Article III. The System of Probabilism is Vindicated

Probabilism, as was observed above, is applied not to all cases, but only to those cases in which there is discussion of the licit and the illicit; for if there is question of obtaining some necessary end, for example, of procuring the matter or form of some sacrament, one must always flee to the safer part, any probability whatsoever being set aside. Besides, it must be noted that in the application or use of probabilism two essential conditions are required, one which regards the remote foundation, but the other which regards the proximate foundation upon which the probabilist relies while acting. The remote foundation is probability itself, which ought to be not slight, not doubtful, not apparent, but true and solid. But the proximate foundation is some reflex principle, and this must always be invoked by the one operating, either explicitly or implicitly. These things, which are the compendium of the whole system, are explained more fully in the following twofold proposition.

Proposition I. It is not licit to follow a probable opinion, nor a more probable one, the safer having been left aside, whenever there is present an absolute obligation of efficaciously obtaining some determinate end, which the use of a probably unfit means would bring into danger; therefore then the safer part must be followed.

Proof. Whoever is driven by an absolute obligation to efficaciously obtain some determinate end, he is bound to choose those means by which he will be about to attain that end in the more efficacious way in which he can. But by the safer part alone can the end be more efficaciously obtained: for from the hypothesis, a means only probably apt brings into danger the end which I am bound absolutely to attain. Therefore it is not licit to use a means only probably apt, but more apt means and the same safer means are to be chosen. Therefore the safer part must be followed. Hence the following are deduced.

Corollaries. 1st. In those things which are necessary for salvation by necessity of means, you are bound to follow what is safer; for the most grave obligation presses each one to attain certainly the eternal salvation of his soul; therefore absolutely safe and certain means are to be applied. Therefore in matters pertaining to faith or to true religion, the opposite probability being put after, the safer opinion must necessarily be followed.

2nd. A hunter, fearing lest by discharging lead at a wild animal he perhaps wound some man, cannot fire, even if he should think it more probable that danger is absent; for this danger, if perhaps it is present, cannot be removed by a contrary probability, even a greater one. For he is bound by a certain law to remove even the probable danger of harm.

3rd. The physician and the surgeon are bound to apply the safer medicines and means which here and now can be had; because by a tacit contract they have obligated themselves to obtaining the end more securely, insofar as can be done. The same likewise must be said concerning all others who have contracted some obligation of this sort toward their neighbor.

4th. The minister of a sacrament, where there is question of its validity, unless the defect is supplied by the Church, or a case of necessity presses, is bound to follow the safer part, insofar as he can, the less safe probable or even more probable opinion having been left aside; because otherwise he would expose the sacrament to the danger of nullity, and his neighbor to the danger of spiritual harm. Hence the following proposition was deservedly condemned by Innocent XI: "It is not illicit, in conferring the sacraments, to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the sacrament, the safer having been left aside."

I said, 1st, unless the defect is supplied by the Church; for sometimes the Church can and is judged to supply that which is wanting for the validity of the sacrament: and this can indeed happen in two sacraments, namely in the sacrament of Penance, if for a grave reason it is conferred with doubtful jurisdiction, or with probable jurisdiction; and in the sacrament of Matrimony, when it is celebrated with a doubtful impediment of ecclesiastical law, or also when the delegation of the assisting priest is doubtful, as will be said in its own place.

I said, 2nd, unless a case of necessity presses, because since the sacraments are for men, they are to be ministered to a man constituted in grave danger of life in the better way in which it can be done, even with mere probability, indeed with slight and most slight probability concerning their validity. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 43-49.

Proposition II. It is licit to follow an opinion truly and solidly probable, the safer having been left aside, which is at the same time more probable, where there is question of the licit or illicit alone.

Proof, 1st, From Reason. A law against which true and solid probability militates is not a certain law; but a law which is not certain induces no obligation. Therefore a law against which true and solid probability militates induces no obligation, and therefore it is then free to each one, that law not certain having been left aside, to follow the opinion favoring liberty. The major is most openly clear from this, that probability and certainty necessarily exclude one another: therefore either the hypothesis is not verified, namely that true and solid probability in fact militates against some law in particular; or if the matter so stands, that law cannot be certain. But the minor is proved from this, that the effect cannot surpass the cause; but it would surpass it, if the binding produced by some law were certain when the force of binding is not certain. But this is most beautifully illustrated by St. Thomas by the following comparison: "The command of someone governing stands toward binding in voluntary matters, in that mode of binding which can happen to the will, as corporeal action stands toward binding corporeal things. But the corporeal action of an agent never induces necessity into another thing except through the contact of the coercion itself with the thing upon which it acts. Hence neither is anyone bound from the command of some lord, unless the command reaches him to whom it is commanded. But it reaches him through knowledge." These words of the Angelic Doctor having been related, St. Alphonsus thus continues: "The likeness brought forward here by St. Thomas cannot be more lucid and convincing for proving our sentence or principle, namely that an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation. The holy Doctor says that knowledge of the precept is like a bond which binds the will; hence, just as for binding some thing there is need that a cord actually be applied, so for binding the will of man, so that he is bound to exercise or omit some action, it is necessary that he have knowledge of the precept; otherwise that man remains in his liberty.... Therefore, just as he who is not actually bound by some bond has the power of turning aside where he wills, so he who is not bound through knowledge of the precept is free from the obligation of the precept." Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 90, art. 4; 2-2, q. 1, art. 4; QQ. DD. De Veritate, q. 17, art. 3. - St. Alphonsus, Systema Mor., §§ 1 and seq.

Nor should you say, 1st, that under the name of knowledge here, in each holy Doctor, there is not understood certain cognition, but only probable cognition; for St. Alphonsus responds "that this would be a new meaning of a new vocabulary, while all philosophers with the same St. Thomas distinguish opinion from knowledge, which is taken as certain cognition of some truth." Cf. St. Alphonsus, Syst. Mor., § 2, Objic. 1.

Nor should you say, 2nd, that, the law which directly obliges being lacking, there exists another indirect law, which, as certain, produces a certain obligation. For if such a law could be feigned, it would either be a law of avoiding the danger of sinning, or a law of following what is safer; moreover neither can be said. Not the first, for in order that someone expose himself to the danger of sinning, it is not enough that he incur the danger of acting against the law, but it is required that he undergo the danger of acting against an obligation imposed upon him by the law; for although perhaps a law exists, if from elsewhere it is certain that I am not obligated by the law, it is not to be feared lest I formally violate the law. Nor can the other be said, for that law of following what is safer would suppose that it is not simply safe to set aside a law probably not existing; but this is false where there is question of the licit or illicit alone, for it is indeed safe to avoid formal sin and the danger of sin. Besides, the objection, if it has any force, can very well be turned back against the probabiliorists who urge it. For the probabiliorist will neither avoid the danger of sinning, nor follow what is safer, unless he practically says farewell to his own system and falls into absolute tutiorism.

Proof, 2nd, From Authority. For (a) St. Gregory Nazianzen thus urges a certain Novatian: "Do you give to young widows, on account of the slipperiness of age, the power of entering marriage? But Paul by no means doubted to do this.... But, you say, this by no means after baptism. By what argument do you confirm this? Either prove that the matter so stands, or if you cannot do this, do not condemn. But if the matter is doubtful, let humanity and ease prevail." Orat. 39, in Sancta Lumina, n. 19.

(b) St. Jerome, reproved by Chrysogonus, the disciple of Rufinus, because he taught that those who had successively taken two wives, one before, the other after baptism, could be promoted to the Episcopate, responds: "Let him hear us again proclaiming: the old Adam dies wholly in the laver, and the new is raised with Christ in baptism.... We say these things not because we ourselves, Christ being propitious, are held by this question; but having been asked by brothers what seemed to us, we have responded, prejudging no one from following what he wills, nor overturning the decree of another by our sentence." Apolog. advers. Rufin., lib. 1.

(c) St. Bonaventure, treating of the dispensation of vows, recounts three sentences or opinions, and finally concludes: "Which of these three opinions is truer, I confess that I do not know, and any of them can sufficiently be sustained; yet if someone wishes to accept this last one, no manifest inconvenience occurs to him." In 4, dist. 38, a. 2, q. 3.

(d) St. Antoninus, after he had established that only two things are required for the honesty of an action: first, that the agent not doubt practically about the goodness of the act; the other, that the sentence which he follows is not against the express authority of Sacred Scripture, nor against the determination of the Catholic Church, descending to a particular case says: "If it were said that here there is usury, and usury is against the decalogue, it is answered: that usury is against the precepts of the decalogue is true reductively; but that this contract is usurious is not clear, since wise men think things contrary to one another in matters of this sort." Summa, p. 1, tit. 3, cap. 10, § 10, reg. 4; and p. 2, tit. 1, c. 11, § 28.

(e) Melchior Cano, attacking Scotus who said that sinners are bound to elicit contrition on every feast day, writes thus: "There is no human or evangelical law by which this precept is asserted; let them bring it forth, and we shall be silent." And again: "Since I do not know whence those doctors have come to this opinion, I can freely deny what is not sufficiently ascertained as precept." Relect. 4, de poen., p. 4, q. 2, prop. 3.

(f) Dominic Soto requires that a man look upon the law, namely so that he know it as certain: "He who uses a rule must look upon it." And again: "When there are probable opinions among grave doctors, whichever you follow, you have your conscience in safety." De just. et jur., lib. 1, q. 1, a. 4; and lib. 6, q. 1, art. 6. Cf. Bouquillon, n. 298 and seq.

Nor should you say, 1st, that probabilism is something recent, and therefore that it is not licit to recur to the authority of the ancient Fathers and scholastics; for it is answered that two things are to be distinguished in the system of probabilism, namely its use founded upon its substantial foundation, and its scientific form. Moreover, whatever may be the case concerning the latter, it suffices for the force of the argument to show that the former is most ancient in the Church of God; and this is clear not only from the cited texts and many others which can be cited, but also from this, that when in the year 1577 Bartholomew Medina proposed to the schools the doctrine of probabilism reduced scientifically into a system, no one cried out against it as something new, but it seemed to all altogether conformable to the rule of morals, and was received by unanimous consent.

Nor should you say, 2nd, that probabilism lay as if dead in the middle of the seventeenth century, and throughout the whole following century; for it is answered that that death, which the adversaries boast of, was finally nothing other than a diminution of splendor, and that this must be owed entirely to the frauds, reproaches, and outcries of the Jansenists. But if it is certain that many truths have sometimes been somewhat obscured by the force and pertinacity of adversaries, what wonder if the same happened to probabilism? But in these our days, if the schools diffused throughout the whole world are inspected, in most of them will be found the doctrine of probabilism handed down and defended, which, the Jansenistic outcries having been stilled and the heresy overcome, chiefly by the work of St. Alphonsus, today enjoys new honor and new patronage. Cf. Bouquillon, nn. 300 and seq.

Proof, 3rd, From Consequences. For if, probabilism having been rejected, we were bound to follow probabiliorism,

(a) There would follow a difficulty too grave for confessors, and one so great that the office of hearing confessions would be altogether intolerable for many. For the confessor would perpetually expose himself to the danger of sinning on account of defect of sufficient diligence in weighing the various degrees of probability, especially in the matter of restitution, when from two probable opinions he would follow one. For if he should assume the more benign sentence, he would sin by permitting that in which he would apprehend a deformity probably existing; but if he should act according to the more rigid sentence, he would sin by imposing an uncertain yoke upon the penitent. Besides, although the more rigid sentence may appear to him more probable, when will he be certain that it is truly such, and that the opposite does not seem more probable to another confessor? Hence follows also that contradiction of confessors who, although professing probabiliorism, nevertheless not rarely keep saying that in the administration of the sacrament of Penance they cannot rigorously apply the principles of probabiliorism; and therefore they hold one thing in theory, but another altogether opposite in practice. Would it not be better to establish and admit milder principles with so many most wise Doctors, and to bring them into practice more exactly?

(b) There would follow a most troublesome difficulty for the faithful. For in doubts there would be imposed upon them the obligation of inquiring which opinion is more probable; for the obligation of operating according to the more probable necessarily includes the duty of inquiring into it. But for the most part there is given a moral impossibility of distinguishing between the more probable and the less probable; for even for the learned this is very often quite difficult. And indeed I ask whether I am bound to what is more probable in itself, or absolutely, or with respect to me, or relatively? If the former, whence shall I know it? If the latter, again there is question either of intrinsic probability or extrinsic probability. If of the latter, what school is to be followed? And what Doctors are to be asked? If of the former, the difficulty increases: whence shall I know whether I am sufficiently fit for this judgment? Whether I am living in invincible ignorance, or not? Therefore, uncertain and pressed by doubts, what shall I do? Shall I recur to teachers? But from the hypothesis, it is mine to judge. Therefore it becomes manifest how many and how great anxieties would hang over the faithful from that necessity of following what is more probable or safer.

(c) There would follow a perpetual fluctuation of doctrine. For this is clear not only from the daily experience of probabiliorists, but also from the very nature of probabiliorism; since, the obligation of following the opinion which appears more probable to each one having been posited, it is impossible that several probabiliorists agree in the same decision. Wherefore some will necessarily stand for the affirmative part, and others for the negative: one will bind, another will loose, and what will appear more probable to you will very easily seem equally or less probable to another. Hence there will follow confusion of decisions, perplexity of the faithful, and anxieties of the confessors themselves, who from some supposed excess of probability will impose most grave obligations. But probabilism well understood lacks inconveniences of this sort, at least for the most part. For only two things are to be weighed by probabilists, namely certain obligations and merely probable obligations. But although it is not always clear concerning true probability, nevertheless no one fails to see that, ordinarily speaking, it is much easier to discern whether a solid reason or authority is had against the law, than to bring forth a judgment concerning some excess of probability. Therefore.

Nor should you say, 1st, that probabilists are oppressed by greater inconveniences, not only because they love danger, which is against that saying of Ecclus. iii, 27: "He who loves danger will perish in it," but also because they lack a true word or directive principle, which is against that saying of Ecclus. xxxvii, 20: "Before all your works let a true word go before you"; for it is answered that the true word among us is the reflex principle itself, which, since it produces practical certainty, means that we incur no danger of formally sinning. Besides, each text can very well be turned back against the probabiliorists who object them, unless they wish to flee to condemned tutiorism.

Nor should you say, 2nd, that against probabilists that well-known rule of canon law can be urged: "In doubts the safer part is to be chosen"; for besides the fact that the argument could again be turned back, it is answered that in the aforesaid rule there is question either of practical doubt, or of cases in which some end must necessarily be obtained.

Nor should you say, 3rd, that probabilists can be accused of imprudence, because, not choosing the more truthlike opinion, they do not imitate those prudent physicians who seriously strive to drive out diseases of the body; for in no way can he be called imprudent who, the obligation having been weighed, acts after he has seen certainly that no deformity is found in his action. But to the example it is answered that it is not to the point, for the physician, just as also the judge, does not deal with the licit or illicit, but the first seeks the efficacy of the means, and the other the truth of the matter; and these two do not depend upon some reflex principle.

Nor should anyone object, 4th, that the more probable opinion must be embraced as being nearer to truth; for a greater or lesser approach of two contradictory propositions is ineptly asserted in relation to truth, since one is true and the other false; but which is true, which false, we do not know. There is indeed a greater appearance of truth in one than in the other; assent can be given to each, but to neither without fear. Indeed truth can stand on the part of the less probable; and therefore the assent given is not necessary. And although it is licit to embrace the more probable, the obligation of embracing it is not to be affirmed; it is licit also to embrace the less but truly probable, because there is present a grave reason and one worthy of assent. Nor should anyone say that this is repugnant: it is indeed repugnant in evident matters in which the intellect necessarily assents, but not in merely probable matters in which the will determines the mind to assenting.

Nor does it suffice, 5th, that there are more probable reasons for someone to assert that this obligation of the law is imposed upon us, because as long as there is had only that greater probability in favor of the obligation, this obligation can exist or not exist, and therefore it is not known. "What is known," as the Angelic says, "cannot possibly be otherwise." Hence, while the solid probability of the contradictory opinion remains, the obligation cannot be imposed; for it is unknown. And an unknown obligation is to be held as none for this subject. Moreover, an object cannot truly be called necessary when it is not known whether it is such or not. Namely, the force of law consists in this, that it imposes necessity upon some object in order to the will; and surely when a twofold opposed probable opinion is had, this very necessity remains uncertain, and therefore the object itself, as necessary, cannot be proposed to the will.

6th. We certainly ought by every human effort to tend toward the agreement of our acts with their norm, and hence with truly reasonable diligence to inquire what the law itself is; we ought also to be prepared to fulfill the known law itself. For to these things we are obligated by nature itself. Namely, objective obligation is the effect of an existing objective law; but subjective obligation is the effect of law existing in the mind: but known law is law existing in the mind, and hence subjective obligation is the effect of known law, but not of unknown law. But law is unknown when opposed probable opinions concerning it are had. Therefore there is no subjective obligation in the case: or, an uncertain obligation is none. Therefore we are bound to conform our acts with their known norm, but not with an unknown norm.

Nor did the Decree of Innocent XI given on 26 June 1680 condemn probabilism, although many have asserted this. The genuine text of this Decree was at last published on 19 April 1902 by the secretary of the Holy Office: "A report having been made by Father Laurea of the contents in the letters of Father Thyrsus Gonzalez of the Society of Jesus directed to our Most Holy Lord, the Eminent Lords said: that it should be written through the Secretary of State to the Apostolic Nuncio of Spain, that he signify to the said Father Thyrsus, that His Holiness, his letters having been kindly received and read not without praise, has commanded that he freely and intrepidly preach, teach, and defend with the pen the more probable opinion, and also vigorously attack the sentence of those who assert that, in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one thus known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable, and that he make him certain that whatever he will have done and written in favor of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness. Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus, by order of His Holiness, that he not only permit the Fathers of the Society to write for the more probable opinion and to attack the sentence of those asserting that, in the concurrence of the less probable with the more probable thus known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable; but also that he write to all the Universities of the Society that the mind of His Holiness is that each one, according as it shall please him, write freely for the more probable opinion and attack the aforesaid contrary one, and command them that they submit themselves altogether to the mandate of His Holiness." It is added in the exemplar of the Holy Office on 8 July 1690: "The aforesaid Order of His Holiness having been announced to the Father General of the Society of Jesus through the Assessor, he responds that in all things he will obey as quickly as possible, although neither by himself nor by his Predecessors had it ever been forbidden to write for the more probable opinion and to teach it."

The decree itself contains a singular and private mandate, 1st, to Father Thyrsus, that he himself freely and intrepidly preach, teach... the more probable opinion, etc.; 2nd, to the Father General of the Society, both that he permit the same to the Fathers of the Society and that he write to the Universities of the Society that the mind of His Holiness is that each one, according as it shall please him, write freely for the more probable opinion, etc. The difficulty arises especially from the second part. Namely, seriously and constantly the Supreme Pontiff desired that in the Society of Jesus there be full liberty for teaching that it is not licit to follow a sentence favoring liberty against the law, unless the one operating should first prudently and probably persuade himself that it is true and not contrary to the eternal law, which persuasion he will never be able to have unless by authority and reason, or by both together, it is clearly more truthlike to him that the matter is licit and permitted by divine law. From the order of His Holiness, liberty was conceded to the Fathers of the Society of defending the more probable sentence: "each one, according as it shall please him, write freely."

This father, when he was a subject, was wholly intent on this: that he persuade the superiors "that it was expedient for the Society that in its schools," I use his own words, "each sentence be read indifferently," probabilism and anti-probabilism (Monumenta ad Gonzalezii Fundamentum, p. 216); that they should "leave free to the Fathers to hand down that" sentence of the Probabilists "or the opposite" (ibid., p. 214); "lest the Society should undertake to defend that" probabilistic sentence "by common studies" (ibid., p. 214). The liberty conceded removed an obligation, if any had ever existed, not of defending the more probable opinion; it did not impose an obligation of defending it; it removed the obligation of defending probabilism, but not the liberty of defending it. Thus the Society itself understood the Order of His Holiness when it established the 18th Congregation, decree 12, by force of which it is clear that the Society neither prohibited nor prohibits defending the sentence contrary to this: "in acting it is licit to follow a less probable opinion favoring liberty, the more probable standing for the precept having been left aside." Indeed, if the decree of Innocent XI had condemned probabilism, Father Gonzalez, exercising the supreme office in the Society, could not have written these things in his book concerning the right use of probable opinions: "But I do not publish this treatise as the General Superior of the Society of Jesus, but as one theologian from the Society: intending to bind none of my subjects to teaching thus, but leaving full liberty to all, so that in this most grave controversy they may defend that part which, after accurate study undertaken from a sincere desire of finding the truth, they have found to rest upon more solid foundations." Fundamentum Theologiae Moralis, Rome, year 1694, p. xv, n. 41.

Add, if this decree had transfixed probabilism, it also transfixed no less equiprobabilism. Probabiliorism, confirmed in it, is the system of Father Gonzalez, who admitted that "the limitation applied by Father Esparza, by Father Terillo," and by certain others to the licit use of the less safe opinion in the occurrence of the safer "is indeed necessary and very useful for restraining the abuse of probable opinions; nevertheless it does not suffice; and further I inferred," thus he continues, "that it is permitted to no one to embrace the less safe sentence in the occurrence of a safer one equally or almost equally truthlike to him; and therefore for the licit use of the less safe opinion it is altogether necessary that, after diligent inquiry of the truth, it appear to the one operating, apart from passion and fault, sensibly and clearly more truthlike than the opposite, and for this reason be judged by him true by an absolute determinative judgment" (ibid., XII, n. 36); "indeed it is required," as he afterwards says, n. 38, "that it be notably and clearly and manifestly more truthlike: for since a little is reputed as nothing, if the excess of truthlikeness is slight, morally those opinions will be equal; and then he will not be able prudently to judge that the contract is licit." In the seventh Dissertation the same Father Thyrsus investigates: "Whether it is licit to follow a probable opinion favoring liberty, in the occurrence of an equally probable opinion standing for the precept?" Concerning the affirming sentence he says: "I judge it false, and the negative true and altogether to be held" (ibid., p. 134, n. 2), which negative he indeed attempts both to prove and to defend from objections through very many pages. Besides, it must be noted that "no reflection can make it licit to follow a less safe opinion which someone knows to be directly less probable by authority and reason" (p. 124). The probabiliorism of Father Thyrsus rejects both probabilism and equiprobabilism, and the favor shown to Father Thyrsus must be said to transfix this no less than that, if it destroyed any system. The more benign sentence at that time was not only the doctrine of very many authors of the Society, but also of almost all sacred religious orders and universities, a few doctors excepted. Concerning it Father Segneri, on 8 June 1692, wrote to Father Gonzalez: "The whole Roman Curia in more than a hundred affairs is directed by this ancient sentence; whence to condemn this it would be necessary to turn the world upside down." A splendid example of this practice of the Roman Curia exists in the responses of the Holy Office made on 11 February 1661 concerning the obligation of denouncing soliciting confessors. The solution is given according to the probability of the sentence denying that the obligation exists; namely, where the denying sentence is probable, the confessor is not to be denounced; but where this sentence is not probable, he is to be denounced. Let the examples be: The lord qualifiers judged that he was to be denounced, and that the negative opinion was not probable, 1. 5. 8. 9. 13.; that he was to be denounced, the contrary opinion being rejected, which they judged not to be probable, 2.; that he was to be denounced and that the contrary opinion was not probable, 3.; but in other cases: if the solicitation is made outside the place of confession and without pretext of confession, they judged that the negative opinion was probable; otherwise if in the confessional, or in the place of confession, 4.; they judged that the negative opinion did not lack probability, 6. 7. 14. 15.; as to each article, they judged that the negative opinion was probable, 10.; they judged that the negative opinion was probable, 11.; they judged that if that praise is serious and has no scent of depraved intention, the negative opinion is probable. But if otherwise, it is not probable, 12. 16. And Urban VIII, when a certain faculty was requested by Lugo for a Missionary in Paraguay, said: Respond to Lugo that a need for his special faculty does not seem to him to exist; but where the sentences of doctors on both sides would intervene as probable, they should follow the opinions more favorable to the Barbarians according to the condition of places and men.

Corollary. If it is licit to follow a solidly probable opinion favoring liberty, a fortiori it will be licit for you to follow the more probable or most probable opinion, provided that, relying proximately upon some reflex principle, you form for yourself a certain conscience. Nevertheless one must beware lest the burden of favoring liberty only in that case in which this appears more probable or most probable be imposed also upon others, according to that saying of Chrysostom related by St. Alphonsus: "concerning your own life be austere; concerning another's, benign." Moreover, this is the sense in which several probabilists affirm that it is licit to follow probabiliorism. It is likewise licit to use equiprobabilism; but if someone wished to impose that system as such upon both confessors and penitents, all the arguments brought above would have to be solved by him, which have force no less against equiprobabilists than against probabiliorists.