Article II. On the Obligation and Effects of Betrothals

I say 1°. Betrothals introduce a grave obligation from justice to enter Marriage at the determined time, if any has been determined; but if no time has been fixed beforehand, as soon as one party reasonably demands it. The reason is that betrothals are a true bilateral contract concerning matter certainly grave. Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 845.

I say 2°. Betrothals introduce no impediment. Indeed, by a promise of marriage, although it is valid and no just cause excuses from fulfilling the same, no action is given for seeking the celebration of marriage; yet one is given for the reparation of damages, if any is owed (Can. 1017, § 3). The reason is lest perhaps something worse happen from this, namely that someone marry such a one whom he holds in hatred; therefore the betrothed are to be admonished and led by all means to observe the faith given, but they are not to be compelled, because compulsions are accustomed to have difficult outcomes. But if they have suffered damages, an action is given to them for reparation, but not for seeking the celebration of marriage. This canon protects the due liberty of wedlock and, at the same time, the party faithful to the promise. Therefore, when a valid promise is had, the betrothed are indeed bound in the internal forum to stand by the promises, but no impediment any longer exists, whether impeding or diriment.

Question 1. If someone has contracted betrothals with two women and has sinned with the second, which one ought he to marry?

Resp. Certainly he ought to marry the first, if the second, when she contracted, was conscious of the prior betrothals, because then she could not give true consent; but if she was not conscious, then some theologians only probably say that Marriage must be contracted with the second, on account of the damage which otherwise would come to her. But this reason makes only some probability; and therefore, just as the first betrothed woman is to be induced, but not obliged, to yield concerning her right if the other is going to suffer grave damage from defloration, so the betrothed man who altogether wished to marry the second, when she was not conscious of the prior promise, could not certainly be obliged to marry the first. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 848.

Question 2. Ought a betrothed woman to return gifts accepted from the betrothed man, if Marriage does not follow?

Resp. Negatively, if the gifts were given absolutely, for example, to conciliate benevolence or something else of this kind, because then their ownership was irrevocably transferred by the betrothed man. But if the gifts were accepted only conditionally, that is, in view of Marriage, then again one must answer negatively if the betrothals are dissolved through the fault of the betrothed man; but affirmatively, speaking of itself, if they are dissolved without his fault. The reason for the negation is that the betrothed man, by culpably withdrawing from the promise, is deservedly deemed to incur the loss of these gifts. But the reason for the affirmation is that, the condition not having been verified, the title by which those gifts can be retained fails. - I said speaking of itself, because if, considering the condition of the betrothed man, the gifts are of small importance, and he does not reclaim them, he is deemed to remit them. Gifts given in view of Marriage differ from earnest-money, insofar as these are a pledge of fulfilling the promised thing, but the former are conditional largesses; and therefore, once Marriage has followed, the earnest-money must indeed be restored, but not the gifts. - Cf. Baller. note (a), p. 689.

Question 3. Is the placement of some penalty by way of a fine against one withdrawing from betrothals licit and valid?

Resp. Negatively, if a penalty of this kind is placed against one withdrawing justly, because then it would of itself diminish the liberty of future Marriage, and therefore would be against natural right. But if this penalty is placed against one withdrawing unjustly, it is disputed among theologians. It is also disputed whether, if the penalty added has already been paid, the one who received the payment of the money is bound to restitution. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 853.