Chapter I. On the Obligation of Restitution

I say. Restitution, namely the reparation of another's right injured in the goods of fortune, if it concerns grave matter, is absolutely necessary for salvation, either in reality, or at least in desire, when here and now it cannot be done. The reason is that restitution of this sort is the one means of repairing injured justice, and consequently of preserving it; but to preserve justice is to preserve the law of God. Therefore.... Wherefore St. Augustine says, epistle 153 to Macedonius: "The sin will not be remitted unless what was taken away is restored, when it can be restored." - But the precept of restoring, according to St. Thomas, is verbally indeed affirmative, but formally negative, and consequently binds at every moment. Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 62, art. 1, 2, and 8.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. If someone cannot restore from goods of the same order, he is not held to restore from goods of a different order, because since no comparison can be made between goods of a different order, neither can compensation be made. Nevertheless by vindicative justice it can be imposed by a judge or by a superior, that someone, for an injury concerning one kind of goods, furnish something in goods of another order; but only by reason of penalty, not indeed by reason of justice. Moreover the injured person has the right of denouncing before a judge him from whom he received injury, and therefore of accepting money from him, in order that he may omit the denunciation; thus, for example, a woman forcibly violated by someone can compel the violator before a judge, or exact money from the scoundrel, in order that she may renounce her right. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 627.

2nd. From an injury to another's right that is affective only there cannot be given an obligation of external and real restitution, because reparation and injury must correspond to each other. Hence an ill-willed judge pronouncing a sentence which he thinks unjust owes nothing to restore, if in reality it is just; or he who snatches a thing which he thinks belongs to another, while it is his very own. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 556.

3rd. He who has inflicted light damage upon his neighbor is held to restitution toward the injured owner under light obligation and with inconvenience proportionate to the thing; for light injustice must be repaired under light obligation, just as grave injustice under grave obligation. Nevertheless there can be a case in which someone is held under grave obligation to restore light matter, namely when a thief has secretly taken what indeed reaches grave matter, but does not exceed it. For then there is not required under grave obligation except restitution of that sum which completes the gravity of the matter, but in itself cannot be grave. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 553.

4th. He is deservedly held unworthy of absolution who refuses at least to promise restitution; who leaves to his heirs the care of restoring, while he can do it by himself; who, burdened with debt, in food, clothing, service ..., undergoes expenses of this sort, on account of which he foresees that afterward he will be unequal to the payment of his debts. The same must be said of him who, enjoying good fortune, does not wish gradually to reduce his state, in order to satisfy his creditors. But concerning him who, having promised twice or thrice that he would restore, in no way stood by his promises, it will belong to a prudent confessor to judge whether restitution is to be demanded before absolution or not.

5th. Nor are they to be absolved who bring forward futile pretexts for deferring restitution, for example, those who are accustomed to say: I shall not bring my goods into the tomb ..., the heirs will restore ..., I shall set down in my testament that restitution is to be made ..., or: I have already instructed my sons that they themselves restore as soon as possible. For they are to be reckoned ill-disposed who do not wish to do here and now whatever they morally can to satisfy their neighbor: 1st, because the precept of restitution urges without ceasing, and the creditor suffers injury, and often also damage, from the delay; 2nd, because poor provision is made for restitution to be made by committing it to heirs, for these likewise can prolong the same to the end of their life; 3rd, because perhaps time for making a testament will be lacking, or, if it is made, perhaps for various causes or pretexts it will also happen that it is not put into execution.

6th. The confessor must act cautiously with the dying who are liable to restitution. But he will be able to proceed thus: 1st. If the penitent seems to be in good faith, and there remains no time for prudently warning him of his obligation, or it is foreseen that the warning will not be profitable, this warning being omitted, he is to be absolved. 2nd. But if fruit from the warning is hoped for, or if the penitent is not in good faith, he will have to be admonished firmly and at the same time sweetly concerning the obligation of restitution, and helped to perform it at once. 3rd. If the obligation is occult and cannot be fulfilled immediately, the sick man will have to be induced to entrust a sum of money to the confessor himself, or rather, if this can be done, to a faithful man, so that afterward it may be secretly committed to the creditor, or to leave that sum to him in his testament, with mention of restitution omitted. 4th. If the obligation is not occult and cannot immediately be fulfilled, let the confessor bring it about that it is certainly cared for by the heirs, whether through a note to be handed to the creditor or in some other manner.