Article IV. In What Manner Restitution is to be Made

I say. Generally it is required and it suffices that restitution be made in that manner by which violated justice is repaired fully or to equality. The reason is that the full reparation of justice is the principal end to be obtained in restitution.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. It is not necessary per se that restitution be made openly; indeed often it cannot be done in that manner, when provision must also be made for the reputation and honor of the one restoring.

2nd. It is not necessary that restitution be made by the debtor himself, but it can be done through another, provided that the thing is returned to the owner. Sometimes it can be done through the confessor; nevertheless great caution is then needed, both that the seal of confession remain uninjured and that the penitent learn that the creditor was in reality satisfied, lest any suspicion against the probity of the confessor be able to arise.

3rd. It is not necessary that restitution be made with the owner being aware; because this is not required in order that he be indemnified. Hence the debtor can restore, for example, by increasing weight or measure in selling, or the owed work in laboring, and in six hundred other ways.

4th. Restitution can be made through a simulated donation, because that which is owed is the thing, and it is not required that the debtor externally confess that he is paying. But if the creditor, moved by gratitude, should recompense him with another gift, this would have to be restored, because that donation does not seem fully voluntary and spontaneous. - Cf. Carrière, n. 1265.

Question 1. In what place and at whose expense must restitution be made?

Resp. If the obligation of restoring is from a thing accepted and retained in good faith, restitution is not necessarily to be made in another place than that in which the thing now exists; nor is a debtor of this sort held to send the thing into another place where perhaps the owner now lives. The reason is that he is not held to restore the owner into his former state, from which he did not cast him down by formal injury. But if the obligation of restoring arose from delict, restitution must be made in the place in which the owner would have possessed the thing if it had not been taken away, and this at the debtor's expense. The reason is that the creditor must be kept indemnified and suffer no damage from the iniquity of the debtor, but be restored into his former state. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 677.

Question 2. Whether a debtor from delict must also pay expenses for the thing to be sent to the owner, if those expenses exceed the value of the thing itself?

Resp. Affirmatively, if the excess is not very notable, because both the debtor, by committing injustice, took such a burden upon himself, and the owner is not held to suffer the loss of his own thing. But otherwise it must be said if those expenses were very great with respect to the value of the thing to be sent back. Then, however, from the presumed will of the creditor, restitution would have to be made to the poor. For right reason and charity dictate that the creditor cannot demand that restitution be made to him with any expenses whatsoever. But theologians do not agree how great the loss of the debtor must be, so that he can be excused from making restitution to the owner himself. They hand down this rule rather commonly: When, all things having been weighed, the damage which the debtor will suffer exceeds the damage of the creditor by only double, it is not sufficient that the owner be deprived of his own thing. But if it exceeds this proportion, it suffices that restitution at least be deferred. But according to various circumstances this rule must be modified. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 598. - Lugo, disp. 20, nn. 185 and seq. - Vogler, n. 415.

Question 3. Whether the debtor must restore again, if he sent the debt through a faithful person and it perishes by chance or by the fault of a third party?

Resp. A debtor from possession in good faith is held to nothing; because, fault and pact being excluded, the thing perishes for the owner, who is the creditor himself. Nor is a debtor from contract held to anything, if it is a question of the thing of another existing in nature, accepted as a loan for use or deposit, etc., because the thing perishes for the owner, unless it has been agreed otherwise. It is otherwise if it is a question of a price to be paid, because the debtor preserves dominion over it until it reaches the creditor, and he must answer for the risks of the price transmitted until it is handed into the hands of the same creditor. Finally, a debtor from delict is not freed from restitution and remains bound to it so long as he has not made the owner truly indemnified, because he always remains the culpable cause of the damage which this man suffers. Nevertheless St. Alphonsus does not dare to condemn those excusing a debtor of this sort who sent the thing owed through a confessor.

Except the threefold case in which the debtor is freed from every burden, namely: 1st, if the owner designated the person through whom he wished the thing owed to be sent to himself; 2nd, if the creditor did not indeed choose the person, but left to the debtor the freedom of choosing whomever he wished, provided one prudent and faithful be chosen; 3rd, if this person was designated by the decision of the judge. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 705.

Question 4. In what manner must restitution be made for damages inflicted upon the Republic?

Resp. Restitution must be made through the means constituted by the Government itself, if such are had. Therefore attend to the various laws and customs of places. Among us two modes especially seem more apt. The first is that so great a quantity of paper money or of stamps be destroyed as is equivalent to the money or damaging. The other is that restitution be made to the public treasurer of the general Government or of the particular Government of each State, as the case requires, with the obligation that this be inscribed in some newspaper designated by the debtor himself.

Others also admit that satisfaction is made to the obligation, from the presumed will of the republic, by paying the sum owed to the poor, or to pious causes, or to those damaged by the state itself. - Cf. Bucceroni, n. 1454.