Article — Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Article I. On the Liceity of the Conjugal Act

933.
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I say. The conjugal act, had between legitimate spouses, is of itself honorable and licit. The reason is that an act of this kind is the means established and ordained by the very Founder of nature for the legitimate propagation of the human race. - I said of itself, because it can become illicit by reason of the end and of circumstances. And first it would become gravely illicit by reason of the end, if either a gravely depraved end were positively intended, or all ends rendering this act honorable were positively excluded, which are 1°. generation of offspring; 2°. satisfaction of the obligation toward the other spouse; 3°. avoidance of incontinence both in oneself and in the co-party; 4°. the desire of fostering or conciliating honorable love, of manifesting or promoting conjugal affection, etc. - By reason also of circumstances, especially of position and time, the conjugal act otherwise licit could be gravely vitiated. On account of position indeed, if it were unnatural in such a way that the spouses could not come together and the semen were poured out outside the vessel; but on account of time, if the conjugal act were placed at that time when proximate danger of abortion or of death of the co-party was present. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, nn. 881 and seq.

934.
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You Will Resolve. 1°. The use of marriage is illicit if it is done on account of pleasure alone, that is, by not intending the other ends even virtually or implicitly. This is clear from prop. 9 condemned by Innocent XI, which sounds thus: "The work of marriage, exercised on account of pleasure alone, is wholly free from all fault and venial defect." Nevertheless of itself, if it were done, it would be only a venial sin, just as it is venial to take food on account of delight alone. But the use of marriage is immune from this fault if it is made as a remedy of concupiscence, or on account of another honorable end, whether expressly or implicitly, even if otherwise delight or pleasure is intended. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 912. - Baller. note (b), p. 881.

2°. The use of marriage is licit for sterile persons, both because no law in the opposite can be shown, and because sterile persons of themselves are suitable for completing the conjugal act; but if no generation follows, that happens wholly by accident; and other honorable ends besides generation are present, rendering conjugal intercourse honorable. Besides, scarcely is there given a case of sterility certainly known.

3°. To old men, whose semen is no longer prolific, the use of marriage is licit, provided they can sufficiently complete intercourse, or have a non-empty hope of completing it. For the same reasons favor old men which we adduced concerning sterile persons. It is confirmed besides from the practice of the Church, which blesses the Marriages of old men. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 954.

4°. The wholly licit position is that which nature itself teaches, namely that the woman be lying beneath, and the man lying above. But any other position diverse from the aforesaid, provided the conjugal act can be sufficiently completed, does not exceed venial sin, and with a just cause acceding, lacks all fault. Wherefore spouses by no means sin who invert the position on account of danger of abortion during the time of pregnancy, on account of the corpulence or curvature of the man, on account of excessive weariness of the woman, or also on account of frigidity, when they are more aroused by an unnatural position, etc. Indeed the position which alone is possible, whatever finally it may be, is in no way condemned, although a not small loss of semen follows; because that part of the semen is not necessary for generation, and by accident, against the will of the spouses, is lost. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 917.

5°. According to not a few theologians, the conjugal act is never forbidden, not even lightly, by reason of time; the reason is that no law can be assigned by which it is ever prohibited even under light fault. Nevertheless to S. Alphonsus the opinion is more pleasing which does not excuse from venial fault if intercourse is made during the time of pregnancy, unless there is danger of incontinence or another honorable cause, which otherwise can often be present. Besides, the more common opinion teaches that coition had during the time of menstruation is not excused from venial fault on account of the indecency which it seems to bear before itself, unless there is some cause rendering it honorable, namely for avoiding quarrels or preventing incontinence, etc. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, nn. 924 and seq.

6°. According to the more common opinion it is not illicit on Sundays and Feasts, even more solemn ones; both because no law is opposed, and also because marital intercourse does not remove spouses from observing the Feasts of the Church. Most of the Holy Fathers who are objected in the opposite seem to speak of counsel rather than of precept. Hence you will also deduce that there is no reason why use of this kind should be prohibited during the time of Advent or Lent. Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 923.

7°. The S. Office on 24 March 1897 declared artificial fecundation of a woman to be illicit.1

8°. A Marriage once validly entered is not invalidated by the fact that the man, even before it is consummated, has become impotent; hence there enters also the condition or circumstance which, had it existed before, he could not have entered. But after marriage has been entered, to such a man, says D'Annibale, vol. 3, n. 470, note 13, rights are established on both sides. C. 25, Can. 32, 7. And therefore for those who after contracted marriage have been made eunuchs, to coit is not illicit. - Tolet. L. 7, 1, 6, 4. Sanch. 7, 192, 6.

9°. It is licit for a woman who cannot retain semen to use marriage, because now perfect intercourse within the vessel is had; but if the semen is not retained, this is by accident, nor does it in any way impede the use of marriage; indeed also in that case the woman cannot be obliged to apply extraordinary means or means harmful to her bodily health.

1 Cf. Addenda, p. 1116, n. 66.