Appendix: On the Obligation of Paying Taxes

By the name of tax is understood a payment which subjects pay from their own goods to the Government for the common expenses of the Republic. Some taxes are direct, which affect actual and determinate goods of private persons; others indirect, which immediately regard certain goods and only mediately the persons who transport, sell, buy them, etc.

I say, 1st. Imposition of tax is an act of supreme and legitimate authority, and therefore to this authority alone it pertains to decree whether and how much is to be paid by each one. The reason is that to that authority it pertains to lead society to the common good, to which taxes stand as means to an end. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 615.

I say, 2nd. Besides legitimate authority, three other conditions are required so that the imposition of taxes may become licit, namely: 1st, justice of the cause, which is the necessity of the common good; 2nd, proportion of the tax with the occurring necessity, namely that the people not be burdened more than their good demands; 3rd, equality in persons, namely that those who have greater riches pay more. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 615.

Question 1. Whether laws which regard the payment of taxes, viewed generally, oblige in conscience, or are to be judged penal?

Resp. According to the opinion which St. Alphonsus calls most common and more probable, these laws oblige in conscience. It is clear, 1st, from Sacred Scripture; for Christ, Matt. xxii, 21, says: "Render the things that are Caesar's to Caesar," and the Apostle, Rom. xiii, 5: "Be subject not only because of wrath, but also because of conscience; for therefore also you pay taxes. . . . Render therefore to all their dues: tax to whom tax, tribute to whom tribute." It is clear, 2nd, from reason; for the supreme authority is held in conscience to procure the good of society and justly to distribute its burdens; therefore in like manner subjects are held in conscience to supply the means by which that good can and ought to be procured, and to undergo the distribution of burdens. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 615 and 616.

Nevertheless there are not lacking theologians who, perhaps not improbably, especially today, hold that these laws are only penal; and they say this is gathered both from the sense and manner of acting of peoples, and also from the way in which the supreme authority enacts and applies those laws. - Cf. Kenrick, tract. 6, n. 20. - Acta S. Sedis, vol. 7, pp. 219 and 220.

Question 2. Whether restitution must absolutely be exacted from those who, not observing tax laws, have defrauded the Government?

Resp. Negatively, probably, both because perhaps it could be doubted whether those laws oblige in conscience, and because even if they did so oblige, whoever did not observe them would indeed injure legal justice, but not commutative justice. Nor is weight of authority lacking to this opinion. For:

Bonacina, disp. 2, de Restitut. quest. 9, punct. 1, prop. 2, as regards indirect taxes, says: "Let it suffice for us to say that what we have asserted can probably be defended, lest we impose an excessively grave burden upon penitents after the fact, although before the fact this more benign opinion is not to be counseled, since the edicts of the Prince are not easily to be reprehended."

Vogler, n. 332: "Even though the faithful are especially to be exhorted to pay taxes diligently, nevertheless if at times they defraud somewhat, they do not seem to be obliged to restitution, because most common practice holds this, Princes connive, and in so great a multitude of taxes all the wisest persons doubt whether all are just."

Lugo, disp. 36, n. 43: "The counsel of Fr. Molina has always greatly pleased me . . . that before the fact it must be counseled that taxes not be defrauded; after the fact, if the penitent certainly or probably persuades himself that in so great a multitude of taxes there is something unjust . . . he is not to be compelled by the confessor to restitution; nevertheless, this doctrine must be used prudently . . . lest they render the sacrament of Penance too grave and lest they block the way of salvation for many, who, if they are obliged by the confessor, will not restore and will incur eternal damnation."

Scavini, de Restit. cap. 1, art. 1, after setting forth both opinions, says concerning the more benign one that it "does not lack its authority and probability. . . . Whatever may be the case concerning the probability both of the first and also of the second opinion, which we leave to be defined by wiser men, we admonish one thing for practice with the most learned Cardinal de Lugo: Generally speaking, the people are to be admonished and stirred up to paying taxes, but after the fact they are not to be compelled to restitution of the tax defrauded, if they probably persuade themselves that in so great a multitude of imposts they have paid something unjustly or have contributed sufficiently to public necessities."

Rousselot, in the notes to the Moral Theology of Saettler, de Leg. part. 2, cap. 2, art. 3, as regards taxes imposed upon goods, the trade of which is permitted to all under the condition of paying the tax, has these things: "There is not given an obligation of paying certain taxes before they are demanded, for example, taxes at the gate of a city, at a bridge, etc. For thus custom provides, and laws do not oblige beyond custom. Moreover, with the author, Saettler, and very many other foreign authors, it can more probably be asserted that those taxes for the exacting of which guards and collectors have been appointed are neither to be paid in conscience, nor are those defrauding them held to restitution."

"These things having been duly weighed, it must not immediately nor easily be pronounced that the defrauding of indirect taxes is sinful and obliges to restitution. Nevertheless, let these things not be preached upon the roofs; but with St. Alphonsus and Saettler, let pastors and confessors urge observance of the laws also in this matter, let them deter from transgressions with all their strength; but let them not immediately condemn transgressors of grave sin nor force them to restore, especially if greater evils, for example, desertion of the sacraments, are to be feared. From another side, good faith often intervenes, to which they are deservedly left."

Cf. also Revue des sciences ecclés. vol. 17, p. 86. - Ballerini, note (a), p. 615.

You will gather from what has been said, 1st, that the confessor, speaking absolutely and under penalty of denying absolution, cannot indiscriminately urge the obligation of paying these taxes in the future, although he ought diligently to exhort the faithful to pay them diligently and to abstain from every defrauding of them.

You will gather, 2nd, that the following are certainly to be condemned: 1st, those who corrupt by unjust means those placed over the exacting of imposts, lest they perform their office; for they sin at least by cooperating in the sin of these men; 2nd, those who do not pay taxes already imposed for a long time, which have been paid by all and no complaint concerning their injustice has ever been heard; 3rd, those who violently resist the ministers exacting imposts; for these certainly sin at least against legal justice; 4th, those who by right and wrong means exercise defrauding as if it were a certain trade, and with the intention of resisting, even armed, wander by day and by night; for men of this sort become rebellious citizens and most harmful to society; 5th, those who, although they never resist nor have the intention of resisting, nevertheless with every zeal and work devote themselves to the art of defrauding, and have it as if the profession of their life; for these at least are not rarely exposed to dangers of soul; 6th, authors probably excuse from violated commutative justice citizens who do not assign the full value of houses, etc.; or, when an estate has been bought, put down a lesser price, namely lest they be compelled to pay the whole tax. For in reality in certain places these taxes are excessive; many enough other men do the same; and officials plainly know that these methods are employed. Therefore practically the proportion among citizens is preserved; nor are notaries, who by office have not been appointed to procure these taxes for the state, immediately to be condemned because they do not turn men away from these arts. And therefore where there exists a custom of lowering the price, it does not seem to be unjust to assert that the declaration was duly made, provided namely that the price not be excessively diminished beyond the custom of others. Cf. Bulot, n. 673, 2. - Lehmkuhl, n. 1173, ed. 11th.

Question 3. Whether officials sin against justice whenever they do not exact the tax?

Resp. Affirmatively, in itself generally, and indeed gravely in grave matter. The reason is clear, since they have obliged themselves to watch duly and to exact taxes diligently. Wherefore, if they are lacking in their office, they are held to restitution toward the Republic. - I said generally because according to several, those placed over the exacting of imposts are not always to be condemned when sometimes they act more benignly in a light matter, especially with the poor or even with those who otherwise pay diligently.