Chapter IV. On Probable and Improbable Conscience

Probable conscience, or, as others prefer, a probable opinion, properly and through itself, is that act of the intellect by which we adhere to some proposition, yet not without fear concerning the opposite. Therefore it differs from doubtful conscience, not indeed on the part of the motives, which exist in each case and can be of the same weight, but from the diverse mode by which the intellect holds itself toward them: for if it adheres to them, it is called probable; otherwise it will remain doubtful. I said properly and through itself, because often by the name of probable opinion or even probable sentence, among many authors, there comes the very complex of motives or reasons by which the intellect could prudently be supported, if it wished to adhere to one part rather than another. But this complex of motives is indeed better accustomed to be designated by the name of probability, and concerning this alone we shall have to speak here. Cf. Lacroix, n. 387.