Chapter III. On the Object of Law

The object of law, generally, is whatever law can command or prohibit. Hence the object of law can be all and only those acts whose placing or omission favors the common good.

Concerning the object of law the Supreme Pontiff Leo XIII speaks thus: "Among human laws, some are concerned with that which is good or evil by nature, and command that the one be followed, the other fled from, with the due sanction added": decrees of this sort are by no means derived from human society, but rather precede human society itself and are entirely from the natural law. "Therefore the precepts of natural right, comprehended in the laws of men, have not only the force of human law, but chiefly embrace that much higher and much more august command which proceeds from the law of nature itself and from the eternal law."

"But other prescriptions of the civil power follow not immediately and proximately from natural right, but more remotely and obliquely, and they determine various matters concerning which provision has been made only generally and universally. Thus nature commands citizens to contribute their effort to public tranquility and prosperity; how much effort, in what manner, and in what matters is established not by nature but by the wisdom of men. Now human law properly so called is contained in these particular rules of living, discovered by prudent reason and proposed by legitimate power. This law indeed commands all citizens to work together toward the end proposed to the community, and prohibits them from turning aside; and the same law, insofar as it is attendant upon and consenting to the prescriptions of nature, leads to those things which are honorable and deters from the contrary." "The liberty of those who preside is not placed in this, that they may command rashly and according to desire, which would equally be shameful and joined also with the greatest destruction of the commonwealth; but this ought to be the force of human laws, that they be understood to flow from the eternal law and to sanction nothing which is not contained in it, as in the principle of all right." - Encyclical Letter Libertas.

Question 1. Can acts already placed be the object of law?

Response. Negatively, according to the common axiom: law does not look backward. The reason is that law does not extend itself to past acts by reason of guilt, which, in the absence of law, was none, nor by reason of penalty which follows guilt, nor by reason of rescission, except in some case expressed by law. Besides, that retroaction would induce great disturbance in society. - Cf. Scav. n. 218. The Constitution of the United States is consonant with this; for in art. I, sect. ix, n. 3, it is had: "No ex-post-facto law shall be passed"; and art. I, sect. x, n. 1: "No State shall pass any ex.post-facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts."

Laws regard future things, not past things, unless provision is made in them by name concerning past things (Can. 10).¹

C. 13. X, I. 2. Thus in fact, C. 4. I. 15 in VI extended the canon of the Church not only to future affairs, but also to past and still pending affairs.

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1093, n. 26.

Question 2. Do heroic acts fall under human law?

Response. Generally, and with prior acceptance excluded, they do not seem to fall under law, because they are judged morally to exceed human powers, and therefore a law of this sort could not be called possible. Nor should you say that this reason has equal force for divine law; for when God commands some heroic act, He at the same time gives and strengthens powers through grace. I have said, 1st, generally, because sometimes, when the common good requires it, heroic acts can be commanded by human law; thus, for example, soldiers on guard cannot desert their post even when danger of life is imminent. I have said, 2nd, with prior acceptance excluded, because a precept is not reputed morally impossible for the few who voluntarily receive it; thus, for example, the Church commands perpetual enclosure for Nuns.

77. Question 3. Can human law command merely internal acts?

Response. Civil law certainly cannot, both because it cannot judge concerning internal things, and because without these acts the proper end of that law can be obtained. But it is controverted whether ecclesiastical law can, and the sentence which denies it is more probable, at least extrinsically. - Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 100, art. 9. - St. Alphonsus, n. 100. - Suarez, de Leg. lib. 4, cap. 12.

The same must be said concerning internal acts which are joined accidentally with external acts, as would be, for example, true devotion in giving alms. But those internal acts which are joined with external acts necessarily, whether as form, for example, the consent of the will in contracts, or as cause, for example, the desire of harming in homicide, can indeed fall under human law, but only indirectly. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

Question 4. Do acts indeed external but hidden fall under human law?

Response. Affirmatively, because hidden acts by their nature do not differ from others; and besides, they can be judged by sentence, as hidden heresy which does not escape censure. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

Question 5. Can a confessor enjoin merely internal acts?

Response. Affirmatively, and the reason is both because the office of directing the penitent in the way of salvation demands this, and because the confessor represents Christ Himself and participates in His divine power. - Cf. Voit, n. 163. - Scav. n. 217, and the note to n. 209, Paris edition.