Article II. On Numerical Distinction

It is certain that sins which are distinguished specifically are much more still distinguished in number; wherefore here it is asked only in what way the numerical distinction of sins within the same species is known.

Rule I. The numerical distinction of sins is taken from the diversity of total objects, or objects morally diverse. The reason is that the object, as St. Thomas teaches, is in some way the form of the act; and therefore it necessarily brings it about that the act is such as the object itself is. Therefore where there are several objects in number in the genus of morals, there are several acts in number in the same genus; where there is one object, the act is reputed to be one. Therefore there are as many sins as there are total objects. Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, q. 18, art. 2. - St. Alphonsus, n. 36. - But in the present matter we call that object total which either by its own nature so effects one moral thing that it is neither a part of another, nor is referred to another which completes it; or, if it can be referred to another as a part or complement, is not so intended by the one acting. Thus one total object is had in completed copulation, one likewise in a wound inflicted with the intention only of wounding; and therefore one and the same object, when by its nature it is not total, can be or not be total according to the varied manner in which it is intended.

Rule II. The numerical distinction of sins is also taken from the multiplicity of acts morally interrupted. For when acts of the will are morally interrupted, the individual acts become complete in themselves, nor can the following act be called a continuation of the preceding. Thus he who, on several occasions morally interrupted, strikes another or steals, commits as many sins as there are strikes or thefts, because these constitute so many diverse acts. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 36.

But acts of the will are interrupted in a threefold way, namely: 1st. By retraction or express revocation of the will, because this prevents the later act from being joined with the former, for example, if someone retracts an evil will of acting badly, and afterward resumes it. 2nd. By voluntary cessation from the act, or by application of the mind to a diverse object, for example, if someone freely ceases from an evil purpose, and then returns to it. 3rd. By a sufficiently notable involuntary cessation, regard being had to the nature of the act, according to the judgment of prudent persons, for example, through sleep, distraction, occupation, etc.

But in order that these principles may be applied more easily, the following things must be kept before the eyes.

1st. Merely internal acts, which have no order to an exterior effect, for the most part are morally completed as soon as they are physically interrupted, and therefore of themselves are multiplied as many times as they are physically interrupted. The reason is that such acts, because of their simplicity both on the part of the object and on the part of the will itself, and because of the lack of any exterior effect in which they agree, speaking of themselves, are not morally continued, nor do they coalesce into one, since they have nothing, neither in themselves nor in another, by which they may be united with each other. Hence the penitent ought in confession to express, if he can, how many times he adhered to an internal temptation; but if he cannot, let him say approximately; or at least whether he gave consent very frequently during the course of the day. - I said of itself or for the most part that the matter is so, because if sometimes several acts of this kind proceed from the same impulse of passion, they will constitute one mortal sin, although some brief interval may have intervened between the acts. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 37.

2nd. Internal acts with the purpose of placing an external action are multiplied as many times as the evil purpose is formally renewed, that is, as many times as through retraction or voluntary cessation it ceases to be, and afterward is assumed anew: for then the later act cannot be judged morally a continuation of the prior, and a new act of the will formally distinct intervenes. But if it ceases through involuntary cessation, it is judged to persevere virtually for some time, but not always and indefinitely, and therefore, when it is again assumed, it is not held as morally interrupted, provided that too long an interval of time has not intervened. But what such an interval ought to be can be defined only by the judgment of wise persons. For the same purpose endures for a greater or lesser time according to the varying intensity, and also according to the varying circumstances of persons, age, sex, disposition, etc. St. Alphonsus thinks that the impulse of one act, ordinarily speaking, can with difficulty be prolonged for more than two or three days. Hence, he says, one who so perseveres virtually in an evil will beyond two or three days ought in confession to explain the time, so that thus the number of internal acts concerning external sins may be understood morally. - Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 138.

3rd. External acts, or acts externally consummated, are multiplied as many times as the object is disparate, or terminated in itself; but they are not multiplied, even when a notable interval of time has been interposed, when they are as it were parts of a more principal act, or when they tend to one end. The reason is that then they effect one moral thing, which is not completed unless the principally intended act has been consummated. Thus he who has determined to perpetrate theft commits one sin, although through several days he has thought about it, has renewed the evil purpose more often, has undertaken a way to this, has sought an opportune time, etc.; for the prior act of the will is judged to persevere virtually in that very effect or external work. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 40.

You Will Resolve. 1st. He commits one sin who, intending fornication, touches a woman basely, kisses her, entices her by base conversations, and at last fornicates; for all those previous acts are ordered to consummating the act. But if from the beginning he had willed only to touch the woman, and afterward, induced by lust, completed copulation, there will be a twofold sin, and therefore it will not be enough if he confesses only the copulation. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 43.

2nd. A priest who wills to omit the whole Office on one day makes one sin, because the individual Hours on one side bespeak an order to completing one Office, and on the other their omissions are intended after the manner of one thing. But he would make two sins who first had willed only to omit Matins, and afterward refused to recite the remaining Hours, because there would be a twofold act of evil will plainly distinct.

3rd. He perpetrates one sin who, from the same impulse of passion, repeats an evil act many times, for example, several times basely touches himself or another, even with some interruption; several times strikes an enemy, or imprecates very many evils upon him, etc.; for there is one evil affection of the will, and those various actions are morally united. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 50.

4th. He makes one sin who denies several articles of faith at the same time, because the motive of faith is one; therefore he is equally an unbeliever who denies one article and he who denies all. - Likewise probably he makes one sin who by the same act blasphemes the twelve Apostles; because all blasphemies against the Saints take their malice from one relation to God. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 47.

5th. He makes one sin who, intending to steal some determined sum of money, takes it away on several occasions lest he be detected, because there is one evil act of the will, which is consummated in the last theft. On the contrary, he perpetrates several sins who on several occasions steals from the same mass of money, without having determined from the beginning to carry off the whole, because the individual thefts effect an object total in itself. - Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 141.

6th. He makes several sins who fornicates several times with the same woman; for each fornication is terminated in itself, or constitutes a total object by its own nature. - The same must be said concerning diverse pollutions. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 46.

Question 1. Whether one sin or several sins are committed by one who by one act detracts from an entire religious community, or by one blow kills several men, or snatches a purse belonging to several associates?

Response. It is greatly controverted: according to St. Alphonsus and many others, several sins are committed in these cases, both because the rights of several are violated, and because detraction, a blow, or theft of this kind is virtually multiple in the judgment of prudent persons. - But many others, and theologians of great note, probably hold that only one sin is committed, because there is one act of the will, one account by which that multiple object is apprehended, and one external manifestation of the malice of the will. But to the reason taken from the violation of the rights of several, they respond that when someone does not obey different superiors commanding the same thing, he certainly commits one sin, although he violates the rights of several. - A fortiori the same Doctors teach that one sin is committed when, by one act of the will, one tends ineffectively to several objects apprehended after the manner of one thing, for example, if someone by one act should desire several women by simple affection or complacency. But in the case of an efficacious purpose of perpetrating something which would have to be reached by diverse external acts, there would be several sins; and therefore he would sin several times who efficaciously willed to omit several fasts, to approach several women, or the same woman several times. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 45. - Lacroix, n. 149. - Baller., note (b), p. 141.

Question 2. Does he make several sins who detracts before several persons?

Response. Probably he makes only one sin, because to detract before several persons is only an aggravating circumstance: for the right to reputation is one among all, not multiple. Wherefore, practically speaking, there is no obligation of explaining in confession the number of persons before whom someone has detracted, but it suffices to say: I detracted before several persons. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 49.

Question 3. Must the means employed for sinning be explained in confession, if the sin afterward was not consummated?

Response. Some affirm this, even if those means were not evil in themselves, as to undertake the journey, to carry a ladder for theft, etc., and their reason is that the sin then does not remain only internal, but becomes external by those means. For those actions, although they are indifferent in themselves, nevertheless become evil from the evil end.

But others probably deny it, unless those means are evil in themselves; in which case they ought to be indicated, and indeed all of them if they are diverse in species, as touches or obscene words employed for soliciting. Indeed others say that the means are not necessarily to be explained even when they are evil in themselves and diverse in species; but that it suffices if the sinner accuses himself thus, for example, I willed to commit fornication, but although I employed certain means, I could not. - Cf. D'Annibale, 1, n. 287, n. 15. - De Lugo, De Poenit., n. 566. - Varceno, vol. 1, p. 259. - Baller., note (b), p. 143.

Question 4. Does he commit several sins who wishes several diverse evils upon an enemy?

Response. Affirmatively, of itself, if the intention of the one imprecating is borne determinately to evils of diverse species, for example, infamy and death; because desire takes its species from the desired object, as will be said below. But by accident there would be one sin, namely when these diverse evils are apprehended almost under the general account of evil, as means to ruin; which is accustomed to happen when imprecations proceed from an impulse of anger. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 50; and Hom. Ap., n. 65.