Chapter — Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology
Chapter I. On the Nature and Properties of Law
Law is defined by St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 90, art. 4: "A certain ordinance of reason for the common good, and promulgated by him who has care of the community." - It is said, 1st, an ordinance, because law is imposed by way of a rule and measure by which human acts are subjected to order; 2nd, of reason, because that ordinance ought not to be violent but to proceed from right reason; 3rd, for the common good, because the end of law, at least immediate and direct, is to provide for the community; 4th, by him who has care of the community, because to make laws is an act of jurisdiction; 5th, promulgated, because a rule cannot order except through application, and the application of this rule is made through promulgation. Hence it follows:
1st. There is present a manifold distinction between law and precept. For they differ, 1st, by reason of the one commanding, because a legislator is always a public person, but one giving a precept can be a private person; 2nd, by reason of the subject, because law is made for a community, but a precept even for a private person; 3rd, by reason of the end, because although ultimately the good of individuals redounds to the community, and conversely, nevertheless directly and immediately law regards the common good, a precept the private good; 4th, by reason of place, because law affects the territory, but a precept affects persons, and, as they say, clings to the bones; 5th, by reason of duration, because a precept ceases with the death of the one giving the precept, but law remains in force even after the legislator has died.
2nd. It follows that the properties or conditions of human law consist in this, that it be, 1st, possible, that is, accommodated to the morals and circumstances of persons, etc.; 2nd, honorable, that is, establishing nothing repugnant to right reason or to positive divine law; 3rd, useful, namely apt for procuring the common good; 4th, just, that is, according to the norm of distributive justice; 5th, promulgated, that is, applied to the community for directing actions.
3rd. Laws are instituted when they are promulgated. Thus the Code, can. 8, § 1. Cf. C. 3 D 14; c. 1. X, I. 5.
Law is distinguished in many ways; for it is:
1st. Divine or human, according as it has God or man as its immediate author.
2nd. Natural or positive, according as it is intimated by rational nature itself, or by a positive act of the legislator.
3rd. Ecclesiastical or civil, according as it is made by ecclesiastical or civil power.
4th. Moral or penal or mixed, according as it obliges under guilt alone, or under penalty alone, or under both at the same time.
5th. Affirmative or negative, according as it commands the placing of an act, or prohibits it. Hence it is also called preceptive or prohibitive.
6th. Simply prohibiting or invalidating or permitting, according as it renders an act illicit only, or invalid, or prohibits the agent from being disturbed.
Those laws alone must be held invalidating or inhabilitating by which either an act is expressly or equivalently established to be null, or a person to be incapable (Can. 11).
7th. Favorable or odious, according as it grants a benefit or favor, or brings in a burden or grievance.
8th. Written or preserved by use, according as it is made by written mandate, or introduced and preserved by custom alone.
9th. A personal or territorial law, according as it directly regards the person and then the territory, or directly the territory and then the person.
§ 2. A law is not presumed personal, but territorial, unless something else is clear (Can. 8).
It can, however, be both territorial and personal; a clear example of this was the chapter Tametsi of the Council of Trent.