff are not to be referred to the doctrine which he hands down, but to the practical conclusion, namely, that the man must be compelled to return to the prior spouse, although certain predecessors had sometimes judged otherwise, decreeing, namely, that he could remain with the second; but why? the Pontiff does not say this, but it is permitted to judge that it was because they dissolved the first ratified marriage.

To this also probably pertains what we already intimated in Thesis XV, n. IV, the response of Gregory II to Boniface, which is reported also by Gratian, Cause 32, q. 6, c. Quod proposuisti; and which we reported in the cited place.

That this power is inherent in the Roman Pontiff is also proved from the fact that the Roman Pontiff can dispense in a vow, even a solemn vow of Religion; moreover the bond of this is stronger, since it dissolves ratified marriage; therefore he can also dissolve the bond of ratified marriage. Besides, the power of loosing and binding granted to the Roman Pontiff is most ample, and he can exercise all those acts which are necessary or useful for the right governance of the Church; but the universal Church itself teaches us that this power is useful to the Church, by approving the exercise of the same. Therefore. Wherefore the Roman Pontiff dissolves ratified marriage by the vicarious power of God, which is the very power of the primacy, which is the ordinary power of the Pontiff himself.

But is not the bond of marriage and the obligation of each to the other a thing of divine law, and in such things the Pope cannot dispense? I answer, with the question set aside whether the Pope can sometimes dispense in divine law (concerning which matter in the last thesis), that here there is not properly a dispensation: for the Pontiff does not, while the law perseveres, relax its obligation for this or that person, in the way that he would do, for example, if while the marriage remained he dispensed the spouses from the mutual obligation; but he dissolves the bond itself of marriage. This dissolution indeed is not an act of legislative power, as dispensation is, but is another act of the fullness of the power of loosing, efficacious of itself or ex opere operato. Cf. what we shall say in the last Thesis.

X. You will ask, why then through so many centuries did the Pontiffs never use this power? I answer, 1. that this is not certain, since there are no positive testimonies which teach this, and if the predecessors of Alexander III and Gregory II used it, examples of this thing exist in history even before Martin V and before the year one thousand. 2. Non-use of a power is not of itself an indication of the lack of the power; but non-use for some time, when at another time there exists positive use, proves absolutely nothing. Moreover there could also have been several reasons why the Pontiffs did not use this right, just as formerly they did not use the power of dispensing in diriment impediments: either because dissolution was not being sought, or because the Pontiffs did not then judge it expedient that they should use that power, or also, if you wish, because the knowledge of this power, or of the extension of the power of loosing even to this effect, had not yet been sufficiently explained in the Church, although implicitly believed in the faith of the primacy.

But the Pontiffs who deny that ratified marriage is dissolved except by profession speak of intrinsic dissolution, or of that which is in some way in the power of man; for here he can freely place that condition by which God dissolves the bond.

XI. You will say: therefore ratified marriage ought to be called soluble. I answer in the negative; rather, of itself it is and ought to be called insoluble. For that contract, as we said at the beginning, is insoluble of itself which cannot be dissolved intrinsically; but if it can be dissolved extrinsically, it will be soluble accidentally. Thus a vow by its nature is a perpetual bond, although it can be dissolved by the authority of a superior.

You will ask how this coheres with the words of Christ: what God has joined, let not man separate. I answer that it coheres excellently according to the things which we said at the beginning of this thesis. For when the Pontiff dissolves, not man, but God separates; for the Pontiff acts by the vicarious power of God.

XII. Besides these, however, ratified marriage cannot be dissolved. For intrinsically it cannot be dissolved; extrinsically it is dissolved either by the authority of the Vicar of God or by divine law, some condition being placed on the part of man. But this law is not present except for religious profession; for Tradition and Canon Law make mention only of this, and expressly exclude that which would seem able to have this effect, namely, the reception of sacred order, "since neither by divine law (as regards order itself) nor by the sacred canons (as regards the vow annexed) is it found established," says John XXII, Extrav. Antiquae, De Voto. But whether the Roman Pontiff can by universal law decree that, when a certain condition is placed, ratified marriage is severed, for example by the reception of sacred order, or by a subsequent consummated marriage, theologians dispute, but it is difficult to demonstrate the negative side. Cf. Sanchez, l. II, d. 13. Concerning the power of the Pontiff over consummated marriages contracted before baptism we shall speak in the following thesis.

XIII. From the doctrine handed down here concerning the solubility of ratified marriage, perhaps you will gather an argument against the intrinsic indissolubility established in the preceding theses, in this way. Whether it is dissolved extrinsically or intrinsically, it is true that marriage, even then when it is a sacrament, is dissolved; therefore it is false that reason rather favors indissolubility, unless we wish to say that the law of Christ is less conformable to reason. Moreover, the inconveniences which reason brought forward for persuading intrinsic indissolubility, do they not have equal force for extrinsic indissolubility? Therefore either both dissolubilities or neither must be conceded. I answer. There is a great difference between each dissolubility. For by intrinsic dissolubility conjugal society is reduced almost to the condition of a contract and is subjected to the mutable will of men and to depraved desires; but by extrinsic dissolubility the marriage is subordinated to God alone, by whose law or delegated authority the conjugal union is dissolved, retaining the proper character of a natural institution. But just as it is false that it is the same thing for a vow pronounced to God to be dissolved by the private authority of the one vowing or by the authority of God himself or of the Roman Pontiff acting in the name of God, so it is false that it is the same thing to assert some extrinsic or intrinsic dissolubility for marriage. Moreover, reason rightly consulted does not dissuade full dissolubility except intrinsic dissolubility. Besides, what must often be repeated, the cause of full intrinsic indissolubility is the positive institution of God.

Nor do the inconveniences which we brought forward in the preceding Thesis against divorce have force for this extrinsic dissolubility which we defend. For 1. those which suppose divorce to occur after consummated marriage have no place here. 2. If there are any inconveniences, they lose their force because of the more excellent good, when there is question of religious profession. 3. Since the dissolution of ratified marriage which is made by the Roman Pontiff is made by an independent authority, from certain causes, with at least one spouse petitioning, on account of a good which in reality redounds to both, the reins are not loosened for desires, nor is chaste love diminished, but only in certain cases, where the union was made less prudently, a remedy is supplied to the spouses; by which indeed any inconveniences that might have to be feared are sufficiently compensated.