Chapter III. On the Obligations of Accused Persons

Those are called accused persons who are accused in judgment, whether criminal or civil, whether they are guilty or innocent. Various doubts occur concerning them, especially concerning confession of a crime and flight. Hence:

Question 1. Are accused persons questioned by a judge bound to confess the truth?

Resp. Negatively, if they are not legitimately questioned; namely when the judge is not legitimate, or when he does not observe the judicial form, as if he were to question without prior accusation, etc.; they also add, when there is not at least half-full proof of the crime. Whence it follows that accused persons among us ordinarily are not bound to manifest their crime, because the interrogations are made before juridical proof. Besides, according to the Constitution itself by which we are governed, no one can be compelled to give testimony against himself in a criminal case. Yet note that this is not the same as lying, for those words, "I am not guilty," signify by the consent of all that the accused does not wish to confess the crime. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 272 et seq. - Kenrick, tract. 8, n. 133. - Constit. of U. S. Amend., Art. V.

Question 2. Is it licit for an innocent accused person to flee or resist?

Resp. It is certainly licit for him to flee and to snatch himself from the hands of the officers; but it is not licit to repel force by force, by killing or wounding, because he would violate the rights of public power. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 279.

Question 3. Is it licit even for an accused person who has truly committed a crime to flee?

Resp. Affirmatively, if he has not yet been condemned to punishment by juridical sentence, because no one before sentence is bound to pay the penalty. Likewise if he has already been condemned to a most grave penalty and prison has been assigned to him for custody until the established penalty is inflicted. But the Doctors more commonly deny, if prison has already been assigned for punishment by the sentence of the judge; because the accused is bound to obey in the execution of a just sentence. Nevertheless several except the case in which necessary things are not given to him, or if the prison is most harsh; because the obligation of not freeing oneself from a most grave penalty seems to exceed human powers when someone can accomplish this without force and resistance. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 280 et seq.

After setting forth this common doctrine, thus, so far as pertains to us, Kenrick continues: "I judge that all penalties are established by law and decreed by the judge in such a way that they are to be inflicted by the ministers of justice; and therefore I do not dare to condemn him who, without injury to another's right, withdraws himself, provided nevertheless that he does not employ force and does not disturb the public order." - Cf. Kenrick, n. 138.