Article V. When Restitution is to be Made

Concerning the circumstance of time, these few things are to be noted:

I. As regards any debts whatever, generally restitution must be made as soon as it can be done without grave inconvenience. For natural right demands that you not retain another's thing when the owner is reasonably unwilling. Hence: 1st, he who culpably defers restitution remains always in sin and cannot be absolved. Besides, if damages come to the owner from the delay of restitution, he is held to compensate them. 2nd. If someone, having the purpose of restoring, defers for some time without grave inconvenience to the owner, he is not easily to be condemned for mortal sin, indeed not even for venial sin if there is some cause of deferring, for example, hope of a more convenient occasion, etc. 3rd. He who would wish to restore by parts, when he can easily restore the whole, would not be absolved, because the owner even in this is reasonably unwilling. The same must be said of him who, when through the course of life he can restore, nevertheless defers until death; or who, placed in danger of death, would cast the obligation of restoring upon his heirs without sufficient reason, unless perhaps it is a question of restitution of uncertain goods. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., nn. 104 and 105.

II. As regards debts from injury, all damages, at least ordinary, which have followed from delay, must be compensated, even when the delay was inculpable. - I said ordinary, because extraordinary things cannot be foreseen. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., ibid. - Vogler, n. 426.

Nevertheless it must be noted that there are those who hold as probable the opinion denying that a burden exists of compensating damages following from inculpable delay. They namely hold that a just delay purges the delay, and hence that the delaying debtor is not the unjust cause of these damages, nor can the creditor be judged reasonably unwilling. - Ballerini-Palmieri, vol. 3, n. 359.

III. As regards debts from contract, generally one must stand by the conditions placed upon the contract concerning time or concerning other circumstances, unless another will of the other contracting party is prudently presumed. Hence: 1st, restitution, or rather payment, must be made at the time concerning which it was expressly or tacitly agreed. 2nd. The debtor can anticipate, if the term assigned for payment is in his favor, as it is ordinarily accustomed to happen; but otherwise if the same term turns to the utility of the creditor, as, for example, in the furnishing of money with profit to be received.